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Abstract
This thesis explores ways in which the reality of Kantor’s existence at a key 
moment in occupied Kraków may be read as directly informing the genesis and 
development of his artistic strategies. It argues for a particular ontological 
understanding of human being that resonates strongly with that implied by 
Kantor in his work and writings.
Most approaches to Kantor have either operated from within a native 
perspective that assumes familiarity with Polish culture and its influences, or, 
from an Anglo-American theatre-history perspective that has tended to focus on 
his larger-scale performance work. This has meant that contextual factors 
informing Kantor’s work as a whole, including his happenings, paintings, and 
writings, as well as his theatrical works, have remained under-explored.
The thesis takes a Heideggerian-hermeneutic approach that foregrounds 
biographical, cultural and aesthetic contexts specific to Kantor, but seemingly 
alien to Anglo-American experience. Kantor’s work is approached from 
Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian perspectives that read the work as a 
world-forming response to these contexts. 
Read in this way, key writings, art and performance works by Kantor are 
revealed to be explorations of existence and human being. Traditional 
ontological distinctions between process and product, painting and 
performance, are problematised through the critique of representation that 
these works and working practices propose.
Kantor is revealed as a metaphysical artist whose work stands as a 
testament to a Heideggerian view of human being as a ‘positive negative’: a 
‘placeholder of nothing’, but a ‘nothing’ that yet ‘is’ …
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 ‘EVEN THE THING I AM ...’:
TADEUSZ KANTOR AND THE POETICS OF BEING
  […] Captain I’ll be no more;
But I will eat and drink, and sleep as soft
As captain shall: simply the thing I am 
Shall make me live. […]
(Parolles, All’s Well That End’s Well IV.iii: 312–315)
Being held out into the nothing—as Dasein is—on 
the ground of concealed anxiety makes the human 
being a lieutenant of the nothing.
(Martin Heidegger, ‘What is Metaphysics?’ 1998e: 
93)
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Introduction
In his discussion of the difference between critique and commentary, in his 
1924-1925 essay on Goethe’s Elective Affinities, Walter Benjamin expresses 
the problem of dealing with an enigmatic subject:
Let us suppose that one makes the acquaintance of a 
person who is handsome and attractive but impenetrable, 
because he carries a secret with him. It would be 
reprehensible to want to pry. Still, it would surely be 
permissible to inquire whether he has any siblings and 
whether their nature could not perhaps explain somewhat 
the enigmatic character of the stranger. In just this way 
critique seeks to discover siblings of the work of art. And 
all genuine works have their siblings in the realm of 
philosophy. It is, after all, precisely these figures in which 
the ideal of philosophy’s problem appears.
(Benjamin 2004c: 333)
It seems to me now, that drama, theatre, or even performance discourses, are 
not true siblings of Kantor’s work. As Kantor maintained, he was primarily an 
artist and the work that he produced was, for him, primarily a work of art in 
whatever form it took. As Benjamin points out, ‘all genuine works [of art] have 
their siblings in the realm of philosophy’ and I argue that Kantor’s work has its 
siblings in the realm of Heideggerian ideas, ideas that on the one hand reach 
back to revise the received interpretations of Aristotle, Plato and the Pre-
Socratics, and on the other hand reach forward as the ground out of which the 
‘continental’ philosophical strands of ‘post-structuralism’ and ‘deconstruction’ 
grew. In particular, one of Martin Heidegger’s ‘accidental’ students, the 
contemporary Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben, has developed a matrix of 
Heideggerian and Benjaminian philosophy that seem to me to resonate with 
Kantor’s work and ideas. These are ideas that raise fundamental questions 
concerning Being and beings, and of a certain sense of the nature of human 
being, the fragile and provisional nature of which is exactly what occurred to me 
on an afternoon in 1999 in Podgórze, a suburb of Kraków, where the German 
occupying force had confined Kraków’s Jewish population in 1941. Standing on 
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the site of the former dividing line that had separated the Jewish ghetto, from 
the side of the street where Kantor was at the time living as part of the Polish 
population was one of the seeds of this thesis. During subsequent trips to 
Kraków in which I researched the Podgórze ghetto and tried to establish 
Kantor’s movements and the reality of Kraków during the occupation, the 
inevitability of an ontological approach became more apparent. Kantor’s 
human-object hybrids, or bio-objects are, in a sense, non-synthetic. Kantor and 
his actors are not ‘speaking through objects’, but rather the reverse: objects 
speak through them. Piles of discarded clothing and possessions, seen in 
grainy black-and-white photographs in the Podgórze ghetto museum, and in the 
capacious vitrines on display in the museum at Auschwitz I, though themselves 
mute, seemed somehow to speak with the eloquent voice of human being. This 
voice, when one pauses to hear it, rises from the very cobbles in the streets of 
Kazimierz, the original Jewish quarter in Kraków, from which the Jews were 
evicted by the Nazis. To make sense of Kantor’s art it is necessary to make 
sense of his relationship with objects and this requires research into the 
relationship between being, not-being and human being; a consideration of life 
and death in abstractio. It was this realisation, on a street on my way between 
Kazimierz and Podgórze, that first led me to Heidegger’s Being and Time, and 
then to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and other philosophical reading, as a parallel to 
my continued reading of Kantor’s work. I now realise that this metaphysical 
questioning of human being is the conceptual basis of Kantor’s crumpled 
umbrellas and clothing, and the tremulous realisations of human being 
performed in works such as The Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole.
Tadeusz Kantor: a brief critical biography
Tadeusz Kantor was born in 1915 in the Galician village of Wielopole-
Skrzyńskie, to the southeast of the city of Kraków in southern Poland in the 
Subcarpathian area. He died in Kraków in 1990. His life therefore almost spans 
the entire twentieth century and all that that has meant for Poland: the Great 
War and its aftermath with the short-lived Second Republic of Polish 
independence (1918–1939); the inferno of the Second World War and German 
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occupation (1939–1945); and the resulting legacy of Yalta when Poland became 
a satellite of the Soviet Union until 1989.1
After starting at the village school in Wielopole, Kantor moved with his 
mother and sister to Tarnów, a provincial town midway between Wielopole and 
Kraków. He graduated from the primary school there and was admitted to the 
Kazimierz Brodziński First Gymnasium where his interest in art flourished. That 
part of southern Poland, Galicia, had been part of the Austro-Hungarian empire 
and the Gymnasium education would, as Pleśniarowicz has noted, still have 
been based on the ‘nineteenth-century philological-classical curriculum’ (2004: 
17). Kantor apparently excelled in Greek and Latin and his knowledge of the 
classics is evident in his later work. In 1933 he moved with his mother and sister 
to Kraków where he enrolled at the Fine Art Academy to train as an artist. ‘I had 
decided to be a painter, and a famous painter at that! So I travelled to Kraków’ 
Kantor claimed (in conversation with Krzysztof Miklaszewski, cited in 
Pleśniarowicz 2004: 23). However, paradoxically, Kantor reacted against the 
traditional aspect of his education at the academy (dominated as it then was by 
a conservative preoccupation with French Postimpressionism) and ended by 
taking courses with the scenography professor, Karol Frycz (1877–1963), 
training as a theatre designer in Frycz’s studios on the opposite side of the 
street from the main Neoclassical academy building. Although, according to 
Kantor, Frycz was a ‘friend of Stanislavsky’ and ‘represented the Craig 
School’ (Kantor quoted in Miklaszewski 2006: 156 and 157), he was a protégé 
of the Constructivist artist and theatre designer Andrzej Pronaszko (1888–1961) 
and had been tutored by artists associated with the Constructivist movement in 
Poland (and with whom Kantor briefly worked in 1946). As such, Frycz would 
have been familiar with the work of the Russian avant-garde and the Bauhaus. 
Michal Kobialka, in his 1993 book on Kantor A Journey Through Other Spaces, 
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1 Kantorʼs life has been, and continues to be well-documented by the efforts of Jozef Chrobak, 
an associate of the Cricoteka archive and former member of the Kraków group of artists, whose 
list of publications on the subject (in Polish) continues to grow. Chrobak et al. 2000 is a useful 
summary and this, together with Krzysztof Pleśniarowiczʼs masterful summary in his 2004 book 
have been my main sources. These have been supported by reference to Kantorʼs lengthy 
interviews about his life and work with his friends and colleagues, the Polish art critics Wiesław 
Borowski (1982) and Mieczysław Porębski (1997).
confirms that Kantor was well aware of the visual artists of the Polish inter-war 
avant-garde, such as Leon Chwistek (1884–1944), Titus Czyżewski (1880–
1945), Władysław Strzemiński (1893–1952), Katarzyna Kobro (1898–1951) and 
Maria Jarema (1908–1958) ‘all of whom rejected the officially accepted 
aesthetic tenets of Post-Impressionism’ (Kobialka 1993: 270). The styles of 
these painters ranged from that of Analytic Cubism (Czyżewski) and Italian 
Futurism (Chwistek) to the Suprematism of Kazimir Malevich and the 
Constructivism of Vladimir Tatlin exemplified in the paintings of Strzemiński and 
Kobro, whilst Jarema, with whom Kantor would later form the Cricot 2 group in 
1955, favoured a more pure geometrical form of abstraction (see Kobialka 
1993: 388–389 fn.2). In this cosmopolitan environment Kantor’s work in the late 
1930s started to be inspired by Constructivist and Bauhaus ideas, influences 
that were apparent first in his student production of Maurice Maeterlinck’s 
Symbolist play Śmierć Tintagilesa (‘The Death of Tintagiles’, the play Vsevolod 
Meyerhold had chosen for his first production), which was performed once at 
the Dom Plastyków (‘Artists’ House’) in 1938. Kantor would reprise his student 
production in 1987 as part of his short performance work Maszyna miłości i 
śmierci (‘The Machine of Love and Death’). Subsequently he developed his use 
of the Constructivist/Bauhaus aesthetic in his underground theatre work 
between 1942 and 1945. On December 12, 1939, Kantor completed his final 
exam with Professor Frycz and graduated from the academy. At this time and 
during the war, Kantor painted mainly in a style reminiscent of Analytical Cubism 
and the Russian Cubo-Futurists.
During the occupation Kantor ran one of the three clandestine, 
underground theatre groups in Kraków. He worked on an unrealised project to 
stage Jean Cocteau’s The Death of Orpheus and staged two productions in 
private apartments, somehow managing to escape the notice of the Gestapo. 
The penalty for being caught at or involved with such illegal performances was 
death. Juliusz Słowacki’s (1809–1949) Symbolist Romantic drama Balladyna 
was staged in 1942 and, following Kantor’s student production in 1938 of 
Maeterlinck’s Symbolist play, both productions were heavily influenced by a 
Constructivist/Bauhaus style of abstraction. The next production, which was 
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eventually staged in 1944, Stanisław Wyspiański’s (1869–1907) Powrót Odysa 
(‘The Return of Odysseus’), another Symbolist-imbued text, went through 
various stages, from an ostensibly Constructivist aesthetic to what Kantor, and 
his art-critic colleague Mieczysław Porębski termed ‘poor realism’. Kantor was 
later to claim that:
The return of Odysseus established a p r e c e d e n t  and 
a  p r o t o t y p e  for all the later characters of my theatre. 
There were many of them. The whole procession that 
came out of many productions and dramas—from the 
realm of FICTION. All were ‘dead’, all were returning into the 
world of the living, into our world, into the present.
(Kantor 2009c: 350; emphasis in original)
It was at this time (1944) he would later repeatedly claim that his ideas of ‘reality 
of the lowest rank’ and the ‘poor object’ were born. The period of occupation 
together with these productions and ideas will be discussed at greater length, 
particularly in chapters five and six.2
Following the war Kantor continued experimenting with styles of figurative 
painting reminiscent of Picasso’s Analytical Cubism, and particularly, in terms of 
form and subject, with Russian Cubo-Futurism as exemplified by the early work 
of Kazimir Malevich and Vladimir Tatlin.3 In 1945 Kantor found work designing 
costumes and scenery for productions by the Teatr Stary (‘Old Theatre’), where 
he was employed as an assistant stage designer. Besides this Kantor directed 
and designed his own productions: firstly, a production of a play by Józef 
Czechowicz, Niegodzien i godny (‘The Unworthy and the Worthy’), followed by 
a revival of his 1944 production of The Return of Odysseus. Kantor did not 
direct another production until 1955.
In 1946 the Ministry of Culture and Art awarded Kantor a scholarship to 
travel to Paris where he spent six months in 1947 (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 52). 
Whilst in Paris Kantor acquainted himself with the latest trends in the city’s art-
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2 See Pleśniarowicz 1994b and 2004 chapter 3 for a fuller account of Kantor at this time.
3 See, for example Kantorʼs paintings from this period: The Pigeon Fanciers, Portrait of Tadeusz 
Brzozowski, The Laundress and The Bakers from 1946 (Kantor 1991a: plates 12, 14, 15 and 16 
respectively).
scene, visiting Picasso’s studio and encountering the work of Ernst, Kandinsky, 
Klee, Miró and Tanguy (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 53). However, it was the repeated 
visits that he made to the Palace de la Découverte (Palace of Discovery) that 
seemed to make the most radical impression on Kantor (Kantor n.d. Notebook 
’47: 1; Polish text in: Kantor 2005: 103; see also Pleśniarowicz 2004: 54–55). 
The displays concerning the latest scientific imaging of the internal structure of 
matter fascinated Kantor. He realised that the microscopic structure of reality 
was every bit, if not more fantastic than that revealed by the attempts of avant-
garde art to penetrate reality. It is still possible to see today in one of the 
galleries, a sketch of the atomic structure of crystals, that is echoed in some of 
Kantor’s drawings (see for example Kantor’s various drawings from 1947 and 
1948 titled Przestrzeń ‘parasolowata’ (‘“Umbrelloid” Space’) reproduced in 
Borowski 1982: 27, plate 8, and 29, plates 14–16; also the later drawing of the 
same title from 1952 in Kantor 1997: no pagination).
As the Polish art critic Piotr Piotrowski comments, Kantor’s work of this 
time was not entirely abstract in the sense of absolutely eschewing the (human) 
figure. Sometimes the images articulate space as a convoluted latticework 
(‘umbrella’ or ‘umbrelloid’ space, after the veins of an umbrella). In other works, 
however, this strutted, latticework space is articulated as a figure, for example in 
Man with Umbrella of 1949 (Kantor 1991: plate 19), which would be more aptly 
titled ‘umbrelloid-man’, because the figure is articulated against a coloured 
geometrical background in terms of the twisted struts and spokes of a skeletal 
umbrella. In this way the ‘figure’ is rendered as an intensified field of space 
rather than as some separate entity set within it. Kantor claimed that his 
principal discovery in this period was of the prioritisation of space and of a 
primal conception of it as ‘ur-matter’ that lent it an animated or vital character. 
This spatial conceptualisation allowed Kantor to collapse the normative 
distinction between figure and ground, between the object and the space it is 
located in. In his writings concerning his paintings of this time, between 1947 
and 1954, which he labelled as Metamorphoses, Kantor was keen to articulate 
the work in terms of realising the vitality of space and matter that had made 
such an impression on him in the Palais de la Découverte. This apparent 
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reference to Ovid’s poem (Kantor had enjoyed a classical education in Tarnów) 
indicates a sense of a world seething with change, a world in which reality could 
shift form and where instability renders the action of metaphor actual.4 The term 
‘metamorphoses’ later itself metamorphosed into the label ‘metaphorical’ in 
Kantor’s description and naming of some of the works from this period. In his 
taking literally the metamorphoses implicit in metaphor, Kantor was reflecting 
the general pervasive influence of Surrealism in post-war Europe.5 It is also 
evident in the appearance of the prefix ponad- (‘sur-’) in the titles of some of his 
paintings of this time (for example, Ponad-ruchy (‘Sur-Movements’) 1948). 
However, there was a darker imperative to Kantor’s preoccupation with space, 
form and matter, that came from his recent experience of the Nazi occupation. 
Kantor described how, whilst in Paris, he and his companions had found it 
difficult to countenance the conventional beauty in art and the conventional, 
classical, representation of the human figure. As he remarked in an interview 
with Porębski in 1990:
I remember how, on my first trip to the Louvre [with Jerzy 
Kujawski, a Polish émigré Surrealist artist], I walked right 
past all these images, which were images of the beautiful 
human body, I walked past them with contempt. And 
anyway, Kujawski did so too. And the reason we did so 
was because of the occupation and the Nazi 
dehumanisation. We had not realised that this 
dehumanisation carries on afterwards.
(Kantor in Porębski 1997: 125–126; my translation) 
The nature morte of human corpses on the streets of Kraków had been an all-
too-grim everyday reality for Kantor.
As I will discuss in chapter five, the influence of his particular experience 
of the metamorphic reality of the occupation strongly influenced Kantor’s 
conception of space and matter. This experience can also be seen to have been 
further refracted through the aesthetic conceptions of Bruno Schulz, whom 
Kantor had been reading before the war and in whose fictions, the very fabric of 
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4 See Ovid 2004: 9.
5 See Piotrowski 2009: Chapter Two ʻThe Surrealist Interregnum 1945–8ʼ: 33–57.
reality seethes like an ant’s nest. Just so in Kantor’s paintings and drawings of 
the late 1940s and early 1950s, there is a sense of movement within the 
invisible latticework of the very fabric of space. Where Descartes had envisaged 
a geometrical space carved into a regular three-dimensional grid, Schulz, and 
Kantor following him, saw something that pulsated, ebbed and flowed, a space 
and time that seems more in tune with Einstein’s vision of warped and curved 
space-time than the Cartesian-Newtonian conception of a fixed and unchanging 
eternal framework within which beings moved. This Schulzian sense of reality is  
something that Kantor carried over into his later performative happenings and 
theatrical works. Moreover, it is a sense of reality that is not ‘new’ in the sense 
of Descartes’ new vision of nature, but rather a ‘poor’ and ‘degraded’ reality. As 
Wiesław Borowski notes in his 1982 discussion of Kantor’s Informel paintings 
and subsequent emballage-period works all those who understood his artistic 
vision of reality at the time ‘saw in Kantor, like Schulz, degraded 
reality’ (Borowski 1982: 123; my translation). In Kantor’s work, as I will discuss 
in chapter five, this ‘poor’ and ‘degraded’ reality was a combination of the 
Schulzian sense of provincial bankruptcy together with the sense of the peculiar 
mixture of ethical and metaphysical bankruptcy of the reality of the occupation.
Some of the paintings and drawings from the period following his return 
from this first trip to Paris, especially the series of paintings (as opposed to the 
drawings under the same title already mentioned) entitled Przestrzeń 
parasolowata (‘Umbrelloid Space’) are reminiscent of Mikhail Larionov’s 
Rayonist compositions, Aleksandr Rodchenko’s and Varvara Stepanova’s 
paintings, and especially Liubov Popova’s Space-Force Constructions of 1918–
21 (although it is not clear whether or not Kantor knew the work of these 
painters directly). This is a reminder that, as Marek Bartelik has noted in his 
recent book on the inter-war Polish avant-garde:
From a historical perspective, the fragmentation of Polish 
society during the inter-war period might have been 
dangerous to the security of the Polish state, but it 
enriched the society and its art. Only a few people were 
able to realise that the pluralism of expression that sprang 
from the ethno-cultural diversity was, in fact, beneficial, 
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and resulted in works of art that reflected Poland’s place 
within European culture, suspended as it was between 
Western and Eastern Europe.
(Bartelik 2005: 54)
Poland’s geographical location therefore granted it a character that tended to 
blur and blend the distinctions between eastern and western influences, 
culturally as well as politically. Following his return to Poland in 1947, Kantor 
mounted what was to be the last exhibition of modern art before the imposition 
of Socialist Realism where he made use of the lessons he had learned from the 
Palais de la Découverte.6
During the late 1940s Kantor supported himself as a stage designer and 
for a brief period, from 1947 to 1949 as a junior professor at the State Higher 
School of Plastic Arts (the then-current name for Kraków’s Fine Art Academy). 
He was dismissed in 1949 for a perceived ‘incorrect manner of 
teaching’ (anonymous official letter cited by Pleśniarowicz in 2004: 58). In 1949, 
following the vice-minister of culture Włodzimierz Sokorski’s announcement at 
the now-infamous Nieborów conference that Socialist Realism was ‘the only 
progressive creative method sanctioned in contemporary Polish art’ (Ibid.), 
Kantor, together with sympathetic fellow artists such as Jarema, refused to 
exhibit their paintings publicly (although, in reality it was unlikely that they would 
have been permitted to do so). From 1950 until 1963 Kantor worked officially as 
stage designer for the Stary and Słowacki theatres in Kraków, as well as for 
theatres in Warsaw and other regional cities where he designed around 38 
productions (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 59 and 85). Kantor received state awards for 
his work as a stage designer in 1954, 1955 and 1956, and 1962. To his 
annoyance, his work as a painter was not recognised in this period.
In 1955 Kantor travelled to Paris again as part of the second season of the 
Theatre of the Nations festival where productions featuring his stage and 
costume designs were shown. Kantor used this visit to see current exhibitions 
and to meet European and American painters such as Wols, Fautrier, Matthieu, 
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6 For further information on this exhibition see Appendix 1.1
Pollock and Arnal (Borowski 1982: 41). During this second visit to Paris Kantor 
had been exposed to Art Informel and on his return to Poland, from 1956 to 
1964, he practiced an idiosyncratic version of this which he termed ‘informel’ 
after the French term. In his informel work, at least in his oil paintings, any sort 
of figuration is apparently abandoned for the physical, textural play of thick paint 
on the surface of the canvas. However, for Kantor there was always a tension 
between the spirit of abstraction and that of figuration. As he was later to 
comment in an interview with Porębski (1997: 124, and as noted by Piotrowski 
regarding Kantor’s Metamorphoses paintings of the late 1940s):
I have actually never been an abstractionist, even during 
the informel period it was not abstraction, the human form 
was, for me, always extremely important […]. And this 
human form became compromised [by the experience of 
occupation], we could no longer have its form based on a 
humanistic idea of the Classical beauty of the human 
figure. Such beauty remained absolutely erased, and I 
also did not respond well to deformation, say, the 
deformation of Picasso. I could not reconcile myself to 
this.
(Kantor in Porębski 1997: 124; my translation)
A sense of this hidden presence of the figurative is perhaps behind his 
comment to Jan Kłossowicz that the term ‘lyrical abstraction’ may have been a 
better term (Kantor interviewed by Kłossowicz 1985, cited by Pleśniarowicz in 
2004: 66). These comments give a new perspective to Kantor’s informel 
paintings, allowing the surface textures of these canvases to be seen as real 
forms rather than as ‘abstract expressions’, perhaps, surprisingly, more akin in 
essence to Malevich’s Suprematist experiments, than to European Art Informel, 
or American Abstract Expressionism. As Kantor commented in his conversation 
with Borowski, the pictures were ‘a record, a product of action’ (1982: 42). This 
action was not a romantic product of the artist’s ‘expression’, but an ‘action 
brought about by the intervention of chance’ in which ‘the accidental was not so 
much surrendering to chance, as controlling chance and deliberately assigning 
it a role (Ibid., cited by Pleśniarowicz 2004: 66, translation William Brand).
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Following Stalin’s death in 1953 there was a gradual relaxation in the 
severity of the Soviet regime. By 1955 this ‘thaw’ had spread to Poland and 
allowed for a relaxation of censorship (Davies 2001: 8), a factor which permitted 
greater artistic freedom, culminating in 1956, the year of the ‘Polish Spring’ 
signifying the end of Stalinism in Poland. In this new climate, Kantor, together 
with Jarema and the playwright and poet Kazimierz Mikulski felt able to engage 
publicly in art again and revived the idea of a group of artists dedicated to 
artistic performance. Cricot 2 was formed in 1955 at the Dom Plastyków 
(‘Artists’ House’) on ulica Łobowska (where The Death of Tintagiles had been 
staged in 1938 during his student years). It was named after the inter-war Cricot 
group (1933–1939), which had included the artists Jonasz Stern as well as 
Jarema. (The name ‘Cricot’ is an anagram of the Polish to cyrk—‘it’s a circus’.) 
Kantor and Jarema formed their group outside of the official theatre 
establishment to stage a play by the writer, artist and philosopher Stanisław 
Ignacy Witkiewicz whose works had been banned during the Stalinist period. 
The première of the Company’s first production, Witkiewicz’s Mątwa (The 
Cuttlefish), was staged at the Artists’ House on 12 May in 1956, directed by 
Kantor with costumes designed by Jarema. Kantor was the first director to stage 
one of Witkiewicz’s plays since the war (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 69). Mątwa was 
followed in 1957 by another play, this time by Kazimierz Mikulski, Cyrk (‘The 
Circus’), again staged at the Artists’ House.
Mątwa had been the first production of the original Cricot in 1933 and in it 
the figure of King Hyrcian IV had been made up to look like Hitler (Pleśniarowicz 
2004: 71). According to Pleśniarowicz, Jarema’s costumes in the 1956 Cricot 2 
production:
also seemed like concrete allusions in that Post-Stalinist 
atmosphere. Years later, Jan Józef Szczepański recalled 
that the authorities sent Adam Polewka, a writer who had 
been involved in the pre-war Cricot and a party official, to 
review the dress rehearsal—an ordinary censor would 
have been too low-ranking. Polewka supposedly 
remarked, ‘Listen, I know who Hyrkan is, but don’t tell 
anybody that I know’.
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(Pleśniarowicz 2004: 71; citing from Jan Józef 
Szczepański, ‘Tradycja nonkonformizmu’, Tygodnik 
Powszechny 3, January 17, 1993)
Kantor quickly became the sole leader of Cricot 2 and went on making work 
with it in pursuit of its original manifesto as an autonomous theatre until his 
death.7 The first paragraph of Kantor’s partytura (‘score’) for Cricot 2’s first 
production reads:
This text is a kind of collage. It consists of original texts, 
notes and writings from the time when Cricot 2 was being 
born and I. Witkiewicz’s play Mątwa was being prepared 
for the stage in 1955, but it also contains some additions 
made later or even quite recently, when after some 10–20 
years I have tried to realise the sense of those activities.
(Kantor, ‘The Scuttle-fish’ [sic] n.d.: 1; Polish version in 
Kantor 2005a: 136)
‘Those activities’ that Kantor tried to realise were centred on the idea of 
autonomous theatre, an idea that had several names over the long course of 
his career: ‘Informel theatre’, ‘Zero theatre’, ‘Happening theatre’, ‘Impossible 
theatre’ and ‘The Theatre of Death’. Looking back on his production of Mątwa in 
1963 Kantor wrote:
The theatre that I call autonomous
Is the theatre that is not
a reproductive mechanism,
i.e., a mechanism whose aim is to
present an interpretation of a piece of literature
on stage,
but a mechanism that
has its own independent
existence.
…
I do not apply the concept of
the Autonomous Theatre
to explain
the dramatic text,
to translate it
into the language of theatre,
to interpret it,
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7 See Appendix 1.2 for details about published statements on the formation of Cricot 2 and the 
idea of autonomous theatre.
or to find its new meanings.
The concept of the 
Autonomous Theatre
Is not the tool to
Excavate the so-called
stage equivalent,
which could be perceived
as a second parallel ‘action’
that is mistakenly called
‘autonomous.’
(Kantor in: Kobialka 1993: 42–43)
Kantor’s theatre works were not productions in the conventional sense of the 
staging of a piece of dramatic literature. In an interview with Uri Hertz in 1985 
Kantor stated that he had never ‘ […] staged Witkiewicz’s plays. I’ve done the 
staging of my own personal ideas which have been realised in painting, in 
theater and in happenings’ (Kantor in: Hertz 1985–1986: 17). Although in his 
work with Cricot 2 between 1955 and 1975 (apart from the production of the 
one play by Mikulski in 1957), each of these pieces dealt only with plays by 
Witkiewicz. Kantor talked of ‘playing with Witkiewicz’ in the sense of a 
collaboration between equal partners, rather than any sense of a subservient 
‘playing of’ the text of the play. As he commented to Hertz: ‘You mustn’t play 
Witkiewicz, you must play with him like you’re playing cards with a 
partner’ (Ibid.: 16). Consequently, Witkiewicz’s plays were not privileged over 
the other components of the production but were placed on an equal footing 
with them: ‘environment / objects / actor / and his exceptional characteristics: /
—dynamism /—the ability to undergo psychological and emotional changes at a 
quick rate /—the ability of quick reaction and the ability to discriminate between 
infinitely small nuances, / actions / situations / happenings / events’ (Kantor, 
‘The Scuttle-fish’ [sic] n.d.: 3–4; emphasis in original, Polish version in Kantor 
2005a: 138). Kantor asserted that none of these components had any function 
of explaining commenting or illustrating the text of the play: ‘Since they have no 
such function … They merely form a set of relationships’ (Ibid.: 4; emphasis in 
original). For Kantor the ‘performance turns into / a mill grinding the text’, and he 
asks, ‘does the mill “interpret” the product that it grinds?’ (Kantor in Kobialka 
1993: 48; emphasis in original). In the series of productions from 1956 to 1975 
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Kantor constructed a series of such ‘mills’ with which to ‘grind’ Witkiewicz’s 
texts. In these productions until The Dead Class, the action ran on two parallel 
and equal tracks with the spoken text and the autonomous theatrical action 
functioning separately. According to Pleśniarowicz Kantor’s ‘idea was to 
eliminate “all illustration of the text of the play on stage,” in order, instead, to 
evoke “reality, real action, the real object,” without “any reference to fiction and 
dramatic illusion”’ (Kantor cited from Borowski 1982: 49; in: Pleśniarowicz 2004: 
70).
Kantor had been painting privately during the Stalinist period, but following 
the ‘thaw’ he began to exhibit his paintings publicly again. By the early 1960s he 
had become disillusioned with stage design work and he refused such 
appointments with official theatres after 1963. Although Grupa Krakowska (the 
Kraków group of artists) managed to gain official status as an artists’ group in 
1957 (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 75), Cricot 2 was not officially registered, nor did it 
become so, functioning as the unofficial and informal ‘theatrical section’ of the 
group (Ibid.: 76) until, with Kantor’s growing fame in the 1970s, it became 
indisputably associated with him alone. His ability to support himself from the 
sale of his paintings in the West from the early 1960s (Ibid. 84) may have 
contributed to his ability to assume such control and assert artistic autonomy in 
the prevailing regime. As Pleśniarowicz has noted:
Although it is common even today to think that Kantor’s 
work in the theatre overshadows what he accomplished as 
a painter, and therefore to regard him as an artist whose 
international success was long-delayed, the fact is that he 
made a name for himself in Europe as a successful—and 
original—painter as soon as the first cracks appeared in 
the Iron Curtain, in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
(2004: 77)
Despite the difficulty of East-West relations Kantor was extensively exhibited in 
continental Europe during the 1960s and became very well known in the art 
world of France, Germany and Italy as well as in Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, 
and the former Yugoslavia. Kantor’s art was seen in exhibitions in Paris (1958, 
1959, 1961, 1966, 1970, 1982, 1983 and 1989), Stockholm (1958, 1966 and 
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1975), Düsseldorf (1959), Kassel (1959, 1977 and 1987), Göteborg (1960), 
Venice (13th Biennial 1960), Lausanne (1964 and 1970), Bochum (1970), 
Baden-Baden (1966), Basel (1966). In São Paulo Kantor was awarded first 
prize in the 9th Biennial 1967. In 1968 he was awarded Medal Premio Roma 
and ‘Premio Marzotto’ (Roma). He exhibited in Nuremberg (1968, 1976 and 
1977), Cologne (1970), Oslo (1971), Dourdan (1971), Rome (1979 and 1990), 
Milan (1979 and 1986), Grenoble (1984), Avignon (1985), West Berlin (1986 
and 1990) and Palermo (1987). Besides these exhibitions, Kantor began to tour 
his theatre productions further abroad. For example, as well as extensive 
touring of Europe, Kantor staged productions in Shiraz in 1977; Adelaide, 
Sidney and Caracas in 1978; Mexico City in 1979; Toga Mura and Tokyo in 
Japan in 1982; Helsinki and Buenos Aires in 1984. 
Kantor began to have an impact on the English-speaking world when he 
appeared at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in 1972. His theatrical work was 
seen in the United States in 1979 when Cricot 2 performed The Dead Class at 
La Mama Experimental Theatre in New York. While a few of his visual art works 
had already been shown in New York Kantor’s work as an artist, theatre 
designer and director was relatively unknown in the United States until then. 
Before his La Mama appearance Kantor had several exhibitions in New York. 
He was selected for the exhibition of contemporary Polish art organised by the 
Kościuszko Foundation in New York in 1947 (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 50); he had 
an individual painting exhibition in 1960 at the Saidenberg Gallery (Ibid.: 77); in 
1961 he showed work in the 15 Polish Painters Exhibition at the Museum of 
Modern Art (Kobialka: 7, and also the exhibition catalogue: Selz 1961); and, in 
1965 he showed work in the Seventeen Polish Painters Exhibition at the D’Arcy 
Galleries (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 98).
In collaboration with the Scottish Arts Council Richard Demarco mounted 
an exhibition of contemporary Polish art called Atelier ’72 at his Edinburgh 
gallery as part of the official festival. This exhibition featured artists from 
Wiesław Borowski’s Foksal Gallery in Warsaw in which Kantor had been heavily 
involved since 1965. Alongside Polish artists such as Stanisław Dróżdż, 
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Zbigniew Gostomski, Koji Kamoji, Edward Krasiński and Maria Stangret 
(Kantor’s second wife), the 1972 Edinburgh exhibition featured documentation 
of Kantor’s happenings and examples of his wrapped objects or emballages 
(Jurkiewicz et al. 1998: 52).
In support of the work shown in the Exhibition, Demarco also invited 
Kantor to stage his latest performance at the Forrest Hill Theatre as part of the 
Fringe. With his company Cricot 2, Kantor presented Kurka Wodna (‘The Water 
Hen’), a happening performance after the play of the same name by Witkiewicz. 
This event constituted Kantor’s first truly international success (Kalendarium: 
226 in Suchan 2005). In the following year, Cricot 2 performed again at the 
Edinburgh Fringe with Dainty Shapes and Hairy Apes (also known as Lovelies 
and Dowdies, after Witkiewicz’s 1922 play Nadobnisie i koczkodany, czyli 
zielona pigułka (‘Dainty Shapes and Hairy Apes, or the Green Pill’)), which was 
also performed at the Glasgow Fruit Market and in London at the ICA. Kantor 
returned to Edinburgh with The Dead Class in 1976, this time going on to play 
at the Sherman Theatre in Cardiff and at London’s Riverside Studios. An 
exhibition of Kantor’s emballages followed at London’s Whitechapel Gallery in 
the autumn of the same year (see exhibition catalogue: Stanisławski 1976). 
Cricot 2 performed in Britain again in 1980 with Wielopole, Wielopole, as part of 
the Edinburgh Festival of Art, followed by performances at the Riverside 
Studios, London. The company made two further visits: in 1982, playing Where 
are the Snows of Yesteryear at the Riverside Studios, and in 1991, Today is My 
Birthday, performed, posthumously, in the Edinburgh Festival of Art. In the 
United States, Wielopole, Wielopole was performed in 1982 at La Mama in New 
York, and in 1984 in Los Angeles as part of the Olympic Arts Festival. Cricot 2 
returned to La Mama again with Let the Artists Die in 1985, with I Shall Never 
Return in 1988 and for the posthumous performance of Today is My Birthday in 
1991. 
From the mid-1960s the performance events, happenings and theatre 
productions that Kantor made with Cricot 2 became increasingly successful, first 
in Poland, then Europe and then internationally. In the latter half of the 1970s 
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Kantor’s 1975 production of Umarła klasa: seans dramatyczny (‘The Dead 
Class: a dramatic séance’) became an international success through the series 
of tours detailed above.8 Kantor’s artwork enjoyed continued success and in 
1978 he was awarded the Rembrandt Prize for Painting (also known as the 
‘painting Nobel’ (Piotrowski in: Suchan 2005: 33)). Alongside this successful 
career as an artist, he continued to build on the aesthetic philosophy of his 
performance work in a series of productions with which he toured until his 
death. Following The Dead Class in 1975 his major performance works, which 
are now thought of in terms of a cycle of the ‘theatre of death’, were Wielopole, 
Wielopole (1980), Niech sczezną artyści (‘Let the Artists Die’, 1985), Nigdy tu 
już nie powrócę (‘I Shall Never Return’, 1988), Dziś są moje urodziny (‘Today is 
My Birthday’, 1991). All were performed internationally to tremendous critical 
acclaim. In between these large-scale spectacles, Kantor produced shorter and 
smaller scale performances that he termed ‘cricotages’: ‘a kind of activity which 
stems from the experience of the Cricot 2 Theatre and from the method of 
acting discovered and practised there’ (from the programme notes for Where 
are the Snows of Yesteryear?, 1984). In 1978 Où sont les neiges d’antan? or 
Gdzie są niegdysiejsze śniegi? (‘Where are the Snows of Yesteryear?’, Rome 
1979, and a revised longer version premiered in Paris 1982), Ślub w manierze 
konstruktywistycznej i surrealistycznej (‘A Wedding in the Constructivist and 
Surrealist Style’, Milan 1986), Maszyna miłości i śmierci (‘The Machine of Love 
and Death’, Kassel 1987), Bardzo krótka lekcja (‘A Very Short Lesson’, 
Charleville-Mézieres 1988), and Cicha noc (‘A Silent Night’, Avignon 1990).
From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s Kantor ransacked the twentieth-
century avant-gardes, working across an extremely wide range of media from 
painting, sculpture, installation, happening and performance and 
conceptualising his practice in the form of manifestos that demarcated his 
changing ideas as they metamorphosed from label to label under the titles 
‘Informel’, ‘Zero’, ‘Emballage’, ‘Happening’ and ‘Impossible’. Despite the unified 
nature of his work, early on Kantor was only officially recognised in his own 
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8 See Appendix 1.3 regarding Cricot 2 productions toured after Kantorʼs death.
country chiefly as a stage designer. By the time he received the Rembrandt 
Prize from the Goethe Foundation in 1978 for his outstanding contributions to 
art, he was already predominantly known in the Anglo-American world as a 
theatre director (although, as I have already suggested and will argue later, this 
label is less than ideal). Up to the end of his life he claimed to be co-influenced 
as much by what he called ‘constructivism’—a label that seemingly 
encompassed Suprematism and the Bauhaus as well as aspects of Dada—as 
by ‘symbolism’, which for him eclectically included Franz Kafka and Maurice 
Maeterlinck, as well as Polish figures such as Wyspiański, Witold Gombrowicz, 
Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz and Schulz. In addition, during the 1950s, and 
before his exposure to Art Informel, his paintings, and stage and costume 
designs had been predominantly influenced by Surrealism, which, as noted 
earlier, had been a dominant underlying force in Polish art before the period of 
official Socialist Realism. Viewed in this way, as the recipient of such a wide 
spectrum of influences, Kantor could therefore be understood as a figure that 
has been fractured in his own interpretation and self-representation as much as 
in that of his critics. However, a sense of the ‘fractured’, ‘splintered’ and divided, 
is not necessarily inappropriate, nor, as it may at first appear, a negative 
characterisation of Kantor and his work. As I will argue in chapter three, the 
traditional Western metaphysical representation of the individual as a unified 
presence is something that Kantor critiques. Indeed, his predecessor, the artist, 
playwright, philosopher, Witkiewicz, himself echoing a self-portrait by Marcel 
Duchamp (Five-Way Portrait of Marcel Duchamp, 1917), famously represented 
himself as a fractured personality in two photographic self-portraits. In one, 
Multiple Self-Portrait in Mirrors (1915-6) the artist, in his Russian officer’s 
uniform, sits before several mirrors, whose multiple images stare back at him. 
Another photographic self-portrait is of one reflected image (Self-Portrait, 1910), 
but this time the mirror is fractured into shards that render Witkacy’s face as a 
partial and lacerated image. Kantor’s version of this trope on the fractured self 
was his 1977 installation Autoportret (Self-Portrait), an articulated series of 
black cubes, each bearing a photographic image of Kantor from different stages 
of his life. For Kantor, as for Witkiewicz before him, the idea of jedności w 
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wielości (‘unity in multiplicity’), (part of Witkiewicz’s theory of Czysta Forma 
(‘Pure Form’), which Kantor followed), was fundamental to his art.
By the late 1960s Kantor was operating as an unofficial, but independent 
artist, exhibiting abroad and increasingly coalescing his recent artistic ideas into 
performative, theatricalised experiments. In 1968 he stayed for several months 
in Germany where several of his happenings were filmed by Dietrich Mahlow for 
his 1969 film for West German Saar Television Kantor is da: Die Künstler und 
sein Welt (‘Kantor is Here: The Artist and His World’). This film was broadcast in 
the year Kantor first enjoyed international success with his theatre productions. 
It was also the first full-length study of the artist (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 103). A 
brief survey of Kantor’s work featured in the film demonstrates how his 
preoccupations had developed following his informel period. In the film, Kantor 
and his work are revealed in different situations in various scenes, for example:
• The exterior of a Communist-era apartment block: a sun-lounger is being 
lowered from an upper window by a rope; it is wrapped in brown paper; its 
wrapped form betrays human-shaped legs extending from one end.
• In amongst a room filled with packing crates a giant hand-shaped package 
lies. It is labelled ‘The Hand of Saint Peter’.
• In the same room Kantor is glimpsed sitting amongst the packing crates, as if 
stored there himself.
• Elsewhere in the same room Kantor is seen at work, balancing precariously 
on a chair, hammering nails into the lid of one of the crates; he is observed 
from the other side of the room by two bikini-clad young women who regard 
him with extreme indifference from a state of seeming narcolepsy; the 
hammering Kantor seems both impotent and unnerved, the nailing both 
incompetent and chaotic; later the women have fallen asleep slumped against 
each other as he continues his pointless activity.
• A figure in coat and hat is loaded with a large bulbous rucksack with many 
pockets and set off into the street on his journey; later, in a cafe full of people, 
Kantor attempts to interview this taciturn figure, still fully covered and laden as  
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it noisily slurps from a bowl of soup; it becomes clear from Kantor’s 
references, and from near-subliminal inserts of the image, that the figure is an 
incarnation of Albrecht Dürer’s famous engraving: Rhinoceros.
• In long shot, a black Mercedes-Benz circles the centre of the arena of the 
Nuremberg Stadium anticlockwise. In the centre, on a podium, filmed from the 
circling car, stands Maria Stangret-Kantor, Kantor’s wife: Kantor moves 
around her clockwise, wrapping the podium and the standing human figure 
with a roll of paper tape—a human emballage; the sounds of an earlier crowd 
chanting ‘Sieg heil, sieg heil’ is heard on the soundtrack.
• On a busy restaurant terrace a man seated at a table calmly smokes a 
cigarette whilst Kantor cuts and snips his clothing away as crowd of onlookers 
watch.
• In a gallery before an audience Kantor conducts an anatomy of the clothing of 
a live subject: the scene is arranged in the form of Rembrandt’s famous 
painting The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Nicolaes Tulp (1632) (to be discussed in 
more detail in chapter five).
• In Kantor’s studio a human subject is toppled backwards onto a horizontal 
canvas—his clothing is snipped, nailed and glued to the surface and painted 
onto it; the naked human subject rises and vanishes into the darkness leaving 
the splayed clothing ‘crucified’ under paint on the canvas.
In these scenes the Kantorian themes and preoccupations identified with the 
1975–1990 ‘theatre of death’ cycle can be discerned. For example, an 
intimation of eternity is sensed in the engagement with artworks from the 
Renaissance (treated as objets trouvés), from the reference to crucifixion, from 
the idea that quasi-mythical body parts can be packaged and warehoused for 
future retrieval. The works featured in Kantor ist da provide a snapshot of the 
interdisciplinary nature of the artistic practice in which Kantor was operating in 
the area between art and performance, an area still occupying the world of the 
gallery, but that was being presented increasingly through the medium of the 
live event or happening. However, this sense of liminality was not new to Kantor 
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at this time. As Piotrowski has argued: ‘the work of the so-called metaphorical 
period of the turn of the 1940s, is to some degree, paradigmatic of Tadeusz 
Kantor’s art as a whole’ (Piotrowski 2005: 34). Kantor’s earliest work can 
therefore also be seen to occupy this hinterland between the traditional 
conception of artistic product as easel-art or sculpture and avant-garde 
conceptions of the art as performative event. Similarly, Kantor’s later works 
need also to be seen as a whole across the breadth of his work, from painting 
and installation to his small and large-scale theatrical spectacles.
Unfortunately, because Kantor’s contact with the English-speaking art and 
theatre world has been largely through his theatrical work, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the full breadth of his output is less well known here and in the 
United States, than in continental Europe, given the relatively few gallery 
exhibitions of his work compared with theatre performances. It is not surprising 
therefore, that Kantor has become better known in Anglo-American culture as a 
theatre director than as an artist. The ambiguous nature of his artistic presence
—his tendency to place himself between his work and the spectator, whether 
artwork or theatre spectacle—has perhaps contributed to this (mis)perception. It 
contributes to certain problems in interpretation, where Kantor is seen as a sui 
generis artist, as the creator of ‘strange’ and ‘wonderful’ spectacles featuring 
bizarre grotesquery, apparently non-narrative alogical plotting, and extreme 
anti-naturalistic acting and staging (see Żurowski 1985: 364). However, the idea 
that Kantor is a ‘difficult’ artist, both for his audiences as well as from the 
perspective of his contemporaries, is partly the result of a twofold failure. Firstly, 
it is the failure to see Kantor and his work in their appropriate context; secondly, 
it is a failure to meet him on the metaphysical ground where his art, and his 
discourse as an artist, operates. This ‘difficulty’, as I identify it, is compounded 
by the fact that the contextual and metaphysical perspectives are not separate. 
Although the specificity of Poland’s history might appear strange and exotic to 
the Anglo-American mind, it is nevertheless a history of a certain national form 
of human being, whose story has the power to speak to the human condition. 
That Kantor arose out of this specific national context no doubt contributes to 
his apparent ‘peculiarity’, but his context also provided him with the ‘grist’ for his 
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metaphysical ‘mill’, without which he may never have come to formulate and 
articulate the specific aesthetic strategies that he developed over the course of 
his career.
Having given a brief sense of the context and history of Kantor’s 
biography, it will be useful to identify the distinctiveness of his work in 
comparison with that of the Western European and United States avant-garde. 
It is hardly surprising that in Britain and the United States audiences and critics 
have found the work difficult to understand. Kantor was an artist who spoke 
from the experience of the peculiar vicissitudes of twentieth-century Poland: of 
life lived first in the independence of the Second Republic, then under Nazi 
occupation followed by Soviet dominion. Britain and the United States do not 
have any recent comparable experience of occupation; there is not the 
familiarity with the pressure of reality under a totalitarian regime—it is not a 
recent part of Anglo-American history. Apart from this historical particularity 
Kantor was also informed by the intellectual and cultural crosscurrents in a 
country existing between ‘East’ and ‘West’. A further key feature of this situation 
was the influence of the Jewish presence in Poland. The issues of Jewishness 
and non-Jewishness affect Kantor in significant ways, a theme that I will return 
to in chapter five. Tadeusz Kantor’s success outside of Poland is therefore 
noteworthy, not only because his work was internationally successful despite its 
difficulty, but also because his art was able to come to the West at all from 
behind the Iron Curtain. Kantor commented in a 1974 interview with Teresa 
Krzemień: ‘I have something to say and find the means to do so. I must then 
reach someone—or not’ (Krzemień 1975: 39). Somehow, Kantor did find 
audiences from Buenos Aires to Tokyo and during the 1980s his work acquired 
an almost universal appeal that surprised its creator: ‘I don’t know how it 
happened that I have succeeded to communicate with the whole world when all 
the time I was only communicating with myself’ (Kantor in Maślińska 1991: 9). 
Audiences and critics may not have been able to articulate their 
understanding coherently, but there was an understanding nevertheless. 
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Anyone present at one of his spectacles can attest to this.9 However, in the 
years since his death, an audience has come to know his work only through 
photographs and videos. Perhaps unexpectedly, interest in Kantor and his work 
has grown and not faded away as might have been expected. A further 
peculiarity of Kantor’s legacy is that although his paintings and drawings and 
other art objects remain highly regarded, his international reputation outside 
continental Europe has been established more on the memory of his theatre-
spectacles, which, unlike his non performance-based artworks now exist only in 
archival form: manifestos, scores, drawings, objects, costumes, mannequins, 
scenery, photographs, and video recordings.10
Kantor’s position is therefore somewhat unique within the tradition of the 
twentieth-century avant-garde. The reputation of artists such as Picasso can be 
seen to rest on the exhibition of painting and sculpture in galleries and in 
reproductions. In a sense the traces of creativity become the artwork hanging in 
the gallery or reproduced in books. Since the early 1960s Kantor had argued 
against this view, regarding the creative process itself as the locus of the 
artwork rather than any resulting product. His 1963 Anti-wystawa (‘Anti-
Exhibition’) (also known as the Wystawa popularna (‘Popular Exhibition’)) was 
intended as a demonstration of this idea.11 Proclaiming: ‘art is everything that 
has not yet become a work of art’ Kantor exhibited hundreds of drawings dating 
back to 1945; objects, sketches and notes of ideas, and everyday detritus such 
as tram tickets, a toilet roll, suitcases and newspapers (see: Pleśniarowicz 
2004: 89–90). With the foregrounding of the idea of process over product the 
reputation of performance-based artists has always been more dependent on 
the problematic nature of the traces left by the essential transitoriness of their 
work. If figures approximately contemporary with Kantor in world theatre during 
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9 See Appendix 1.4 for Nicholas Serotaʼs comments on Kantorʼs reception in Edinburgh and 
London.
10 See Appendix 1.5 for a brief discussion of the video archive of Kantorʼs live work.
11 See ʻAnty-wystawa, czyli wystawa popularnaʼ (ʻThe Anti-Exhibition, or the Popular Exhibitionʼ) 
and Manifest Anty-Wystawyʼ (ʻAnti-Exhibition Manifestoʼ) in Kantor 2005: 227–230, and ʻThe 
Work of Art and the Process 1976ʼ in Kobialka 1993: 125–127.
the 1970s and 1980s are considered—for example, directors such as Peter 
Brook, Peter Sellars or Peter Stein—then their reputation more rests on their 
interpretation of dramatic texts and on their conceptions of staging and acting. 
These directors are appreciated for the qualities that they are able to bring out 
of their actors, such as ‘truthfulness’ (in acting), as much as for their conception 
of staging and interpretation of the dramatic text.12
It is perhaps the figure of Robert Wilson who is nearest to Kantor as an 
artist straddling the gallery and the stage. Like Kantor, Wilson was trained in the 
fine arts (as a painter and architect) rather than the theatre, and like Kantor he 
has exhibited artwork around the world as well as touring his theatre 
productions internationally. Also, both artists share an interest in the everyday, 
in stylisation and anti-naturalism and in non-narrativity as means of exploring 
the abstract and the surreal in performance. Both artists have used non-
professional performers. However, beyond this Kantor’s spectacles bear little 
similarity to Wilson’s. Where Wilson’s formal stage compositions tend towards 
the cool and austere in their minimalism, Kantor’s spectacles seethe with all the 
vitality of a rubbish-dump come to life. Wilson’s work derives from the formalist 
tradition of the American avant-garde of Kaprow, Cage, Cunningham and Glass, 
which focuses on the intellectual manipulation of elements according to a 
predetermined set of rules, the focus being the form and the manipulation of 
elements rather than the elements themselves.13 Kantor’s work, as I will later 
show, derives more from European, Polish and Russian avant-garde sources.
Outline of Thesis
Eschewing a direct analysis of Kantor’s major ‘theatre of death’ spectacles, I will 
instead adopt an oblique strategy by approaching them by way of key ‘minor’ 
works: a manifesto, a happening, a ‘poor object’ and a painting. In part this 
strategy is informed by the idea of ‘the minor’ in the writing of Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari (1986: 16–27 and 1988: 105–106 and 469–471). Perhaps 
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12 See Appendix 1.6 regarding exhibitions of Kantorʼs work featuring Kantorʼs theatrical objects 
as artworks.
13 See Kaprow, Allen 1966: 200–201.
predictably the image of Kantor’s work is almost entirely dominated by his major 
final five ‘theatre of death’ spectacles. In this sense these performances, and 
images from them, have come to occupy a hegemonic ‘majoritarian’ and 
somewhat ‘constant’ face of Kantor’s work as a whole. For me, they originally 
seemed divorced from Kantor’s other art. However, this is not the reality of 
those performances, which, as I will show, arose not out of, but as part of the 
process of Kantor’s art as a whole. Viewing these late performances as his 
crowning achievement effectively closes down Kantor as a phenomenon, by 
seeing his work as something completed, as a purely historical phenomenon. 
That the members of Cricot 2 met with failure when they tried to continue the 
company beyond the tours contracted before Kantor’s death is not the issue. 
What is at stake is Kantor’s belief that his ideas would continue beyond his 
death. By foregrounding ‘minor’, less well known works my intention is to 
deterritorialise Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’, to open up the process of Kantor’s 
work so that a sense of its fluctuating essence may make it possible to see a 
possibility for new creative development based on his ideas. Also, appropriately, 
it has something of the quality of the ‘Schulzian’ and the ‘Kantorian’ in 
approaching Kantor and his work by way of a ‘poor side door’.
This thesis will therefore continue as follows: In chapter two I will review 
the literature concerning the artist and his work and highlighting relevant 
contributions to the problems of interpretation and understanding that I have 
indicated so far. I will identify key factors informing Kantor’s work that potentially 
problematise its interpretation and understanding, particularly the cluster of 
ideas concerning ‘reality of the lowest rank’ and the ‘poor object’ that will be 
discussed in more detail in later chapters. I will discuss the place of Witkiewicz 
and Gombrowicz in Kantor’s influences and discuss why I later concentrate on 
Schulz (to their virtual exclusion), as being more essentially in sympathy with 
Kantor’s concerns. Chapter two will conclude by identifying the need for a 
contextual approach that allows for Kantor’s metaphysical concerns to be seen 
as arising out of his experience. This approach requires a reorientation of 
concerns around the problem of interpretation that will be addressed in the 
following two chapters.
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Chapter three takes one of the pieces referred to in chapter two, a 1985 
essay by the Polish theatre critic Andrzej Żurowski, as a case study, using it as 
a basis for a reassessment of the critique of representation, which, I argue is a 
necessary contextual element for understanding Kantor’s work in terms of 
adequately addressing its essentially metaphysical force. The discussion, 
following Heidegger, aligns the problems of interpretation and understanding, 
traditionally seen as epistemological concerns, with fundamental metaphysical 
questions of being. In this way, the epistemological will be seen as ontological, 
the essential as existential, the aesthetic as ethical and the personal as 
universal. Basing its reassessment on this Heideggerian view of human being, 
the chapter begins to open up ways in which such a perspective resonates with 
Kantor’s work.
Chapter four addresses the problem of interpretation and understanding 
from a metaphysical perspective using Kantor’s 1978 ‘Mały manifest’ (Little 
Manifesto) as an axis around which to orient its discussion. The enigma of the 
curiously disappearing voice in Kantor’s manifesto is examined in the light of 
Agamben’s discussion of aesthetics and voice in his early writings. Relating this 
to the discussion of negative ontology in the previous chapter, chapter four goes 
on to locate the problem of interpretation and understanding within Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic discourse.
Chapter five addresses the ontological implications of the discussion of the 
problem of representation begun in chapter three. It takes one of Kantor’s minor 
works, a happening dating from 1968, as a site around which to focus a 
discussion of the ideas of ‘reality of the lowest rank’ and ‘the poor object’. The 
chapter examines the origin of these ideas in Kantor’s experience of the 
occupation in Kraków and his role as a witness to aspects of the Nazi ‘Final 
Solution’. The discussion relates this to the ethical concerns of Michel 
Foucault’s notions of ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’, especially as refracted through 
the more recent Agambenian discourse of la nuda vita or ‘bare life’ to illuminate 
the key moment of Jewish presence in The Dead Class.
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Chapter six examines Kantor’s negative aesthetics of poor and low-
ranking objects from a different perspective. Taking as its starting point the 
consistent tension in Kantor’s art between symbolism and abstraction, and 
Constructivism and Surrealism, the discussion explores the idea of the 
presence of certain elements of Russian Constructivism in Kantor’s work, dating 
back to his 1938 student production. In doing so it takes seriously Kantor’s 
apparently ‘lax’ definitions of ‘Constructivism’ in his 1986 Milano Lessons to 
foreground the essential fluidity and blurring of apparently sharply delineated 
artistic categories which were a living reality in pre-Revolutionary Russia around 
the time of Cubo-Futurism. The discussion focuses on the importance of the 
rediscovery of the aesthetics of icon-painting for the pre-Revolutionary Russian 
avant-garde and how key features of the aesthetics of icons can be seen to 
inform a hidden metaphysical, mystical and symbolic undercurrent in 
Suprematist and Constructivist art. Such a mystical, metaphysical character, 
seemingly at odds with the geometrical character of later ‘International 
Constructivism’ allows for a potential reading of Kantor’s works in which, 
together with the concerns of his writings, they can be seen to be using iconic 
techniques to produce their aesthetic effects. The mute voice inherent in 
Kantor’s poor objects, objects such as the wheel, the chair, the gun barrel, the 
plank and the umbrella—all of which have endured in various recurring ways in 
his work—can arguable be heard more clearly when read in the light of the 
metaphysical aesthetics of icons.
Chapter seven examines Kantor’s later development of his negative 
aesthetics in the form of his ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’. It sets a 
reading of his last production Today is My Birthday (1991) against a 
consideration of his last paintings from the Dalej już nic… (‘Further on nothing 
…’) series, which represented a definitive return to figuration in his painting. It 
discusses in particular his increasing move from a position on the borderline 
between stage and audience, to the placing of himself more centrally within his 
work, whether on stage or within his pictures. It contrasts this move to include 
himself within his own work with Franz Kafka’s ostensibly comparable gesture in 
his last story, ‘A Fasting Showman’. In setting Kafka alongside Kantor in this 
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way, the particular positivity of Kantor’s negative aesthetics can be highlighted. 
This is articulated within a return to and continuation of the discussion of the 
nature of human being begun in chapter three. The discussion draws on 
Heidegger and Agamben’s discussion of Rainer Maria Rilke’s idea of ‘the Open’ 
in his eighth ‘Duino Elegy’.
The thesis concludes with a brief reflection on the paradoxical presence of 
the essential nothingness behind the performative nature of human being that is  
revealed in Kantor's work.
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CHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE AND DISCOURSE ON KANTOR
Introduction
Although in Poland, Kantor was a prominent public figure, publishing articles 
and himself appearing as the subject of articles and interviews in newspapers 
and journals, he did not become the subject of more extended book-length 
studies until the 1980s. Previously, in West Germany, Dietrich Mahlow had 
made the documentary Kantor ist da: Die Künstler und sein welt (Kantor is 
Here: The Artist and His World) for Saar Television, broadcast in 1969. In 
France, Denis Bablet had published a selection of Kantor’s writings, Le théâtre 
de la mort (The Theatre of Death) in 1977, followed by another edited collection 
of writings, Métamorphoses, in 1982. In Poland the 1980s saw the publication 
of the large-format book by Kantor’s friend and colleague from the Warsaw 
Foksal Gallery, Wiesław Borowski, featuring black and white reproductions and 
photographs of the entire range of the artist’s work up to the time of Wielopole, 
Wielopole. Importantly it included lengthy interviews with Kantor about his life 
and work together with a selection of his writings. Borowski’s book was followed 
in 1984 by the publication of the partytura (score) of Wielopole, Wielopole 
edited by Barbara Borowska, which included further selections of Kantor’s 
writings in the form of his two collections of essays Teksty autonomiczne 
(Autonomous Texts), and Miejsce teatralne (Theatrical Place) together with the 
Partytura teatralna (The Theatrical Score) of Wielopole, Wielopole) and 
photographs of that production alongside reproductions of his preceding work. 
In France, Bablet published his book-length study, T. Kantor, in 1983 and 
dedicated volume XI of Les Voies de la création théâtrale to his work, this 
volume offering a further selection of Kantor’s texts, interviews and interpretive 
and contextualising essays (a second volume followed in 1993 devoted to 
Kantor’s later work). In the same year in Germany, Günther K. Kühnel published 
a volume on Kantor, Tadeusz Kantor: Theatre des Todes. Die tote Klasse. 
Wielopole - Wielopole (The Theatre of Death: The Dead Class; Wielopole, 
Wielopole), which included translations of selected texts by Kantor. This 
German interest in Kantor was followed in 1988 by the publication of an 
36
important collection of the artist’s writings by Nawrocki et al.: Ein Reisender - 
seine Texte und Manifeste (A Traveller: His Texts and Manifestos).14 In Poland 
in 1990 Pleśniarowicz published his doctoral thesis on Kantor as Teatr Śmierci 
Tadeusza Kantora (Tadeusz Kantor's Theatre of Death). Following this, the 
1990s and the first decade of this century have seen a gradually increasing 
stream of articles and books on Kantor in Poland and Western Europe. 
Between 1988 and 2003 Anna Halczak published the three Cricot 2 Theatre 
Information Guides containing selected essays and newspaper articles and 
other material concerning Kantor’s work from 1986 until his death. In 1991 there 
was a simultaneous publication in French (Ma création, Mon voyage: 
Commentaires intimes) and Italian (La mia opera, Il mio viaggio: Commento 
intimo) of a lavishly produced album of colour reproductions of Kantor’s 
paintings overseen by the artist himself before his death and including a further 
selection of his writings. In 1990 a book on Kantor’s work was published in 
Japan (Getjutsuka Jo, Kutabare, translated by Hidenaga Ōhtori) and in the 
following year Het circus van de dood, a translation of a selection of Kantor’s 
writings by Johan de Boose was published in Holland. Importantly, the first 
edition in Poland of Kantor’s complete writings was published by the Cricoteka 
in three volumes edited by Pleśniarowicz between 2000 and 2005.
In addition to French and German interest in Kantor, following his stay in 
Florence where he prepared Wielopole, Wielopole at the invitation of the 
municipal authorities, there has been a wealth of Italian publications about him, 
especially albums of photographs of the ‘theatre of death’ performances from 
The Dead Class onwards (for example, see Maurizio Buscarino 1981, 1997 and 
2001, and Romano Martinis 1982 and 2001, and books concerning Kantor’s 
stay in Italy (for example the three volumes of Memorio del teatro edited by 
Luigi Arpini, Józef Chrobak and Valerio Valoriani respectively, published in 
2002). 
37
14 The only full-length study devoted explicitly to the topic of philosophy in relation to Kantorʼs 
work is also German: Dietmar Wiewióraʼs 1998 Materie, kollektive Erinnerung und individuelle 
Existenz im Theater von Tadeusz Kantor, 1983–1991 (Matter, collective memory and individual 
existence in the theater of Tadeusz Kantor, 1983–1991).
As already indicated, the nature of the critical response to Kantor has 
been characterised by a certain fragmentation that arises out of Poland’s 
specific situation in the twentieth century. What should have been a culture free 
to mediate between ‘East’ and ‘West’, a role it was actively fulfilling during its 
independence of the inter-war period, instead became one of the states 
embroiled in the combination of stagnation and resistance characterising the 
satellites of the Soviet bloc between 1945 and 1989. Consequently, the 
translation of the Polish literature on Kantor into English has been slow and 
incomplete and, save for three English translations of key Polish texts, largely 
remains so. Related to this, the barrier of the Iron Curtain meant that the 
number of foreigners able to engage with Kantor’s work were, until relatively 
recently, few. Also, because of the nature of Poland’s partitions, English has not 
historically been one of its natural ‘second languages’, whereas French, 
German and Russian have. Consequently, it is not surprising that the critical 
appreciation of Kantor outside of Poland has historically emanated from France 
and Germany (Kantor himself spoke and read French and German fluently).
There are, to date, six books on Kantor available in English. The first of 
these to be published was George M. Hyde’s and Mariusz Tchorek’s edited 
translation of Kantor’s partytura for Wielopole, Wielopole. This was published in 
1990 as Wielopole/Wielopole. An exercise in theatre.15 This was followed in 
1993 by Michal Kobialka’s book A Journey Through Other Spaces: Essays and 
Manifestos 1944–1990 Tadeusz Kantor. This is a large collection of Kobialka’s 
edited and ‘authorised’ (though often idiosyncratic) translations of Kantor’s 
manifestos and related writings followed by three long critical essays which offer 
contextualisation and a postmodernising interpretation of Kantor and his work. 
This publication has meant that the English-speaking reader’s access to 
Kantor’s written work is almost entirely via Kobialka’s translations. The third 
book to be published in English was William Brand’s excellent translation of 
Pleśniarowicz’s revised and expanded edition of his 1990 book Teatr Śmierci 
Tadeusza Kantora, published by the Cricoteka in 1994 as The Dead Memory 
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Machine: Tadeusz Kantor’s Theatre of Death (1994a, republished in a further 
revised second edition by Black Mountain Press in 2004 using the same 
translator). Pleśniarowicz’s book (especially in its 2004 edition) is undoubtably 
the fullest account of Kantor’s life and work currently available in English. 
Understandably however, from a Polish academic, it assumes an intimate 
knowledge of Polish culture. Also, because it was published in Poland it was 
difficult to obtain until the publication of its second edition a decade later. These 
three books have essentially formed the gateway to Kantor for the Anglo-
American readership until relatively recently and, as such, form a matrix of 
problems for the reception and interpretation of Kantor and his work. They have 
been followed by three more books, all published in Britain or the United States: 
Krzysztof Miklaszewski’s 1992 Polish book Spotkania z Tadeuszem Kantorem 
(Meetings with Tadeusz Kantor) was edited and translated by Hyde as 
Encounters with Tadeusz Kantor and published in 2002. This was a valuable 
addition as it contained useful interviews with Kantor and contextual material 
regarding his later performances and tours, providing a useful source of 
Kantor’s views outside of his own writing. Kantor’s interviews are frequently a 
critical source of information. He often elaborates on ideas from his work and 
writings and expands into areas about which he otherwise remains silent. 
Miklaszewski, an art historian, journalist and filmmaker, toured for a time with 
Kantor as one of his actors and therefore his own essays in this volume provide 
a useful first-hand insight into some of Kantor’s work. In 2009 Kobialka 
published his second book dedicated to Kantor, Further On Nothing: Tadeusz 
Kantor’s Theatre, containing new translations of Kantor’s writings with 
(inexplicably) some republished from the earlier book together with five chapters 
continuing the author’s stated project of postmodernising Kantor. In 2010, Noel 
Witts has produced a short volume for the Routledge Performance Practitioners 
series simply titled Tadeusz Kantor, which draws heavily on Pleśniarowicz’s 
2004 book as well as work in Kobialka’s first book and Hyde’s translation of 
Miklaszewski’s collection. Finally, following the exhibition An Impossible 
Journey: The Art and Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor and accompanying symposium 
Kantor Was Here in 2009 at the Sainsbury Centre for the Visual Arts in Norwich 
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an illustrated collection of essays was published (2011) entitled Kantor Was 
Here: Tadeusz Kantor in Great Britain, edited by Katarzyna Murawska-
Muthesius with Natalia Zarzecka, the current director of the Cricoteka archive in 
Kraków. This is easily the most extensive and lavishly produced book on Kantor 
in English with a welcome British perspective. In the editors’ words, ‘the volume 
is a collage of memories, interview, newly unveiled archival material, as well as 
new critical approaches to Kantor’s art’ (Murawska-Muthesius and Zarzecka 
2011: 9). It contains papers given at the symposium with essays commissioned 
for the book. The contributions include short essays by Hyde and Witts, 
contributions from Richard Demarco, Richard Gough and David Gothard, an 
interview with Nicholas Serota, and interesting perspectives from art historians, 
curators and archivists, which counterbalance the usual interpretation of Kantor 
in Great Britain as primarily a theatre director. However, although the 
contributions provide a range of valuable British perspectives that complements 
the work of Pleśniarowicz and Kobialka, the book as a whole does not 
constitute a new coherent study of Kantor.
Obviously there is much that is valuable in these six books. However, 
except for Kantor Was Here, they all approach Kantor and his work from the 
perspective of his later theatrical work, particularly the major five performance 
spectacles that constitute his ‘theatre of death’ cycle. Consequently it is not 
surprising that the perception of Kantor in the English-speaking world is that he 
is a theatre director, or a ‘man of the theatre’. Pleśniarowicz and Kobialka are 
theatre historians (although the former worked closely with Kantor from the 
inception of the Cricoteka in 1980 until his death) and Witts’ background is also 
as a professor of performing arts. Miklaszewski, although sensitive to Kantor’s 
interest in art is predominantly involved with Kantor’s work as an actor in some 
of his key productions. Hyde, perhaps alone of this group of authors publishing 
in English, is unusual in that his background is as a professor of comparative 
literature rather than someone operating within the theatre or performing arts 
domain. As I will later discuss, Hyde’s background, as attested by the editors of 
the volume of essays dedicated to him (Bystydzieńska and Harris 1999) means 
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that, of all the authors mentioned, he is best qualified to contextualise Kantor 
and his work for an English-speaking audience. 
With the work of Pleśniarowicz (1994 and 2004) and Kobialka (1993 and 
2009), the problem is again that, as Polish nationals, they do not share Hyde’s 
awareness and sensitivity to the inherent difficulty that the intricate complexities 
of Polish culture presents to the Anglo-American reader. As such, Pleśniarowicz 
and Kobialka’s books, useful as they each are, suffer from the unintentional 
assumption of a Polish-literate readership. As Paul Allain notes in his recent 
review of Witts’ book (2010: 301) Kantor is an ‘inaccessible’ figure in need of 
appropriate contextualisation (although again he is described as a ‘director/
artist’ as opposed to ‘artist/director’ or rather, as Kantor maintained just ‘artist’). 
Unfortunately, as Teemu Paavolainen notes in his recent doctoral thesis, Witts’ 
book is ‘abounding in mistakes well beyond the systematic misspelling of some 
Polish names’ (Paavolainen 2011: 249, fn. 1). And, although his 
contextualisation is in one sense, as Allain notes, ‘full and rich’ it is 
predominantly descriptive and unanalytical and is little more than a précis of the 
much fuller and more authoritative context supplied by Pleśniarowicz in his 
2004 book from whom Witts draws so heavily.
With Witts book there is also the problem of the intended readership. As 
Allain notes, Witts’ book forms part of a Routledge series aimed at the further 
education market ‘familiar to most drama teachers and students’ and, in the 
closing statement of his review he hopes that: ‘Kantor and his actor/mannequins 
can now return from the dead in classes across the world’ (Allain 2010: 301). 
And this on the basis of a library of (until very recently) five books in English? 
Such a treatment, I would argue, needs to wait until the interpretation and 
understanding of Kantor has progressed. So far, the metaphysical dimension of 
Kantor and a full appreciation of the particularities of his context have been 
provided predominantly by Polish authors writing in, or being translated into 
English, one from a modernist, the other from a postmodernist perspective. 
Hyde’s contribution, excellent though it is, is too brief, and Witts’ is a student-
oriented textbook.
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One can think of different categories for the English discourse on Kantor 
that include the six books so far discussed. This field of discourse can be 
divided into three broad categories. First are those essays and books originally 
published in another language for a native audience and only subsequently 
translated into English for republication for an English-speaking audience as 
well as those published only as English translations. These consist of essays 
and interviews such as: Teresa Krzemień ‘The Actor Becomes an Object’ (1975, 
originally published in 1974 as ‘Przedmiot staja się aktorem’ (The Object 
Becomes the Actor) in Kultura); Bogdan Gieraczyński ‘Kantor’s Art is in a Blind 
Alley or is it That We Are Afraid of Ourselves … Bodan Gieraczyński talks to 
Tadeusz Kantor (1981); Jan Kott ‘The Theater of Essence: Kantor and 
Brook’ (1983, originally published in 1983 as ‘Teatr esencji: Kantor i Brook’ in 
Zeszyty Literackie, no. 2), ‘Tadeusz Kantor’ (1991a) and ‘Kantor, Memory, 
Memoire’ (1991b); Andrzej Żurowski ‘“Pulling Faces at the Audience”: the 
Lonely Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor’ (1985); Barbara Sawa ‘Art is a kind of 
exhibition’ (1990, originally published in Polish in 1988 in Polityka as ‘Sztuka 
musi być personalna’ (Art Should Be Personal)); Irina Maślińska ‘Art Is a 
Crime’ (1991, originally published in 1990 as ‘Sztuka jest przestępstwem’ in 
Polityka). This category would also include books that are published in bilingual 
versions with English translations but are only available in the country of origin, 
for example: Jarosław Suchan (ed.) Tadeusz Kantor. Niemożliwe/Impossible 
(2000); Romano Martinis and Silvia Parlagreco (ed.) Tadeusz Kantor—Cricot 2 
(2001); and Suchan (ed.) Tadeusz Kantor. Interior of Imagination (2005). In this 
category there tends to be little or no concession made to non-Polish or non-
continental-European readers.
Of this category the 1985 essay by Andrzej Żurowski is particularly 
noteworthy in its identification of ‘a law of shock’ that reigned after the almost 
universal adulation that greeted the advent of The Dead Class in 1975, an 
event that, according to the theatre critic Tomasz Raczek, whom Żurowski cites: 
‘stupefied the art critics, in most cases leaving them completely ignorant and 
helpless in the face of a new phenomenon’ (Raczek in Żurowski 1985: 364). 
Żurowski concurs observing that The Dead Class ‘caused such a surprise that 
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the resulting critical helplessness produced unreserved admiration devoid of 
any broader reflection or attempts at an intellectual analysis. This was the law of 
shock. It is time we recovered from it’ (Ibid.: 365). Żurowski’s response to this 
‘law of shock’ and ‘critical helplessness’ is to concentrate his discussion on ‘a 
certain element of Tadeusz Kantor’ work—in The Dead Class, 
Wielopole,Wielopole, and Where are the Snows of Yesteryear?—that repels me 
so strongly that I cannot view these productions objectively’ (Ibid.: 364). This 
‘certain element’ is the fact of Kantor’s actual on-stage presence in his own 
performances. It is this that struck most reviewers in the press on Kantor’s 
appearances in the United Kingdom, and it is this aspect of Kantor’s work that I 
will discuss at some length in chapter three.
A second category of writings on Kantor in English is represented by the 
essays and books by Polish authors or authors of Polish origin written in English 
(or specifically for translation into English). Publications in this category, besides 
those already dealt with, include Kobialka, ‘Let the Artists Die? An Interview with 
Tadeusz Kantor’ (1986), his 1993 book already mentioned, ‘Forget 
Kantor’ (1994a) and ‘Of Lost Memories and Representational 
Practices’ (1994b); and Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz’s 2004 book. In this category 
the authors have tried to adapt their work for an English-speaking audience by 
including some contextualising biographical and explanatory material, although 
this is open to the problems mentioned above.
Thirdly, there are publications originally written in English by native 
English-speaking authors. In addition to those works already cited that fall into 
this category it currently includes essays and one book: Hyde’s ‘A new lease of 
death: Kantor’s “Wielopole/Wielopole”’ (1985, republished as the introduction to 
Hyde and Tchorek 1990), ‘The Word Unheard: “Form” in Modern Polish 
Drama’ (1988) and a short obituary in Plays and Players,‘Tadeusz 
Kantor’ (1991). Hyde also contributed a lengthy essay to European Theatre 
1960–1990 Cross Cultural Perspectives edited by Ralph Yarrow (1992) entitled 
‘Poland (Dead Souls Under Western Eyes)’; four sections of this essay were 
devoted to Kantor with the respective titles of: ‘Tadeusz Kantor: Death and the 
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Dada’, ‘Kantor’s Theatre of Death’, ‘Measuring Up to the Power Game’ and 
‘Another Savage Parade’. Finally, Hyde’s last published words concerning 
Kantor are the three-page ‘Translator’s Preface’ and illuminating contextualising 
footnotes in the 2002 edition of Miklaszewski’s book. The other writer to deal 
with Kantor in English is the American scholar Daniel Gerould, an expert on 
Witkiewicz. His published essays on Kantor consist of ‘A Visual Artist Works 
Magic on the Polish Stage’ (1980), ‘Kantor at Home’ (1986) and ‘Iconographic 
Images in the Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor’ (1995). There is now also Noel Witts’ 
recent volume for the Routledge Performance Practitioners series (2010) and 
the excellent 2011 volume edited by Murawska-Muthesius and Zarzecka 
following the 2009 Norwich exhibition. 
The English-speaking discourse should therefore technically be defined in 
terms of the second and third category above, with the translated discourse 
from the first category informing it. Consequently the translated discourse 
originating from Poland and the continent stands at a remove from a readership 
in Britain and the United States, as do, to a lesser extent, the English language 
publications from the Polish authors (category two). As I have pointed out 
above, Kantor’s art and theatre enjoyed popularity in continental Europe long 
before it did in Britain or the United States. The continental bias of the literature 
on Kantor is therefore to be expected. It is probably also the case that the 
continental intelligentsia enjoy an easier affinity with the European avant-garde 
movements such as Dada, Cubism, Futurism, Suprematism, Constructivism 
and Surrealism from which Kantor’s art derives (as Kobialka notes, 1993: 388–
389 fn.2). Whilst it is to be expected that Polish authors will enjoy a privileged 
familiarity with their own history and culture there is also a certain shared 
understanding of European modernism throughout Western and Central 
Europe. Such a close familiarity with this specifically European culture is not so 
obviously the case in Britain or the United States. In these countries there is a 
tendency for European cultural modernism to be perceived as ‘other’, although 
in different ways: in Britain artists such as Ben Nicholson, Barbara Hepworth or 
Henry Moore used to be seen as either marginal or not ‘English’ (see below), 
whilst North American artists such as Jackson Pollock, William De Kooning or 
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Mark Rothko, came to be perceived as ‘New American Painting’, and therefore 
not ‘European’ (although undeniably owing a debt to European modernist 
abstraction) (Langmuir and Lynton 2000: 5). The significance of this is the 
question of how much the cultural perspectives between British or American 
authors who write about Kantor, and their continental or Polish counterparts are 
shared or divergent. Conversely, the potential problems with Polish or 
continental commentators writing on Kantor may be a lack of sensitivity to, or 
awareness of, the Anglo-American cultural perspective, whilst in other ways 
being closer to Kantor’s European modernist sources.
For example, from the English perspective there is a historical tendency to 
distrust continental-European avant-garde movements. The painter Ben 
Nicholson and the sculptors Barbara Hepworth and Henry Moore are key 
figures in twentieth-century art who attempted to establish a European-style 
modernism in England during the 1930s. According to Emma Barker in her 2004 
essay ‘“English” abstraction: Nicholson, Hepworth and Moore in the 1930s’:
A recurrent theme in discussion of their work has, 
however, been the assumption of a fundamental 
opposition between international modernism, as 
exemplified by abstract art, on the one hand, and a 
national tradition, typically identified as ‘English’ and 
associated with landscape, on the other. Hence the 
abstract works produced by Nicholson and Hepworth 
during the 1930s have been seen to involve (in the words 
of Charles Harrison) ‘the very extinction of Englishness’.
(Barker in Edwards and Wood 2004: 273)
Consequently, although there was an attempt by a minority of British artists to 
work in the tradition of the European avant-garde they were either marginalised 
or seen as unique individual artists rather than as part of the continental 
tradition. This attitude is encapsulated by a comment from Paul Nash made in 
1932: ‘From all foreign influences, abstractions and the school of Paris, good 
Lord deliver us’ (Nash 1932: 322, cited in Barker Ibid.; emphasis in original).
The discourse on Kantor to date has therefore been predominantly Polish, 
French, German or Italian in origin. In the current English-speaking discourse 
on Kantor the main points of reference therefore remain: Hyde and Tchorek’s 
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translated and edited book Wielopole/Wielopole, Kobialka’s two books (1993 
and 2009), Hyde’s 2002 edition of Miklaszewski’s 1992 book, the 2004 new 
edition of Pleśniarowicz’s book and finally Witt’s 2010 and Murawska-Muthesius 
and Zarzecka 2011.
As previously noted, Hyde and Tchorek’s book is an edited and translated 
version of Kantor’s partytura (score) for his 1980 production published in Poland 
in 1984. Useful as this is as a key English resource on Kantor it is not a 
translation of all the material included in the Polish publication.16 However, the 
English publication does include an excellent short introduction from one of the 
editors, Hyde: ‘A new lease of death: Kantor’s “Wielopole/Wielopole”’, an essay 
originally published in 1985 in the journal Comparative Criticism. Hyde has so 
far been the only British writer, until Noel Witts’ recent book (2010), to write 
extensively on Kantor. (Witts had published nothing substantial on Kantor until 
his 2010 book.) From 1976 to 1979 Hyde worked as a visiting British Council 
Lecturer in English Literature at the Marie Curie Skłodowska University in 
Lublin. He returned to Poland later and from 1992–1993 was a visiting British 
Council Professor at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. As a Senior Lecturer 
at the University of East Anglia from 1970 Hyde published a series of essays 
and reviews about Polish authors and Polish theatre and introduced an English-
speaking audience to the work of Polish writers such as Cyprian Norwid, 
Schulz, Gombrowicz, Tadeusz Konwicki, Aleksander Wat, Tadeusz Różewicz as 
well as Tadeusz Kantor (Bystydzieńska and Harris 1999: 8).
According to Grażyna Bystydzieńska and Emma Harris, Hyde ‘fell under 
the spell of a culture in which he found “surreal and subversive forms that kept 
the avant-garde alive longer than anywhere else in Europe, not just as a trend 
but almost as if it was the bread and butter of the culture”’ (1999: 8). It is Hyde’s 
exposure to these avant-garde trends and his understanding of them in situ—as 
being alive in Polish culture—that makes him such a sensitive commentator on 
Kantor. Hyde said that he felt that, in Poland, he was still living in the heyday of 
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16 See Pleśniarowicz (2004: 232, fn. 596). For detail of material omitted see Appendix 1.7.
European modernism, and that his ‘favourite academic literary issues were 
those of the world outside my window’ (Ibid.: 8).
Having lived in Poland myself in the early 1980s, just after the period that 
Hyde is describing, I can attest to this peculiarity of Polish culture. The feeling 
that the avant-garde is ‘bread and butter of the culture’ is perhaps not so 
evident in Poland now, freed from the yoke of communism and entangled in 
consumer capitalism, but it was a tangible and almost magical phenomenon 
during Kantor’s lifetime. Understanding this difference between Polish and 
British culture is one of Hyde’s strengths, and his essays on Kantor offer 
valuable insights for the Anglo-American audience. Hyde’s account of his time 
in Poland in the ‘Afterword’ to Bystydzieńska and Harris 1999 is an evocative 
picture of the existential and metaphysical qualities of life in Poland as 
perceived by a Western outsider, and is a useful companion to Timothy Garton 
Ash’s essays on his experiences in Poland behind the Iron Curtain in his 1999 
collection of essays The Uses of Adversity. Unfortunately Hyde’s writings on 
Kantor, as already noted, amount to only five pieces. In 1985 he published a 
short essay, ‘A new lease of death: Tadeusz Kantor and Wielopole/
Wielopole’ (this was reprinted as the introduction to his 1990 book with 
Tchorek). In 1999 a volume of essays in English translation was published in 
Poland and dedicated to Hyde in which, according to the editors, Hyde’s six-
and-a-half-page introduction ‘in itself constitutes a significant monograph in 
English on Kantor’s theatre’ (Bystydzieńska and Harris 1999: 8). The editors of 
From Norwid to Kantor: Essays on Polish Modernism Dedicated to Professor G. 
M. Hyde, go on to quote from a review by Professor Włodzimierz Bolecki in 
Życie Warszawy:
Hyde’s excellent introduction deserves attention; this is a 
searching study of the whole theatrical history of this 
Polish director. Hyde shows with insight and precision the 
links between Kantor’s theatre and the twentieth century 
avant-garde in painting (cubism, dadaism, Constructivism, 
surrealism, art informel etc.) and in the theatre (Craig); he 
also shows the links with the Polish literary tradition 
(Wyspiański, Witkacy, Schulz, Gombrowicz) and Polish 
painting (Chwistek, Czyżewski, Kobro, Strzemiński). 
Hyde’s interpretation of the sources of the symbolism are 
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penetrating and represent a highly pertinent approach to 
the work of this great director.
(Bolecki cited in Bystydzieńska and Harris 1999: 8, fn. 2)
As noted above the original 1985 essay was followed by essays published in 
1988, 1991, and 1992, followed by the translator’s preface and editorial material 
in Miklaszewski 2002.
Hyde’s contribution to elucidating Kantor’s work is undoubtably the most 
helpful for the English-speaking reader. It is a shame that, owing to the relative 
brevity of his writings on Kantor it does not have the density of valuable detail 
as exempified by Pleśniarowicz’s translated writings. Hyde has an appropriate 
sense of the need to unpack the Polish references for the non-Polish-literate 
reader together with a sensitivity to the metaphysical import of Kantor’s work 
itself. In the rest of this chapter I will deal the issues that arise from a 
consideration of the particular critical approaches to Kantor’s work taken by 
Hyde, Kobialka, Pleśniarowicz and Witts.
One strategy that has been used to interpret Kantor is to examine his work 
through an existing critical discourse. In his 1993 book, Kobialka complements 
his descriptive accounts of Kantor’s key performances with an analysis based 
on a poststructuralist/postmodernist reading of Kantor’s work that draws heavily 
on readings of the work of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. It is the problem 
of appropriateness of discourse that is most particular to Kobialka’s reading. In 
his 1996 review of Kobialka’s book Jeffrey Lawson rightly argues that 
‘Kobialka’s principal assertion is that Kantor’s work anticipated much that came 
to be claimed as the province of postmodernism. By the time of Kantor’s 
Theatre of Death, Kantor was able to play out an encounter between “the Self, 
the three-dimensional body, and the Other, the multidimensional 
memory”’ (Lawson 1996: 150 citing Kobialka 1993: 312–13). Lawson points out 
that the orientation of the perspective in Kantor’s writings looks backwards 
across the landscape of the twentieth-century avant-gardes rather than 
forwards. If Kantor’s and his work is presented from Kobialka’s position what is 
foregrounded is the discourse of Foucauldian and Deleuzian poststructuralism 
in such a way that the discourse becomes distracting. For example there are 
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more references by Kobialka to Foucault in the index to his book than there are 
to either Schulz or Gombrowicz, two of Kantor’s major influences. This is in 
contrast to Hyde, Gerould and Pleśniarowicz who all recognise the important 
place of Witkiewicz, Gombrowicz and Schulz in Kantor’s range of influences. 
There are four references in Kobialka to Gombrowicz, only one of which is a 
reference to Ferdydurke, which, as has been discussed, was one of the key 
sources for The Dead Class. There are only three references to Schulz, one of 
which mentions ‘The Treatise on the Mannequins [sic]’. There are no references 
to ‘The Old Age Pensioner’, one of the principle Schulzian sources for The 
Dead Class, or to ‘The Sanitorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass’, which was 
surely one of the main sources for Kantor’s concept of the metaphysics of 
death. There is consequently no meaningful discussion of Gombrowicz or 
Schulz, their influence or the way elements of their work were used by Kantor in 
Kobialka’s 1993 discussions. There are ten references to Witkiewicz, seven of 
which are to Tumor Brainiowicz, another of the principle sources for The Dead 
Class. However, as five of Kantor’s productions used Witkiewicz plays as their 
principle springboard (apart from The Dead Class which was the first production 
to incorporate ideas from other authors in equal partnership) it is surprising that 
there are not more references. There is no discussion of Witkiewicz such as 
Hyde attempts in his 1988 essay, and nowhere is there the detailed analysis of 
the way Kantor uses textual fragments from Tumor Brainiowicz in The Dead 
Class, as there is in Pleśniarowicz (2004).
Kobialka’s discussion of Kantor’s Informel period may serve as an 
example of how his use of a Foucauldian reading can prove a distraction. While 
discussing Kantor’s 1961 informel production of Witkacy’s Country House and 
its 1961 manifesto Kobialka cites phrase taken from Michel Foucault’s The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1972):
Matter, always changing and fluid, contains in itself all 
possible past, present, and future structures, which 
constitute, as Michel Foucault observes, ‘unlimited, 
apparently formless fields of discourse.’ Matter inhabits its 
own world, whose horizon is not limited by external 
referents.
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(Kobialka 1993: 287)
The original context of Foucault’s ‘observation’, in the translation cited by 
Kobialka, is as follows:
But what, in fact, have I been speaking about so far? What 
has been the object of my inquiry? And what did I intend to 
describe? ‘Statements’—both in that discontinuity that 
frees them from all the forms in which one was so ready to 
allow them to be caught, and in the general, unlimited, 
apparently formless fields of discourse.
(Foucault 1972: 79)
Foucault, it transpires, is not here discussing matter, but rather ‘statements’ in 
‘formless fields of discourse’. This is confusing given that discourse normally 
has a referent whilst it is at least debatable if the same can be said of matter. 
Whilst Kobialka is right to point out the importance of informe for Kantor it is 
difficult to understand why Kobialka doesn’t explore Kantor’s matrix of sources 
in Witkacy, Gombrowicz and Schulz, the relation between these and the impact 
on Kantor of the Palais de la Découverte scientific exhibition. This would surely 
also have been an ideal place to cite Schulz whose aesthetic authority on the 
nature of matter is central to his fictional universe. Schulz as a Polish source for 
the idea of formlessness predates Kantor’s visit to the Parisian Palais de la 
Découverte in 1947, which became one of the catalysts for his conception of 
matter (Kantor had been reading Schulz in the late 1930s (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 
27)). Schulz would seem a more appropriate illustration than Foucault, who is 
clearly writing about something different. Perhaps, in using Foucault so heavily, 
Kobialka is attempting to locate Kantor in post-modern contemporary theory to 
give the artist’s ideas (and hence, by implication, Polish ideas) a ‘fashionable’ 
and ‘up-to-date’ gloss? I will return to this possibility later in this chapter.
Perhaps this was the case for Kantor too, for in his own way, as Hyde has 
pointed out, Kantor wanted to both stay true to his Polish roots whilst at the 
same time to position himself as part of the international avant-garde tradition. 
Perhaps it is for this reason that mentions of Gombrowicz and Schulz, of 
Constructivism and Jewishness tend to appear only in interviews and not in his 
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own manifestos and publications. During a 1988 interview Kantor comments on 
important trends for him in Poland:
In drama it would be Wyspiański, in painting—Malczewski. 
Bruno Schulz in prose. I mentioned Schulz before, but I 
want to add a few words now. When I created a notion of 
the reality of the lowest rank, I realised I was inspired by 
the Polish inter-war tradition and particularly by Schulz’s 
notion of degraded reality. The difference between Schulz 
and me is that each of us had a different point of 
departure. The important thing, however, is that I do not 
feel isolated with my thoughts: I feel I am a part of a 
certain cultural tradition, and this matters very much to me.
(Kantor in Sawa 1990: 66) 
Gombrowicz and Schulz do not begin to be mentioned by Kantor until the 
early 1970s when they become ‘participants’ in the dramatic séance of The 
Dead Class, after which Schulz alone begins to be mentioned by Kantor in 
interviews. The fact that Kantor does not directly reference these Polish writers 
and artists in the theatre pieces after 1975, does not mean that their influence is  
not present. Kantor was a showman and self-publicist. Although it is commonly 
agreed that he was a ‘great artist and theatre director’, Kantor was extremely 
keen to portray himself as such. One of the ways in which this desire 
manifested itself was in Kantor’s almost obsessive desire to be, and to be seen 
to be, completely original, and more specifically, originally avant-garde. As Jeff 
Lawson points out in his review of Kobialka’s 1993 book, ‘Kantor’s writings were 
colored by his need to be completely original and avant-garde’ himself (1996: 
150). This no doubt stems in part from accusations from other artists and critics 
that he was merely a follower of fashion, a dabbler who brought back the latest 
trinkets of avant-garde styling from his trips abroad. Jarosław Suchan, in his 
essay accompanying the 2000 exhibition Tadeusz Kantor: Impossible, notes 
that Bożena Kowalska considered Kantor, in her book Polska awangarda 
malarska 1945–1980: Szanse I mity (Polish avant-garde painting 1945–1980: 
Opportunities and myths) as ‘a peddler of the avant-garde, the advocate of 
novelty, the artist deprived of his own artistic expression, a chameleon that 
changed with every next fashion coming from Paris or New York’ (Kowalska 
cited in Suchan 2000: 90). Such an impression of Kantor also stems from the 
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misinterpretation of his work and false comparisons made with other figures.17 
This issue is completely missed by Kobialka, and not foregrounded in other 
commentators.
A further problem that follows on from the apparent success of Kantor’s 
self-publicity is a general uncritical acceptance of Kantor’s account of his own 
artistic development. There is a sense in which all of Kantor’s favourable 
commentators, Hyde, Miklaszewski and Pleśniarowicz included, to an extent 
suffer from Raczek’s ‘law of shock’ mentioned in the Żurowski essay discussed 
earlier: they all seemed swept into an uncritical helplessness in the face of 
Kantor’s unquestioned ‘genius’. Lawson is critical of Kobialka’s tacit acceptance 
of Kantor’s claim, for example, ‘to have anticipated if not discovered many of 
the defining aspects of 20th-century art and theatre, such as the use of 
environments, found objects and even happenings’ (Ibid.). With respect to the 
avant-garde strategies of utilising readymades and found objects, there is a 
sense in which Kantor’s versions of these strategies are subtly different from 
earlier incarnations of similarly named tactics (the same can be argued for 
Kantor’s version of other strategies such as informel, packaging and 
happenings). Kobialka does not tackle this particular problem of originality in 
Kantor, and Lawson correctly admonishes him for just recounting ‘how Kantor 
wanted to be remembered’ and not dealing with ‘the gaps that exist between 
that remembrance and the facts of art and theatrical history’ (Ibid.). As Lawson 
observes, ‘Kantor’s desire for originality infects Kobialka’s work’ (Ibid.: 151).
One strategy for addressing the problem of taking Kantor’s account of 
himself at face value would be to read his work within the rich matrix of contexts 
that it arose out of. Such an approach would produce insights into his major 
later works by reading them both against his earlier work and the various source 
contexts. Seeing more clearly the presence of the influences in Kantor’s work, 
however ghostly or transformed, will provide a richer and deeper understanding.
That Kobialka is committed to a postmodern reading of Kantor continued 
to be evident in his keynote conference presentations (for example, at the Past 
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Masters: Tadeusz Kantor and Cricot 2 in Aberystwyth, 2000, and at The 
Anatomical Theatre Revisited in Amsterdam, 2006) and subsequent journal 
contributions (for example ‘Of the Memory of the Human Unhoused in 
Being’ (2000), ‘Tadeusz Kantor’s Practice: A Postmodern Notebook’ (2006) and 
‘Delirium of the Flesh: “All the Dead Voices” in the Space of the Now’ (2008)). 
Many of these writings have now been subsumed in his latest book on Kantor, 
Further On, Nothing: Tadeusz Kantor’s Theatre, published in 2009. The preface 
to this new book announces Kobialka’s wish ‘to explore further [Kantor’s] 
relationship to what we call today postmodern practice or theory’ (2009: ix). This  
is the crux, for, although Kobialka rightly criticises Hans-Thies Lehmann’s recent 
‘postdramatic’ reading of Kantor (2006) for locating ‘Kantor’s practice within 
traditional dramatic theatre conditions […] grounded in representational 
practices’ (Ibid.), his entire attempt to do so is itself grounded in postmodern 
discourse. It is not that this is necessarily wrong or uninteresting; it does, 
however, impose a layer of discourse onto Kantor’s work that obscures the very 
radical nature that it is his intention to reveal. Kobialka would seem to have a 
political agenda that he seeks to ally with Kantor’s anti-commodificational 
stance. This is all very laudable, but it misses the step of understanding the 
nature of Kantor’s radicality in a more fundamental and sympathetic way. When 
Kobialka articulates his arguments within the discourse of, say, Gilles Deleuze, 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Frederic Jameson and Jean-François 
Lyotard he misses out on what I will show is the more sympathetic resonances 
that Kantor has with Heidegger, the father in fact, from which these 
poststructuralists, deconstructionists and postmodernists arguably derive. In 
basing my critique of what Kobialka calls ‘representational practices’ upon 
Heideggerian discourse rather than on what has come after, I am accessing the 
matrix of concerns in Modernism that were Kantor’s own. Whether or not, or 
how much, Kantor prefigured postmodernism, is a later consideration. In saying 
that ‘Kantor’s theatre created a possibility of seeing what cannot really be 
grasped or understood because in its most concrete stage form it shows 
“nothing” or, at best, nostalgia for the impossible’, Kobialka comes very close to 
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the concerns of this thesis. However, in ‘territorialising’ Kantor as a 
postmodernist avant la lettre he diverges from my approach.
Kobialka goes beyond A Journey Through Other Spaces in his latest book. 
He reproduces some of his translations from the older book and includes many 
valuable new ones (a curious duplication that is not explained): in this way the 
dominance of Kobialka’s English translations of Kantor’s writing is further 
advanced. However, there is a significant difference in the scope and 
arrangement of the new volume in comparison to the 1993 book. In the earlier 
volume, Kantor’s writings had pride of place, with Kobialka’s three critical 
essays—‘The Quest for the Self: Thresholds and Transformations’, ‘The Quest 
for the Other: Space/Memory’ and ‘Found Reality’—occupying the position of a 
lengthy afterword to the translations of Kantor’s writings. In the new book, 
however, which sits unambiguously under his authorship,18 his translations and 
essays are interspersed with each other, this notwithstanding the fact that the 
essays themselves are already copiously illustrated with Kobialka’s translations 
from Kantor’s writings. In his preface he states that ‘it is my hope that this book 
will be seen as a performance of the complex palimpsest of Kantor’s work and 
my encounter with this work’ (Ibid.: xiv). Although it is useful to have these new 
translation, it would have been more useful to have full translations of 
Pleśniarowicz’s three-volume edition of Kantor’s complete writings published in 
2004–2005, and a separate book that more clearly deliniated Kobialka’s 
argument as an approach to Kantor and his work, rather than the implication in 
the current volume that it is part of, or symbiotic with it.
Kobialka’s preoccupation with a postmodernising approach to Kantor and 
his work may be seen as an interesting indication of a particular kind of recent 
Polish national bias observed by the Polish literary historian and theorist 
Włodzimierz Bolecki in his 1999 essay ‘Post-modernising modernism’ (in: 
Bystydzieńska and Harris 1999: 127–142). Bolecki notes that in Poland:
in the early 1990s, political change went hand in hand with 
change in the aesthetic and artistic sphere. A new erea 
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18 See Appendix 1.9 regarding the information given on the cover of Kobialka 1993.
required a new name, and when this could not be found in 
politics, it was found in literature and art. The statement 
that we were living in a new era, in the ‘post-modern 
era’—a statement that had already become seriously 
banal in the West in cultural studies and the sociology of 
culture—sounded like a revelation in Poland at the 
beginnng of the 1990s.
(Ibid.: 127)
Although resident in the United States since 1982 when he began his doctoral 
studies, Kobialka (his name would seem to be an Anglicised spelling of the 
Polish ‘Michał Kobiałka’ (see Kobialka 2009: xvi)), is originally Polish, studying 
English and American literature at Warsaw University. As such the double-
edged sword of his Polish cultural literacy—the fact that familiarity can make it 
difficult to know what needs explaining to a non-native readership—is potentially 
compounded by the particular cultural phenomenon noted by Bolecki.19 For 
Bolecki the trend for postmodernism constitutes a paradox because, as he 
notes, ‘Polish literature in recent years has […] produced very few works that 
could be unquestionably categorised as post-modernist’ (Bolecki 1999: 27). In 
consequence, he argues, critics, ‘especially younger ones’ (Ibid.) have been 
forced to ‘search back for examples from the past’ and that it is therefore ‘not 
recent writing that is regarded as typical of Polish post-modernism, but the work 
of three of the best-known writers of the twentieth century: Witkacy [Witkiewicz], 
Gombrowicz and Schulz’ (Ibid.). It is exactly these three figures that, as I shall 
shortly discuss, constitute the key Polish-modernist influence on Kantor’s work. 
However, as Bolecki contends:
Nearly all the critics consider these three writers to have 
been forerunners of Polish post-modernism, because of 
certain characteristic elements in their poetics: parody, 
inter-textuality, anti-mimeticism, multiple signification, 
puns, mixing high and low culture, making fun of the 
existing cultural hierarchies etc.
(Ibid.: 128)
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19 In her recently published essay ʻKantorʼs Art from Informel to Installationʼ, Sarah Wilson notes 
in referencing Kobialkaʼs 1993 book that ʻa frustrating lack of apparatus hampers non-Polish 
scholars hereʼ (Wilson 2011: 138 fn. 6).
Bolecki concedes that superficially this argument seems credible on the basis of 
the particular radicality of these writers’ work, which seems to engage with the 
contradictions in modernism that tend to have been later described by post-
modernist discourse. However, as Bolecki points out:
If Witkacy, Gombrowicz and Schulz can be treated today 
as forerunners of post-modernism, this means only that 
phenomena which are today called post-modernist were 
components of Polish modernism. And so: is this post-
modernism? Or should we rather call it unexplored 
modernism?
(Ibid.)
For Bolecki, the paradox of the ‘post-modernisation’ of these Polish 
modernist figures centres around what he identifies as the fact that ‘in Polish 
literary history there is no concept of modernism that would explain the specific 
nature of the work of these writers’ owing to ‘a gap in Polish literary history 
between, roughly speaking, the year 1918 (the end of Młoda Polska [Young 
Poland]) and the 1980s and 1990s, which are currently seen as the period of 
post-modernist literature’ (Ibid.: 133–134). For Bolecki, Witkiewicz, Gombrowicz 
and Schulz represent ‘the three most important variants of the tradition of 
mature (for it is not even possible to call it late) modernism, which has never 
been analysed in Poland’ (Ibid.: 134). Bolecki traces the history of the particular 
types of the grotesque in these three writers back to antecedents within 
traditions in Easter Europe itself and particularly within the Russian literary 
tradition. This was a tradition that operated on the basis of a ‘destruction of the 
illusion of realism’ (Ibid.: 138), a feature of Kantor’s work that Kobialka identifies 
as anticipating the postmodern. 
In his desire to present Kantor as a postmodern figure, Kobialka continues  
his practice of selective reference to the major theorists of postmodernism. In 
one case, early on in his preface, Kobialka asks: ‘Could it be that Kantor’s 
theatre […] elaborated an initial forgetting, that forgetting which was so 
poignantly described by Jean-François Lyotard on the pages of The 
Postmodern Explained?’ (Kobialka 2009: x). The ‘initial forgetting’ that is 
referred to here occurs in the last paragraph of a letter from Lyotard to 
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Jessamyn Blau on 1 May 1985 containing ‘notes on the meaning of 
“post-”’ (Lyotard 1992: 93), in which Lyotard ends by exhorting the necessity of 
a full engagement with the modernist avant-gardes:
You can see that when it is understood in this way, the 
‘post-’ of ‘postmodern’ does not signify a movement of 
repetition but a procedure in ‘ana-’: a procedure of 
analysis, anamnesis, anagogy and anamorphosis which 
elaborates an ‘initial forgetting’.
(Lyotard 1992: 93)
So, the ʻinitial forgettingʼ is, according to Lyotard, an act of remembrance 
(anamnesis), and a process of critical engagement with the past of the avant-
gardes. This rather makes exactly the point that Bolecki is making against the 
kind of postmodernising that Kobialka can be seen to be engaging in.
Another key point that stems from Kobialkaʼs postmodernising position on 
Kantor is the question of subjectivity. Kobialkaʼs particular reading of 
postmodernism, of Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, is one that is based on the 
tradition deriving from the North American reception of continental philosophy, 
one that refracted these thinkers through the discourses of literary theory and 
cultural studies. As such one of the key tenets of this tendency is that of 
desubjectification, the erasure of the self. As such, Kobialkaʼs overall argument 
would seem to be very similar to mine. However, when Heidegger is seen as 
the immediate source for the philosophers variously categorised as 
ʻpoststructuralistʼ (Deleuze, Foucault), ʻdeconstructionistʼ (Derrida), 
ʻpostmodernʼ (Lyotard) their discourse can be read as part of a different 
tradition, one I argue that has more in common with Kantorʼs concerns (as 
opposed to Kobialkaʼs). As Bolecki has observed: ʻFor the post-modernists, 
“subject” and “subjectivity” are empty words, for the subject does not exist—this 
is one of the slogans of post-modernism, being at the same time a defining 
characteristic of its negative anthropologyʼ (1999: 140). However, as I will go on 
to elaborate in chapter three, Heideggerʼs conception of ʻthe nothingʼ of human 
being is a curiously, paradoxically positive one. Similarly, as Bolecki notes is 
that of Witkacy, Gombrowicz and Schulz, for whom ʻthe subject, the individual, 
individuality, are the most important categories of their thinking and their 
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artʼ (Ibid.). It is no coincidence that as direct influences on Kantor, his thinking 
and art is informed by a similarly strong sense of the individual. Moreover, 
unlike Kobialkaʼs desire to see Kantor as a prophetic critic of post-industrial 
society, the figures that inspired him were, like Kantor himself, products of, as 
Bolecki notes, ʻlate Eastern European feudalism and not industrialismʼ. The 
worlds that they found themselves in they attempted to confront, in the case of 
Gombrowicz and Schulz, with experiments in the presentation of reality or, in 
the case of Schulz, to respond in the form of an escape ʻinto the past […] into 
the hiding places of symbolism and myth, treated as forgotten reservoirs of a 
true Sacred Senseʼ (Ibid.: 141). What is the case in each of these three figures 
of the inter-war Polish avant-garde is that theirs is a uniquely Polish body of 
work, as Bolecki puts it, ʻfull of meanings, ideas and many of the most important 
problems which shaped the European formation of modernismʼ (Ibid.). The fact 
that they helped shape Kantorʼs aesthetic concerns needs to be acknowledged 
and his work needs to be seen within this particular modernist context, rather 
than one in which it is seen as participating in nascent postmodern concerns.
I have indicated some of the ways in which Kantor is a unique artistic 
figure, in the sense that his work, although apparently obscure, has had an 
almost universal appeal to an international audience. However, to understand 
Kantor from an Anglo-American perspective, necessitates overcoming the ‘law 
of shock’, the problem identified by Żurowski as one of remaining at the level of 
a ‘critical helplessness’ that produces ‘unreserved admiration devoid of any 
broader reflection or attempts at an intellectual analysis’ (1985: 365). To recover 
from this critical malaise it is necessary to understand Tadeusz Kantor and his 
work contextually: to understand something of the ground from which it arose. 
For example, Kantor’s work looks unusual. This is partly because in Poland 
during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s under the rule of real socialism, looking 
unusual was merely one of the national reflex strategies for confounding 
censorship. In a 1981 interview with the Party censor ‘K–62’ published in 
Encounter the censor (who preferred to use his old code number) revealed the 
whole things was ‘like a game, where one party tries to get the better of the 
other’, that:
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In my times, the principle on Mysia Street [the location of 
the Censorship Office in Warsaw], was that if a censor did 
not understand what he was reading, the article might be 
let through as such, because the average reader wouldn’t 
understand either. We think that we are more intelligent 
than the average reader. […] Fools are not employed 
there. […] And quite frequently, the higher up you go the 
more liberal it gets. A censor crosses something out, and 
the Chief Censor restores it.
(‘K-62’ 1981: 12)
This reflex for being indirect had been learned by generations of Polish artists 
and intellectuals under the two Partitions,20 and by Kantor’s generation under 
Nazi occupation and the Soviet Imperium. As revealed by ‘K-62’, this was also 
clearly a ‘game’ played by both sides. Hyde has noted:
State socialism was much more that just another form of 
government. It drew heavily upon the iconography both of 
this world and of the next to justify its mysterious ways. It 
generated its own Aesopic language, which dealt in 
indirections and allusions rather than calling a spade a 
spade.
(Hyde 1992: 199)
Such a strategy of resistance can be seen as a fundamental aspect of the 
existential struggle of everyday life in Poland for so much of its troubled history. 
I use the word ‘existential’ here in the sense that the everyday fabric of 
existence is rendered more vivid in terms of the contingent choices that every 
individual is forced to make under the pressure of the particular reality they find 
themselves under: be it occupation by a foreign power or control by the state 
itself. Once the procuring of such ordinary items as meat, sugar or toilet rolls 
becomes an important matter of negotiation for each individual, the randomness 
of life and the consequences of one’s own and others’ decisions take on a 
different tenor from that of a less pressurised, less exceptional normality. The 
balance between the necessity for individual choice and responsibility and the 
awareness of its consequences and potential futility are all too apparent.21 In 
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20 See Appendix 1.10 on the partitioning of Poland.
21 I experienced this reality at first hand whilst living in Poland in 1982–1983, during the period 
of Martial Law.
my opinion it is the sensitivity to such peculiarities of everyday Polish life in the 
mid-twentieth-century that lies behind Kantor’s claim to be ‘almost an 
existentialist’ (Kantor in: Bablet 1991). If this is the case Kantor’s work needs to 
be seen in relation to the reality of Polish life, so that his formal experimentation 
can be seen as grounded in his situation rather than as a series of isolated 
artistic fripperies.
The situation of Kantor as an artist practising during the conditions of 
communist-era Poland can therefore be viewed as ‘existential’. However, more 
generally, any engagement with the hermeneutic project of trying to understand 
someone or something could also be seen as existential. Instead of E. D. 
Hirsch, Jr.’s assertion that ‘ … it is still the author who “determines” the 
meaning’ of a work’ (1967: 23), and the hermeneutic relativity that comes in the 
wake of Gadamer’s assertion of the importance of the historicity of the 
interpreter, I want to recognise the agency of both the artist/author and the 
audience/interpreter. Gadamer writes that ‘If we define the task of hermeneutics 
as the bridging of personal or historical distance between minds, then the 
experience of art would seem to fall entirely outside its province’ (cited in Ling 
1977: 95). An alternative perspective from phenomenology is Heidegger’s in 
Being and Time where he argues that ‘phenomenology’ means, ‘making 
manifest that which shows itself’ (1962: 58). Such a project is existential in the 
sense that, as Eric Matthews explains in his book The Philosophy of Merleau-
Ponty: ‘the subject that engages in phenomenology is not a pure 
consciousness, contemplating that which “appears” to it, but a being who is 
actually part of the reality whose nature he or she seeks to grasp, a being who 
is “in the world”, an “existing” being’ (Matthews 2002: 27). When encountering 
one of Kantor’s performances (whether through the memory of a live 
performance or by way of video, photograph, exhibition or text) a form of the 
paradoxical hermeneutic circle is therefore encountered where any 
understanding of the piece must emerge from some fragment of the mutual soil. 
As noted in chapter one, Kantor commented: ‘I must then reach someone—or 
not’ (Kantor in: Krzemień 1975: 39). But how are the audiences to reach him if 
they can only understand what they witness through their own experience?
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Heidegger, regarding the problem of understanding the concept of ‘being’, 
points out that there is already knowledge of what it is to ‘be’ because the 
individual is already caught in the middle of his or her own process of ‘being’. In 
volume four of his lectures on Nietzsche he argues that the word ‘is’: ‘drifts 
about as the most threadbare word in language, although it sustains all saying, 
and not only in the sense of spoken language’ (Heidegger 1991b, Vol. IV: 188). 
It is consequently difficult to see or understand ‘being’ as a concept in its own 
right. The implication is that in order to understand something the interpreter 
has to already have a prior understanding of their own situation and of 
themselves—the ‘I’ that is in that situation. In one sense this means 
understanding the particularities of individual personal experience as well as 
those of the object of understanding, but also those more fundamental and 
universal aspects of existential experience that link individual human beings 
together. The tendency of Kantor’s critics to detail particularities in the 
performances tends to lead them to a reading of surface detail which often 
appears to make no sense (even when, in many instances, this may even have 
been part of the artist’s strategy) and leads to the superficial conclusion that 
what is being seen is novel and strange. For example B. A. Young in his review 
of Wielopole, Wielopole published on Friday August 29, 1980 in the Financial 
Times complained that he found Kantor’s work difficult to follow, that its style 
was ‘antipathetic’ to him, that the production seemed ‘sloppy’ and that ‘there is 
no depth in the acting, which runs to funny voices and funny walks’. Young was 
also unimpressed by Kantor’s presence on stage ‘pretending to direct 
operations already performed, even conducting the taped music’ (Young 1980: 
15). His impression of Kantor’s stage presence as ‘pointless or arrogant’ was 
not one that myself, my friends and most critics shared of the same 
performance. Young’s position is one that is taken up by Αndrzej Żurowski in his  
1985 essay already briefly discussed, which I will deal with in detail in chapter 
three. Such critics often report a sense that something powerful and important 
was ‘going on’ but are unable to find the discourse to articulate it. Heidegger 
suggests that to solve the problem of understanding it is necessary to begin by 
acknowledging the problem of understanding itself. He argues for an existential 
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hermeneutics that will look into the phenomenon not just of the object of 
interpretation but of the phenomenon of the interpreting subject also. In order to 
reach an understanding that is sensitive to the original soil from which the 
artistic phenomenon grew, an understanding of those elements of the historicity 
of the interpreter’s own situation, which at the same time speak to common 
human dilemmas, is therefore also necessary. Understanding Kantor, I suggest, 
especially requires an explicit recognition of this process. If there are no 
significant elements in the spectator’s personal experience that in some way 
parallel those that informed Kantor then there is no possibility of his ‘speaking’ 
to his audience and interpreters. 
When I lived in Poland in 1982–3 during the Martial Law period, my 
experience of such things as queuing, rationing, riots and demonstrations, 
flares, tear-gas and of clandestine culture was that they were alien and 
sometimes frightening phenomena.22 However, it is rare, if not impossible, for 
any experience to be completely alien. Although I was a foreigner in a foreign 
land, I was nevertheless with other human beings. There were differences but 
there were similarities beneath the differences. Of course I had queued before 
(although not in queues of this scale); like anyone else I had wanted things I 
could not have; I had witnessed, albeit from a distance, the unrest and civil 
disturbance of the English football riots of the 1970s. There was enough of a 
similarity between my own experience and these events for me to make some 
sort of connection with them. In the difference between things there can be a 
blurred boundary between difference-in-degree and difference-in-kind. In this 
limbo it can be possible to make some sort of connection between things or 
experiences that on the surface appear irreconcilably different. Whatever 
happened to me in Poland then, however novel, was happening to me—a 
young man of a certain age, nationality and background—and I therefore had to 
make sense of it in terms of my own experience or make no sense of it at all. 
This is also the case when an audience witnesses a spectacle from outside of 
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22 Poland at this time was infamous for its shortages of food and other basic consumer items. 
Such a situation necessitated rationing, the legendary queuing, and combined with the political 
unrest, this led to frequent demonstrations and riots. All of this I experienced at first hand.
their normal cultural experience. However, the situation is somewhat different in 
that the audience are not embedded in that experience as would be the case if 
they had been living in the country from which the production originated. There 
is only the duration of the performance for the spectator to form an initial sense 
of the action of the event. It is this sense that will live on in memory to become 
the basis of subsequent reflections on the performance. The brain must try to 
make sense of the information that it receives but it can only relate this to 
information that it has already. If a meaningful connection is to be made 
between artist and audience there must be something present in the work that 
can act as envoi to bridge the separation between self and other, i.e. some 
representative element that will allow something from the work to penetrate 
from the other side of the mirrored surface of appearance. With such an envoi 
the surface of appearance will merely reflect the audience’s existing 
preconceptions. It is in this sense that I see the need for greater 
contextualisation of Kantor’s work in terms of the occupation, the Holocaust and 
key cultural and aesthetic influences to begin to solve the problems of 
understanding Kantor and interpreting his work.23
There are various contexts in which Kantor has been situated or has 
situated himself, and these need to be elaborated before any universals can be 
extracted from them. As Hyde has indicated in his 1985 essay (251), an 
understanding of Kantor requires that he be situated in relation to both the 
mainstream of European avant-gardes and his own Polishness. In this sense 
Kantor is both rooted and rootless: he interprets his own Polishness (and its 
relation with the Jewish presence in Poland) through the lens of the avant-
garde, but at the same time his interpretation of the avant-garde is marked by 
his Polishness. Such a complex, intertwined duality also marks Kantor’s 
aesthetic allegiances. He has repeatedly stated24 that he is caught in a tension 
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23 The Heideggerian-hermeneutic philosophical context that I employ I see as an implicit ground 
for the social, cultural and aesthetic contexts argued for here.
24 As stated earlier, my strategy is to take Kantorʼs statements about himself as phenomena in 
themselves, to bracket the questions of factual veracity and, instead, to read them in the context 
of his oeuvre as a whole and the matrix of contexts out of which it arose.
between the contradictions of Symbolism and the abstraction of the Bauhaus 
and Constructivism, for example: ‘In my development there is always this 
contradiction between Symbolism and abstract art’ (Kantor in Hertz 1985–1986: 
14). Also between the absurdist nihilism of existentialism and the Church, for 
example: ‘I used to be an existentialist. But not a faithful one. The same I can 
say about the Church’ (Kantor in Sawa 1990: 68). And again, between the 
Church and the Synagogue: ‘Yes, the church and the synagogue are equally 
important. I wrote once that I had been growing up in the shadow of the church 
and the synagogue …’ (Kantor in Sawa 1990: 69). The pursuit of any one of 
these contextual axes has the tendency to move away from the others because 
of the particular nature of its own preoccupations. Kantor, however, lived with 
these contradictions, and his work arose out of them. In a sense there was a 
continual dialogue in Kantor’s work between the provincial and the metropolitan, 
the national and international; between a Sartrean atheistic existentialism and 
Catholicism; between Christianity and Judaism; between Symbolism and 
Constructivism; and between a string of related antinomies such as: fiction and 
reality, appearance and illusion, the living and the dead. If the work bears the 
stamp of this babel of apparently contradictory binary concepts then it should 
not be considered without due reference to them.
Along with Daniel Gerould (to be discussed presently), Hyde, as noted 
above, has done the most in attempting to keep each of these contextual axes 
in focus in the range of essays that he has written. In his 1988 essay, ‘The word 
unheard: “Form” in modern Polish drama’, Hyde provides the fullest English 
account yet of how the peculiarities of Polish Romanticism feed into the modern 
and early modern avant-garde artists who were Kantor’s main influences and 
sources. The three figures of Polish Romanticism: Adam Mickiewicz (1798–
1855), Słowacki and Zygmunt Krasiński (1812–1859) produced a body of poetic 
dramas that gave Poland its peculiar messianic and matyrological sense of 
identity which informed the characterisation of partitioned Poland as ‘the Christ 
of nations’ (Miłosz 1983: 223; Davies 2001: 237).25 These themes were, in turn, 
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25 Kantorʼs third theatre production was of Słowackiʼs Balladyna (1839) in the Clandestine 
Independent Theatre in 1942.
picked up and developed by Poland’s Młoda Polska (‘Young Poland’) 
movement, a version of the Decadent and Symbolist zeitgeist in the Europe of 
the 1890s, especially by its leading figure, the painter, playwright and theatre 
designer Wyspiański, whose 1904 play, The Return of Odysseus, Kantor had 
staged with his Clandestine Independent Theatre during the occupation, and 
whose paintings, dramas and ideas in general formed one of the key 
inspirations for Kantor’s own work. Hyde is the only critic so far to examine and 
unravel the modernist themes from those of the Polish Romanticism received by 
way of Wyspiański. According to the theatre director Leon Schiller (1887–1954), 
Wyspiański ‘ … went further than the postulates of Craig’ in realising the idea of 
a pure autonomous theatre (cited in Miłosz 1983: 354), an idea which informed 
Kantor’s preoccupation with autonomous theatre through first Witkiewicz in the 
1920s, and later the first Cricot group in the 1930s. Hyde sees a connection 
between Craig’s idea of the über-marionette and the chochoł or Straw Man26 in 
Wyspiański’s most famous work Wesele (The Wedding, 1901), who leads a 
trancelike dance of the wedding guests at the finale of the play. Although Hyde 
is making a connection here between the figure of the Straw Man and the 
somnambulistic dancing of the guests with the übermarionette, he points out 
that ‘Craig’s essay is essentially a plea for a return to the mythic roots of 
tragedy, [while] its reception in Polish literature is more complex’ (Hyde 1988: 
720). Craig was undoubtably influential in Poland as in the rest of Europe and 
Russia, but he intersects with a particularly national version of the Romantic 
metaphor of an alienating force which rules over human beings by turning them 
into puppets.27 Such a perspective is represented at the end of the hotel 
ballroom scene in Jerzy Andrzejewski’s 1948 novel Ashes and Diamonds:
A heavy, indolent fever settled on the crowd like a dream. 
All around, in the smoke and half-light, frozen figures 
stood petrified, heads bowed, with listening faces, staring 
eyes, some full of tears, others glassy and unseeing. 
People who had been drunk a little earlier now looked 
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26 ʻ … an animated version of the straw coverings put over young trees and bushes in Poland to 
protect them from frostʼ (Hyde 1988: 720).
27 See Miłosz 1983: 356. Appendix 1.11 gives his account of the scene in Wyspiańskiʼs play.
sober. The song, carried on the little childish voice, had 
pushed back time, had opened up the past now tragically 
lost in fear and platitudes, in lies and stupidity, in the 
fumes of alcohol, in easy love and easy money, in cloudy 
illusions and vain, blind griefs, in all this confused life 
which was leading to what? Remembrance seized them 
all. The shadows of the voices of the dead, of houses that 
no longer existed. The shadows of landscapes, or of their 
own fates. But no joy had emerged from those years. Life 
was continuing.
(Andrzejewski 1991: 153)
This is a haunting image of public mourning for the fate of Poland combined 
with an accusation of the failure of the strategies of futility and apathy. This has 
become an image close to the hearts of most Poles (Wesele, along with the 
works of the major Romantic poets and Schulz mentioned above, is a set text 
for Polish schoolchildren, as Shakespeare is in British schools). Although Kantor 
claimed not to have been influenced by Wesele as such, and made, as far as I 
am aware, no mention of Andrzejewski’s novel, it is hard not to see a 
premonition of The Dead Class with its circling procession of somnambulistic 
corpse-actors. Here is Kantor’s account of one of the recurring scenes from The 
Dead Class, ‘A Toast’:
The banal and sentimental waltz—‘If only the 
old days were back’ becomes a desperate and futile call,
through constant and endless r e p e t i t i o n .
through this persistent repetition,
unbearable,
hypnotising,
it almost revives the time past, lost and dead.
On stage, for a brief span of time we witness
An undisputable miracle …
The Old People get up from their desks slowly,
the further back the desks are, the higher they rise,
a wall of people animated by the sounds of the waltz soars 
up,
bent with age, the figures suddenly straighten up, look up, 
their eyes gleaming,
their hands raised as if for a toast,
we may be sure now that those people have found
the time of their youth…. dead …
But the tones of the waltz are fading away,
the illusion disintegrates,
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the old people collapse onto their desks
which become what they were originally supposed
to be…. w r e c k s  ….
[…]
in the end everything reaches the point of
inertia that ruled at the beginning.
(Kantor (n.d.) The Dead Class: 26; Polish text in Kantor 
2004: 61–62)
Both Andrzejewski’s and Kantor’s figures are reminiscent of Wyspiański’s 
‘dreamlike dance of “hollow men” that, according to Czesław Miłosz, symbolises  
the inertia of Polish society’ (Miłosz 1983: 357).
Alongside Hyde, Daniel Gerould is so far the only American author to offer 
sensitive and useful contextualisation of Kantor’s Polish cultural context. Apart 
from three essays on Kantor (1980, 1986 and 1995), Gerould’s work has 
concentrated mainly on the figure of Witkiewicz as well as other twentieth 
century Polish dramatists. Nevertheless, his 1995 essay, ‘Iconographic Images 
in the Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor’, is a valuable and insightful discussion and 
illustration of the Polish cultural sources and pictorial influences in Kantor’s 
work. Gerould is the only American author who has provided any in-depth 
explanation of key Polish artists and writers such as the painters Jacek 
Malczewski and Edward Okuń, the painter, stage designer and playwright 
Wyspiański and the novelist, dramatist, painter and philosopher Witkacy to 
illustrate how features in their work can be seen to relate to the peculiarities of 
Kantor’s own. Gerould notes that Malczewski’s work is ‘both abstract and 
existential on the one hand and precise and contextual on the other’ (Gerould 
1995: 177), qualities also inherent in Kantor’s work. Malczewski’s painting 
Melancholy (1890–94), reproduced in Gerould’s essay, is virtually a visual 
manifesto for the form of Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’. The painting, mentioned by 
Kantor as a work he admired, depicts a swirling procession of figures emanating 
from the figure of Malczewski himself sitting at his easel in the background, 
creating the scene he himself is depicted in. Malczewski appears again, 
doubled at the head of the procession, involved in the dying fall of the struggle 
for independence, whilst the figure of Death looks on from the window. Looking 
at this painting one can see links to the trope of the circular procession 
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discussed above in the work of Wyspiański and Andrzejewski as well as a 
precedent for the swirling, repetitive processions featured in The Dead Class 
and Wielopole, Wielopole, and of Kantor’s inclusion of himself within these 
works. In elucidating ‘parallels between the theatrical images of Tadeusz Kantor 
and those of his Kraków predecessors’ Gerould highlights ‘the creative 
presence of symbolist iconography and aesthetics’ in Kantor’s work (1995: 186). 
Gerould‘s essay, like much of Hyde’s work discussed earlier, is a point of 
reference for anyone outside of Polish culture trying to understand Kantor’s 
peculiar fusion of Polish Symbolist and European and Russian avant-garde 
tendencies.
Hyde goes on to discuss in his 1988 essay how the Romantic tradition in 
Poland was taken up and cross-fertilised by the leading three figures of the 
1930s Polish avant-garde (mentioned by Bolecki in his critique of the 
postmodernising tendency in recent Polish critical literature discussed above): 
Gombrowicz (1904–1969), Schulz (1892–1942) and Witkiewicz (1885–1939). 
These three avant-garde figures, who met and corresponded regularly during 
the 1930s, constitute a particularly Polish form of modernism. Their respective 
aesthetic concerns form, as already noted, an important central influence in 
Kantor’s work that requires careful consideration. Later in this thesis I will 
consider in more detail the influence of Schulz, but before I do so I will briefly 
introduce the three figures together.
Gombrowicz was a novelist and playwright from a wealthy landowning 
family and was an influential figure of the 1930s following the publication of his 
novel Ferdydurke28 (1937) whose protagonist, on the eve of his thirtieth 
birthday, is taken back to school and the world of immaturity by his old 
professor. Gombrowicz found himself in Argentina at the outbreak of war in 
1939 and, choosing not to return to Poland he continued writing as an emigré in 
Buenos Aires and later Paris until his death in 1969. Gombrowicz’s Dzienniki 
(Diaries 1953–1969) and three of his subsequent novels, Trans-Atlantyk (Trans-
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translation.
Atlantic, 1953), Pornografia (Pornography, 1960) and Kosmos (Cosmos, 1965) 
have been critically well-received and highly influential.
Schulz was an artist and writer who worked as an art teacher in a school 
in the provincial Galician town of Drohobycz, now in the Ukraine. An assimilated 
Jew, in a town with a large Jewish population, in his fictions and drawings 
Schulz portrayed a highly charged version of his home life and town seen 
through the eyes of his childhood self. This highly ‘mythologised reality’ became 
hugely influential in Poland following the publication, aided by Witkiewicz, of two 
collections of Schulz’s short fictions Sklepy cynamonowe in 1934 (The 
Cinnamon Shops, published in the United Kingdom and North America as The 
Street of Crocodiles) and Sanitorium pod klepsydrą in 1937 (The Sanitorium 
Under the Sign of the Hourglass). Both Witkiewicz and Gombrowicz 
championed the cause of this provincial Jewish school teacher and Schulz 
became something of a cause célèbre. Schulz was shot on a street corner by a 
Gestapo officer in Drohobycz in 1942.29
Witkiewicz was the senior and more famous figure of the three and 
encouraged and helped Schulz and Gombrowicz in their work and its 
publication. Witkiewicz was the son of a famous painter, architect and art critic, 
also called Stanisław Witkiewicz (1851–1915) and the son created the name 
‘Witkacy’ for himself out of the first part of his last name and the last part of his 
middle name, Ignacy, to distinguish himself from his father. He grew up in the 
bohemian environment of the south-Polish Tatra Mountain resort of Zakopane 
where he was friends with the composer Karol Szymanowski. In 1914 
Witkiewicz was invited by another friend, the Polish anthropologist Bronisław 
Malinowski, to accompany him as draughtsman and photographer on an 
expedition to Oceania in the South Pacific. The outbreak of the First World War 
brought an end to this tropical adventure. As Witkiewicz had been born in 
Warsaw, which was part of the Russian partition, he was technically a Russian 
subject. Against his patriotic father’s wishes he volunteered to serve in the 
Russian Imperial army. He attended officer’s training school in Saint Petersburg 
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and was commissioned as an officer in the reserve regiment of the elite 
Pavlovsky Guard. He was wounded in 1916 and received the Order of St. Anne, 
fourth class. During his long convalescence he developed his artistic and 
philosophical interests and visited the Shchukin collection of modern art in 
Moscow, where he saw Picasso’s paintings. Witkiewicz lived through the last 
days of the old order and the revolutions in Saint Petersburg, where, in 1917, 
following the first revolution in February, he was appointed political commissar 
of his regiment, a short lived and precarious position. He was discharged from 
the army in November 1917, and survived the rest of the period living with 
Polish residents in Saint Petersburg until he was able to return to Poland in 
June 1918 (see Gerould 1981: 13–14, and 1993: 76–78, and in Witkiewicz 
1993a: 31–34). Following the First World War he supported himself largely 
through portrait painting and became known in Poland as a painter, playwright, 
novelist and philosopher and an active member of the Polish avant-garde group 
of the 1920s the Formists. In 1939, whilst fleeing eastwards from the Nazi 
invasion, Witkiewicz committed suicide on learning of Stalin’s invasion (Gerould 
1993: 274–275).
The creative cauldron of influence formed by these three figures is 
extremely important for the foundation and development of Kantor’s aesthetic. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will briefly consider their importance as 
influences for Kantor. I will focus here mainly on Witkiewicz and Gombrowicz 
and briefly indicate why I choose to focus on the influence of Schulz in later 
chapters of this thesis rather than on them.
Witkacy
The concerns of Polish Romanticism, as Hyde shows, were transmitted through 
Wyspiański and the ‘Young Poland’ movement to surface in the peculiar work of 
Witkacy. Witkacy was an artist of central importance for Kantor: ‘Witkiewicz, 
Witkiewicz and once more Witkiewicz. He is such an interesting writer that there 
ought to be a theatre devoted just to him. We want to be such a theatre’ (Kantor 
in Echo Krakowa (March 30, 1967) cited in Pleśniarowicz 2004: 175). All of 
Kantor’s theatre productions from The Cuttlefish, the first production of Cricot 2 
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in 1956, up to and including The Dead Class in 1975 ‘played with’ (Kantor’s 
phrase) Witkacy’s dramas in his theatre works. This obvious prominence of 
Witkacy in Kantor’s work has tended to obscure the fact that Schulz and 
Gombrowicz were also important, because, in a sense the influence of one 
implies the influence of all three due to the interconnectedness of their ideas in 
the 1930s. Despite the prominence of Witkacy in Kantor’s work there has been 
relatively little examination of this aesthetic relationship. Pleśniarowicz (2004) 
gives due weight to the importance of Witkacy in Kantor’s biography, and is so 
far the only author published in English to have attempted to disentangle the 
nature of the presence of Witkacy’s drama Tumor Możgowicz (Tumor 
Brianiowicz, 1921) in The Dead Class. However, his account tends to assume a 
familiarity with Witkacy’s work and is therefore relatively difficult to follow for the 
non-Polish-literate reader. So far Hyde and Gerould are the only Anglo-
American authors to discuss the almost symbiotic relationship between the two 
artists’ work. As Gerould has commented:
what Kantor discovered in Witkiewicz was something that 
lies behind and beneath the dialogue and surface of the 
plays. He penetrated to their underlying rhythms and 
theatrical mechanisms, and it was these Witkacian secrets 
that Kantor assimilated and made his own. Thus, it was 
that in his productions of Witkacy Kantor revealed the 
deepest wellsprings of Witkacy’s art.
(Gerould 1995: 186)
Gerould goes on to catalogue some of Witkacy’s theatrical devices and 
inventions that can be seen to be used by Kantor in his own work:
1. The idea of the theatrical event as a dramatic séance 
and performance as a mediumistic summoning of the 
dead.
2. The risen corpse, returning to the world of the living not 
as a ghost but a normal human being.
3. The figure of the chthonic [belonging to the underworld] 
cook or servant in touch with the dark forces of death 
and given to ominous entrances and exits.
4. Mechanical doubles, cloned puppets, and marionettes.
5. The theatricality of packing and unpacking the human 
body.
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6. A decorative principle of characterisation, based on 
repetition of gesture and sharply defined outline.
7. The use of trashy rhymes and doggerel verse.
(From Gerould 1985: 186–187)
In this list can be seen many of the characteristics not only of The Dead Class, 
but of all of Kantor’s post-Witkiewicz period productions which followed it, with 
their performers’ jerky and puppet-like manner of movement, the use of 
repetition in gesture and action, ‘trashy’ or nonsensical speech and dialogue, 
the fetishising of wrapping and packing. The return of the dead to the living was 
a trope that Kantor explicitly employed in a number of different forms from The 
Dead Class onwards. Following the return of the dead to their classroom in The 
Dead Class, Kantor staged a ‘return’ of his dead family to the family room in 
Wielopole, Wielopole (1980, the repetition of the name in the title indicating the 
particular nature of the return). In Let the Artists Die (1985) General Piłsudski 
(the first leader of the Second Republic) and Veit Stoss (c1450–1533, the 
medieval Nuremberg artist who created the giant altarpiece in Kraków’s St 
Mary’s Basilica) ‘return’ from the Dead, as does Odysseus in I Shall Never 
Return (1988), and Jarema, Stern30 and Meyerhold in Today is My Birthday 
(1991). Finally the ‘chthonic’ figures of the Charlady (The Dead Class), the 
Photographer’s Widow (Wielopole, Wielopole), the Constructivist Innkeeper (I 
Shall Never Return)—along with various other figures—take on the role of 
mediating between the world of the living and the world of the dead. With this 
comprehensive assimilation of the elements of Witkacy’s aesthetic, Kantor, 
according to Gerould:
Disregarding the outer trappings of Witkacy’s dramas, 
grasped their inner physical theatricality, which 
corresponded closely with his own vision and production 
after production he demonstrated the power of these 
conceptions. It is thanks to Kantor that the most profound 
aspects of Witkacy’s art were realised on stage. 
Posthumously, Witkacy came back at Kantor’s bidding. 
That is how two artists could work together even after one 
of them had died. And need I say that, in collaborating with 
Witkacy, Kantor became uniquely himself?
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30 Jarema and Stern were members of the original 1930s Cricot group of artists.
(Ibid: 186–187)
It is hard to deny that Witkacy’s aesthetic informs Kantor’s work in fundamental 
ways. In many ways a paradoxical figure, Witkacy, as noted above, had been 
an Officer in the Russian Imperial Army and was elected Political Commissar in 
his post-Tsarist regiment in February 1917 (see Gerould 1981: 13–14, and 
1993: 77, and in Witkiewicz 1993a: 31). Despite his ‘revolutionary’ and avant-
garde disposition as an artist, he was something of an anti-Constructivist, 
although he associated with the Formists in the early 1920s, in many ways a 
group somewhat aligned with Constructivist tendencies in Poland. His paintings 
could veer towards an extreme, somewhat Surrealist style, often informed by 
hallucinogenic drugs such as peyote, which he intentionally took to affect his 
work. Furthermore, as Hyde shows in his discussion of Witkacy’s Kurka Wodna 
(‘The Water Hen’) (1921), Witkacy transformed the themes of Polish 
Romanticism in particular ways which also informed Kantor’s work. In this way 
Witkacy may be seen as a key, and peculiarly Polish, source of Kantor’s 
Symbolist-Surrealist influence.
Witkacy developed an elaborate theory of art which he named Czysta 
Forma (‘Pure Form’), a complex theory, developed in opposition to the theory of 
‘the multiplicity of reality’ (wielości rzeczywystości) in art developed by fellow 
artist Leon Chwistek (1884–1944)31 whose theories of form were heavily 
metaphysical in character (Bartelik 2005: 66). Pure Form was perhaps inspired 
in part by the Cubist and Futurist’s fragmentation of the pictorial plane into 
multiple ‘conflicting and interacting’ components (Hyde 1988: 721). However, 
Witkacy took this fragmentation further in applying it to dramatic form where, in 
his plays multiple realities and times collide in the same scenic space and the 
personal identity of dramatic characters ‘does not so much develop as 
mutate’ (ibid.), a strategy that tends to attack ‘the whole idea of one’s own unity 
and identity’ (Gerould in Witkiewicz 1989: xliii). The aim was for the work to 
operate on the spectator through the internal dynamics of its construction rather 
than through the reading of any discursive content of notional subject matter, 
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31 Chwistek was a philosopher and mathematician as well as a critic and painter. He was a 
member of the Formists, a group of artists active in Kraków between the world wars.
and to communicate a sense of ‘the metaphysical feeling of the strangeness of 
existence’ (see Gerould’s Introduction in Witkiewicz 1989: xliii). This theory can 
be seen to have informed Kantor in significant ways apart from providing a 
source for the strategy of layering multiple realities within the stage space and 
the principle of using dynamic structure and rhythm as compositional devices 
rather than a conventional narrative approach.
Witkacy’s philosophical interests also provide one of the sources for the 
metaphysical and existential quality of Kantor’s work. Witkacy’s art, as Marek 
Bartelik amongst others has pointed out, was rooted in the ontological problem 
of human existence (Bartelik 2005: 54). In the face of the metaphysical anxiety 
concerning the strangeness of existence, Hyde argues, ‘Witkacy’s marionettes 
speak endlessly without communication, shut into the “formal” world of ritual 
gestures. They are simulacra of human beings straining to discover an image of 
themselves that might fit the facts’ (Hyde 1988: 721).
Informe
The matrix of influences brought to Kantor by Witkacy is related to similar 
concerns in the work of Gombrowicz and Schulz. These concerns may be 
related, although not unproblematically, to the concept defined in a short 1929 
essay in Documents by Georges Bataille as informe or ‘formlessness’ (in 1985: 
31).32 Each in their individual manner, Gombrowicz, Schulz and Witkacy 
independently developed this idea of the marginal-yet-powerful potentiality. 
Without explicitly identifying their focus on informe, for Hyde, it was these ‘three 
Polish writers of genius who constitute a kind of modernist pantheon’ and he 
saw Kantor as their direct successor (1990: 11). As he notes, the core idea of 
The Dead Class, Kantor’s key work that produced what Raczek called the ‘law 
of shock’ affecting both critics and audiences, was where:
adults return to the schoolroom and rediscover their 
capacity for futile vindictiveness, aggression, 
competitiveness, owes much to Gombrowicz’s absurdist 
first novel, Ferdydurke, with its bitter celebration of 
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32 The critical debate surrounding Batailleʼs informe and its problematic relationship to art 
informel will be examined in more detail in chapter five.
humanity’s eternal attachment to is own immaturity, 
intensified in the face of an ignorant and obscurantist 
authority that tries to turn everyone into an eternal 
schoolboy. … Here is the ‘marginality’ of which Kantor 
says that it is central to the real experience of the modern 
world, where truth has retreated to the boundary. Schulz, 
for example, writes from within a world where not to be of 
the centre is the only tenable kind of centrality. His takes 
of provincial inertia and paralysis are at the same time 
celebrations of the power of the imagination: they confirm 
Walter Benjamin’s thesis that ‘Boredom is the dream bird 
that hatches the egg of experience’. The life of Schulz’s 
characters (if they may be called characters) is lived 
somewhere between the Baudelairean extremes of ennui, 
spleen and ideal. It is as if modernist literature had found a 
local habitation and a name among the Jewish and Judeo-
Christian communities of Polish Galicia.
(Hyde 1990: 11)
Perhaps this habitation lies within the domain mapped out by Bataille in his 
definition of Informe. As noted in chapter one, Kantor’s experience of the Nazi 
occupation of Kraków had a profound and enduring effect on his artistic 
sensibilities. This sensitivity to the provisional nature of existence informed 
Kantor’s visit to the Palais de la Découverte in Paris, which in turn fuelled his 
sense of the metamorphic qualities of space and matter. However, it would be a 
mistake to assume that this radical conception of reality came only from his 
experience. It is evidently present in the work of Witkacy, Gombrowicz and 
Schulz, each in different ways. It is therefore not accidental that the three 
figures are cited by Kantor as being ‘participants in the performance’ of The 
Dead Class. For Gombrowicz, whose 1937 novel Ferdydurke, as noted by Hyde 
above, provides one of the sources for The Dead Class, informe was 
immaturity, or greenness, a state of seething potentiality, unfinished and 
incomplete (Hyde 1988: 724). In Gombrowicz’s novel the adult hero is returned 
to this green state by being sent back to school, where the subversive and 
scatological anarchy of the playground with its games and rhymes stands for 
the idea of formlessness. Rules and the order of routine are required to contain 
this vitalistic force. This conception of the immaturity of youth as having a 
potent, subversive force owing to its state of incompleteness is given a more 
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poetic and sinister rendering in Gombrowicz’s 1960 novel Pornografia. Set in 
the Polish countryside during the Nazi occupation the novel hinges around the 
potential erotic attraction between two adolescents and how it is fuelled and 
used by the middle-aged narrator and his friend Frederick both for their own 
metaphysical entertainment and to achieve a political execution within the 
Resistance. There is a continued sense that beneath the surface appearance of 
reality, there are darker forces waiting to erupt in violent and unexpected ways 
and it is this force that is channelled and unleashed through the manipulation of 
the adolescents’ ‘unfinished’ state. This sense of a chaos, bubbling and 
fermenting beneath the surface of the respectable reality of society is further 
elaborated in what many regard as Gombrowicz’s masterpiece Cosmos (1965).
A similar sense of the marginal yet vital potentiality inherent in the 
underlying formlessness of space and matter also informs Schulz’s fictional 
writing and drawing. It is through the influence of Schulz, as I will argue in 
chapter five, that Kantor’s most profound sense of informe derives. The reasons 
for this are the correspondences between Schulz’s biographical situation and 
Kantor’s. It is worth remembering that Gombrowicz came from a wealthy 
background of landowners and estates and that Witkacy came from a relatively 
bohemian and privileged background and was deemed suitable as officer 
material for the Russian Imperial army. These two young men automatically had 
an entrée into Warsaw society and were able to move in literary circles with 
ease. Schulz, on the other hand, was part of the assimilated Jewish community 
in the provincial Galician town of Drohobycz, formally part of the Austro-
Hungarian partition (part of Poland between the wars, then briefly Russian, then 
German and then finally Ukrainian).33 In his Diaries years later, Gombrowicz 
examines his assessment of the differences between himself and Schulz:
Bruno was a man who was denying himself. I was a man 
seeking himself. He wanted annihilation. I wanted 
realization. He was born to be a slave. I was born to be a 
master. He wanted denigration. I wanted to be ‘above’ and 
‘superior to’. He was of the Jewish race, I was from a 
family of Polish gentry.
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33 For details of Schulzʼs biography see Ficowski 2002, chapter 2 ʻBruno, Son of Jacobʼ.
(Gombrowicz 1993: 6)
Schulz’s background as the son of a cloth merchant was the relatively modest 
Jewish mercantile class of ‘small town shopkeepers and impoverished 
artisans’ (Ficowski 2002: 34) and he was forced to earn a living, even after his 
literary success in the mid-1930s, teaching drawing in the local school. It was 
his friend Debra Vogel who championed Schulz’s talent and, with the 
intervention of the sculptor Magdalena Gross, managed to encourage him to 
travel from Drohobycz to Warsaw for an introduction to the writer Zofia 
Nałkowska who found him his first publisher. In this sense Kantor has a more 
profound personal affinity with Schulz than with either Gombrowicz or Witkacy 
beyond that of their artistic influence. However, it is the particularities of 
Schulz’s assimilated Jewish background that make him especially pertinent to 
Kantor’s work. As a Jew Schulz did not speak Yiddish yet was fluent in Polish 
and German. Yet as a Jew he occupied the peculiar liminal ground of the 
assimilated: neither exactly Polish, nor exactly Jewish. For all the peculiarities of 
Witkacy’s and Gombrowicz’s lives, the particular dwelling in the near-zero 
identity of the liminality of Jewish assimilation—where either side of the dividing 
line is ‘other’—is a specific and poignant quality in Schulz’s peculiar aesthetic. 
To continue Gombrowicz’s assessment from his Diaries:
No, he was not made to dominate! A tiny gnome with an 
enormous head, appearing too scared to dare exist, he 
was ejected from life and crouched along its peripheries. 
Bruno did not acknowledge his rights to exist, he sought 
his own annihilation—not that he wanted to commit 
suicide; he merely ‘strove’ for nonbeing with all his might 
(and this is precisely what made him, Heidegger-style, so 
sensitive to being). In my opinion there was no instinct that 
moves a sick animal to separate, remove itself. He was 
superfluous. He was extraneous. It is possible that his 
masochism also had a different aspect, I don't know, but it 
most certainly was homage paid to the powers of being 
that were trampling him.
(Ibid.: 6–7)
This quality intersects with Kantor’s life in three key areas. Firstly, his childhood 
living conditions in Wielopole, which, although much smaller, was a similarly 
provincial Galician milieu to that of Drohobycz, where Kantor lived, according to 
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his own report, ‘in the shadow of the church and the synagogue’ (Kantor 
interviewed in 1988, in Sawa 1990: 69). Secondly, his living conditions in 
Kraków during the time of Nazi occupation when he worked in a disused 
synagogue, lived for a time next to the Jewish ghetto wall and was frequently 
mistaken as a Jew by certain elements on the street, and where he learned of 
his estranged father’s murder in Auschwitz. And thirdly, the period of the early 
1970s when he was beginning to formulate the ideas for his ‘theatre of death’ 
and The Dead Class, where Schulz tangibly returns as a ‘participant of the 
performance’ alongside Gombrowicz and Witkacy and lends to that 
performance, and to those subsequently, a particular quality. These three key 
periods in Kantor’s life each echo aspects of Schulz’s biography and work. In 
the case of the childhood and occupation periods Kantor’s situation mirrors, to 
an extent, positive and negative forms of liminality respectively, whilst it is 
Kantor’s approach to old age during the 1970s that triggers a turn towards 
Schulz’s aesthetic and temporal strategy of challenging death through a return 
to childhood that so permeates the latter’s work.
There is a further sense in which Schulz ‘fits’ Kantor as the model of a 
creative artist in terms of both his work and his personal philosophy of the act of 
creation. This is the sense in which both artists see their role as one of acting as 
a messenger or intermediary between spirit and matter. In his diaries 
Gombrowicz refutes this aspect of Schulz:
Hermes, Sandauer calls him. No, no, to my mind there 
wasn’t much Hermes in him; he was useless as an 
intermediary between spirit and matter. In fact, his 
perverse attitude to being (the Heideggerian question 
‘Why does Something and not Nothing exist?’ could be the 
motto of his work) resulted in the fact that matter for him 
became illuminated by the spirit, and the spirit was 
incarnated, but this Hermes-like process is spiced with the 
desire to ‘debilitate’ being: matter is corrupt, diseased, or 
insidiously hostile, or mystifying, and the spiritual world is 
transformed into an utterly sensual phantasmagoria of 
color and light, its spiritual purpose is corrupted. To 
replace existence with half-existence, or with the 
appearance of existence—such were Bruno's secret 
dreams. He also wanted to weaken matter as well as 
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spirit. We often discussed various moral and social issues 
but behind everything he said crouched the passivity of 
someone brought to ruin. As an artist he was completely 
fixed in the very material of his work, in his own game and 
internal arrangements, when he wrote a story he had no 
other law beyond the immanent law of the unfolding form. 
A false ascetic, sensuous saint, lascivious monk, nihilistic 
fulfiller. And he knew this.
(Ibid.: 8)
But Gombrowicz (despite correctly noting Schulz’s proximity to Heidegger) is 
surely incorrect in his dismissal of Artur Sandauer’s assessment in his 1964 
essay ‘Rzeczywistość zdegradowana (Rzecz o Brunonie Schulzu)’ (Degraded 
Reality—A Study of Bruno Schulz). In this essay Sandauer cites Thomas 
Mann’s view that ‘the artist is a kind of Hermes midway between the lower and 
upper realm, between the subconscious and consciousness, body and 
spirit’ (Sandauer 1971: 96; my translation), and describes the figure of the artist 
as ‘one who descended into the underworld of instinct, to the most material 
layers of personality—and brings them out, dripping with darkness, into the light 
of day’ (Ibid.; my translation). Later in the essay he then explicitly identifies 
Schulz as ‘a kind of Hermes […] “using heretical and illicit methods” […] an 
artist-Hermes circulating between light and darkness’ (Ibid.: 96 and 99; my 
translation). Kantor too, in his location of his art in the regions of the ‘reality of 
the lowest rank’ and his use of ‘heretical and illicit methods’ in assisting in the 
passage of his art of the ‘poor object’ across this ‘garbage dump’ of form from 
eternity into the world—the manner in which he renders the concreteness of his 
objects and environments meaningful—can also be seen in the role of Hermes 
the messenger. Although Kantor may not share Schulz’s particular masochistic 
tendencies (or at least not in an entirely or overtly erotic form) he nevertheless, 
in his own particular way, shares in this messenger-like role. This is a role that, 
as I will discuss in chapter four, is far from straightforward.
It is therefore the tacit presence of Schulz in Kantor’s work that I recognise 
as most important as a vital influence, and one so far insufficiently 
acknowledged and explored. To return to Benjamin’s notion that ‘all genuine 
works of art have their siblings in the realm of philosophy’: I would argue that 
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artists and writers too can realise, through their work, philosophical concerns 
and be siblings to each other. In this sense, in terms of artistic influence within 
Kantor’s own culture, I see Schulz as the true ‘artistic sibling’ of Kantor’s art, 
and that Gombrowicz and Witkacy are at the very least only half-, possibly only 
‘step-brothers’. Schulz is aesthetically for Kantor what Heidegger is 
philosophically. Kantor may have ‘played’ with Witkacy, and this may have 
defined his theatrical work between 1955 and 1973, but he is not, essentially, 
‘Witkacian’. He may have designed for official theatre productions of 
Gombrowicz’s plays, and harboured desires to produce his own productions of 
Gombrowicz’s work, but he is not, essentially, ‘Gombrowiczian’. However, in the 
centrality of the particular form of formlessness that is articulated by his ideas of 
the ‘reality of the lowest rank’ and the ‘poor object’ and their combination in his 
late work in the form of his ‘poor little room of the imagination’, I argue that 
Kantor is, essentially, ‘Schulzian’.
The aims of this study
The peculiarity of Kantor’s work therefore lies in the use he makes of a 
combination of personal memory and Polish nationality together with his 
idiosyncratic interpretation of a variety of historical avant-garde strategies 
ranging from Symbolism to Constructivism. This is a mixture that has markedly 
metaphysical resonances. I have also already noted that some of the apparent 
difficulty and randomness in Kantor’s work, for an Anglo-American spectator 
can, in part, be understood as a typically Polish strategy for dealing with 
German occupation and Stalinist annexation. What I want to show is that 
Kantor’s metaphysical and mystical tendencies are comprehensible when 
placed in a historical context of Polish experience and the intellectual history of 
Kantor’s lifetime together with key aspects of his biography. This clarification 
can then be used to generate greater insight into the major performance works 
of Kantor’s later life. I will argue that, while this work was ‘understood’ by 
audiences around the world on an intuitive level, it is possible to make the 
mechanisms of Kantor’s work more extant by using such a contextualising 
strategy. The simultaneous aim of this thesis, however, is to show how the 
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specificities of Kantor’s historical situation also reach outwards, to questions 
and dilemmas that affect human being.
An obvious question is why hasn’t such a contextualising strategy already 
been accomplished? There have been a variety of reasons for the relative lack 
of success to date in this regard. There has been a lack of detailed discussion 
around the subject of the Holocaust as an influence on Kantor’s work. The 
implications of the biographical details concerning Kantor’s living situation 
during the Nazi occupation have yet to be fully considered. Related to the issue 
of the Holocaust, the complex and problematic situation of the Jewish presence 
in Poland has also so far received little attention in relation to Kantor. This is 
especially pertinent to my argument given the centrality of the Jewish writer and 
artist Schulz in Kantor’s work, which despite Hyde’s 1988 essay and 
Pleśniarowicz’s coverage of this area (2004, the fullest to date), has not been 
sufficiently foregrounded. As I discuss in chapter five, there is a far deeper 
influence from Schulz than has previously been acknowledged (apart, perhaps, 
from Kantor himself). Together this matrix of contexts will illuminate Kantor’s 
work.
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CHAPTER 3. THE ONTOLOGICAL CONTEXT: JUST ‘PULLING FACES AT 
THE AUDIENCE’? THE PROBLEM OF RESPONSE TO KANTOR’S WORK
Introduction
In 1985 Andrzej Żurowski, the then head of the Polish section of the 
International Association of Theatre Critics, published an essay in New Theatre 
Quarterly entitled ‘“Pulling Faces at the Audience”: the Lonely Theatre of 
Tadeusz Kantor’. The essay makes a refreshing change from much of the 
discourse on Kantor to date as in it (as noted in the previous chapter) Żurowski 
attempts to temper the awe in which Kantor had begun to be held since the 
premiere of his 1975 performance work The Dead Class. Żurowski’s essay 
takes the form of a critique of some of the peculiarities of Kantor’s work and 
particularly questions ‘some of the premises behind the creator’s presence on 
his own stage’ (1985: 364). Żurowski’s essential point is that in including himself 
within the performance work in this way, Kantor creates a problematic doubling 
of roles. However, as I will show, such a criticism can itself be seen to be based 
on a tacit conceptual assumption: the idea that there is already a ‘doubling’ 
between reality and appearance. This conceptual assumption of a ‘double 
reality’—a ‘real’ reality that lies behind or beneath the surface veils of ‘apparent’ 
reality occurs in the development of ideas concerning representation within the 
history of the metaphysical tradition. This tradition stretches from Plato to what 
Derrida has termed, in his discussion of Heidegger’s ‘The Age of the World 
Picture’, a ‘subjectivity of the Cartesian-Hegelian type’ (Derrida 2007: 107).34 
Such conceptual assumptions have remained prevalent to date despite the 
influence of Heidegger’s radical critique of representation and the prominence 
of certain strands of post-Heideggerian discourse that seek to develop it.35 
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34 See particularly Heidegger 2002 and Derrida 2007. Derridaʼs phrase quoted here would seem 
to be referring to Appendix 6 of Heideggerʼs essay (Heidegger 2002: 76).
35 See for example: Butler 1990, Derrida 2001 and 2007, Deleuze 2004a and 2004b and 
Foucault 2002 and 1980; regarding the critique of representation concerning theatre and 
performance: Schechner 1988 and Lehmann 2006. The discourse on Kantor either ignores or 
conducts itself within the parameters of the existing critique, as exemplified in Kobialka 2009, 
which deals with Kantorʼs work in terms of a ʻtradition of representational practicesʼ.
Kantor, from early on,36 was directly opposed to the idea of representation in the 
sense that conceives of the work of art as a ‘mirror’ of reality. In a conversation 
in 1972 with Miklaszewski, Kantor remarked that ‘The autonomous theatre I 
have in mind is a theatre which does not take the form of a reproducing 
apparatus, i.e., a scientific interpretation of literature, but possesses its own 
independent reality’ (Kantor in Miklaszewski 2002: 10). According to the 
contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, in his Handbook of Inaesthetics 
(2005: 3–4) the Aristotelian revision of this apparatus lies in the recognition in 
mimesis of its own mimetic essence—that it does not purport to be ‘truth’, that 
‘the purpose [destination] of art is not in the least truth’ (Ibid.: 4; emphasis in 
original). Nevertheless, although this mimetic conception of art may have been 
tamed in Aristotle’s conception, as enshrined by Hamlet’s advice to the Players 
the idea retains elements of its Platonic origins. As I will discuss in more detail 
below, Plato’s famous critique of art in Book X of The Republic proposed that art 
was merely the thirdhand imitation of reality and the artist essentially merely a 
charlatan and faker. In his zeal on this central issue Kantor developed an 
aesthetic strategy that, I will argue, can be understood to equal the radicalism of 
Heidegger’s critique. This argument can be illuminated from the perspective of 
Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian philosophy and especially in recent 
discourse, particularly that of Agamben. When aspects of Kantor’s artistic 
strategy are examined in the light of the implications of the radical perspective 
from this Heideggerian tradition, it becomes possible, I will argue, to better 
understand the Kantorian pronouncements that Żurowski finds so distracting 
and contextualise them in both his life and work as a whole: to understand that 
Kantor was not ‘pulling faces at the audience’ with his work and that the 
‘loneliness’ of his ‘theatre’ was, and continues to be, a symptom of the radical 
nature of the artist and his work. Before examining Żurowski’s essay in detail, I 
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36 It is apparent from comments about his education as an art student at the Kraków Academy 
of Fine Arts that Kantor was unhappy with the conventional conception of art as a mirror held up 
to reality. This is probably what led him to take refuge from the more traditional professors and 
the hegemony of Post-Impressionism and place himself under the guidance of the more 
radically oriented professor of stage design Karol Frycz. Kantorʼs early experiments with 
Constructivism, the Bauhaus and abstraction generally can be viewed as a strategy of rebellion 
against the idea of art-as-copy (see, for example, Borowski 1982: 19, Pleśniarowicz 1997: 29–
31 and 2004: 23–29).
will first trace some of the issues concerning the idea of representation from a 
Heideggerian perspective.
A critique of representation
Following Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of the post-Platonic tradition, there has 
been a trend in continental philosophy to offer critiques of the representational 
basis of Western metaphysics. Such critiques form the tenor of the ‘existenz-
philosophie’ underlying the work of Søren Kierkegaard, Henri Bergson, Edmund 
Husserl, Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, 
Foucault, Deleuze and Badiou. Whilst not normally regarded under the common 
banner of Existentialism, all of these philosophers prioritise the performative 
character of being over notions of its substantial or essentialist character: of 
doing as the basis of being. As the Nietzschean formulation in the thirteenth 
section of the first essay of On the Genealogy of Morals famously states: ‘[…] 
there is no “being” behind the doing, acting, becoming’ (Nietzsche 1998: 29). 
Such an existentialist ontology would appear to be radically at odds with the 
representational theory of being and the implications of this difference are still 
being explored. The theory of representation is enshrined in Plato’s allegory of 
the cave in Book X of The Republic (514a–520a). In this allegory the ordinary 
experience of reality is likened to the situation of the experience of apparent 
reality available to prisoners trapped in a cave. Bound and forced to look only in 
one direction the prisoners see shadows cast on the cave wall by the light of a 
fire burning behind them. Sounds issue from behind the prisoners and reflect 
back to them from the cave wall, and the prisoners perceive these as coming 
from the shadows on the wall. Thus their assumption is that the apparitions of 
shadows and echoing sounds are not shadows or echoes but reality itself. 
(Plato’s allegory, which seems so elegant when reduced to its common formula 
of ‘our reality is but a shadow of the real’, becomes ludicrously unworkable and 
incredible when analysed in any practical detail. For example: who are the 
prisoners? How do they eat, drink, attend to their bodily functions, or 
reproduce? What is the status of the puppeteers: captors or subjects? And, if 
the Sun stands for ‘Truth’ or ‘God’, who or what is in charge of the Cave’s 
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arrangements?) However, as Heidegger has shown in his essay ‘Plato’s 
Doctrine of Truth’ (1998b), the detail is important, for the prisoners and their 
perception of shadows are but one small part of a larger conceptual whole. It is 
in Heidegger’s analysis of this whole that ‘representation’ can be understood in 
a non-representational way. As Plato’s dialogue itself is at pains to point out, 
this second-hand reality is at a further remove from ‘true’ reality because the 
origin of the shadows is not reality itself, but a model of reality performed by 
puppeteers operating behind the screen of a wall between the fire and the 
prisoners’ backs. Thus the shadow of a horse cast onto the cave wall and 
perceived by the prisoners as a ‘real’ horse, is not the shadow of an actual 
horse at all, but the shadow of a model of a horse. In Plato’s model, true reality 
is not in the fire-lit realm of the cave, but in the world outside the cave 
illuminated by the sun, the only source of ‘true’ or ‘real’ light; the fire is in fact a 
second-rate substitute for the sun. The prisoners’ reality is therefore a subset of 
a subset of reality: it is not ‘not-reality’ but rather just one of the ‘“realities”-
within-reality’ in the economy of the allegory as a whole. Heidegger, in his 1940 
essay ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ analysing this allegory describes its initial 
interpretation in traditional representational terms:
The cavelike abode is the ‘image’ for τὴν … δι ᾽ὄψεως 
φαινοµένην ἕδραν, ‘the place of our dwelling which (in an 
everyday way) is revealed to sight as we look around.’ The 
fire in the cave, which burns above those who dwell there, 
is the ‘image’ for the sun. The vault of the cave represents 
the dome of the heavens. People live under this dome, 
assigned to the earth and bound to it. What surrounds and 
concerns them there is, for them, ‘the real’ [‘das 
Wirkliche’], i.e., that which is. In this cavelike dwelling they 
feel that they are ‘in the world’ and ‘at home’ and here they 
find what they can rely on.
(Heidegger 1998d: 164)
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However, this ‘image’37 of reality is given a narrative dimension in the dialogue 
recounting ‘a story of passages from one dwelling place to another. Thus this 
story is divided in a general way into a series of four different dwelling places in 
specific gradations of up and down’ (Ibid.: 168). Heidegger goes on to detail 
these four stages:
1. The condition of imprisonment in which ‘People live chained inside the 
cave engrossed in what they immediately encounter’ (Ibid.: 168).
2. The initial unchaining of a prisoner who although still confined to the 
cave, is now free to turn around and perceive the immediate source of the 
shadow-reality (Ibid.: 168).
3. The leading of the prisoner out of the cave and ‘into the open’38 (Ibid.: 
169).
4. ‘The return to the cave and the battle waged within the cave between 
the liberator and the prisoners who resist all liberation […]’ (Ibid.: 171).
Thus, what is often reduced to an ‘image’ of reality, merely an implied simile that 
reality ‘is like’ the condition of prisoners in a cave who perceive shadows as 
real, becomes, when taken in its narrative context, a more complex whole. This 
narrative articulation, according to Heidegger’s reading, opens up the possibility 
for a nonrepresentational interpretation of the allegory:
This ‘allegory’ can have the structure of a cave image at all 
only because it is antecedently co-determined by the 
fundamental experience of ἀλήθεια [alētheia], the 
unhiddenness of beings, which was something self-
evident for the Greeks. For what else is the underground 
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37 In this thesis I try to remain aware of a potential distinction between ʻimageʼ and 
ʻrepresentationʼ following the analysis that derives from the understanding of ʻimageʼ in icons, 
which will form a later theme in chapter six. Unfortunately, as Derrida (2007) has observed, the 
term ʻrepresentationʼ is inherently ambiguous and translation strategies unavoidably compound 
the problem. An ʻimageʼ understood in terms of iconography is not a ʻrepresentationʼ in the 
sense of a ʻcopyʼ, or ʻimitationʼ in the pejorative sense. An iconic image is something that 
partakes directly with its ʻoriginalʼ via an unbroken connection. It is therefore not something 
separate from its source but rather a direct extension of it, in the same sense that a river is not 
separate from its source. The interpretation of ʻrepresentationʼ has a direct bearing on the 
concepts of ʻartʼ, ʻartistʼ and ʻspectatorʼ as I will argue later.
38 The importance of ʻthe openʼ will be further explored later, particularly in chapter seven.
cave except something open in itself that remains at the 
same time covered by a vault and, despite the entrance, 
walled off and enclosed by the surrounding earth? This 
cave-like enclosure that is open within itself, and that 
which it surrounds and therefore hides, both refer at the 
same time to an outside, the unhidden that is spread out in 
the light above ground. Only the essence of truth 
understood in the original Greek sense of ἀλήθεια—the 
unhiddenness that is related to the hidden (to something 
dissembled and disguised)—has an essential relation to 
this image of an underground cave.
(Heidegger 1998d: 172)
When understood from the perspective of its narrative totality, Plato’s allegory 
can be seen to be concerned not with a representational account of reality, but 
with an account that is at pains to lay out the ground for the conditions of reality 
such that appearances can be deceptive as part of the natural order of things. 
However, Plato’s enduring image of the cave has instead come to be 
understood as the representation of reality as representation. This is not, of 
course the only possible interpretation of the allegory, as Heidegger was at 
pains to point out,39 but its interpretation in this one particular direction was 
cemented by other aspects of Plato’s argument.
 In the allegory of the divided line (The Republic 509d–513e) existence is 
divided principally into the visible and the invisible, and it is made clear that 
‘true’ reality lies in the upper portion of the line, the invisible world of the eidei, 
the αἱ ἰδέαι—‘forms’ or ‘ideas’—that are alone the true origin of all appearances. 
The forms are, therefore, the originary substance, the true essence of the 
beings that appear in the world. In the notorious critique of art at the end of The 
Republic (Book X, 595a–607b) after the allegories of the cave and the line, all 
art is portrayed as being of ontologically low rank on the basis of it being a 
copy-of-a-copy. The famous analogy of the bed is invoked in which the ‘real’ 
bed is the ‘form’ or ‘idea’ of a bed, of which there is but one. Then there is ‘the 
bed made by the carpenter’, which is a copy of the original idea and of which 
there can be many. Lastly, occupying the ontological bottom rung of this ladder 
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39 See Heidegger 1998b.
of representational being is the painter’s representation of a bed in the painting: 
a copy of a copy. In this scheme the artists’ efforts are doubly suspect because 
they are not only twice removed from the truth, but also because, it is argued, 
they are actively attempting to appear real. There is therefore a suspicion of 
fraud that taints the artist in the Republic, and this is one of the reasons that 
artists and poets were to be excluded from the ideal state (Book III: 398a).
The ethical implications of representation
What is at stake in the Platonic ontology of representation is not just the 
downgrading of art as imitation but an ontological understanding that creates 
the possibility for the deprivation of human being itself. This representational 
ontology can be seen to underwrite Agamben’s concept of bare life, the figure of 
the homo sacer and Kantor’s aesthetics of the poor object and the reality of the 
lowest rank (to be discussed in more detail in chapter five). In the Platonic 
scheme art is characterised as ontologically inferior precisely to protect the 
source of truth, the forms, as the archē—the origin—of all things. Under this 
conception ‘Truth’ cannot reside in the world of appearances. The forms are the 
true substance of reality—the guarantors of authentic being and, according to 
Platonic metaphysics, they lie beyond appearances in the realm of ideas. The 
fact that Aristotelian philosophy ‘internalises’ this doctrine of form by combining 
it with substances occurring within nature does not remove the problems of 
representational ontology. Substance, the first and most fundamental of 
Aristotle’s ten categories and the essence of being, still lies hidden beneath the 
veil of appearances. So, although for Aristotelian ontology and for the Stoics 
and Epicureans who followed, imitation and representation were not regarded 
as necessarily ontologically suspect, the doctrine of a substance that somehow 
lay potentially concealed by appearance nevertheless persisted and survived. 
In the Modern era a particular form of dualistic doctrine became associated with 
the work of the French philosopher René Descartes who is often seen to have 
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inaugurated it.40 This ‘Cartesian’ doctrine reformed Aristotle’s dualistic system of 
hylomorphism (the doctrine that every thing is a combination of matter and form 
or soul) with a psychophysical substance dualism that reconceptualised the soul 
and limited it to the human mind. In one sense this can be seen as a combining 
of features of Platonism and Aristotelianism, with the Cartesian conception of 
the mind, the descendant of Plato’s forms, having its origin in God, whilst matter 
came to be seen as wholly the product of nature (although, of course, having its 
ultimate origin in the Divine, which sets it in motion as part of creation). 
Descartes’ revision of Aristotelian metaphysics performed a particular 
internalisation of the essence of human being: this essence, he famously 
reasoned, was a non-physical soul or mind, res cogitans, a ‘thinking substance’ 
unique to human being. Everything else was res extensa, ‘extended 
substance’ (see Sixth Meditation in Cottingham et al. 1984: 54). Although 
Descartes later struggled to reassert a form of psychophysical unity to human 
being, famously in his letters to Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, his earlier 
rationalisation of Aristotle’s metaphysics left a vivid image of human being as an 
incorporeal soul housed within a mechanical-animal body.41 The essential 
substance of the individual human being, the soul, remained hidden, while the 
world of material objects was governed by the internal mechanical movement of 
minute corpuscles (the particles or atoms of matter). The outward form of 
objects concealed this internal movement, that had been set in motion originally 
by God. Human being itself, however, became a rationalising conscious 
presence that interacted with this mechanical world of material objects, which it 
represented to itself through the sensory mechanisms of its material animal-
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40 In recent scholarship ʻCartesian Dualismʼ has been increasingly thought of as a ʻfoundling 
childʼ, that is, that the idea was ʻabroadʼ in Northern European intellectual circles before 
Descartes articulated it in his Discourse on Method (1637) and Meditations on First Philosophy 
(1641). See John Cottingham (ed.) (1992) Cambridge Companion to Descartes and Jonathan 
Sawday (1995) The Body Emblazoned. The Culture of Dissection in the Renaissance: 158 and 
296, ff. 18.
41 Paradoxically, although Descartes actually wrote in the Sixth Meditation, ʻthat I [i.e. his mind 
or soul] am not merely present in my body as a sailor is present in a ship [the translators note 
that the French version has ʻ… as a pilot in his shipʼ], but that I am very closely joined and, as it 
were, intermingled with it, so that I and the body form a unitʼ (Cottingham et al 1984: 56), it is 
the contrary view of the ʻIʼ or ʻsoulʼ lodged in the mechanical body exactly like a pilot in a ship 
but separate from it that has prevailed.
robot body. The substance of human being in the modern age now resided in its 
incorporeal, God-given soul, hidden within a mechanical body. As Descartes 
observed in his Second Meditation: 
But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing 
the square, as I just happen to have done, I normally say 
that I see the men themselves […]. Yet do I see any more 
than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I 
judge that they are men. And so something which I 
thought I was seeing with my eyes is in fact grasped solely 
by the faculty of judgement which is in my mind.
(Descartes in: Cottingham et al 1984: 11)
In essence, Descartes’ metaphysics of human being can also be seen as a 
particular internalisation of Plato’s image of the cave (and one that attempts to 
disentangle the mingling of soul and matter in Aristotle’s doctrine of 
hylomorphism): where, for Plato’s prisoners, the representational mechanism 
was played out in the cave, in Descartes’ schema, it is mediated via the bodily 
senses, which must be interpreted by the soul or mind. Although both extended 
and thinking substances are theoretically united in God as their source,42 the 
newly subjective experience of human being is fragmented into each body-
trapped soul.
 Why does the conception of substance matter? The answer is because, as 
Heidegger and the followers of this motif in his work have observed, the 
development of the concept of substance in Western metaphysics has occurred 
in a manner that means it has become inseparable from the concept of 
representation, as Jacques Derrida has observed in his 1980 address ‘Envoi’: ‘It 
is thus only in the modern period (Cartesian or post-Cartesian) that what-is is 
determined as an ob-ject present before and for a subject in the form of 
repraesentatio or Vorstellen’ (Derrida 2007: 105). This dissociation of substance 
from appearance, what Agamben has called ‘that original fracture of 
presence’ (Agamben 1993a: 136), is demonstrated in Descartes’ example 
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42 In this sense, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza are as one in that for all of them, in 
essence, the fundamental substance of all things is the primary Being of God.
above of seeing in the street no more than ‘hats and coats which could conceal 
automatons’. It is a dissociation or fracture that means that being can 
apparently only be mediated by potentially misleading representation. When this 
happens, being becomes subject to representation, and in this, subjectification 
enters a labyrinth of confusion in which it becomes extremely vulnerable. This 
problem arises, as Charles Guignon observes in his discussion of Heidegger’s 
critique of representation, because ‘concealment occurs when a particular form 
of presenting come to be taken as the ultimate truth about things’ (2006b: 18). 
For Heidegger, being, understood principally in terms of its appearance, ‘cloaks 
itself as appearance insofar as it shows itself up as being’ (Heidegger 1987: 
109). In this way, as Guignon points out:
what shows up at a particular time presents itself as the 
last word about reality, as the ‘only game in town,’ with the 
result that the current epoch’s interpretation of reality 
comes to be taken as self-evident and beyond discussion.
(Guignon 2006b: 19) 
The point for Heidegger in his destruktion of Western metaphysics was to 
liberate the idea of being from the totalising hegemony of the post-Platonic 
tradition of representational metaphysics. This representational tradition as 
Derrida, amongst others has argued, has led directly to:
the substitution of subjects identifiable with one another 
and all the more replaceable in that they are objectifiable 
(and here we have the other side of the democratic and 
parliamentary ethics of representation, that is to say, the 
horror of calculable subjectivities, innumerable but that 
can be numbered, computed, the crowds in concentration 
camps or in the computers of the police or other agencies, 
the world of the masses and the mass media, which would 
also be a world of calculable and representable 
subjectivity, the world of semiotics, of computer science, 
and of communications).
(Derrida 2007: 113)
As an example of the horrible power of the ethics of representation one 
particular testimony recorded by Charles Reznikoff in his documentary poem 
Holocaust will perhaps suffice:
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IX Entertainment
1
The commander of a camp, among his amusements, as in 
other camps had a large dog
and at the cry of ‘Jude,’ that is, ‘Jew,’
the dog would attack the man and tear off pieces of flesh.
In another camp, the Jews who had just come
kept seeing a dog—
the dog belonged to the S.S. man in charge of the 
‘showers,’ that is,
 the gas chambers;
the S.S. man would call the dog ‘Mensch,’ that is, ‘man,’:
and whenever he set the dog on a Jew he would say, 
‘Man, get that dog!’
(Reznikoff 2010: 53)
As Himmler argued in his reflections on racial theory in 1939: ‘we must not 
endow these people with decent German thoughts and logical conclusions of 
which they are not capable, but we must take them as they really are’ (cited in 
Davies 1981: 445). The idea of a people being taken ‘as they really are’ could 
not exist without its basis in substance ontology. To be taken ‘as they really are’ 
in this case meant to be taken as non-human, as lacking that essence of human 
being that would entitle them to equal treatment with the truly German. In 
Descartes’ time physiologists, and it is rumoured, even Descartes himself, felt 
perfectly able to vivisect a dog, ignoring its cries under the knife as being merely 
the reflex product of an animal-robot mechanism: animals, and therefore dogs, 
did not have souls and therefore any apparently ‘emotional’ display was merely 
an appearance and had no basis in subjective substance. In their account of 
German racial policies of the early 1940s, Of Pure Blood (1976), Marc Hillel and 
Clarissa Henry observe that in order to ‘avoid mistakes which might 
subsequently occur in the selection of subjects suitable for “Germanization”, the 
RuSHA [Rasse und Siedlungshauptamt, Head Office for Race and Settlement] 
in 1942 distributed a pamphlet, The Sub-Human [Der Untermensch], to those 
responsible for that selection’ (Hillel and Henry 1976: 32). This pamphlet stated:
The sub-human, that biologically seemingly complete similar 
creation of nature with hands, feet and a kind of brain, with 
eyes and a mouth, is nevertheless a completely different, 
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dreadful creature. He is only a rough copy of a human being, 
with human-like facial traits but nonetheless morally and 
mentally lower than any animal. Within this creature there is 
a fearful chaos of wild, uninhibited passions, nameless 
destructiveness, the most primitive desires, the nakedest 
vulgarity. Sub-human, otherwise nothing. For all that bear a 
human face are not equal. Woe to him who forgets it.
(Quoted in Hillel and Henry 1976: 32)
For the German state in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the biopolitical 
representation of certain races apparently made possible a form of treatment 
not unlike Descartes’ (possibly apocryphal) treatment of a dog. The 
metaphysics of representation opened up the possibility of a world of 
metamorphoses in which gas chambers were turned into showers, dogs 
became ‘men’, and Jews were first turned into animals before being further 
metamorphosed into lampshades and soap: the labyrinth of representation in 
which ‘human being’ becomes lost. As I will discuss further in chapter five, 
Kantor’s direct experience of the reality of the Nazi treatment of the Jews in 
occupied Kraków was of critical importance in the formation of his aesthetic.
 For the subjects caught up in this labyrinth of representation one form of 
resistance was to subvert representational ontology itself. One model for such a 
non-, or anti-representational strategy lies in Heidegger’s43 alternative reading 
of Plato informed by the perspective of pre-Socratic philosophy.44 This sees 
being in more performative terms, as a dynamic process of concealment and 
unconcealment. In Heidegger’s revision Being—in the sense of kosmos, the 
totality of all that exists—becomes the generator of truth such that individual 
beings—such as you, I, and the other apparent objects in the world—each 
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43 I am aware of the terrible irony that the model I am proposing for the resistance of 
representational atrocities perpetrated in the name of the German Nazi party comes from 
someone who was, however briefly, an early member of that party. However, as Derrida has 
noted ʻThe problem opened up by Heidegger is to my knowledge the only one today to treat 
representation as a wholeʼ (Derrida 2007: 114).
44 This strategy attempts to re-think Plato as he may have been operating in the intellectual 
climate of his time, where the ideas of the pre-Socratic philosophers, dominated by Parmenides 
and Heraclitus, held sway un-eclipsed by the institutionalised tradition of Platonic and 
Aristotelian metaphysics through which the Western tradition has subsequently come to view 
the field. The pre-Socratics fragments are used by Heidegger and those working in his tradition 
as critical levers to pry open and loosen traditional post-Platonic interpretations of Platoʼs 
thought.
participate equally in the shared clearing of Being itself. In this way, truth 
becomes not something fixed that can inhere in the individual being’s substance
—be it abstract form, or hylomorphic entity—an essence that had to be 
discerned as to whether or not it was in agreement with its appearance. Instead 
truth becomes something generated through the performance of Being and 
beings as a whole. Just as the image of Plato’s allegory of the cave is a 
condensation of a narrative whole, so the representations of human being as a 
‘this’ or a ‘that’ are but versions of an image that condenses the essence of 
human being from a larger temporal whole. The implications of this ontological 
scheme are such as to undercut representational ontology as a whole and 
touch a range of fields apparently unconnected. As Derrida has noted: ‘The 
same chain, if we assume that its consequences hang together and if we follow 
the development of the Heideggerian motif, traverses a certain system of 
political, pictorial, theatrical, or aesthetic representation in general’ (Derrida 
2007: 113). An understanding of this reorientation of perspective on human 
being will, I will argue, help illuminate the apparent peculiarities of Kantor’s art. 
This is an art that exploited the strategies of both the first and second avant-
gardes to détourne45 a particular representation of certain categories of human 
being. In this way Kantor’s art serves as a form of resistance to the pejorative 
representation of these certain categories as ‘rough copies’, as a formless and 
‘fearful chaos of wild, uninhibited passions, nameless destructiveness, the most 
primitive desires, the nakedest vulgarity’: the category branded as ‘Sub-human, 
otherwise nothing’. Kantor’s art is one that features in painting, in sculptural 
objects, in happenings and in theatrical performances, multiple doublings of 
human figures, both in the flesh and in wax, bodies wrapped and bandaged, 
space, matter, character and plot ‘minced’ into formlessness; form rendered into 
nothing, but a nothing that is paradoxically yet something.
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45 The term is from détournement, ʻhijackingʼ, which can be interpreted as the turning of 
something from its initial purposes to oneʼs own (see Guy Debord and Gil J. Wolman 1956). 
Debord (1995) later stated: ʻThe device of détournement restores all their subversive qualities to 
past critical judgments that have congealed into respectable truths—or, in other words, that 
have been transformed into liesʼ (thesis 206 in Debord 1995: 144–145). See also Wark 2011: 35 
and 37–38.
The ἦθος (ēthos) of human being
The peculiarities of Kantor’s work, with its apparently fragmented presentation 
of human being, and its confusion between human being and inanimate objects, 
can be understood as an attempt to articulate the nature of human being in the 
Heideggerian sense outlined above. This is evident in the work produced 
throughout Kantor’s career but particularly in the performance works made 
during his last years: the five major performance spectacles made between 
1975 and 1990. In these performances, which I will collectively refer to 
(following Pleśniarowicz in his 2004 book) as his ‘theatre of death’, a 
Heideggerian sense of human being is most clearly articulated. This sense of 
being remains, however, firmly grounded in Kantor’s wartime experience and 
receives a chief impetus from it, as I will argue in more detail in chapter five. Far 
from being pessimistic, as their collective title ‘theatre of death’ would suggest, 
this account celebrates both the paradoxical frailty and greatness of human 
being in all its contingent quotidian detail. In its own way, Kantor’s artistic output 
is more Comedia (in the sense of Dante’s epic poem) than Tragedia. In this 
attempt Kantor can be seen to be following Heidegger’s radical re-
conceptualisation of human being as Dasein, a concept developed to focus on 
the proper place or dwelling of human being. Towards the end of his ‘Letter on 
“Humanism”’ Heidegger discusses the relationship between ontology and ethics 
by way of an analysis of Heraclitus’ fragment 119 in which he argues for a 
radical rereading:
The saying of Heraclitus (Fragment 119) goes ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ 
δαίµων [ēthos anthropōi daimōn]. This is usually translated, ‘A 
man’s character is his daimon.’ This translation thinks in a 
modern way, not a Greek one. ἦθος means abode, dwelling 
place. The word names the open region in which the human 
being dwells. The open region of his abode allows what pertains 
to the essence of the human being, and what in thus arriving 
resides in nearness to him, to appear. The abode of the human 
being contains and preserves the advent of what belongs to 
human being in his essence. According to Heraclitus’s phrase 
this is δαίµων [daimōn], the god. The fragment says: The 
human being dwells, insofar as he is a human being, in the 
nearness of god.
(Heidegger 1998c: 269)
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Heraclitus’s fragment has been variously translated as ‘One’s bearing shapes 
one’s fate’ (Haxton in Heraclitus 2001: 83) or ‘Man’s character is his fate’ (Kahn 
1979: 81), the connotation being that personal character traits will determine 
what will happen to an individual. Such a translation is clearly grounded in a 
representational ontology in which individual subjects are at the mercy of some 
inner substance in the form of ‘character’. Heidegger’s originary interpretation of 
ēthos as ‘abode’ or ‘dwelling place’ instead of ‘bearing’ or ‘character’, upsets 
this familiar truism and immediately places human being within a more 
Nietzschean framework. Such a repositioning proposes an existentially 
performative ontology of human being, rather than one of an essentialist-
substantialist nature. Similarly, the translation of daimōn as ‘the god’, or ‘the 
unfamiliar one’, forces a reorientation of the idea of ‘fate’. Later in the same 
essay, Heidegger refines his translation still further to read: ‘The (familiar) 
abode for humans is the open region for the presencing of god (the unfamiliar 
one)’ (Heidegger 1998c: 271). Rather than a trite moral proverb, Heraclitus’s 
fragment begins to be revealed as an ontological statement about the space or 
place in which human being exists. Heidegger’s bringing into relation of the 
familiar and the unfamiliar, human being and ‘god’, upsets the conventionally 
unidirectional manner in which human being is thought of with respect to time: 
here the finite, human being, is brought into close proximity with the eternal, 
‘god’.
 The conventional idea that human being consists of an individual’s 
experiencing of a string of ‘nows’ strung like pearls along the forward-arcing 
linear reach of time does not always agree with actual experience. As Kantor 
shows in his ‘theatre of death’ (and as I will discuss in more detail in the next 
section in relation to memory), human being is circumscribed in eternity by its 
finitude, but within this bubble of time, an increasingly ‘dead’ past, is illuminated 
and animated by the act of memory within which the play of being exists. 
Dasein, or human being, is, literally, being ‘here’ or ‘there’. This dwelling place is 
not only always ‘now’, but also always ‘then’. However, the ‘then’ is, in its 
pastness and deadness, always a harbinger of the ‘when’, the fact of finitude, 
the fact of death.
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 The conventional idea of death is of an end awaiting the individual at 
some point in the future. However, in his discussion of a related fragment 
(Fragment 25) the Heraclitean commentator, Charles H. Kahn, discusses the 
translation of the Greek word moira in its relation to the concept of death in a 
way that complements Heidegger’s reading of ēthos:
The meaning of moros as ‘portion’ or ‘lot’ survives only in a few 
technical uses; from Homer on, the term acquires the literary 
sense of ‘doom’ or ‘violent death’. The cognate moira does have 
a wide range of uses in which the etymological value is 
preserved: ‘part’, ‘share’, ‘fraction’, hence ‘allotted region’, 
‘territory’, or ‘share of esteem’, ‘social class’. But moira in poetry 
characteristically refers to the personal fate of a man, his 
allotted share of life delimited by the moment of death.
(Kahn 1979: 231–232)
The idea of moira, or death, as defining the ēthos—the dwelling of human being
—offers a radically different view of death, and in turn informs Heidegger’s 
account of Dasein. If the dwelling place of human being is not, in essence, a 
home in the normal domestic sense of a house or a flat, but rather ‘the open 
region’ ‘in the nearness of god’, then this ‘region’ is surely Dasein’s ‘allotted 
share of life’. In this sense ‘death’ is another manner of thinking about ēthos, 
which, in turn is itself another manner of thinking about the nature of human 
being. In this manner of thinking, human being, or Dasein, is not an individual in 
the present, but that individual’s history and potential as well.
 Agamben, in his essay ‘*Se: Hegel’s Absolute and Heidegger’s 
Ereignis’ (in Agamben 1999c: 116–137), offers further reflections on 
Heidegger’s reading of the Heraclitus fragment and in particular the question of 
the term daimōn:
As for the term daimōn, it neither simply indicates a divine figure 
nor merely refers to the one who determines destiny. 
Considered according to its etymological root (which refers it to 
the verb daiomai, ‘to divide, lacerate’), daimōn means ‘the 
lacerator, he who divides and fractures.’ [...] Only insofar as it is 
what divides can the daimōn also be what assigns a fate and 
what destines (daiomai first means ‘to divide,’ then ‘to 
assign’ […]). Once restored to its etymological origin, 
Heraclitus’s fragment then reads: ‘For man, ēthos, the dwelling 
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in the “self” that is what is most proper and habitual for him, is 
what lacerates and divides, the principle and place of a 
fracture.’ Man is such that, to be himself, he must necessarily 
divide himself.’
(Agamben 1999c: 117–118)
Agamben’s reading of Heraclitus’ fragment could serve as a gloss on the image 
of human being found in Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’, where, in each of the five 
major spectacles human being is fractured, divided, doubled and lacerated by 
the vicissitudes of fate. In this sense Heidegger’s thinking can be seen to be in 
proximity to Kantor’s conception of his performance work where he saw an 
equation between art, eternity and death. In Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’ the 
‘individual’ human being is fractured into its memories (both real and imagined), 
into its past, present and future selves and into heroic and mythological models, 
where time is elastic and the future, present and past dwell simultaneously in 
the same space.
Memories as ʻfound objectsʼ: the concept of memory in the light of the 
ēthos of human being
The sense of ēthos discussed in the last section is encapsulated in a poetic 
image from Bede’s The Ecclesiastical History of the English People. In Book II, 
chapter 13, during King Edwin’s council with his chiefs over accepting the 
Christian faith, one of his men says:
This is how the present life of man on earth, King, appears 
to me in comparison with that time which is unknown to 
us. You are sitting feasting with your ealdormen and 
thegns in winter time; the fire is burning on the hearth in 
the middle of the hall and all inside is warm, while outside 
the wintry storms of rain and snow are raging; and a 
sparrow flies swiftly through the hall. It enters in at one 
door and quickly flies out through the other. For the few 
moments it is inside, the storm and wintry tempest cannot 
touch it, but after the briefest moment of calm, it flits from 
your sight, out of the wintry storm and into it again. So this 
life of man appears but for a moment; what follows or 
indeed what went before, we know not at all.
(Bede 1999: 95)
The flight path of the sparrow through the warmth of the hall is suggestive of the 
linear arc of time mentioned above. However, in this image, the totality of 
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human life is likened to only that portion of the flight path within the hall. The 
entire life of human being is equated with the flitting of an instant. It is as if the 
string of ‘nows’ is contracted, or perhaps expanded, into a sense of one ‘now’. 
In his essay ‘Time and History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum’ 
Agamben notes that while ‘the classical representation of time is a circle, the 
image guiding the Christian conceptualization of it is a straight line’ (Agamben 
2007a: 103). This Christian conceptualisation of time derives from Aristotle’s 
discussion of the topics of time and continuity in Physics IV (chapters 10–14) 
and VI (chapters 1–3) respectively (Aristotle 1996: 102–117; 138–146). 
Augustine’s discussion in Book XI of his Confessions elaborated on the 
paradoxes of time discussed by Aristotle but relates them to personal 
experience and thereby introduces a phenomenological and existential 
dimension to the discussion (1961: 253–280).46 The spatial representation of 
time as a line creates problems because the continuous succession of the string 
of ‘nows’ become equated with the idea of geometrical points, which, in being 
sublated to the geometry of the line cease to exist. This is a problem for 
Augustine’s argument, taken up and elaborated by Heidegger: ‘What is this now 
[…]? […] Am I the now? Is every other person the now? Then time would 
indeed be I myself, and every other person would be time. And in our being with 
one another we would be time—everyone and no one’ (Heidegger 1992: 5). 
However, from the experiential perspective, time can be seen to have a 
distinctly non-linear quality, not circular in the sense understood by Antiquity (as 
Agamben notes), but rather one that loops back on itself in a way that envelops 
the individual human experience and makes a dwelling for it. Over the course of 
life’s span, the perspective on time gradually shifts from one that looks forward 
with expectancy towards a future opened up before it, to one that is oriented in 
the opposite direction, where human being turns around on itself to look 
backwards at what is increasingly the larger ‘portion’ of the ‘allotted share’—the 
expanse of the past now opening behind it. In this sense, human being comes 
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46 ʻIt seems to me, then, that time is merely an extension, though of what it is an extension I do 
not know. I begin to wonder whether it is an extension of the mind itselfʼ (Augustine 1961: 274; 
this passage is also cited in Heidegger 1962: 480).
to occupy the situation of Walter Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’, who advances 
backwards into the future, its face ‘turned towards the past’, gazing at the rubble 
of history in its wake (Benjamin 2006b: 392). This change of direction, from 
expectancy to a regard of the past, is a function of memory, and becomes 
increasingly dominant over the course of life. In this sense human being, from 
its subjective perspective, comes to dwell increasingly in memory.
 For Augustine, memory is ‘like a great field or a spacious palace, a 
storehouse for countless images of all kinds’ (Augustine 1961: 214). However, 
the function of memory is not merely as a vault for the past in which human 
being dwells. One aspect of memory is that it also transforms the past into a 
mirror that reflects, in some way, the future now encroaching with increasing 
speed from behind. In this way, human being is literally in time—suspended in a 
moving area of temporal awareness, stretched like an expanding and 
contracting elastic bubble between what is past and what is to come. This is 
another sense in which the notion of the individual as discreet spatio-temporal 
being—as an essential substance occupying a ‘here and now’ is problematised. 
For Augustine ‘neither the future nor the past exist, and therefore it is not strictly 
correct to say that there are three times, past, present and future’ (1966: 269). 
Instead, he argues, there is only a present ‘now’ in which the acts of memory, 
sense perception and expectation are performed (ibid.). However, it was exactly 
this ‘now’, the Aristotelian nȳn, occupying as it does the no-place of a stigmē or 
geometrical point that both thinkers found so perplexing: the non-existence of 
the ‘fleeting now’. In his discussion Agamben cites Hegel’s development and 
response to this idea:
Hegel thinks of time in terms of the Aristotelian model of 
the precise instant. Against the Aristotelian nȳn, he sets 
the now in correspondence; and, as Aristotle conceived 
the nȳn as stigmē, so he conceives the now as a point. 
This now, which ‘is nothing other than the passage of its 
being into nothingness, and from nothingness into its 
being’, is eternity as ‘true present’.
(Agamben 2007a: 107, Hegel quotations unreferenced in 
original)
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However, the ‘now’ occupied by the subject is arguably composed of greater or 
lesser expanses of the past from which expectations are derived and projected 
as a potential future.47 This complex self-performance of intra- and extra-
reflexivity is a peculiarity of human consciousness: a looping of the self into 
itself in an endless recasting. This understanding of the relation of human being 
to time, via memory, is one in which the idea of a specifically human being is the 
product of a reflexive self-recognition: to be human is to recognise oneself as 
human.48 Both the idea of the species, and the conceptual understanding of the 
self are based on a self-reflexive performance, itself apparently based on 
nothing. As Agamben notes in his discussion of Hegel’s treatment of time:
Defining time in this way as a negation of negation, Hegel 
cannot avoid taking to its extreme conclusion the 
nullification of experience by time implicit in its 
determination as a continuous succession of precise 
instants. ‘Time’, he writes in a passage from the 
Encyclopaedia which still resonates with an—albeit 
subdued and consciously assumed—Augustinian anxiety 
in the face of time’s fleeting essence, ‘is the thing existing 
which is not when it is, and is when it is not: a half-
glimpsed becoming.’ As such, this negative being which ‘is  
not and is not what is’ is formally homologous to man.
(Agamben 2007a: 107, Hegel quotations unreferenced in 
original)
In his détournement of avant-garde strategies, Kantor is effectively re-
performing the idea of the human—‘a half-glimpsed becoming’—out of the 
‘nothing’ of the informe or formlessness.
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47 The conception of time that I articulate here owes a great deal to Agambenʼs discussion of 
messianic time—the time of the ʻnowʼ—in Agamben 2005a: 61–72. An enriched conception of 
time is also present in the work of Schulz, who will be discussed in more detail in chapter five. In 
the second story in the collection Sanitorium Under the Sign of the Hourglass (1937), entitled 
ʻGenialna epokaʼ (The Age of Genius), Schulz begins by stating: ʻOrdinary facts are arranged 
within time, strung along its length as on a threadʼ but then moves to suggest that there are 
ʻparallel streams of time within a two-track time […] branchlines of time, somewhat illegal and 
suspectʼ that exist for the ʻcontraband of supernumerary events that cannot be 
registeredʼ (Schulz 1988b: 140).
48 This formulation echoes Agambenʼs critique (in Agamben 2004a: 25–26) of Linneusʼ attempts 
to define human being, and his characterisation of the ʻanthropological machineʼ and will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter five.
 One of the distinguishing characteristics of Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’ was 
his extension of his technique of the ‘found object’ to include memories, as well 
as spaces, situations and character (historical and fictional). For Kantor, 
memories were treated as real objects in the present, and not as nostalgic 
references to a lost past. In this sense Kantor is following Augustine who, in the 
Confessions maintained that: ‘the present of past things is the 
memory’ (Augustine 1961: 269). As such, memories for Kantor were not 
understood as ‘copies’ in the pejorative sense, as inferior, second-rate 
substitutes for some authentic original. Such a tension still exists, however, in 
that in Kantor’s work, the stigma of memory-as-poor-copy is retained but 
instead forms part of the ‘reality of the lowest rank’. This is managed by the 
acknowledgement that memories are not ‘real’; or rather their realness lies in 
their very inauthenticity. The ‘reality’ of past events is in effect ‘played’ by 
untrustworthy and suspect elements (themselves real) that stand in for the 
‘real’ events they depict. Kantor’s conceit for this is that of an ‘Agency for the 
hiring of the dear departed’, a troupe of second-rate travelling players, drunks, 
gamblers, whores and hypocrites who ply their trade in poor re-enactments (a 
trope he seems to have taken, at least in part, from the fictions of Schulz, as will 
be explored in chapter five):
In memories
truthful and magnanimous people do not exist.
Let’s say it quite openly: the process of evoking memories
is suspect and none too clean.
It is simply a hiring agency.
The memory makes use of «hired» characters.
They are sinister individuals, mediocre and suspect 
creatures
waiting to be «hired» like home helps «by the hour».
Almost crumpled, dirty, badly dressed, sickly,
bastardized, acting out badly the parts of people often 
near and dear to us.
(Kantor 1980: n.p., from the programme notes for 
Wielopole, Wielopole)
It is these ‘crumpled, dirty, badly dressed, sickly, bastardized’ players that are 
‘hired’ to present Kantor’s memories in his ‘theatre of death’ and, 
simultaneously, to also present the condition of the artist, as Kantor viewed it, 
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as society’s ‘outsider’. In this way the memories function as ‘poor objects’ and 
not as realistic illusions. This reconceptualisation of memory into poor object 
allows Kantor to practice what he called a ‘constructivism of the 
emotions’ (Kantor interviewed by Denis Bablet in the documentary Bablet 
1991). Memory for Kantor is therefore opposed to any notion of sentimental 
reminiscing.
Kantor dealt with this underlying reality of these various aspects of time in 
relation to human being in a number of ways in his ‘theatre of death’. One way 
was to use the idea of ‘memory plates’ (an idea taken from the glass negatives 
of nineteenth century plate cameras) to characterise memory as a collection of 
random ‘snapshots’ of the past that are shuffled and layered, one on top of the 
other, so that distinct events, distant in time from one another, can find 
themselves next to each other outside of their normal temporal sequence. In 
this way Kantor seized on an aspect of memory that is normally ignored: the 
fact that memory does not necessarily work in a straightforward, linear-historical 
manner, that people and places can find themselves in contact with one another 
in ways which ‘did not actually happen’ but which nevertheless follow a certain 
autonomous logic. In his writings from 1970–1980 gathered under the title 
Theatrical Place, Kantor articulates this notion of time in art:
In art, the logic of a phenomenon’s successful development 
does not often coincide with a linear chronology.
Often, I have the impression, which fascinates me, that TIME in 
art, in its course of events, encroaches upon the notion of 
eternity.
As if past and future did not exist in it.
As if the phenomenon of succession or progression did not exist 
in it.
It is only later, after it is already over, we arrange the facts and 
events according to the logic of our time, following our cause 
and effect.
All these explanations of the relationships between the ideas, 
my attempts at locating, defining, and analyzing them, help me 
identify for myself my expanding past, discover its 
transformations, which may lead me to new solutions.
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With the passing of time, we realize that everything, however, 
always remains in this infinite 
i n t e r i o r.
Everything is intertwined—one could say: exists simultaneously.
(Kantor 2009c: 360)
For example: the old people in The Dead Class share their childhood classroom 
with the carcasses of their dead youthful selves in the form of wax dummies; in 
Wielopole, Wielopole, the First World War Soldiers from a photograph, sent 
back by Kantor’s father from the front, inhabit a corner of the family room.
Kantor’s particular adaptation of photography in his idea of ‘memory plates 
is a metaphor for the way in which memory lends a temporally extended 
dimension to the nature of human being. In a recent essay, ‘The Last 
Judgment’ (in Agamben 2007b) Agamben makes a similar claim for 
photography, one which echoes the way in which Kantor’s work from The Dead 
Class onwards rolls the entire span of a human life, its past, present and future 
as contained within its ‘allotted portion’ or span into one image (or perhaps in 
Kantor’s case it is better to say one selection of images, or ‘snapshots’). 
Agamben uses the example of Henri Daguerre’s famous daguerreotype, the 
Boulevard du Temple, ‘considered the first photograph in which a human figure 
appears’ (2007b: 23). Agamben goes on to describe what makes this image so 
haunting:
The silver plate represents the Boulevard du Temple, 
photographed by Daguerre from the window of his studio 
at a busy moment in the middle of the day. The boulevard 
should be crowded with people and carriages, and yet, 
because the cameras of the period required an extremely 
long exposure time, absolutely nothing of this moving 
mass is visible. Nothing, that is, except a small black 
silhouette on the sidewalk in the lower left-hand corner of 
the photograph. A man stopped to have his shoes shined, 
and must have stood still for quite a while, with his leg 
slightly raised to place his foot on the shoeshiner’s stool.
(Agamben 2007b: 23–24)
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Seizing on the uncanny presence of this one solitary figure Agamben then 
proceeds to elaborate a startling vision of humanity in which a sense of eternity 
is bound up with that of the mundane and the trivial activity of a single moment:
I could never have invented a more adequate image of the 
Last Judgment. The crowd of humans—indeed, all of 
humanity—is present, but it cannot be seen, because the 
judgment concerns a single person, a single life: precisely 
this one and no other. And when has that life, that person, 
been picked out, captured, and immortalized by the angel 
of the Last Judgment—who is also the angel of 
photography? While making the most banal and ordinary 
gesture, the gesture of having his shoes shined. In the 
supreme instant, man, each man, is given over forever to 
his smallest, most everyday gesture. And yet, thanks to 
the photographic lens, that gesture is now charged with 
the weight of an entire life; that insignificant or even silly 
moment collects and condenses in itself the meaning of an 
entire existence.
(Ibid.: 24)
Agamben’s version of the ‘Last Judgment’ and his identification of its angel as 
the ‘angel of photography’ could almost be a description of Kantor’s aesthetic. 
In this chapter I have concentrated on a critique of representation a means of 
identifying the way in which it distracts from other ways of conceptualising 
human being, particularly the idea developed from Heidegger and Agamben 
that the ‘now’ of the present is a peculiar nothingness that is somehow 
extended into the past and the future. This creates the possibility of a positive 
reading of the idea of ‘the nothing’ that will link with Kantor’s preoccupation with 
the ‘reality of the lowest rank’ and the ‘poor object’ to be considered in more 
detail in chapters five and six. I merely pause to note here that that sense of 
poverty, or abjectness links with the sense of the ‘smallest, most everyday 
gesture’ that ‘condenses in itself the meaning of an entire existence’.
Kantor’s method of shuffling ‘memory plates’ could, in theory, produce an 
infinite drift of combinations and juxtapositions as the ‘memory plates’ endlessly 
shuffle themselves. Kantor’s method of ‘organisation’ for these ‘memory plates’, 
which initially, according to his method, ‘found’ him, was to ‘fix’ a particular 
combination, using a single concrete place upon which that combination of 
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plates could be layered and within which the elements could dwell and cohere. 
In an interview with Leslie Caplan and Krystyna Rabińska in 1980 Kantor 
stated: ‘In reminiscence there is never action, only photographic plates. […] I do 
not develop the photographic plate, I only lift it out of the reservoir of 
memory’ (Kantor interviewed in ‘Metoda klisz’ (Memory-Plate Method, Dialog 12 
1980), cited by Pleśniarowicz in 2004: 187). In The Dead Class it was the 
schoolroom, stumbled upon by accident whilst on holiday on the Baltic coast, 
sparking a memory of his childhood schoolroom (see Kantor 1995). In 
Wielopole, Wielopole it was the family room of childhood in which he witnessed 
the dying of his Great Uncle (the priest of Wielopole). In Let the Artists Die it is a 
combination of places to do with dying: a cemetery, Kantor’s imagining of his 
future deathbed, a childhood playroom in which games of death are played with 
toy soldiers, a prison cell, a torture chamber which becomes a vision of Stoss’s 
altar piece of The Dormition of the Virgin Mother from the Basilica in Kraków’s 
main square. In I Shall Never Return the place is a dirty, low-life inn which is 
invaded by characters from Kantor’s earlier productions who themselves 
channel figures from the Greek myths. And, in Today is My Birthday it is the 
artist’s studio, a space designed to be shared by the artist, his self-portrait, 
Velàzquez’s Infanta, a family photograph, colleagues from the 1950s Kraków 
Group and the Russian Constructivist theatre director Meyerhold.
 Kantor used these concrete places as initial, organising devices, which 
could be transformed into other spaces as required by the developing logic 
arising from the interplay of the memory plates. The essence of the concrete 
place carried with it its own logic: a geometry not only of space and architecture 
but also of use and human dwelling. This actual and real logic—the 
autonomous logic of a concrete, real place—was employed by Kantor to 
choreograph the contents of the memory plates. In essence, the concrete place 
acts as a fixing pin that pierces the memory plates, installing them in a kind of 
stasis. In this way the place becomes a sort of antechamber of eternity, a key to 
the eternal dimension that Kantor attempts to evoke. Real elements of place 
illuminate—irradiate—the contents of the memory plates and show them up for 
the duration of the performance. This combination of memory plates and place 
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creates the possibility for the paradoxical creation of a fragmentary, eternal 
space that opens up for the audience during the performance to invoke wider 
social, political, cultural and historical events and contexts outside of Kantor’s 
direct experience. For example, the announcement of the declaration of the 
First World War and the Beadle’s singing of the Austro-Hungarian national 
anthem in The Dead Class locates the classroom in Galicia 1914, the year 
before Kantor’s birth. Kantor could not have remembered this classroom, as he 
could not have been there. However, provincial Galicia and the event of the 
First World War molded the character of the world he was born into and helped 
determine the fate of his father. Similarly, the world performed as Wielopole, 
Wielopole is one that existed before Kantor’s birth, but which directly informed 
his early childhood: he remembered the photograph of his father with the 
recruits, and he remembered soldiers marching around in the square of 
Wielopole; he remembered the family (minus his father) gathered around his 
Great Uncle, the priest’s deathbed. In Let the Artists Die the references to 
childhood are personal memories, but the reference to the author’s own death 
is obviously imaginary, though in some form inevitable. Kantor-the-child plays 
with his life-sized tin soldiers and leads them in a march with the figure of 
General Piłsudski, the hero who secured Poland’s independence following the 
Great War. The particular ‘leaden’ paint and makeup covering these soldiers 
also recalls the appearance of the photographs of the bodies uncovered at the 
site of the Katyń massacre during the Second World War, which were widely 
publicised in Polish newspapers (see Pleśniarowicz 2004: 248). The General in 
part stands as a remembered figment of the six-year old Kantor’s imagination. 
At the same time, in his on-stage reality, he is also the historically heroic figure 
of Poland, whose ‘dead’ status is emphasised by the skeletal form of his famous 
favourite white horse on which he rides. The scenes of prison and torture that 
follow relate to the loss of independence as well as to the condition of the artist 
seen as an outlaw spurned by society. The reference to the altarpiece is at once 
a reference to a local cultural and religious landmark in Kraków as well as to the 
medieval artist Stoss, references to Nuremberg and to eternity signified by the 
Ascension of the Virgin. I Shall Never Return refers again to its author’s death, 
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to his own previous artistic productions and to his estranged father’s death in 
Auschwitz. The three picture frames, which themselves ‘frame’ and install the 
artist’s studio in Today Is My Birthday become the site for the recreation of a 
family photograph of a birthday celebration, dating from before Kantor’s own 
birth. Later, an evocation of the war-wounded in a field hospital links the 
provincialism of Wielopole in the Chagall-like figure of the Jewish water-carrier, 
with Jehovah walking among his Creation. The figure of Velàzquez’s Infanta, 
from Kantor’s series of paintings around the same theme, steps out of one of 
the frames. This studio-place becomes the site for the visitation by his artistic 
colleagues and inspirations, each invoking a particular kind of horror: Jarema, 
the cofounder with Kantor of Cricot 2 in the 1950s appears in the guise of an 
artistic commissar; Stern, another member of the Kraków group of artists, 
appears as a survivor from a mass grave. Meyerhold reads out his letter to 
Stalin pleading for mercy before his torture and execution is staged within one 
of the picture frames. All of this eventually leads to an evocation of the ‘gales of 
war’ and oppression that have blown through the twentieth century.
In each of the ‘theatre of death’ productions, there is a sense of a fullness, 
of a space of human being, that is replete and teeming with potential, with 
bustle and busyness, and at the same time punctuated periodically by a sense 
of silence that serves as a reminder of its ultimate encirclement of existence by 
eternity, the circumscription within which the finitude of human being is marked. 
The sense of fullness in this account of life-as-ēthos would seem to run counter 
to Kantor’s aesthetic of the ‘reality of the lowest rank’ and the ‘poor object’, 
mentioned earlier, and the sense of the ‘bareness’ of ‘bare life’ with which I 
argue it equates. However, a relation to ‘bare life’ can be seen in that this 
apparent fullness, the fullness of memory, is what is normally seen as the 
consolation for loss. Memory is often seen as an emptiness full of ghosts, as in 
the familiar formulation of ‘all we have now are our memories’. However, viewed 
from the perspective of the Heraclitean-Heideggerian sense of human-being-as-
ēthos, it is possible to suggest a different understanding: that the reality of that 
which is regarded as lost—the reality of the ‘absent’ or ‘dearly departed’ as well 
as of the lost in the sense of ‘abjectness’—is merely a partial and apparent 
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aspect of a larger reality. The absence of the things that are lost, the dearly 
departed, is rather an illusion based on the traditional Western metaphysical 
understanding that represents human being as substance. Because the 
memory appears ‘insubstantial’ it is understood as ‘second rate’ and a ‘poor 
copy’ of the ‘real authentic individual’. However, the ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ are 
arguably themselves ghostly presences if separated from their wider temporal 
ēthos. Kantor articulates this particular sense of plenitude in his programme 
notes to Let the Artists Die:
I […] I am made up of numberless ranks of characters […] 
A whole crowd walking into the depths of time […] They 
are all me […] What an extraordinary richness […] I—the 
naked infant […] I—the barefoot boy in short pants […] I—
in my school uniform […] I, with a romantic forelock […] I
—and so on until today […] I can feel the hand of invisible 
TIME, the cause of this richness, which nevertheless, 
mercilessly and ruthlessly, deprives me of this multiplicity, 
this abundance, these profiles, silhouettes, varieties, 
which impoverishes me into one figure, the present one 
[…]
(Kantor, cited in Pleśniarowicz 2004: 251–252)
The sense here is not of an individual human being occupying a temporal nȳn 
or point-like present on a temporal line. It is rather a sense of a creative 
‘richness’ that is nevertheless in the process of bringing about an inevitable 
impoverishment and destruction. The ‘nothingness’ that beckons from beyond 
the grave is thereby linked as part of a continuum with the ‘nothingness’ that 
constitutes the ‘extraordinary richness’ that walks ‘into the depths of time’. This 
effect is entirely dependent on Kantor’s presence within his own artworks, not 
just conceptually as in the passage just cited, but performatively in a variety of 
ways that are explored in this thesis. It is, however, precisely Kantor’s presence 
within his work that has troubled some critics, in particular Andrzej Żurowski, 
whose essay was cited at the beginning of this chapter and to whom I turn next.
Is Kantor really ʻPulling faces at the audienceʼ?
Andrzej Żurowski’s 1985 essay ‘“Pulling Faces at the Audience”: the Lonely 
Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor’ provides an interesting case of a critic keen to pay 
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tribute to the peculiarities of the emergence of Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’. He 
does so through what I am arguing is the inappropriate strategy of attempting to 
find a way of placing it within a traditional theatrical framework and hence to 
understand it within a traditional representational framework. The second part of 
the title of Żurowski’s essay implies that Kantor is in a position of isolation, 
ostracised by the audience because he has, indirectly, pulled faces at them. 
Although insulting the audience has been a not-unfamiliar strategy of the avant-
garde, there is perhaps the hint here of an implication that Kantor is pulling 
faces at his audience out of spite, that this might be a self-fulfilling situation: the 
artist feels forced to ‘pull faces’ because he is not understood and is shunned 
because he ‘pulls faces’. If this logic is followed it begs the question of which 
came first: the ‘pulling faces’ or the ‘loneliness’?
 In the one black and white photograph in Żurowski’s essay (which faces 
the title page as it is printed in New Theatre Quarterly), Kantor is shown in the 
foreground of a performance of The Dead Class, his left hand raised in some 
gesture in the direction of the audience, his right hand, lowered palm down 
towards the floor seems a gesture aimed towards the performers in the school 
desks in the background behind him. These figures, the old men and women of 
the ‘dead classroom’, are caught in a state of agitation and are indeed seen 
grimacing or ‘pulling faces’. In this image, Kantor is captured apparently on the 
threshold between the viewer and his performers: in one sense separated from 
the audience, but also, due to the forced perspective resulting from the depth-
of-field in the photograph, distanced from the actors in the background. 
Together with the title the image seems chosen to depict both Kantor’s 
loneliness, his apartness, and the act of conducting the pulling of faces at the 
audience. This seems to be what Żurowski finds so problematic and, indeed, 
repellant.
 Żurowski’s main complaints about Kantor centre around this on-stage 
presence and, as he sees it, Kantor’s ‘pretence’ of conducting and somehow 
spontaneously arranging the performance. Initially, however, Żurowski’s praise 
for Kantor seems wholehearted:
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Tadeusz Kantor’s Cricot-2 Theatre is among the most 
highly regarded phenomena in the contemporary theatrical 
landscape. The international resonance of Kantor’s 
successive productions, and the numerous prizes and 
distinctions that he has received in countries on several 
continents, testify to his position, especially among the 
avant-garde in that great tide of experimental theatre that 
tries to cross the barriers of existing conventions, find an 
adequate language, and broaden the system for 
transmission of those thoughts and emotions accessible to 
the art of the theatre.
(Żurowski 1985: 364)
Kantor’s ‘peculiarities’ are explained as a result of the interpretation by an 
uncomprehending traditional, academic literary approach to theatre-criticism:
Anyone anxious to respond to the production in the 
traditional linear way found a ragged, conceptually 
incoherent script full of inconsistencies, simplifications and 
incomprehensible episodes. This was the response of 
those drama critics who had grown up in the atmosphere 
of drama rather than theatre, who had produced 
philosophic exegeses, and who were helpless in the face 
of a theatre of visual narration.
(Ibid.: 364)
However, Żurowski’s account goes on to demonstrate a number of interesting 
qualifications. Having noted these apparent peculiarities of Kantor’s ‘theatrical’ 
work, he turns to peculiarities that he discerns in Kantor’s character itself 
concerning questions of his originality and his standing in the avant-garde. 
‘What was he’, Żurowski asks, ‘a precursor or a catcher of fashionable finery 
who quickly and impressively transferred the fashion of the season from the 
West to his own studio?’ (Ibid.: 365). He notes Kantor’s ‘ostentatious indignation 
and public protest’ against the Ministry of Culture and Art honouring him 
‘merely’ as a stage designer rather than as a director (Ibid.: 365–366).49 After 
asking if Kantor is ‘the last of the three Polish leaders of the avant-
garde?’ (Ibid.: 366) (alongside Józef Szajna and Jerzy Grotowski), Żurowski 
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49 As previously noted, Kantor had been awarded medals for stage design during the 1950s and 
in 1962. It is not clear which award Żurowski is referring to in his essay because, according to 
Pleśniarowicz (2004: 126), in 1981, before the imposition of martial law, Kantor had been 
honoured by the Minister of Culture and Art for his painting.
then asks: ‘To what extent, indeed, can Kantor’s theatre be considered avant-
garde or precursory?’ (Ibid.: 366). For Żurowski:
The function of the avant-garde, every avant-garde, [is] 
like that of a comet: it emerges suddenly, shooting out 
from nowhere, crosses the sky of art with a radiant 
brilliance, kindles the minds who observe it, and vanishes 
as rapidly as it came, a phenomenon as fascinating as it is 
transient. But the minds it has stirred remain and often 
create a current, an epoch in art, or merely a trend, after 
the comet has disappeared. That is the function that 
Grotowski’s theatre has performed in contemporary 
culture.
 It is quite different with Kantor’s theatre, which is a 
‘separate theatre’, a ‘lonely theatre’, around which one can 
see no meaningful movement, school, or following. This in 
itself is neither good nor bad: it is simply the case. But 
because of this, it is difficult to speak about the precursory 
or avant-garde character of Kantor’s beliefs. It would be 
better to speak about a uniqueness that broadens the 
artistic panorama of the period.
(Ibid.: 366–367)
The question that Żurowski raises here, of Kantor’s apparent aesthetic isolation, 
or ‘loneliness’ as he puts it, is an important and interesting one, and one that I 
will attempt to address in the concluding chapter. However, the possibility that 
Kantor’s apparent isolation is due to a particular and genuinely radical 
uniqueness remains unexplored by Żurowski.
 In trying to account for what, in his view, is this ‘loneliness’ of Kantor’s 
theatre Żurowski attempts to strip away what he sees as: ‘the halo, the highly 
suspect wrapping, of theatrical manifestoes […] a harmless eccentricity with no 
negative influence on the spectator’s attitude towards the scenic works 
enwrapped, were it not for the prophetic tone of these programmes’ (Ibid.: 367). 
Then, before going on to present his central critique of Kantor, Żurowski, in 
passing, attacks what he calls the ‘embarrassingly childish provocations’ and 
‘gimmicks’ which he sees as distracting additions to the work, for example, the 
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use of the identical twins50 in Wielopole, Wielopole as ‘quasi-chance 
spectators’, which he thinks adds nothing. Kantor’s professional standing as an 
autonomous artist is in this way undermined, his manifestoes are accused of 
peddling ‘feeble para-existential thoughts’, their form a ‘perfect confusion of 
stylistic flourishes and a sham of graphic notion’ (Ibid.: 367), before Żurowski 
focuses his attention on the ‘element that is so central’ to the structure of 
Kantor’s productions ‘that it largely determines their reception as whole 
works’ (Ibid.: 367). This element that ‘repels me so strongly that I cannot view 
these productions objectively’ (Ibid.: 364), is Kantor’s inclusion of himself in his 
theatrical works.
 Żurowski cites at length the description that Tomasz Raczek gives of this 
element (‘in good faith’ (Ibid.: 367)) in his 1982 essay from the newspaper 
Polityka:
The postulate of palpability, of physical contact with his 
work has brought Kantor to a point where he finds it 
necessary to include … himself in the artistic action. In the 
Cricot-2 Theatre’s productions Kantor plays the role of a 
somewhat satanic Conductor-Demiurge who sets the 
world of marionettes and super-marionettes created in 
motion. Like Craig, he is anxious to control every gesture 
and every second of his actor’s work. He moves among 
them in silence, tense, watchful of their every movement. 
An imperious gesture of the hand or a convulsive bend of 
the fingers impose the pace, the direction, and the mood 
of successive scenes in his theatre. Kantor is no longer an 
actor in it. He remains its creator although he cannot avoid 
the need for a physical presence. From time to time he 
shifts a prop, he corrects something, folds, unfolds, 
handles. He makes it impossible to stage the play 
elsewhere, in a different production, without him.
(Raczek cited in Żurowski 1985: 367; ellipsis in original)51
For anyone who has witnessed Kantor in The Dead Class or Wielopole, 
Wielopole especially, either in live or recorded performances, Raczek’s 
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50 See Appendix 1.12 on the Janiccy twins and other apparent similarities to elements in 
Hergeʼs Tintin books.
51 For the Polish text see Appendix 1.13.
characterisation will be recognisable. However, the mention of ‘marionettes’ and 
‘Demiurges’ with reference only to Edward Gordon Craig misses the fact that 
one of the inspirations for Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’ was not so much the work 
of Craig (suggested by Kantor himself, though somewhat dismissively, with his 
reference to Craig in his Manifesto of the Theatre of Death) but rather that of 
Schulz, and in particular his ‘Traktat o manekinach, albo wtóra księga 
rodzaju’ (Treatise on Tailors’ Dummies, or The Second Book of Genesis) from 
the short story ‘Manekiny’ (Tailors’ Dummies) in Sklepy Cynamonowe 
(Cinnamon Shops, 1934).52 The strong presence of Schulzian echoes in 
Kantor’s work will be explored in greater depth in chapter five. However, the 
more relevant issue here is that Raczek’s account makes a number of 
assumptions about the nature of the work that Kantor is appearing in. ‘Kantor is 
no longer an actor’, Raczek states, as if he ever had been. ‘He makes it 
impossible to stage the play elsewhere, in a different production, without him’. 
The Polish word that Żurowski has chosen to translate, or have translated, as 
‘play’ is teatr—‘theatre’; Raczek does not use either of the Polish words for 
‘play’ (in the sense of the performance of a dramatic text)—sztuka or gra. 
Raczek’s Polish more literally means that: ‘it makes it such that this theatre 
cannot be realised elsewhere in a different staging’. Raczek’s complaint, 
especially translated as it is in Żurowski’s essay, betrays the critical treatment of 
the work in traditional theatrical terms, one whose conceptual framework sees a 
theatrical performance as a performance of a dramatic text, realised by actors 
playing roles in a set designed by a stage designer and whose movement is 
coordinated within a mis-en-scène conceived by a director, both of whom 
remain invisible off-stage. Because Kantor is ‘on stage’, for Raczek and 
Żurowski, he must be an actor and his apparent rupturing of the normal role of 
the actor by appearing as a creator who cannot avoid the ‘need for a physical 
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52 The English translation by Celina Wienewska of Sklepy cynamonowe (itself the title of one of 
that collectionʼs stories) has been published in various editions always under the title The Street 
of Crocodiles, after another story in that collection: ʻUlica krokodyliʼ. As noted elsewhere, 
ʻTailorsʼ Dummiesʼ is but one of the Schulzian sources for The Dead Class. Other obvious 
influences are ʻEmerytʼ (The Old-Age Pensioner) and the longer eponymous story from Schulzʼs 
second published collection Sanitorium pod klepsydrą (The Sanitorium Under the Sign of the 
Hourglass, 1937).
presence’ disturbs the normal pattern of theatrical performance according to this 
conception. Indeed, Raczek’s characterisation of Kantor’s on-stage presence is 
clearly one that understands it as an ‘act’, but a disruptive, dissonant, 
troublesome one.
 Silently taking his cue from this subtext in Raczek’s account, Żurowski 
observes that these actions ‘give the whole an embarrassing flavour of 
mystification’ (Ibid.: 367):
For Kantor pretends to create the world presented, to 
improvise it on the spot, yet at the same time the work into 
whose plot he intrudes is strictly defined beforehand: the 
productions are precisely programmed and develop 
according to a meticulous plan. Within such a work the 
Creator’s faces and the Demiurge’s gestures become a 
tautological make-believe: they reduce the Demiurge to an 
imposter who, just before dawn, when the Sun is about to 
rise above the horizon anyway, makes a buffoonish 
gesture in front of the crowd of disciples and … the Sun 
appears above the horizon.
(Ibid.: 367–368)
Żurowski here echoes the criticism by B. A. Young in his review in the Financial 
Times of Wielopole, Wielopole at the 1980 Edinburgh Festival:
I don’t find Kantor’s work easy to follow, and its style is 
antipathetic to me. The production seems deliberately 
sloppy (although I can’t believe it was meant to be as 
sloppy as it looked on Wednesday), and Kantor’s constant 
presence on stage, tidying the scenery and pretending to 
direct operations already often performed, even 
conducting the taped music, seems to me either pointless 
or arrogant. There is no depth in the acting, which runs to 
funny voices and funny walks.
(Young 1980: 15)
Of course, Kantor had already choreographed just such a ‘buffoonish gesture’ in 
the Sea Concert segment of his Panoramic Sea Happening at Osieki on the 
Baltic coast in 1967, in which a conductor-figure was rowed out to sea and 
installed on a stepladder to ‘conduct’ the sea before an assembled public 
watching from deck chairs on the beach. Kantor would surely have been well 
aware of the pointlessness of this ‘act’—it was, presumably, rather the point of 
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that event. But of course, that was a ‘happening’ and therefore understood 
within the conceptual framework of avant-garde art, a framework in which it was 
already somewhat the norm to challenge the conventional conception of art-as-
representation.
An alternative to Żurowski’s and Raczek’s critical standpoint can be found 
in Jarosław Suchan’s illuminating discussion of Kantor’s 1957 film collaboration 
with Mieczysław Waśkowski and Adam Nurzyński: Uwaga—Malarstwo! 
(Attention—Painting!)53 (Suchan 2005). Suchan is not a theatre critic or 
historian but an art historian and curator and, since 2006, director of the 
Muzeum Sztuki in Łodz. As he argues in his notes to an earlier exhibition of 
Kantor’s art, Tadeusz Kantor: Impossible (Bunkier Sztuki, Kraków 2000, and 
Ludwig Múzeum, Budapest 2001)
Sadly, owing to the character of most exhibitions, the 
complex and immensely rich phenomenon called Tadeusz 
Kantor has been slowly sinking into oblivion. By focusing 
on his theatre and sometimes on his painting, they 
perpetuate a distorted – since one-dimensional – image of 
the artist. Moreover, by removing his art from its neo-
avant-garde context in which it was born, those exhibitions 
deprive it of its actuality.
(Suchan 2001: n.p.)
In his discussion of Kantor’s involvement in the film Attention—Painting!, 
Suchan carefully situates Kantor in relation to two other films of artists at work: 
Pablo Picasso and the treatment by Henri-Georges Clouzot in his 1956 film Le 
Mystére Picasso (‘The Mystery of Picasso’) on the one hand and to Jackson 
Pollock and the latter’s portrayal in film and photography by Hans Namuth. In 
his discussion of the areas of apparent similarity between the three films, 
Suchan argues that Attention—Painting! demonstrates certain radical concerns 
that situates it against the conceptions of the relation between artist and work 
implicit in the films of Picasso and Pollock. In all three films painting is shown in 
action, that is, in the act of its creation. However, as in the Picasso film, where 
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53 Directed by Mieczysław Waśkowski, camera by Antoni Nurzyński, music by Adam Kaczyński, 
produced by Filmów Fabularnych—Zespół Filmowy ʻKadr.ʼ After J. K. Malkiewicz, ʻCzy film 
ożywi taszyzm?ʼ [Will Film Revive Action Painting?], Film (no. 13, 1957), p. 7. Source for these 
credits: Suchan 2005: 63 note 2, and Pleśniarowicz 1997: 108.
the painter is largely hidden from the camera’s gaze, Kantor remains largely 
unseen in Attention—Painting!, whereas in the Hans Namuth and Paul 
Falkenberg film Jackson Pollock (1951), the artist is, as it were, the centre of 
attention, always seen in the act of applying the paint. As Suchan argues: 
Though Kantor was much closer to Pollock than to 
Picasso in 1957, Attention—Painting! has little to do with 
Pollock’s expressionism, especially in Namuth’s 
interpretation. It is not a film about the artist’s ‘self’ and his 
gesture, but solely about the painterly matter.
[….]
In this context, it is worth comparing the photographs of 
Pollock at work with the drawings that Kantor made—
probably many years later—to illustrate the process of the 
making of Attention—Painting! The former show the 
painter move as if dancing alongside the canvas spread 
on the floor, pouring paint on it, with rhythmic gestures. His 
movements are violent, commanding, ‘male’: the critics 
likened them to shamanistic ritual, to cowboy bravado—in 
an allusion to the artist’s rustic childhood—and to the 
anarchic vitality of Stan Kowalski from Tennessee 
Williams’s A Streetcar Named Desire. How differently is 
the artist depicted in Kantor’s drawings: cringing behind a 
cylinder standing between him and the camera, crouched 
in an uncomfortable position below the edge of the frame, 
he resembles neither John Wayne’s characters nor the 
protagonist of Williams’s play. He is—sticking to film/
theatre analogies—more like a prompter, invisibly feeding 
the lines to the leading actor.
(Suchan 2005: 57–58)
Żurowski’s portrayal of Kantor has more in common with the American critics’ 
portrayal of Pollock as a stage-hogging egomaniacal method-actor. In Suchan’s 
discussion, Kantor, in contrast to Pollock and Picasso, appears as a self-
effacing servant of art, more as a ‘prompter’ than an ‘actor’. This last image, of 
Kantor crouching out of sight, whilst he applies paint to a spinning glass drum is 
totally at odds with the image that Żurowski suggests, of the preening charlatan, 
the imposter-Demiurge, pretending to create. Indeed, Żurowski’s idea of 
‘creation’ and ‘improvisation’ would seem to be somewhat uninformed given the 
avant-garde context of the work to which he is referring. To be perfectly clear, I 
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understand Żurowski to be suggesting here that Kantor is staging a 
representation of himself creating The Dead Class, ex nihilo. Presented in this 
way the idea is clearly preposterous and it would seem to reveal that Żurowski 
was carried away by his own rhetoric. His characterisation also creates a false 
dichotomy between improvisation and the performance of rehearsed material. 
All live performance has an element of improvisation because of its very 
liveness. The symphony orchestra will have put in many hours of rehearsal with 
its conductor who accompanies them during the performance of a previously 
written score. However, no two performances, however ‘strictly defined’ and 
‘meticulously planned’ beforehand, will be the same. Conductor and musician 
have to realise their plan in the moment of performance. In doing so, all manner 
of contingencies must be managed and solutions to overcoming them 
improvised, albeit within a tightly constrained framework. This ‘thinking in 
activity’ by the group is one of the elements that makes a live performance 
gripping. It was just this form of ‘thinking in activity’ that Kantor encouraged 
among his performers and that he aimed to facilitate by his on-stage 
presence.54
Żurowski’s final insult is to suggest that, in choosing his on-stage strategy 
in the way that he does, Kantor is a ‘poseur’: that he affected his manner, as 
either ‘creator’ or ‘stage character’, merely in order to impress: ‘as if a little boy 
dressed up in a black suit and pretending before his friends that he was Satan 
himself, although at most he suggested the devil from a mystery play’ (Żurowski 
1985: 368). Again, Żurowski identifies and interprets as negative an element of 
Kantor’s work that is positively central to it. This characterisation is reminiscent 
of the manner in which Kantor portrayed himself in his ‘Little Manifesto’ 
acceptance speech, delivered when he was presented with the Rembrandt 
Prize in 1978. That Kantor would consciously adopt this rôle for this occasion 
118
54 The phrase ʻthinking in activityʼ was coined by the American Pragmatist philosopher John 
Dewey to describe his experience of lessons in the technique of Frederick Matthias Alexander 
(cited by Alexander 2001: 42). In his writing such as Human Nature and Conduct (1922) and 
Experience and Nature (1929) his account of the momentary aliveness of process and the 
illusory nature of the dichotomy between perceived ʻendsʼ and ʻmeansʼ echo similar concerns in 
the continental phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Heidegger.
would tend to indicate that this was central rather than peripheral to his artistic 
strategy. However, Żurowski ends his ‘wholehearted support’ of Kantor and his 
work with the view that ‘the same Kantor who struts, puts on airs, frightens and 
censures the stage as the Demiurge-Creator’ is the ‘same Kantor’ who:
prophesies ultimate truths in a stentorian voice in his 
manifestoes and interviews, as if he were not aware that 
crutches are an obstacle on one’s way to the pedestal. 
Walking with crutches, one may easily stumble on 
eulogists hanging around their knees.
(Żurowski 1985: 368)
These are somewhat odd final words with which to close a critical celebration of 
this stage of Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’, although the metaphor of ‘crutches’ is 
unintentionally apt. One interpretation of Żurowski’s intended meaning is that 
what he sees as Kantor’s irritating peculiarities are an unnecessary support for 
his art and, moreover, that it is this apparatus that, at least partly, is what is 
attractive to his supporters and that adds to the interpretative critical confusion 
that surrounds his work. However, lurking in this veiled insult is a truer portrait of 
Kantor, whose selected artistic medium was ‘reality of the lowest rank’: poor, 
crippled and discarded reality. Out of this artistic field Kantor also found himself: 
the poor, weak, crippled, stumbling and stuttering human being—Kantor’s 
idiosyncratic version of Hamlet’s ‘celebration’ of human being as simultaneously 
both the ‘paragon of animals’ and ‘quintessence of dust’ (Hamlet II.ii., ll. 309–
310). As I shall show in the next chapter, Kantor’s ‘stumbling’ and ‘stuttering’ 
can be seen as a conscious part of his art.
I will return in chapters five, six and seven to the question of Kantor’s role 
alongside and within the performance space of his artworks—be they painting, 
sculpture, installation, happening or ‘theatrical’ performance. My aim here has 
been to set the ground for both my own discussion of Kantor’s work and of the 
dominant tenor of the discourse surrounding it. I have suggested that a 
particular post-Heideggerian philosophical perspective can illuminate Kantor 
and his work and serve to set this at odds with the kind of reading demonstrated 
by Żurowski. Żurowski’s reading operates within a normative, representational 
framework that views Kantor’s more ‘theatre’-based works within a conventional 
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context of theatrical and dramatic discourse, one that assumes such 
ontologically loaded elements as: ‘drama’, ‘plays’, ‘actors’, ‘acting’, ‘costumes’, 
‘props’, ‘stages’ and ‘sets’. Żurowski’s account is fundamentally impoverished 
by his tacit framework. As an alternative I argue that the existential concerns of 
human being are fundamental to the wide spectrum of Kantor’s work and unite 
it as a whole. Central to these concerns is Kantor’s particular and radical 
critique of representation. It is this that unites questions of aesthetics with 
philosophical hermeneutics and the existential ethical concerns of post-
Heideggerian philosophy that will be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4. THE HERMENEUTIC CONTEXT. SPEAKING A ‘STAMMERING 
SPEECH’: TADEUSZ KANTOR AS MESSENGER
Introduction
The act of interpretation is not straightforward. It involves a mysterious 
movement of information, a transportation between two realms: a movement, 
one hopes, from the unknown to the known, a passage from darkness to light. 
However, the process is fraught with the potential for duplicity and intentional, 
as well as unintentional, misinformation. It is also not only the critic or interpreter 
of the unknown that performs this function, and who can become lost in the 
subtleties of its art. Artists and writers are also seen as messengers, or 
transmission-agents in the interpretation of the unknown. As the literary critic 
Frank Kermode points out in his 1979 book, The Genesis of Secrecy—which he 
describes as ‘an interpretation of interpretation’ (Kermode 1979: 2)—the god 
Hermes, the patron of interpreters, is also ‘the patron of thieves, merchants, and 
travelers; […] cunning, and occasionally violent: a trickster, a robber’ (Ibid.: 1). 
Hermes is thus, according to Kermode, ‘the god of going-between: between the 
dead and the living, but also between the latent and the manifest […] between 
the text, whether plain or hermetic, and the dying generations of its 
readers’ (Ibid.: 2). I suggest that the figure of Hermes sounds suspiciously like 
Kantor himself, who likens his theatre to ‘the fairground booth’55 of rogues and 
thieves, foregrounding its place as a liminal zone comparable to the River Styx
—a transitional space between the world of the living and the world of the dead. 
As portrayed in the photograph reproduced in Żurowski’s essay, Kantor himself 
appears as the ‘go-between’ or mediator between his actors and the audience. 
Kantor supervised the literal sending of a message in his List (Letter) happening 
of 1967, in which a giant letter measuring fourteen-by-two metres was 
mischievously, but officially, posted and delivered by seven authentic postmen 
(necessary to carry such a large delivery) with a real police escort, through the 
streets of Warsaw from the main post office to the Foksal Gallery (see 
Pleśniarowicz 2004: 99–100 and Murawska-Muthesius and Zarzecka 2011: 
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55 See, for example, Kantor 2009c: 338.
143). In his predilection for characters from the ‘reality of the lowest rank’, and 
in his characterisation and concealed naming of his company in circus-like 
terms—‘Cricot 2’—Kantor’s ideas might be seen in relation to those of Mikhail 
Bakhtin. In his book Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin recognises the liminal 
nature of the figures of the medieval ‘carnivalesque’: ‘Clowns and fools […] 
represented a certain form of life, which was real and ideal at the same time. 
They stood on the borderline between life and art, in a peculiar mid-zone as it 
were’ (Rabelais 1984: 8). Viewed in this way, as noted in chapter two, Kantor, 
like Schulz, one of his key influences, is operating in the role of a Hermes-like 
messenger, mediating between the truth and appearance of being.
This chapter argues that fundamental to understanding Kantor’s work (and 
that of any artist) is the acknowledgement of the prior ground of understanding 
that already unites artist and spectator. This prior ground may be understood as 
the individual, existential experience of human being—of human existence 
itself, as introduced and articulated in the preceding chapter. As Badiou has 
stated (Badiou 2006: 1–2), regarding the metaphysical questions concerning 
the nature of human being, Heidegger is the defining philosopher of the 
twentieth-century. It is Heidegger—rather than Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, 
or any of the Analytic philosophers such as Ludwig Wittgenstein—who has set 
the most fundamental questions concerning human being for our time. In this 
light, much thought that has been grouped variously under the banners of 
‘Structuralism’, ‘Deconstruction’, ‘Post-Structuralism’ and ‘Post-Modernism’, is in 
a philosophical sense ‘post-Heideggerian’. It is in this sense that I use the term 
‘post-Heideggerian’, and consequently, when I refer to philosophers such as 
Gadamer, Agamben and Badiou in this way, I do so with a sense of their 
Heideggerian heritage. This idea, the idea of an ontological basis for 
interpretation and understanding at the heart of this heritage, is based in 
Heidegger’s project of understanding in Being and Time—it is the idea of the 
priority of Being for beings This, in turn, is the basis for the philosophical 
hermeneutics employed in this chapter, developed by Heidegger’s student, 
Gadamer.
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When I began my attempts to understand Kantor, following my viewing of 
Wielopole, Wielopole in 1980, I had naively assumed that interpretation of 
Kantor’s work would be a relatively straightforward matter of decoding the ‘text’ 
of the performance. Over time, it became apparent that understanding Kantor’s 
work would necessitate the prior process of developing an understanding of key 
contexts: critical aspects of Polish culture such as the specific nature of Polish 
Romanticism and the Modernism of the Polish inter-war avant-garde, and 
especially significant ‘Eastern’ influences such as Russian Constructivism and 
icon art. However, this process of contextualisation in turn uncovered the 
necessity of developing a philosophical context within which to make sense of 
Kantor’s particular approach to art and art making. In his writings, it quickly 
becomes apparent that Kantor is as much concerned with the metaphysical 
questions surrounding the process of creation as with the apparent ‘product’. 
His national and international contexts helped form him as an artist, but in his 
artistic concerns there is always a metaphysical dimension that transcends 
mere context. Indeed, this sense of questioning invades the works themselves 
so that they can be seen to actively continue an interrogation of their own 
existence. This recognition of Kantor’s active questioning of his own creative 
process meant that, eventually, I was forced to consider the question of 
understanding and interpretation as a field of operation that involved both 
myself and my subject. In this chapter, which considers this field from a post-
Heideggerian philosophical perspective, it is therefore appropriate to begin with 
an example of what might be seen as Kantor’s own hermeneutic procedure.
The chapter will focus on Kantor’s writing, in particular his 1978 ‘Little 
Manifesto’, which, I will show, explores the problematic of the artist’s experience 
in terms that parallel the concepts that Heidegger and Gadamer developed in 
their philosophy. The discussion draws on certain themes from post-
Heideggerian philosophy, in particular, Agamben’s account of negativity in the 
metaphysics of presence, and his radical critique of aesthetics. I will further 
suggest that, as well as providing a useful framework for ‘understanding 
Tadeusz Kantor’, such a philosophical hermeneutic framework harmonises 
productively with Kantor’s own aesthetic and metaphysical concerns in a way 
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that the framework implied by Żurowski’s critique, discussed in chapter three, 
does not. Post-Heideggerian hermeneutics is based on Heidegger’s radical 
reorientation of understanding in Being and Time, from the domain of the 
question of epistemology (knowledge) to the domain of the question of ontology 
(Being). The problem of understanding anything, Heidegger argues, itself rests 
on the tacit problem of the understanding of the nature of Being itself. 
Consequently, both interpreter and object of interpretation share the same 
ground in the prior problem of Being. For Heidegger, there was always already 
a prior understanding between subject and object because of this shared 
communal ground of being. This shift or turn of hermeneutics from the 
epistemological to the ontological (and therefore metaphysical) was developed 
by Gadamer in Truth and Method (2004, originally published in German in 
1960), and informed much Post-Structuralist philosophy. It is this implied 
continuity between artist and spectator that is discernible as a concern in 
Kantor’s artistic practice, and I shall explore this here as a sympathetic 
hermeneutic framework for understanding Kantor and his work.
The ʻLittle Manifestoʼ: A celebration of nothing
On April 8, 1978, Kantor was awarded the Rembrandt Prize for outstanding 
contributions to art. It might be expected that an artist, upon public recognition 
of his greatness, might have something to say concerning the essence of his 
art, something that might aid public understanding. Indeed, Kantor did have 
something to say, and as a response to receiving this award he read out a 
specially prepared ‘Little Manifesto’, in effect, an acceptance speech. According 
to Piotr Piotrowski, the Rembrandt Prize ‘is also known as the “painting Nobel”, 
not only because of its prestige, but also because artists obtain it for particular 
achievements in painting’ (Piotrowski 2005: 33). Previous recipients of the prize 
were Paul Delvaux, Fausto Melotti, Ben Nicholson, Eduardo Chillida, Pierre 
Soulages and Dušan Džamonja. Kantor was awarded the prize for the ‘real 
contribution to shaping the image of art of our time’ (Chrobak et al. 2005: 148; 
my translation).56 In 1978 Kantor was enjoying international success following 
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the tours of The Dead Class, and he was, according to Wiesław Borowski 
‘somewhat confused’ (Ibid.) to be awarded a prize for his painting. Indeed, 
Kantor’s presentation of this manifesto itself represents a somewhat puzzling 
performance. Instead of thanking the international panel of the Goethe 
Foundation for the award, Kantor painted a strange picture of the artist ‘on trial’. 
The manifesto appears to end with a sort of disappearing act. The great artist 
stands before his audience and makes seemingly profound statements about 
fear and the nature of the artist. He attempts to redefine Dada for his audience, 
and suddenly finds that he has turned himself into the accused, has become a 
schoolboy again, has forgotten what he had to say, and appears to fade away to 
the nothing of the closing ellipsis. If the definition of ‘manifesto’ is ‘a public 
declaration of policy and aims’57 then what exactly is Kantor publicly declaring 
with such a disappearing act? The answer to this question lies in the realisation 
that in the course of this short text there are enacted a number of Kantorian 
concerns that can be seen to be shared with those of existential 
phenomenology, especially in the form inaugurated by Heidegger as elaborated 
in the previous chapter. Here is the text of the published manifesto together with 
Kantor’s prefatory remarks:
I wish to read you ladies and gentlemen, my Little 
Manifesto (I am still writing manifestos), which was written 
especially for this occasion.
Before I read it, however, to make it clearer I will take the 
liberty to remind you that the fundamental (if I could use 
this pathetic word) idea behind my creative work has been 
and is the idea of reality, which I labelled the Reality of the 
Lowest Rank.
It can be used to explain my paintings, emballages, poor 
objects, and equally poor characters, who, like the 
Prodigal Son, return home after a long journey. Today I 
would like to use the same metaphor to describe myself.
(Kantor in Kobialka 1993: 250)
Little Manifesto
It is not true
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57 Oxford Dictionaries 2010, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/manifesto (accessed 
July 25, 2012).
that MODERN man
is a spirit which has vanquished FEAR …
It is not true!
FEAR exists:
fear before the outside world,
fear before our destiny,
before death,
fear before the unknown,
before nothingness,
before the void …
It is not true
that the artist is a hero
or an audacious and intrepid conqueror
as a conventional legend would have it …
Believe me!
he is a POOR MAN
without arms and without defence
who has chosen his PLACE
face to face with FEAR
in full awareness!
It is from awareness
that fear is born.
I stand
before you
SEVERE BUT JUST JUDGES
I stand accused
and plunged in my FEAR …
And there is a difference between
the former dadaists from whom
I feel I am descended, and me:
‘Stand up!’—
cried Picabia
the Great mocker—
‘You are accused!’
And here is my correction
—today—
to that invocation
imposing in another time:
It is I that am judged and accused,
I stand before you
and must seek grounds and proofs
—I do not know—
for my innocence
or for my guilt …
I stand
as in the past,
126
standing behind my desk, in my classroom …
and I say:
‘I’ve forgotten,
I did know, I did know
I assure you
Ladies and Gentlemen …
(Bablet 1991: 2:19:10, translation: Sally Jane Norman)
As already noted above, this seems a strange acceptance speech: it doesn’t 
contain any ‘thanks’, and the only ‘acceptance’ would appear to be the 
acceptance of fear, of accusation, and of defeat. It is clearly more of a 
performance than an acceptance speech. Why would a great artist wish to 
portray himself like a forgetful schoolboy? Of course, in 1978 Poland was still a 
part of the Soviet bloc. Any artist who did not toe the official party line did indeed 
stand accused, and the ‘fear’ that Kantor speaks of was then all too real. From 
this historical perspective the oblique strategies of Kantor’s ‘Little Manifesto’ 
may therefore be seen as simply an example of the veiled and allegorical 
methods that were employed by many artists resistant to the official regime. 
Kantor accepted the Rembrandt Prize at a ceremony held at the Sukiennice 
(Cloth) Hall58 in the centre of Krakow’s huge central Renaissance square. For 
Kantor and his sympathisers, there may have been a delicious sense of 
mischief in accepting this international honour in one of the central cultural 
institutions of the country that had, to say the least, been somewhat selective in 
its recognition of him as an artist.59 In his anti-acceptance speech, Kantor 
affects the disposition of a naughty schoolboy before his ‘masters’, feigning 
innocence as to why he is there. However, thirty years after the collapse of the 
Soviet bloc it is possible to discern a more fundamental message about the 
state of art and the artist in Kantor’s manifesto, one that can be set in a wider 
historical context.
The apparent paradox of Kantor’s manifesto is that it appears to be such a 
negative and inconsequential response, and yet it was consciously prepared 
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58 This is the current home of part of the Polish National Gallery of Art and a site of state 
functions since the Renaissance.
59 As already noted in chapter three Kantor had only received official recognition for his work as 
a set-designer in official theatres in the 1950s (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 60, and Stangret 1994: 4).
(‘written especially for this occasion’), and is somehow powerful and affecting. If 
it is to be considered as the product of the voice of Kantor as an artist—
interpreting his own specific condition as an artist—then it might be profitable to 
enquire what sort of voice it is, or, more specifically to ask the question: out of 
what underlying hermeneutic context does the voice arise? In his 1989 Preface 
to Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience (2007a) Agamben 
asks: ‘Is there a human voice, a voice that is the voice of man as the chirp is the 
voice of the cricket or the bray is the voice of the donkey?’ (Agamben 2007a: 3–
4). If Kantor’s ‘Little Manifesto’ is the ‘voice of the artist’, and the artist is, as the 
manifesto suggests, a category of human being, then it is odd that this voice 
ends up being the voice of a forgetful but well-meaning schoolboy. What then is 
the significance of the relation between the voice in Kantor’s manifesto, and the 
human voice of Agamben’s question? The comparison seems pertinent 
because Kantor clearly sets himself as an artist within the metaphysical context 
of human being in the first part of the manifesto. This context is one of 
humanity’s tremulous state of being in the face of fear. Before I return to discuss 
Kantor’s interpretation of this state it will be useful to analyse the manifesto 
more closely.
To reduce the structure of the manifesto’s argument to its barest outline it 
appears to consist of:
1. An assertion of the reality of existential fear for human beings
2. An assertion that artists are not heroes but poor defenceless beings 
who choose to stand opposite fear
3. A reversal of the Dadaist’s accusation of culture and society; Kantor 
asserts the opposite: that culture and society should accuse him!
4. The turn to the past, and the conceit of reverting to a forgetful 
schoolboy standing behind his desk
This brief structural outline of Kantor’s manifesto belies a more intricate design. 
The opening two paragraphs contain the negation of two assumptions: firstly, 
the assumption that ‘modern’ human being has conquered fear, and secondly, 
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the assumption that the artist, as a special category of modern human being, is 
a ‘hero or an audacious and intrepid conqueror’, presumably one who has 
‘vanquished fear’. The use of the term ‘modern’ immediately introduces a 
temporal dimension, the implication being that in the past human being had not 
conquered fear, and that one of the characteristics of ‘modernity’ is that fear has 
been overcome so that humanity no longer dwells in apprehension. The winning 
of this victory over fear by artists occurred in the past according to ‘conventional 
legend’. This defeat of fear and the heroic nature of the artist are then both 
negated. What is left in the place of these optimistic assumptions based on the 
Enlightenment idea of progress is the artist as a ‘poor man’, opposed by a 
seemingly triumphant and enduring ‘fear’. However, there is still a heroic 
character to the ‘poor artist’ who has ‘chosen his place face to face with fear in 
full awareness!’ But what becomes of this brave ‘poor artist’ who has chosen to 
stand face to face with fear? He turns into a version of the schoolboy who has 
forgotten his homework. To further understand this apparent regression, it is 
necessary to follow the underlying development through the manifesto in terms 
of its references to time.
The second half of the manifesto develops the temporal dimension 
referred to in the opening sections at the same time as developing the 
confrontational sense of trial—of accusation and defence. Firstly, there is the 
appeal to the tradition of the first avant-garde of the Dadaists, and secondly, 
there is the return to childhood. Viewed sequentially over the course of the 
whole manifesto, the four (implicit and explicit) references to the past form a 
progression from the general and large-scale perspective to the dimension of 
the personal:
1. The implication of a pre-modern fearful past progressing to a fearless 
present (negated)
2. The legendary heroic artist who vanquished fear (negated)
3. The Dadaists who put society on trial (reversed or ‘corrected’)
4. The schoolboy who did know but has forgotten ... 
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As the manifesto moves towards its conclusion Kantor declares that he stands 
before his public ‘judged and accused’. But of what is he accused? And what is 
it that he has forgotten, but is sure that he once knew? There is a paradoxical, 
Kafkaesque quality to the questions raised by the manifesto’s closing section. In 
Franz Kafka’s The Trial, Josef K. stands accused, and like Kantor, he knows not 
of what. From the perspective of Kafka, and the reader however, it is much 
clearer that Josef K. stands for humanity, and is judged, as a matter of course, 
just for being alive. (Anthony Perkins, the actor who played Josef K. in the 
Orson Welles 1963 film of The Trial, commented: ‘After a couple of days of 
shooting I said to Orson, “Don’t you think it’s going to be interpreted that K. is 
guilty?” He said, “He is guilty! He’s guilty as hell!”’)60 One possible interpretation 
of The Trial is therefore that, because Josef K. fails to take responsibility for his 
existence, he is found guilty and executed. However, unlike Josef K., Kantor’s 
manifesto seems to close on a more optimistic note. As with much of Kantor’s 
work, the protagonist and Kantor are apparently identical. As has been noted, 
the manifesto is clearly a performance, but it is a self-performance. Whilst Josef 
K. never tires of proclaiming his innocence and demanding an explanation for 
his ‘arrest’, Kafka and the reader look on with ironic amusement. Kantor is, at 
least, not so sure whether he must seek ‘grounds or proofs’ for his innocence or 
for his guilt, and the engagement of the audience or reader would seem more 
empathic than ironic. The final ellipsis of the manifesto does not resemble the 
dying ‘like a dog’ of Kafka’s protagonist. If the manifesto, with its negation of 
enlightenment progress, seems somewhat nihilistic in the context of the 
celebratory occasion of its delivery, it is nevertheless still a strangely positive, 
optimistic kind of nihilism.
In his comments on Nietzsche in his essay ‘On the Question of 
Being’ (1955, in Heidegger 1998a: 291–322), Heidegger critiques the 
conception of nihilism—‘that uncanniest of guests’—as the culmination of the 
post-Platonic development of the Western metaphysical tradition. In his return 
to pre-Socratic conceptions of being, Heidegger sought to rethink the Platonic 
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and Aristotelian basis of metaphysics as it had been understood through 
subsequent traditions. In doing so, he made a virtue out of the sense of wonder 
generated by the pre-Socratic thinkers and of their sense of provisionality over 
the nature of being. According to Heidegger, the tradition that followed Aristotle 
interpreted the latter’s doctrine of substance in such a way that the idea of 
being became chained to it. The subject-object duality of the ensuing substance 
ontology became the ground for the nexus of apparent contradictions that 
continue to preoccupy ontological thinking: subject-object, life-death, mind-body, 
self-other, fiction-reality, and of course, artist-spectator.61 For Heidegger, 
Nietzsche’s nihilism, or at least the prevalent reception of it,62 was simply the 
culmination of a certain stale way of thinking that was grounded in a particular 
conception of being-as-substance. One way towards an understanding of the 
nature of the voice of the artist in Kantor’s ‘Little Manifesto’ is to understand how 
Kantor’s ‘regression’ to forgetful schoolboy can be seen not as negatively 
nihilistic but as a positive Heideggerian critique of the ontological situation he 
perceived himself to be in.
In his first book, The Man Without Content (1999a, but first published in 
Italy in 1970), Agamben uses his reading of Heidegger to develop a radical 
critique of aesthetics that challenges traditional ideas about the artist, the 
artwork, and the spectator, and the nature of the relationship between them. 
Agamben traces the development of an ‘aesthetic alienation’ in which ‘art’ 
becomes split into art-as-it-is-lived-by-the-artist and art-as-it-is-perceived-by-
the-spectator. Art comes to:
alternately [present] two sides that cannot be put back 
together into a unity. The side that faces the artist is the 
living reality in which he reads his promise of happiness; 
but the other side, the side which faces the spectator, is an 
assemblage of lifeless elements that can only mirror itself 
in the aesthetic judgement’s reflection of it.
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relation of this to the artist-spectator dichotomy see Agamben 1999a, which is discussed later in 
this chapter.
62 It would appear that Nietzsche was on the verge of redeeming nihilism himself before he 
became mentally incapable (see Agamben 1999a: 93).
(Agamben 1999a: 11)
The ‘fear’ amidst which Kantor places himself metamorphoses into the ‘severe 
but just judges’ of his audience (in the sense that first he is standing before fear 
and then before his judges). The artistic ‘fear of failure’ is a double one 
because, on the one hand, in creating, the artist is pursuing a desired ‘promise 
of happiness’ (the successful creation of the artwork), a project that carries the 
risk of failure; but on the other hand, because the creation is in the context of 
the potential reception by the audience, the artist’s sense of success is in 
jeopardy because it may not coincide with that of the expectations of the 
spectator. Agamben recognises an increasing trend in the art of modernity that:
For the one who creates it, art becomes an increasingly 
uncanny experience, with respect to which speaking of 
interest is at the very least a euphemism, because what is 
at stake seems to be not in any way the production of a 
beautiful work but instead the life and death of the author, 
or at least his or her spiritual health. To the increasing 
innocence of the spectator’s experience in front of the 
beautiful object corresponds the increasing danger 
inherent in the artist’s experience for how art’s promesse 
de bonheur [promise of happiness] becomes the poison 
that contaminates and destroys his existence. The idea 
that extreme risk is implicit in the artist’s activity begins to 
gain currency, almost as though—so thought Baudelaire—
it were a sort of duel to the death ‘où l’artiste crie de 
frayeur avant d’être vaincu’ [‘where the artist cries out in 
fright before being defeated’]
(Agamben 1999a: 5)
For Kantor, the confrontational trial staged in the ‘Little Manifesto’ can be seen 
as the harbinger for a series of works where he stages himself as a victim of 
confrontation either by proxy or in person. In Wielopole, Wielopole (1980), the 
next major theatrical spectacle following his receipt of the Rembrandt Prize, a 
village priest, a pregnant bride, and a rabbi are all, in a manner of speaking, put 
on trial and executed. In Let the Artists Die (1985), the figure of the medieval 
sculptor Stoss is invoked because of his gruesome punishment for bankruptcy 
at the hands of the Nuremberg authorities. In I Shall Never Return (1987) 
Kantor himself is put on trial, taunted and held to account by characters from his 
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previous productions. Ten years after his delivery of the ‘Little Manifesto’, one of 
a series of paintings from the series Dalej już nic … (Further on, Nothing …), 
entitled Pewnego dnia żołdak napoleoński z obrazu Goi wtargnął do mego 
pokoju (One day Napoleon’s soldier from Goya’s painting invaded my room, 
1988), depicts the Bohemian figure of Kantor standing in frail defiance as one of 
the soldiers from Goya’s 1814 painting The Executions of the Defenders of 
Madrid takes aim at him. Kantor was clearly an artist who understood the 
activity of art as one of ‘extreme risk’, as a ‘duel to the death’.
But what is worth such ‘extreme risk’? What is ‘the promise of happiness’ 
that draws artists into their trial? As a counter to the fragmenting effect of 
aesthetic alienation Agamben returns to a conception of art and artistic practice 
derived from Ancient Greece. The term ποίησις (poiēsis) designated the pro-
ductive activity of human being—the bringing forth into being of something that 
did not previously exist. It meant production in the sense of any truth-making or 
truth-revealing activity, not just in the more limited literary sense commonly 
understood today. The term was then understood in relation to τέχνη (techne), 
art, craft or skill, without distinction between ‘artist’ and ‘craftsman’ as this is 
currently understood. In this way, human being is seen, in itself, as a poiētic 
activity, a continual bringing into being—the revealing of the truth of an 
existential self. Human being exists in and as a shared clearing, illuminated and 
revealed by being itself. In this context ποίησις (poiēsis), pro-ductive activity, 
functions as a shared, communal enterprise, and not as the solipsistic self-
expression of a notional and egotistical ‘artistic will’. This idea invites a more 
communal and inclusive sense of art and artistic practice in which any human 
activity can potentially be considered ‘poetic’ and anybody can potentially be 
understood as engaged in artistic practice. Viewed in this way there is a direct 
continuum between what is commonly thought of as everyday practice and what 
is commonly thought of as artistic practice. The ‘promise of happiness’ lies in 
engaging with the shared bringing into activity of human being, a fundamental 
engagement with reality itself as illuminated by us.
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It might at first seem difficult to equate Kantor with this originally poiētic or 
pro-ductive conception of art. He consciously adopted the pose of the ‘Great 
Artist’, choosing to model himself, in part, on the figure of Edward Gordon Craig 
with his overcoat, hat and long scarf.63 And, as video footage of rehearsals with 
his company attest,64 Kantor was the epitome of the didactic, autocratic director. 
Nevertheless, he did have, from the very beginning, a very radical and 
metaphysical conception of ‘art’ that was based on the idea of the process of 
rehearsal—of exploration, rather than product: ‘Nothing should remain but 
REHEARSALS, and only REHEARSALS: Just normal rehearsals, often 
unsuccessful, full of mistakes, corrections, changes, alternative versions, and 
snags. We must acknowledge the REHEARSAL, with its intensity and agitation, 
as true art’ (Kantor 1990: 142).65 In prioritising process over product in the 
particular way that he did, Kantor was able to maintain the poiētic character of a 
critical engagement with reality. The ‘true artist’ for Kantor was one who 
consciously placed him or herself in the way of engagement with this continual 
flux of the reality of being: ‘to catch … all the incandescent particles of 
imagination, of scepticism, of resolution, of capitulation, of rapture, of euphoria, 
which are generated by the actual process of creation’ (Kantor 1990: 142).66 His 
particular innovation was to manage the flux of the creative process, of reality, 
in such a way that the very process could be installed in what would normally be 
understood as the artistic ‘product’. Viewed from this perspective it is possible to 
see the ‘Little Manifesto’ as an example of this methodology. As Kantor states in 
his prefatory remarks, he wishes to use the metaphor of the ‘Reality of the 
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64 Many hours of video footage of rehearsals for Kantorʼs major performance spectacles from 
Let the Artists Die onwards were recorded. This material is available in the Cricoteka archive on 
ulica Kanonicza. An edited version of video footage shot of Kantorʼs rehearsals for Today is My 
Birthday was released as Próby tylko próby … (Rehearsals, only rehearsals …, directed by 
Andrzej Sapija 1992, DVD release 2006).
65 This idea was enshrined in Kantorʼs Anti or Popular Exhibition of 1963 in which what was 
exhibited were not finished works but rather the detritus of the creative process.
66 Kantor also characteristically added: ʻI am anxious to differentiate between my own case and 
a widespread trend which you can look up in any encyclopaedia of contemporary art under the 
heading Process Artʼ (Kantor Ibid.).
Lowest Rank’ to describe himself, and in the manifesto, he renders himself 
before his audience as a ‘poor man’. This ‘poor man’ becomes a forgetful 
schoolboy who in turn melts into the nothingness of the ellipsis. Kantor finds 
himself as his own ‘poor object’ and makes himself disappear: in this process 
he installs himself within the work.
As I will elaborate in the next chapter, Kantor’s metaphysics of the ‘Reality 
of the Lowest Rank’, along with the associated ideas of the ‘poor object’, and 
‘poor’ or ‘degraded’ reality, are derived from the metaphysics of Schulz, and 
from issues to do with Kantor’s experience of the comparative realities for 
German, Polish and Jewish populations during the Occupation. To anticipate 
that discussion briefly here, the taking on of the low rank as a positive can be 
seen as a form of resistance, where open aspiration or competition for high rank 
is impossible. However, in a more fundamental sense, ‘high rank’ is undesirable 
in so far as it is erected on undesirable and suspicious foundations, and is 
based on a false, corrupt or otherwise unpalatable conception of reality. The 
German occupying population in Kraków in the early 1940s may have assumed 
for themselves and temporarily enjoyed the ‘high rank’ privileges of a ‘master 
race’, but those in the ‘lower ranks’ at least knew that those above them were 
morally bankrupt. ‘Low rank’ and humiliation were essential components of 
Kantor’s artistic practice, as evidenced by his statement that ‘greatness comes 
from utter humiliation’ in his reference to Wyspiański’s stained glass window of 
the skeletal King Casimir the Great (Kantor 1987: 10–11).67
The voice of the artist
In his fourth book, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity (1982, English 
translation published 1991), Agamben discusses the curiously double negative 
foundation of the metaphysics of presence that he sees as inherent in human 
being. Taking its cue from a phrase in Heidegger’s On the Way to Language
—‘The essential relation between death and language flashes up before us, but 
remains still unthought’ (Heidegger 1971: 107–8)—Agamben’s discussion 
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67 Kantorʼs reference to Wyspiańskiʼs stained glass window design will be discussed in chapter 
five.
traces the strangely elusive nature of the presence of human being as it shifts 
between voice and language. Agamben foregrounds the curious fact that the 
physical voice that produces language is left behind in its act of the production 
of language, the production of meaning, which, in turn, forms a discourse that 
cannot speak of its physical-vocal origins: ‘Logic demonstrates that language is 
not my voice. The voice—it says—once was, but is no more, nor can it ever be 
again. Language takes place in the non-place of the voice’ (Agamben 1991: 
108; emphasis in original). In answer to the question posed earlier about the 
existence and nature of a distinctly human voice, Agamben argues that 
paradoxically, the essential voice of human being is ‘a silent and unspeakable 
voice’ (Agamben 1991: 85), the existence of which creates the potential for the 
speaking of language, which, in turn, as Heidegger has famously stated, ‘is the 
house of being’, and that in ‘its home human beings dwell’ (Heidegger 1998c: 
239). It is the clearing in which being realises itself. In a final poetic coda to his 
book, Agamben paints a picture of a metaphysics of presence, or rather, a 
poetics of being, that has its reality in a suspension:
What remains in suspense, what dangles in thought? We 
can only think, in language, because language is and yet 
is not our voice. There is a certain suspense, an 
unresolved question, in language: whether or not it is our 
voice, as baying is the voice of the ass or chirping is the 
voice of the cricket. So when we speak we cannot do 
away with thought or hold our words in suspense. Thought 
is the suspension of the voice in language.
[…] we are ourselves suspended in language […].
(Agamben 1991: 107)
Agamben’s poetic embracing of the negativity of human being seems to me to 
strike a positive chord that can illuminate the mystery of Kantor’s 
‘disappearance’ at the end of the ‘Little Manifesto’. In a period when the idea of 
human being, as ‘subject’, is continually being explained away as a social, 
political or neural construction, or as a commodified product, such an ‘idea’ is 
powerless to oppose its negation in so far as it finds no ownership, or personal 
investment in society, the market, in neurophysiology or evolutionary 
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psychology.68 If human being has no substance of its own, then, insofar as it 
subscribes to a substance ontology, it is a poor, homeless non-thing. However, 
if it is not a substance, but a being suspended between language and thought, 
then our being lies not in any substance but in the process of becoming itself, 
the same ‘home’ as the home that Kantor makes for himself in his conception of 
his art as rehearsal. Agamben’s metaphor for this concept of being is of a walk 
in the woods:
suddenly we hear the flapping of wings or the wind in the 
grass. A pheasant lifts off and then disappears instantly 
among the trees, a porcupine buries in the thick 
underbrush, the dry leaves crackle as a snake slithers 
away. Not the encounter, but this flight of invisible animals 
is thought. [No],69 it was not our voice. We came as close 
as possible to language, we almost brushed against it, 
held it in suspense: but we never reached our encounter 
and now we turn back, untroubled, toward home.
(Agamben 1991: 108)
The approach that Kantor demonstrates with his ‘Little Manifesto’, and in the 
rest of his artistic practice, and the approach that, as I have argued in the 
previous chapter, I feel is necessary to understand his work, can be considered 
together as part of the joint hermeneutic project that is enabled by Heidegger’s 
radical reconceptualisation of human being. In this light Kantor’s oeuvre can be 
seen as a form of post-Heideggerian deconstructive enquiry into the truth of 
human being. Without interpreters of his work engaging in their own version of 
the same hermeneutic process, attempts at understanding will always stumble.
In his essay on the ‘The Universality of the Hermeneutic Problem’, 
Gadamer makes the following observation on the apparent fragmentation of 
reason through the variety of languages:
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68 This is an awareness that has come to the fore in recent literature and, indeed, 
uncharacteristically appears to be alluded to in Kobialkaʼs second book on Kantor in his preface 
(2009: x). See for example: Midgley 2010, Robinson 2010 and Tallis 2011.
69 It would appear that there is an error in the published English translation. The original Italian 
text reads: ʻNo, non era la nostra voceʼ (Agamben 2008: 139), which would translate as ʻNo, it 
was not our voiceʼ, as opposed to ʻNot, it was not our voiceʼ as is printed in the 1991 translation. 
To master the foreign language means precisely that when 
we engage in speaking it in the foreign land, we do not 
constantly consult inwardly our own world and its 
vocabulary. The better we know the language, the less 
such a side glance at our native language is perceptible, 
and only because we never know foreign languages well 
enough do we always have something of this feeling. But it 
is nevertheless already speaking, even if perhaps a 
stammering speaking, for stammering is the obstruction of 
a desire to speak and is thus opened into the infinite realm 
of possible expression. Any language in which we live is 
infinite in this sense, and it is completely mistaken to infer 
that reason is fragmented because there are various 
languages. Just the opposite is the case. Precisely 
through our finitude, the particularity of our being, which is 
evident even in the variety of languages, the infinite 
dialogue is opened in the direction of the truth that we are.
(Gadamer 1990: 157)
Speaking, then, as was noted earlier in this chapter regarding Agamben’s 
identification of the fracture between ‘voice’ and ‘language’, is itself a 
performance of a kind of self-revealing becoming. Its self-revealing is a kind of 
packaging, or, in Kantorian terms, an emballage, a wrapping that reveals by its 
very act of veiling. As Gadamer observes, stammering is already a speaking, 
but as ‘the obstruction of a desire to speak’ it paradoxically embodies the 
potentiality of the ‘infinite realm of possible expression’.
Kantor, invariably, found himself forced to operate between two worlds 
(and particularly when accepting this official international prize): on the one 
hand, he was forced to operate in the world of culture and society, with the 
commodification and the underlying ontology that enables it, and on the other, 
he inhabited the world by the terms of what he understood as the ‘true artist’, 
someone who accepted the mystery of reality beneath the labels and categories 
maintained by society, and attempted to find ways to engage with it. In a 
statement from 197770 on ‘The Situation of the Artist’, Kantor wrote:
The artist has to pay for this strange privilege of operating 
‘beyond’ life. The condition of the artist is like that of 
someone, who,
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70 This text, ʻSytuacja artystyʼ was published in Kantor 1984: 7, in which it is dated 1977.
striving toward some particularly significant goal,
suddenly senses that the act of pressing onward
is the essence of his quest and the point of his existence.
And—looking for a way out, or just an easy way through
realizes
that around him more and more doors are shutting,
that he must shut many of them himself,
try another way,
press on,
in the full and terrifying knowledge that everything is Void,
that the real nature of his task
is to close doors, thereby
shutting off
shutting out everything
that ceaselessly tries to furnish the Void with a content,
that passes under the name of Reality,
arrogating to itself the only valid universality
and all legitimacy pertaining thereto ... 
And only when the holocaust happens,
When our vaunted ‘reality’ dissolves,
amid disgrace and denunciation, clutching at words
to describe itself: ‘it all turned out to be a fabrication’,
amid the babble of mutual contradictions and alternative 
strategies—
the ‘condition of the artist’ draws close to the moment
of self-revelation. But it is already too late.
And, in any case, nobody has been listening.
(Kantor 1990: 140–141)
Kantor recognises that, in the ‘world’s terms’, he inhabits a ‘foreign land’ and, in 
so far as he is contaminated by it, he is a stranger to the underlying reality with 
which he is trying to commune. Nevertheless, in his desire to speak, ‘even if 
perhaps a stammering speaking’ as Gadamer puts it, he opens up the ‘infinite 
realms of possible expression’, an expression that opens up with those who 
wish to learn the same language the ‘infinite dialogue in the direction of the truth 
that we are’. This truth is the strangely positive truth of being, In Heidegger’s 
phrase, the ‘placeholder of nothing’, perhaps best expressed in the nothingness 
of the ‘…’ with which Kantor closes his ‘Little Manifesto’.
But surely this ‘nothing’, the ellipsis or ‘…’, is open to the charge of 
‘emperor’s new clothes’ so beloved of some contemporary commentators. As a 
phrase this term is frequently deployed by the media as a clichéd pejorative 
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metaphor in the face of modern art seen as pretentious and hollow. In reality the 
phrase is also often applied to any art that seems bemusing and difficult to 
understand, because it challenges normative ideas of what ‘art’ should be (see 
Robbins 2004: 672, note 3). However, is this the provocation that Kantor is 
intending? Does he have a satirical intent? After all, both Kantor’s manifesto 
and Hans Christian Andersen’s tale of ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’ feature a 
‘little child’.71 However, the forgetful schoolboy that Kantor becomes in his ‘Little 
Manifesto’ does not seem to have the same triumphal, whistle-blowing tenor 
that is the common interpretation of Andersen’s tale. Upon analysis this is 
instead what appears to be underlying Żurowski’s critique of Kantor discussed 
at the end of the previous chapter. In this critique Żurowski labelled Kantor a 
charlatan and buffoon, characterising his manifestos as ‘highly suspect 
wrapping’ or, in other words, a sham. What this chapter has shown are the 
existential preoccupations Kantor was working through in his art and writing. 
The ‘little boy dressed up in a black suit and pretending before his 
friends’ (Żurowski 1985: 368) evokes perhaps an interpretation other than that 
of the ‘little boy’ or ‘little child’ in Andersen’s tale. However, Anderson’s tale, as 
opened up in essays by first Jacques Derrida and later by Hollis Robbins (in 
each case their respective essays are an ‘interpretation of interpretation’) is 
every bit as ‘tricky’ as the patron of interpretation, Hermes, mentioned at the 
start of this chapter. In chapter three, I developed a particular view of human 
being, through a critique of representation, as a being that is extended through 
time, dwelling in the ‘allotted share’ of its ēthos. In the next chapter (chapter 
five) I will relate this idea of human being to notions of abjectness and negativity 
derived from further readings of Heidegger, Foucault and Agamben and locate 
these in Kantor’s work. Before I do so, however, I want to turn briefly now to 
relate the sense of interpretation developed so far to the questions concerning 
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71 In her essay Hollis Robbins references the translation of Andersenʼs tale available from 
Project Gutenberg on the internet, giving the reason that this particular translation ʻis the most 
literal availableʼ (Robbins 2004: 641 fn. 1). This Project Gutenberg translation describes the 
ʻvoice of innocenceʼ as ʻa little childʼ; the line, which occurs towards the very end of the tale 
(third paragraph from last) reads: ʻ“But the Emperor has nothing at all on!” said a little 
childʼ (Andersen 1999). Despite this, Robbins, throughout her essay, refers almost entirely to 
this ʻlittle childʼ as a ʻlittle boyʼ.
‘truth’ and ‘appearance’ discussed in chapter three and reflect further on the 
way in which the interpretative field itself can also be seen to be extended. The 
conventional and reductive idea of two-way communication between ‘sender’ 
and ‘receiver’, that interpreters such as Żurowski seem to operate on, can 
instead be seen as an integral performative part of the ēthos of human being 
itself.
The misleading ʻlittle childʼ
Derrida’s short critique of Andersen’s tale occurs near the beginning of his 
essay ‘The Purveyor of Truth’, whose main theme is a lengthy critique of 
Jacques Lacan’s reading of Edgar Allen Poe’s story ‘The Purloined Letter’. In 
this preliminary short discussion, he deconstructs Sigmund Freud’s reading of 
Andersen’s tale as a veiled expression of the unconscious fear of public nudity:
Freud’s text is staged when he explains to us that the text, 
e.g. that of the fairy tale, is an Einkleidung [‘disguise’] of 
the nakedness of the dream of nakedness. What Freud 
states about secondary revision (Freud’s explaining text) 
is already staged and represented in advance in the text 
explained (Andersen’s fairy tale). This text, too, described 
the scene of analysis, the position of the analyst, the forms 
of his language, the metaphorico-conceptual structures of 
what he seeks and what he finds. The locus of one text is 
in the other.
(Derrida 1975: 37–38)
For Derrida, Andersen’s tale pre-empts and already performs Freud’s analysis 
of it in his Interpretation of Dreams and as such it contains the seeds of its own 
reading. As Robbins observes, ‘Andersen’s tale is also a critique of criticism, 
Derrida’s criticism suggests. As tale, teller, interpreter, and critical case study all 
in one, it knows what it is about in offering such a transparent fantasy’ (Robbins 
2004: 659). Critical theorists such as Derrida and Robbins are also, like Schulz 
and Kantor, and Andersen’s tale, Hermes-like messengers.
Robbins, keen to take seriously Derrida’s point about the tale’s auto-
interpretative nature, proposes a hermeneutic strategy that subverts the popular 
interpretation that the tale seems itself to favour: the seductive power of the 
romantic idiom of the innocent child speaking truth to power. She proposes:
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that ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’ offers several other 
critical positions besides that of the courageous romantic 
child. These positions are figured in the story by five very 
familiar ‘characters’: the Emperor, the ‘rogue weavers,’ the 
ministers, the canopy, and the public. Each of these 
positions offers us critical verbs: to rule, to weave, to 
minister, to parade, and to applaud. In the critique that 
follows I will present and parade ‘The Emperor’s New 
Clothes’ by weaving the threads of the tale’s often ignored 
characters and words, and in doing so address and 
applaud its sociopolitical-literary-critical complexities.
(Robbins 2004: 661)
In Robbins’ subsequent reading Andersen’s tale is seen to establish a charged 
zone of interpretative possibilities suspended between the ‘characters’ that 
precede the ‘little child’ together with the text that mediates them. Robbins 
considers the tale from seven perspectives in all: the Emperor, the weavers, the 
ministers, the canopy, the public, the little child and finally the text itself. In doing 
so she performs something like the reading that Heidegger performs on Plato’s 
Allegory of the Cave, which was discussed in the preceding chapter. 
Understood in a conventionally representational manner Andersen’s tale seems, 
as Marshal McLuhan describes it ‘simply a perfect illustration of how perceptive 
but antisocial individuals—children, poets, artists, sleuths—can see what is 
really going on more clearly than “well-adjusted” individuals’ (McLuhan and 
Fiore 1967: 88–89). In Derrida’s reading, the tale, echoing Heideggerian 
concerns (as well as the Kantorian strategy of emballage, of concealing to 
reveal), becomes a somewhat more convoluted tale of veiling and unveiling:
in the form of an invisible nakedness and an invisible 
garment, a fabric visible to some and invisible to others, a 
nakedness at once unapparent and exhibited. The same 
fabric conceals and shows the Stoff [matter] of the dream, 
i.e., also the truth of that which is present with no veil. If 
we take into account the more than metaphorical equation 
of veil, text, and fabric, Andersen’s text has the text as its 
theme. More precisely, the determination of the text as a 
veil within the space of truth, the reduction of the text to a 
movement of aletheia [sic].
(Derrida 1975: 37)
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But, for Robbins, the tale, although containing these various readings becomes 
a shimmering zone of multiple shifting potential readings. Viewed from the 
perspective of each of the tales ‘characters’, the tale is simultaneously 
concerned with: the Emperor’s dilemma of how to perform his power; the 
weavers’ creativity in their successful ‘weaving’ of a web of deceit; the 
ministers’ concerns with managing the diplomacy of their office; the canopy’s 
performance of its function in signifying ‘that the Emperor is the emperor, 
whatever he happens to be wearing’ (Robbins 2004: 666); the public’s sense of 
participation in the performance of power in their initial ‘blind-seeing’ 
acquiescence in ‘seeing’ the Emperor’s invisible clothes; and the little child’s 
apparent puncturing of all this chain of enchantments begun by the weavers.
For Robbins, the text betrays itself in the seductive force with which it 
apparently resolves the tale around the pointing finger of the child, for in reality:
The child’s words are disruptive—not for having levelled 
the difference between ruler and ruled, but for 
endangering the formal process by which it is 
accomplished without being openly acknowledged. While 
the pubic outside the text applauds the boy’s act of 
disenchantment, the community inside is fractured and 
diminished.
(Robbins 2004: 668)
From this particular perspective the child emerges as ‘scandalously 
reactionary’ (Ibid.: 668), one who creates problems for the social fabric of the 
town rather than resolving or liberating anything. 
When I first began thinking about this tale some years ago it was because 
of the regularity with which commentators would respond to the coverage of the 
annual Turner Prize by evoking the title of Andersen’s tale. This seemed to be a 
view shared particularly by large numbers of first-year undergraduate students, 
who would react negatively to the slightest avant-garde gesture in performances 
they were shown or taken to. At the time it seemed to me that the obvious 
assumption being made was that the bemused and uncomprehending public—
together with the commentators themselves—were fulfilling the function of the 
little child whilst the artists were cast in the role of the scheming, roguish, 
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deceiving and villainous weavers. Then it had seemed enough for me to simply 
reverse this. I argued in lectures (mischievously delighting in provoking my 
audience) that the deceivers were the public and the commentators who both 
had a vested interest in maintaining the hegemony of the visible, of normativity, 
of the status quo. It was surely the artist who was in the role of the innocent little 
child in revealing the nakedness of the ‘real’, a sense of the ‘thing in itself’. 
However, what is often overlooked is that Andersen’s tale does not end quite 
with the child’s pointing finger. Indeed, as Robbins points out citing from Elias 
Bredsdorff’s biography of Andersen, the original version of the tale had no child; 
the Emperor’s invisible new clothes were a success, he continues on his 
procession and ‘the whole town talked about his wonderful new 
clothes’ (Bredsdorff 1975: 312, cited by Robbins in 2004: 668). Even with the 
addition of the child, the Emperor, though vexed, ‘thought the procession must 
go on now! And the lords of the bedchamber took greater pains than ever, to 
appear holding up a train, although, in reality, there was no train to 
hold’ (Andersen 1999). As Robbins observes ‘If the function of art is to make the 
invisible visible, both the weavers and the chamberlains prove themselves 
aesthetically (as well as ethically) proficient in their specific references to what 
the cloth actually looks like’ (Ibid.: 674, fn. 17). What the little child innocently, or 
perhaps ignorantly points to—the Emperor’s nudity—is something that could be 
interpreted in a number of ways: that power is something invisible yet real; that 
the Emperor is, as signified by the canopy above him, still the emperor naked or 
not; that the power structure is a function of consensus, another real-but-
invisible commodity. Viewed in this way, my revision was too simplistic, 
especially compared to the tale’s own performance of itself, which points 
towards the romantic resolution identified in the pointing finger of the little child, 
a gesture that veils the shimmering complexity and latent potentiality of its 
concealed, interpretative field.
Conclusion: ʻmaturing into childhoodʼ
In the last chapter I argued that a particular idea of representation, arising out of 
a post-Platonic metaphysical tradition, engenders a paradoxically non-narrative 
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idea of human being as an essential unitary substance moving through linear 
time. Using ideas from Heidegger and Agamben, I have problematised this 
particular notion of a unitary essence-as-substance by arguing that another way 
of conceiving human being is as a fluctuating temporal field extended through 
time: that human being is an extended process, an ongoing performative 
referencing backwards and forwards that constructs the individual’s space of 
being or ēthos. In this chapter I have problematised ideas of understanding and 
interpretation in such a way that the traditional notion of artist and spectator 
have become blurred. What I want to suggest is that the plane of interpretation 
is also collapsed into the nature of human being, and intersects with it in such a 
way that it, also, becomes part of its very construction. The ēthos—the dwelling-
space or room—of human being is constructed by the passage backwards and 
forwards not just through time, by way of memory and expectation, but also 
Hermes-like, by multiple acts of interpretation: interpretation of oneself, self-
reflexively in the sense of one’s creation of oneself, as well as interpretation of 
others and the shared environment of being, which Heidegger calls ‘the 
clearing’. So, there is the performative structural relationship between past and 
future, and performative hermeneutic relationship between the known and the 
unknown. In the range of possible interpretations of ‘The Emperor’s New 
Clothes’ offered by the readings of the tale by Derrida and Robbins, Żurowski 
seems to stand out more clearly in the role of the ‘little boy’ in the sense of an 
interpreter who is ‘scandalously reactionary’ as outlined above. For who is 
Andersen’s little boy in the tale other than an infantile deus ex machina, a 
‘johnny-come-lately’, nothing more than a narrative device with which to ‘neatly’ 
close the tale. According to Robbins (citing from Bredsdorff’s biography 1975: 
313), shortly before publication Andersen had second thoughts about his 
original childless conclusion and substituted the final three paragraphs that 
everyone now knows, apparently because he wanted to give it a more satirical 
appearance.
This ‘little child’, whose apparently innocently pointing finger is the locus 
for the popular ‘finger-pointing’ interpretation of the tale, is a red herring. Just as 
much of a red herring in aesthetic terms as the idea of ‘disinterest’ is in the 
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creation and spectatorship of art. The finger-pointing little boy is nothing more 
than another symptom of the fracture between artist and spectator as identified 
by Agamben. If this is the case, who is the little boy that Kantor regresses to 
shortly before his disappearance into the ‘…’ of the closing ellipsis of his Little 
Manifesto’? For he is not Andersen’s little boy. The answer lies with two of 
Kantor’s artistic precursor-siblings Gombrowicz and Schulz, both of whom 
utilise tropes of a return to childhood. However, it is Schulz, particularly, who 
holds the key to Kantor’s staged regression in the Sukiennice Hall on April 8, 
1978. In a letter of March 4, 1936, replying to his friend Andrzej Pleśniewicz, a 
prominent Catholic intellectual, Schulz wrote:
What you say about our artificially prolonged childhood—
our immaturity—takes me a little aback. After all, the kind 
of art I care about is precisely a regression, childhood 
revisited. If it were possible to reverse development, to 
attain the state of childhood again, to have its abundance 
and limitlessness once more, that ‘age of genius,’ those 
‘messianic times’ promised and sworn to us by all 
mythologies, would come to pass. My ideal goal is to 
‘mature’ into childhood. That would be genuine maturity for 
you.
(Schulz 1988a: 126)
There is a different intimation here of the potential relevance of the small child. 
What is foregrounded here is not the child per se, but rather a particular idea of 
‘regression’, of ‘childhood revisited’. What is at stake is a certain freedom of 
temporal mobility that would enable the ‘abundance and limitlessness’ of 
childhood to be smuggled back into the present as a messianic act. This is 
nothing to do with the simplistic finger pointing of the child at the end of 
Andersen’s tale. It does, however, relate to a sense of the weaving, or 
construction of human being out of time. To return to Kantor’s ‘Little Manifesto’, 
it is now possible to read it as a performative sculpture in which Kantor weaves 
himself into a distinctive artistic form. In his regression to childhood from the 
defiant stance at the beginning of the manifesto, from his having something to 
say, to the state of forgetfulness at its close, he enacts a move from the status 
of award-winning artist to something more abject. But, paradoxically, that very 
state of humiliation in the return to the immaturity of childhood, and of the 
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absence of memory, is a return to potentiality. The apparently humiliating 
regression, when seen as a fragment of a larger movement, process or cycle, 
becomes a potentially positive beginning rather than a humiliating end. In the 
same way that ‘poor objects’, as will be seen in the next chapter, became a form 
of resistance against the threat of annihilation during the occupation, a 
regression to childhood and the potentiality of the informe of immaturity 
becomes, for Kantor, a form of resistance, even though futile, against the 
encroachment of the final annihilation of death. It is as if by embracing the 
nothing of forgetfulness as a conscious, intentional gesture, Kantor is able to 
suggest the continuation and potential of the performance of ‘even the thing I 
am …’. In the next chapter I will explore in more detail the negative ontology 
that underlies Kantor’s poetics of being.
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CHAPTER 5. THE BIOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT. KANTOR’S ANATOMY 
LESSON: ‘REALITY OF THE LOWEST RANK’ AND THE BIOPOLITICS OF 
BARE LIFE
Introduction
Artists often use oblique strategies to explore the nature of human being and 
Tadeusz Kantor was no exception. As with other artists for whom the Second 
World War was a formative experience, Kantor’s particular aesthetic strategies 
are evidently profoundly influenced by his wartime experience. However, for 
Kantor this did not happen as a simple linear narrative in his artistic 
development. Until the 1970s, his experience can be understood to have been 
continually refracted through his engagement with a succession of international 
contemporary art practices. Each of Kantor’s encounters with a foreign art 
movement—Constructivism and abstraction, Surrealism, informel, ‘zero’, 
emballage, happening—was transformed in his hands through its intersection 
with his underlying concerns. As such, separate and, on the surface, seemingly 
disparate movements acquire a certain homogeneity as they are each 
détourned by Kantor in his struggles to articulate a poetics of being. As a 
consequence of his personal operation on them, these individual avant-garde 
artistic strategies are each turned into vehicles for each other. In this way, and 
certainly when viewed retrospectively, all of Kantor’s work can be seen to be 
expressive of certain tendencies from Constructivism, Dadaism, Surrealism, 
informel; it is all, in a sense, ‘impossible’, all ‘packaged’ and all concerned with 
the immediacy and aleatoricism of the happening.
With The Dead Class, Kantor began to leave such explicit engagement 
with and personalisation of existing art forms behind. Nevertheless, his ability to 
consistently bend existing artistic practice to his own purpose is an intrinsic part 
of the process that led to his later work. The continuous element underlying this 
process is Kantor’s concern with the paradoxical nature of human being, what 
Agamben (following Hegel) would later characterise as ‘this negative 
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being’—‘the thing existing which is not when it is, and is when it is not: a half-
glimpsed becoming’ (Agamben 2007d: 107). Death is the negative side of this 
‘half-glimpsed becoming’, the ‘thing that I am’. This ‘negative being’ is the 
‘placeholder’, the ‘lieutenant of the nothing’. Death, whether witnessed in the 
form of someone casually shot in the street, or, as the realisation of one’s own 
impending mortality, problematises life by casting its shadow in such a way that 
the all-too-temporary, provisional nature of the ‘tenant-in-lieu’ is thrown into 
stark relief. Arguably it is Kantor’s experience with death in occupied Kraków 
that informed his work until The Dead Class. However, as he was preparing The 
Dead Class he was approaching his sixtieth year and had started to see friends 
and colleagues from his youth pass away. Consequently, in the early 1970s, 
Kantor experienced a re-acquaintance with death in a different sense to that of 
the violent slaughter of the occupation, and the inevitable encroachment of his 
own end started to inform his thinking. There is consequently a direct link 
between the witnessing of death during the period of 1939-1945 and—through 
the reminder of the natural deaths of his friends and acquaintances and the 
approach of his own sixtieth year in the early 1970s—the beginning of Kantor’s 
‘witnessing of his own death’, something that, as I shall explore in chapter 
seven, featured increasingly in his work following The Dead Class. In this 
chapter I want to explore in more detail the metaphysical underpinnings of the 
paradoxical ‘negative being’ of human being. Firstly, I will examine Kantor’s 
engagement with art informel and argue that his interest with this form may 
derive from an underlying sense of informe peculiar to Polish Modernism 
embodied in the work of Witkacy, Gombrowicz and Schulz. I will then discuss 
this in relation to Kantor’s détournement of the happening form, which he 
staged for the first time in Nuremberg in1968: Lekcja anatomii wedle 
Rembrandta (An Anatomy Lesson According to Rembrandt).72 In doing so I will 
show how Kantor’s reflection on aspects of his wartime work surfaces in the late 
1960s in a way that prefigures certain key concerns that emerge more explicitly 
in The Dead Class and his subsequent work. This early, key experience in 
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72 This happening was realised several times as stated in the notes to the passage translated in 
Appendix 1.20.
occupied Kraków will be shown to relate to Kantor’s reading of the work of the 
Jewish graphic artist and short-story writer Schulz, whose own aesthetic 
strategies of inverting dominant ontological hierarchies can be seen to inform 
Kantor’s own artistic practice. Implicit in this strategy is again a critique of a 
representational ontology that prioritises a substantialist concept of being over 
the more dynamic and mutable concepts of becoming and seeming; a reading 
of reality that Schulz championed. In his performative staging of Rembrandt’s 
painting, Kantor can be seen to challenge conventional ontological hierarchies 
in a way that both echoes Schulz’s metaphysics and prefigures a sense of the 
immanence of life as elaborated in the work of Gilles Deleuze.
Informe and Informel
Kantor’s ‘happenings’ emerged for him in the second half of the 1960s as a 
natural development of his previous concerns with informel, ‘zero’, and 
packaging or emballage. To understand the specific nature of negativity in 
Kantor’s work, and before exploring the underlying metaphysics of negative 
ontology in more detail it is worth first untangling the various strands present in 
the particular art movements that he engaged with. I particularly wish to single 
out the ideas that, for Kantor, cohere around his engagement with the idea of 
informel, the postwar European movement in painting that flourished during the 
1940s and 1950s, exemplified in the Parisian scene by painters such as Jean 
Fautrier, Jean Dubuffet, Georges Mathieu, Hans Hartung and Wols. Arguably, 
Kantor’s particular interpretation of informel continues to underly the work he 
subsequently labelled as ‘zero’, ‘emballage’ and ‘happening’, and indeed, his 
‘theatre of death’, although it was not necessarily the ideas of the historical 
genre that Kantor was articulating.
Superficially, because Kantor publicly engaged in the second half of the 
1950s with art informel, it can seem as if he was just importing ‘the latest fad’ 
into Poland following his second trip to Paris in 1955. However, it is possible to 
argue that this is not the case, that although, on the surface Kantor found the 
aesthetic of informel conducive to the problems of figurative painting and 
geometrical abstraction, he can also be seen, at a deeper level, to be 
150
continuing his development of a poetics of being that he had begun with the 
aesthetic of ‘poor realism’ developed for his underground production of The 
Return of Odysseus in 1944 (and which will be explored in more detail in 
chapter six). For one thing, as Suchan notes in his discussion of Kantor’s 
informel in relation to the lost film Attention—Painting! (which was discussed in 
chapter three) Kantor’s conception of his informel work was not identical with 
that of the American Abstract Expressionists, or the various approaches of the 
Western European painters working in this genre. As commentators such as 
William Rubin (1979) have noted, Abstract Expressionism and Pollock’s 
approach in particular, is understood as having arisen out of the concerns of 
Surrealism regarding automatism as a technique for liberating unconscious 
creativity. Kantor, despite his exposure to Surrealism during his first trip to Paris 
in 1947, was not following this particular route. Regarding the difference 
between what he calls the informe of Pollock and Kantor, Suchan notes that:
while the interpreters of Pollock’s painting saw chance as 
a way of liberating the subconscious—the true ‘self’—from 
the tyranny of culture, Kantor sees it as a way of liberating 
matter from the control of the artist. He thus confirms once 
again that, for him, informel is not exclusively (though it is 
to some extent) a means of self-expression, nor the 
painting—solely a recording of inner experience. That the 
relation between the artist and the painterly matter is of 
more complicated nature.
(Suchan 2005: 58)
Indeed, Suchan goes so far as to suggest that Kantor may have simply 
misunderstood informel, conflating two of its strands together:
At the time when he first met with it—during his visit to 
Paris in 1955—gesture painting was gradually giving way 
to matter painting. It is highly probable that the fact that 
Kantor simultaneously absorbed the two concepts—one of 
which attached greater importance to artistic expression, 
while the other tried to represent reality without cultural 
mediations—‘blurred’ his own formula of informel. Its 
subsequent hybridisation was doubtless a result of 
consecutive ‘modifications,’ made under the influence of 
ideas that at a given moment absorbed the artist’s 
attention—‘finding’ the object, ‘zeroing’ the artist’s creative 
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functions, recognising the ‘reality of the lowest rank’ as the 
only area of artistic exploration, and so on.
(Ibid.: 62)
Whatever the truth of this, what is clear is that Kantor was using what he 
understood of informel to pursue his own artistic goals. In doing so he created 
what Suchan characterises as the ‘conglomerate of artefacts and ideas that we 
know today as Kantor’s informel’ (Ibid.). However, this ‘conglomeration’, 
however accidentally formed, indicates Kantor’s deeper concerns. These 
concerns, as identified by Suchan, are more important and interesting than the 
details of any origins in the circumstances of 1950s Paris. What determines, for 
Suchan, the ‘heretical nature’ of Kantor’s informel is rather ‘the blurring of the 
line separating the artist from the material’ and that it is this that can be seen to 
unify his aesthetic strategy beyond the ostensible genre of informel: 
While the material changes: from dyes and canvas, 
through ready-made objects, ‘poor’ objects and situations, 
to ‘memory clichés, archetypal images, and individual 
memories, what remains unchanged is the complicated 
relation bonding the artist and the matter of his art into a 
single fluid system.
(Suchan Ibid.)
For Suchan ‘the artist balances on the border between the subject and the 
object of artistic activity’ (Ibid.).
As I shall discuss later in this chapter, the borderline between subject and 
object is something that acquires a complex significance in Kantor’s work. His 
proximity to the Jewish ghetto in Podgórze in Kraków during the occupation 
placed Kantor next to a physical border between life and death as marked by 
the barbed wire fence separating the free side of the street from the ghetto 
enclosure. However, this boundary was more than just physical; it also 
manifested itself as a form of liminality within Kantor’s own identity. Because of 
his Semitic features and the fact that his living situation necessitated his travel 
to and from an area adjacent to the ghetto, Kantor was frequently stopped and 
checked as a potential Jewish escapee. It will be remembered that Kantor, 
though not officially Jewish himself probably had some Jewish ancestry on his 
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father’s side, and during his childhood had coexisted happily with the prewar 
Jewish population of Wielopole. The fact of living in such close proximity to the 
dwindling, doomed Jewish population of Kraków and being mistaken for a Jew 
himself, placed Kantor in a peculiarly liminal situation of his own.
As I will show later in this chapter, the relationship of Jews to Poles 
according to the Nazi law governing occupation was logically that of a subset 
within a subset, in which a particular section of Polish society had been marked 
as ‘other’ on the basis of its race, transformed into a negative and then erased, 
thereby leaving an empty set—a void—in the heart of the Polish population. If 
the situation of the martyred Polish nation, as read through the filter of its 
Romanticism, can be seen as symbolic of humanity, its Jewish community is 
frequently seen as its hidden, guilty secret. To be a Polish Jew was, in a sense 
to be in a situation of provincialism and victimhood, more so than a Pole. Hyde 
cites Renato Palazzi,73 who, in his speech at the 1989 Paris conference at the 
Centre Georges Pompidou dedicated to Kantor’s work, spoke of what he called 
‘le moi Hebraique’:
It is the Hebraic ‘I’ dissolved in the Holocaust and the 
Diaspora, it is the Polish ‘I’ stifled in its own national 
identity and condemned in turn to another, more modern 
diaspora where to be a Jew or a Pole is not an ethnic 
allegiance but the symbol of a universal condition.
(Palazzi cited in: Hyde 1991: 20)
Kantor had been reading Schulz’s writings since before the war and, as I will 
argue later in this chapter, was influenced by the sense of ‘degraded reality’ in 
the Jewish author’s work. However, in Schulz’s fictions, this Hebraic identity is 
never actively voiced. Schulz was not a practising Jew. He did not attend the 
Synagogue or speak Hebrew. So, for example, the school that his Old Age 
Pensioner in the eponymous story from The Sanitorium Under the Sign of the 
Hourglass seeks re-admittance to is, in Schulz’s original text, just a school (i.e. 
a Polish Catholic school). The Headmaster in the story asks the Pensioner: ‘Do 
you remember for instance, how much is five times seven?’ (Schulz 1988b: 
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73 Renato Palazzi was a collector of Kantorʼs art and supporter of his work.
289).74 In The Dead Class, which, in 1975 partially draws on this particular story 
for its situation, the teacher tellingly asks not a simple, neutral arithmetical 
question, but rather a question concerning the Old Testament: ‘What do we 
know about King Solomon?’ (Kantor n.d. The Dead Class: 18).75 In his 
discussion of The Dead Class in his article ‘Sztuka po końcu sztuka’ (Art after 
the end of art, 1981), the Jewish critic Artur Sandauer saw that Kantor had 
given this Hebraic ‘I’ a voice by making the ‘dead classroom’—a memory of a 
provincial Galician Polish-Catholic classroom—momentarily transform into a 
cheder or Jewish schoolroom, and the teacher into a mełamed or Rabbinical 
schoolmaster. In this way, Sandauer argued, Kantor had voiced the tacit 
Jewishness present in Schulz’s fictions, and in Poland’s heart. The Jewish 
presence that surfaces in Kantor’s work, particularly in the ‘theatre of death’ 
cycle, is one of its most powerful aspects, one that refers to both the time of the 
occupation and of Kantor’s childhood. These two periods, when placed side-by-
side show the positive and negative sides of the Jewish presence at the heart of 
Poland, which Kantor repeatedly stated was so important alongside that of the 
Christian Church.
As noted in chapter one the experience of death, in the form of both 
indiscriminate killing and the very precise discrimination of genocide, left many 
artists, and Kantor in particular, with a strong aversion to the utopianism of pure 
abstraction on the one hand, and any use of the human figure in art on the 
other. As Kantor commented in an interview with Porębski:
this human form became compromised, we could no 
longer have its form based on a humanistic idea of the 
ancient beauty of the human figure. This beauty remained 
absolutely erased, and I also did not respond well to 
deformation, say, the deformation of Picasso. I could not 
reconcile myself to this.
(Kantor in Porębski 1997: 124; my translation)
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74 In Polish: ʻCzy pan jeszcze pamięta na przykład, ile jest pięć razy siedem?ʼ (Schulz 1989: 
319).
75 In Polish: ʻCo wiemy o Królu Salomonie?ʼ (Kantor 2004: 54).
The problem of how to engage artistically with reality ‘after Auschwitz’ (to quote 
Theodor Adorno’s phrase from the 1950s (Adorno 2003: 435)) remained with 
Kantor’s generation after the war and its presence can be detected in his 
attitude to art during his 1947 stay in Paris:
The image of the human being, which up till then was 
regarded as the only truth-telling representation, 
disappears.
Instead, there gradually emerge biological forms of a lower 
kind, almost animals, with few remaining traces of their 
past ‘humanity’ or, perhaps, a few traces foreshadowing 
their humanity.
Let there begin a new cycle of creation.
(Kantor in: Kobialka 1993: 19)
The paintings that Kantor made in response to this were those of his 
‘metamorphoses’ and ‘metaphorical’ periods. However there is a sense of 
wanting to come to terms with, to transform a perception of formlessness. If, 
under the occupation, human life, that of Poles and Jews, had been deformed 
by the Nazis into ‘biological forms of a lower kind’ a potential form of resistance 
to this was to détourne deformity into a positive form of evolution: a 
metamorphosis, a ‘new cycle of creation’.
In chapter two I noted that the three key figures of the inter-war avant-
garde, Witkacy, Gombrowicz and Schulz, each individually exhibited an 
independent sense of what Georges Bataille writing in Paris in the 1920s had 
identified as informe or ‘formless’. Published in December 1929 as a short entry 
in the Surrealist art magazine Documents (№7) as part of his mischievous 
‘critical dictionary’, Bataille’s ‘article’ reads:
A dictionary begins when it no longer gives the meaning of 
words, but their tasks. Thus formless is not only an 
adjective having a given meaning, but a term that serves 
to bring things down in the world, generally requiring that 
each thing have its form. What it designates has no rights 
in any sense and gets itself squashed everywhere, like a 
spider or an earthworm. In fact, for academic men to be 
happy, the universe would have to take shape. All of 
philosophy has no other goal: it is a matter of giving a 
frock coat to what is, a mathematical frock coat. On the 
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other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing 
and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is 
something like a spider or spit.
(Bataille 1985: 31)
Bataille’s editorial project for this incomplete enterprise is now understood to 
entail an intentional destabilisation of concepts and ideas. As such, this initially 
apparently insignificant and inconsequential article has acquired a significance 
beyond its diminutive size. In its opposition to the tyranny of form, and with its 
provocative and subversive presentation of formless as an amorphous and un-
categorisable category, the article can be seen to be using a negative as a 
positive. The message of the article is that the world, as understood by science 
and the academy, is nothing but a formlessness forced into a ‘mathematical 
frock coat’. As such the article suggests that the world, in its essential 
formlessness inherently, undercuts the pomposity of academe through its 
manifestation as the kind of lowliness found on the sole of a shoe: a squashed 
earthworm or spittle.
Coming after Witkacy’s plays and novels of the early 1920s but before 
Schulz’s two short-story collections and Gombrowicz’s novel Ferdydurke of the 
mid-1930s Bataille’s article can be seen as roughly contemporary with the 
Polish inter-war avant-garde. However, this potential parallel has tended to be 
ignored. In succumbing to an equation between Bataille’s informe and the later 
informel of the forties and fifties it is easy to overlook the fact that in having the 
influence of Witkacy, Schulz and Gombrowicz, Kantor was already imbued with 
a specifically Polish sense of informe before he ever became aware of the art 
informel painters in Paris. In the work of these three figures, formlessness 
acquires a playful and subversive power to challenge and liberate conventional 
thoughts and values and Witkacy’s sense of the essential formlessness of 
reality predates Bataille’s article by a number of years. As Gerould writes in his 
introduction to his translation of Witkacy’s 1921 play The Water Hen (A 
Spherical Tragedy in Three Acts), reality for Witkacy consists of ‘New groupings, 
hybrid graftings, preposterous fusions—the play’s motion is generated by the 
odd malleability and mutability of matter’ (Gerould in Witkiewicz 1989: 35). 
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Witkacy’s is a vitalist world in which ‘People are like insects and Infinity 
surrounds them and summons them in a mysterious voice’ (Witkiewicz 1989: 
49) and ‘The world is a desert without meaning’ (Ibid.: 50). This conception of 
matter in Witkacy—the combination of questionable forms-of-life within a desert 
of inanimate matter—seems very close to Bataille’s idea of Informe. 
Gombrowicz and Schulz too, each in their own way, share this predilection for 
the prioritisation of lowliness and immaturity, a sense in which reality seethes 
and writhes beneath humanity’s perception of it, and arrives, with some sort of 
cruel sense of humour, at surprisingly inappropriate ways of subverting the 
human sense of superiority.76
The problem with placing Kantor’s informel paintings so securely within the 
framework of the Parisian style detracts from the sense of his continuity with the 
interwar avant-garde concerns of Witkacy, Schulz and Gombrowicz. Together 
these figures can be seen as a source of a specifically, and particularly Polish 
brand of informe, one that arose out of the nationalistic concerns of Polish 
Romanticism as it processed the aftermath of partition and the challenges of 
independence. Paradoxically, the tenor of existential absurdity represented by 
the work of these three figures became equally applicable to the realities of Nazi 
occupation and later those of the Soviet bloc. Failure to recognise the 
importance of this ‘Polish informe’ for Kantor’s understanding of his own 
practice of informel, risks that practice being seen as entirely continuous with 
that of art informel, and thereby understood within narrow art-historical terms. 
As a related example, some critics have equated Bataille’s term with that of the 
‘informal’ of art informel and, in doing so, unhelpfully serve to conflate these 
terms in a way that allows them to lose their interesting specificity and reduces 
their subversive force. The painting, variously categorised as ‘matter’ or 
‘gesture’ painting arose in Paris as a response to various currents in the 
Parisian art scene: ranging from a sense of rebellion amongst younger artists to 
the shadow cast by the ‘School of Paris’, to a general feeling that the 
experience of war and occupation demanded, as a response, a complete break 
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76 The ending of Gombrowiczʼs last novel Cosmos (Gombrowicz 2005) provides perhaps the 
supreme example of this.
with aesthetic tradition. In consequence the resulting experimentation with a 
non-geometrical form of abstraction is indicative that a certain sense of ‘anti-
form’ or ‘formlessness’ was seen as a potential aesthetic strategy for dealing 
with the perceived problems of geometrical utopianism on the one hand, and 
straightforward figurative painting on the other. Utopianism seemed a bankrupt 
gesture in the wake of Auschwitz and Hiroshima, and for many artists, the 
recent experience of death in one form or another rendered the very act of 
depicting bodies at all in figurative painting inherently distasteful. Edouard 
Jaguer, in his 1946 article ‘Les Chemins de l’abstraction’ (The Paths of 
Abstraction), referring to the kind of contemporary geometric abstraction typified 
by Piet Mondrian, commented: ‘Confronted with these cheerful or austere 
mosaics, we stay indifferent (apart from the pleasure to the eye). In no way do 
these decorative elements relate to our apocalyptic age. We cannot recognize 
ourselves in them’ (cited in Guilbaut 1990: 49). Echoing this sentiment Bataille 
wrote in 1947 in his review in Critique of Sartre’s Réflexions sur la question 
juive (published in English as Anti-Semite and Jew):
Like you and me, those responsible for Auschwitz had 
nostrils, a mouth, a voice, human reason, they could unite, 
to have children: like the Pyramids or the Acropolis, 
Auschwitz is the product, is the sign of the human. The 
image of humanity is inseparable, henceforth, from the 
gas chamber ...’
(Bataille 1947: 471; my translation)
However, such a simple equation of informel with Bataille’s informe merely on 
the basis that painters favoured an informal and improvisatory approach over 
geometrical abstraction or figuration as a more appropriate response to the 
aftermath of war misses out on the subversive import of Bataille’s ‘definition’.
As a term specifically for painting informel was coined by Michel Tapié in 
his book Un art autre (Art of Another Kind) published in 1952. As Yve-Alain Bois, 
writing in his essay ‘No to … the Informel’ notes: ‘The word informel is self-
evidently badly chosen, and its greatest wrong is to look so much like the word 
informe, even though the latter’s field of reference is diametrically opposed to 
the former’s’ (Bois 1997a: 140). It does seem that the term informel has come to 
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encompass what Bois calls ‘the huge gang of painters who followed in [the] 
wake [of Fautrier, Dubuffet, Wols, etc.] and who were often characterized as 
“tachistes” or “abstraits lyriques”’ (Ibid.; emphasis in original). Writing in his 
essay ‘Postwar Painting Games: the Rough and the Slick’ in Reconstructing 
Modernism: Art in New York, Paris and Montreal, 1945–1964 (1990), Serge 
Guilbaut nevertheless confidently asserts an assumed thematic relationship 
between the two terms: ‘Important here, besides the recurrent themes of 
Surrealism, was the concept of the “incoherent,” the “inchoate,” which became 
for Tapié the symbol of the new art and which derived from what Georges 
Bataille had named the “formless” in the 1920s. (Informe in French) (Guilbaut 
1990: 50).
While Critics like Bois and Sarah Wilson argue that informel is distinct from 
Bataille’s informe, Bataille’s conceptualisation of informe does provide informel 
with an important subversive and metaphysical tenor without which it would 
merely function as a descriptive term in opposition to geometric abstraction: 
‘informal’ and improvisatory as opposed to ‘formal’ and meticulously planned. 
Bataille’s text, in its original context in Documents 7, followed two entries on 
‘spittle’, one of which characterised spittle as the epitome of the informe. 
Bataille’s article has thus two obvious intentions, deriving from the formlessness 
of spittle, but also the base, lowly nature of such a bodily secretion. This idea of 
informe might appear applicable to Kantor’s informel paintings, as well as those 
of some of the Parisen painters, such as Mathieu, looking as they do as if 
something has been squashed onto the canvas (as indeed Kantor’s umbrellas 
often were). However, as Suchan has argued, Kantor’s informel paintings come 
from a set of concerns that are more complex than this, concerns that are to do 
with the liberation of the artistic creation, as well as to its relationship with the 
artist: the ‘balancing on the border of the subject and object of artistic 
creativity’ (Suchan 2005: 62). As noted Kantor already had access to a Polish 
sense of informe with which he was already familiar before the war, and this 
was further influenced by the informe of the reality of occupation that placed him 
in a personal liminality between Jew and non-Jew.
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During his first visit to Paris in 1947—the period of the first phase of the art 
that Tapié was to label informel in 1952—Kantor appears not to have 
encountered the painting of Fautrier, Dubuffet, Mathieu, Wols et al. directly. The 
painters he met with then were figures such as the Social Realist painter André 
Fougeron, whom he interviewed, and the Chilean Surrealist Roberto Matta. 
Alongside the collections in the Louvre, he saw paintings by Max Ernst, Wassily 
Kandinsky, Paul Klee, and Joan Miró. He also encountered Picasso’s postwar 
paintings of bestially deformed human figures, which, together with the example 
of Matta seemed to have influenced his subsequent ‘metamorphoses’ and 
‘metaphorical’ paintings (see Pleśniarowicz 2004: 53). Instead of the ‘gesture’ 
and ‘matter’ painting then being developed, Kantor seems to have obtained a 
sense of something approaching Bataille’s concerns in his ‘critical dictionary’ 
article via the unlikely source of his visit to the exhibits of the Musée de 
l’Homme at the Palais de la Découverte (Palace of Discovery) which presented 
images of the world seen under the microscope—images of the microscopic 
structure of matter as revealed by the techniques of science as opposed to 
those of art. Interviewed by Borowski years later Kantor confided that: ‘For the 
first time I encountered the image-world as the product of [scientific] knowledge. 
I was fascinated, but overwhelmed by the awareness that access to this world 
[via science] alone provides the supreme and the most precise 
knowledge’ (Kantor in Borowski 1982: 32; my translation).
In her book of reminiscences, Szkice z pamięci: zapiski, wspomnienia, 
listy (Sketches from Memory: Notes, Memoires, Letters), Kantor’s first wife, Ewa 
Krakowska77 recollects her and Kantor’s visits to the Palais de la Découverte. 
The book presents reproductions of sketches made there by Kantor and the 
photographs he took of their visit to the museum. The Kantors’ visit to Paris 
coincided with the museum’s International Science Exhibition organized by 
UNESCO from 1946 to 1947 (Krakowska 2009: 115). The exhibition featured 
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77 Kantor married his first wife, Ewa Jurkiewicz, just before the end of the war on March 24, 
1945. They had met in the Young Artistsʼ Group and she had been involved in his Independent 
Theatre. She accompanied Kantor on his first trip to Paris. They were later divorced and Ewa 
subsequently married Wojciech Krakowski and retained his name (see Pleśniarowicz 2004: 49).
presentations on organic chemistry, showing equipment used in 
stereochemistry with display cases of molecular models. Other halls presented 
material on endocrinology, formal genetics and cytogenetics and of the 
microscopic details of plant biology. As evidenced in the reproductions in 
Krakowska’s book, Kantor made sketches of the stoma of mustard plants, of the 
latticework-like structure of the molecular models, and many other curious 
shapes and forms (mostly unidentified in the sketches) that he found in the 
museum’s galleries. He took photographs of images such as the x-ray of a 
human head, showing the skull beneath the skin, and of a large wire model 
showing the latticework-like three-dimensional internal structure of solids 
(unidentified in the photograph). This model seems to directly prefigure Kantorʼs 
drawings and paintings of the period following his visit to Paris when he was 
preoccupied with the depiction of ʻUmbrelloid Spaceʼ. Also featured in the 
museumʼs hall of medicine then, according to Krakowska, was Honoré 
Fragonard’s 1766-1771 sculpture, Rider, on loan from l'Ecole nationale 
vétérinaire de Maisons-Alfort. Kantor had pasted a reproduction of this sculpture 
in his sketchbook. The sculpture consisted of full-sized fake skeletons and 
internal organs of a horse and its rider (Ibid.: 124–125) and is a possible model 
for the figure of General Piłsudski on his skeletal horse created years later in 
Kantor’s 1985 production Let the Artists Die. Krakowska recalls the effect of the 
exhibition on first arriving:
After familiarising ourselves with the area around our 
apartment, we decided to visit several exhibitions near the 
Champs Élysées. Included in our inventory was the Palais 
de la découverte. Unfortunately, we reached it after 
closing time. Disappointed by the closed doors, we 
decided that tomorrow I will go alone to see if it is worth 
seeing.
On the second day, after entering the first room, I saw a 
meter-high magnifying glass, and behind the lens moved 
monstrous-size human figures. Shocked, your view quickly 
ran around the rest of the room with mathematical graphs, 
models of chemical compounds, models of atoms, the 
magnified cross sections of rocks and I immediately went 
back to our hotel to tell Tadeusz. The very next day we 
both went there and when I saw through the lens 
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Tadeusz’s great head, again it made an electrifying 
impression on me. Many times we went there. Tadeusz 
made sketches and researched the scientific discoveries 
that were presented there in different ways.
(Krakowska 2009: 113; my translation)
The exhibition was a revelation to Kantor and appears to have influenced him 
as much if not more than the Surrealist paintings of Picasso and Roberto Matta 
that he had seen in Paris. ‘… stop going to museums and galleries …’ he 
proclaimed:
I have discovered a new museum. The Palais de la 
Découverte. I reached it one day and entered—as if it 
were just a museum of curiosities.
But later going there between 11.00am and 3.00pm 
became a duty almost.
————————————
… The unusual accumulation of all that the EYE—the 
human organ extolled since the times of the 
Impressionists that has usurped exclusive rights to the 
area of painting and the knowledge of the world—could 
not see.
… Sections of metals, cells, genes, molecules, 
structures ...
… A completely different morphology. The concept of 
NATURE that embraces the infinite and the unimaginable. A 
real ANT-HILL!
Or: DUMPING-GROUND!
A concentration of nature imagined in a nightmare. 
Madness…. the hectic mobility of life. And its CRUELTY! ….
All anthropomorphic norms have been brought to ruin.
(Kantor (n.d.) ‘Notebook ’47, or Inferno’: 1; Polish text in: 
Kantor 2005: 103 and similar in interview in Borowski 
1982: 31; ellipses in original)
The Palais de la Découverte exhibition seems to have allowed Kantor to make a 
connection with the idea of a troublesome, immature, trashy, seething sense of 
reality that was circulating between Witkacy, Gombrowicz and Schulz. This 
would later, and for a limited time, find direct expression in Kantor’s work in his 
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Informel period, but as a description of matter from his ‘Night Notebooks’78 
makes clear, the idea of informe or formlessness—akin to Bataille’s notion, but 
taken rather from the leading figures of the interwar Polish avant-garde—was 
already established, this time described in terms of space:
Space is not a passive r e c e p t a c l e  
in which objects and forms are posited….
SPACE itself is an OBJECT (of creation).
And the main one!
SPACE is charged with E N E R G Y .
Space shrinks and e x p a n d s .
And these motions mould forms and objects.
It is space which G I V E S  B I R T H  to forms!
[…]
A figure of a human being is formed at the threshold 
between a living, suffering organism and
a mechanism,
which functions automatically and absurdly.
It is governed by the laws of M E T A M O R P H O S I S .
A figure of a human being is subject to
transformations,
expansions,
transplants,
and interbreeding.
(Kantor, ‘After the War: A Night Notebook or 
Metamorphoses (1947–1948)’, in: Kobialka 2009: 108–
109; original Polish text in: Kantor 2005: 110)79
This is the sense of the seething, writhing informe that underlies Kantor’s 
postwar painting and, I would argue is what underlies what Suchan sees as the 
originality in the ‘conglomerate of artefacts and ideas that we know today as 
Kantor’s informel’ (Suchan 2005: 62).
Kantor was so disconcerted by the ability of scientific perception to see 
further and more clearly than artistic perception that he wondered if there was 
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78 ʻ1948… 1949… 1950… Notatnik Nocny, Czyli Metamorfozyʼ (1948… 1949… 1950… Night 
Notebooks, or Metamorphoses) in Kantor 2005: 108–112, translated in Kobialka 2009: 106–109 
as ʻAfter the War: A Night Notebook or Metamorphoses (1947–1948). As with much of Kantorʼs 
writings, it is not clear when these pieces were written. According to Pleśniarowicz most of 
these writings ʻwere written or edited only in the 70s and 80sʼ and are understood as reflections 
and recollections of the years indicated (in Kantor 2005: 5: ʻW większości były pisane lub 
redagowane dopiero w latach 70. i 80.ʼ; my translation).
79 See Appendix 1.17 for an earlier, unpublished, anonymous translation in the Cricoteka 
archives that follows the format given in the Polish publication of Kantorʼs collected writings.
any way forward for art. In his conversation with Borowski years later, following 
a discussion about his first encounter with art informel in 1955, Kantor is asked 
if he no longer believed in painting. In response to Borowski’s question Kantor, 
making a direct link with his informel period, replied:
I believed, but it was not an absolute faith. Always, as in 
informel painting, I wanted something more than some 
form of autonomy or the methods in the art. I want to apply 
this method to the whole of reality. The case interested me 
more as a phenomenon of reality than as a stand-alone 
value of the painting.
(Kantor interviewed in Borowski 1982: 42; my translation.)
Clearly, in the particular character that he found in the ‘formlessness’ of 
informel, Kantor saw an insight into the flux of reality akin to the insight he had 
received in his time spent in the galleries of the Palais de la Découverte, the 
‘concentration of nature imagined in a nightmare. Madness…. the hectic 
mobility of life’. For Kantor, commenting later in the discussion when asked what 
the ‘new’ informel tendency meant for him, replied:
The [new] painting, which was just arriving, manifested an 
end to all calculation and intellectual constraints and as a 
result, it was also the end of current experience. It took on 
the forces of darkness and disaster revealing their nature 
and mechanism. Painting was situated beyond all form 
and aesthetics. It became for me a manifestation of life: 
not a continuation of art, but of life.
(Ibid.; emphasis in original)
In one sense then, art informel, for Kantor, was yet another strategy for 
responding to the aftermath of the war. However, it was a strategy that was 
enlisted as an articulation of the underlying sense of the ‘Polish informe’, 
especially in the sense of ‘degraded reality’ that he had acquired from Schulz’s 
writings.
Ostensibly it is Witkacy that is associated with Kantor due to the six plays 
by that author that he chose to associate his productions with for the twenty-
year period between 1955 and 1975. However, underneath the overt 
preoccupation with Witkacy, ran the constancy of certain aesthetic concerns 
derived from Schulz. In his discussion ‘From Informel to emballage’, one of the 
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essays accompanying his interviews with Kantor, Borowski makes a further link 
between what I am terming the ‘Polish informe’ in Kantor’s work and that of 
Schulz, observing that: ‘Genuine, proper interest in the reality of the artist saw in 
Kantor, as in Schulz, degraded reality’ (Borowski 1982: 123; my translation). 
Indeed the affinity between Kantor and Schulz is, in places, striking. In Kantor’s 
recollections of his time in Paris in 1947, where he articulates this crisis of form, 
his phrasing bears distinct echoes from Schulz’s prose. Kantor remembered his 
dismay at the realisation that the structure of reality, as he had seen it revealed 
in the Palais de la Découverte exhibitions, could only be accessed through 
scientific methods and that his artistic training disqualified him from acquiring 
such knowledge himself:
But I could not accept this. Then, after some time I made a 
‘discovery’, which personally for me is of fundamental 
importance. I came to realise, however, that there exists 
another entrance. That it will be a rather poor side-door, 
unrepresentative, maybe even ridiculous, through which 
art might enter.
I realized that I had to remain a layman, in order to 
maintain the conditions necessary for the imagination!
(Ibid.: 32; my translation)80
In his discussion of matter and creation in Schulz’s ‘Manekiny‘ (Tailors’ 
Dummies), the fourth story from The Cinnamon Shops, the narrator’s father 
argues that: ‘even if the classical methods of creation should prove inaccessible 
for evermore, there still remain some illegal methods, an infinity of heretical and 
criminal methods’ (Schulz 1988b: 40). In another example of Schulzian echoes 
in one of the notes in his ‘Notebook ’47 or Inferno’ Kantor reflects that:
It may well also be that my progress is not going to end at 
this ‘stop’ … 
Maybe there will be ‘sidetracks’ off the Main Track of my 
life and work that I will have to follow to get back to the 
Main Track …
(Kantor (n.d.) ‘Notebook ’47, or Inferno’: 6; Polish text in: 
Kantor 2005: 106; ellipses in original)
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80 There is almost identical text in Kantorʼs ʻNotebook ʼ47 or Infernoʼ; unpublished anonymous 
translation Kantor n.d.: 2, Polish text in Kantor 2005: 104.
This seems to directly echo the language used by Schulz at the beginning of 
‘Genialna epoka’ (The Age of Genius), the second story from The Sanitorium 
Under the Sign of the Hourglass, in which the narrator asks: ‘Have you ever 
heard of parallel streams of time within a two-track time? Yes, there are such 
branch lines of time, somewhat illegal and suspect […]’ (Schulz 1988b: 140). 
Kantor’s account of matter itself, towards the end of his informel period in 1961 
seems redolent with the sense of Schulzian informe:
[The Informel Theatre] is a discovery of an unknown 
aspect of 
REALITY or of its
elementary state: MATTER that is
freed from abiding by the laws of construction,
always changing and fluid;
that escapes the bondage of rational definitions;
that makes all attempts to compress it into a solid form
ridiculous, helpless and vain;
that is perennially destructive to all forms
and is nothing more than a manifestation;
that is accessible only by the forces of destruction,
by whim and risk of a COINCIDENCE, by fast and violent 
action.
(Kantor in: Kobialka 1993: 51)
Schulz’s account of matter,81 again voiced by the narrator’s father in the story 
‘Tailors’ Dummies’, although more celebratory and positive is couched in a 
similarly vitalist rhetoric:
Matter has been given fertility, inexhaustible vitality, and, at 
the same time, a seductive power of temptation which 
invites us to create as well. In the depth of matter, 
indistinct smiles are shaped, tensions build up, attempts at 
form appear. The whole of matter pulsates with infinite 
possibilities that send dull shivers through it. Waiting for 
the life-giving breath of the spirit, it is endlessly in motion.
(Schulz 1988b: 39)
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81 It is not only matter in Schulz that is animate and mutable, but space and time that are also 
liable to surprise with unexpected changes. In the story ʻCinnamon Shopsʼ streets and rooms 
change their shape and relation as the narrator runs on an evening errand. In ʻThe Age of 
Geniusʼ, as already noted, there are ʻparallel streams of timeʼ with ʻbranch lines […] somewhat 
illegal and suspectʼ (Schulz 1988b: 140). 
Although at first glance Kantor’s account of matter seems more pessimistic than 
that of Schulz, perhaps owing to its refraction through his experience of the 
occupation, there is nevertheless a strong sense of Schulz’s vitalism in its 
description as ‘always changing and fluid’ and of its ‘fast and violent action’. 
Also, as noted in chapters two and four, there is the sense of both artists 
occupying a Hermes-like position of liminality on the borderline between their 
own creativity and that of the material itself.
This conception of the subversive, vital nature of matter can be seen 
earlier in Kantor in the aesthetic of ‘poor realism’ developed for his wartime 
production of The Return of Odysseus in 1944 (to be considered in chapter six), 
before his adoption of the term Informel in the late 1950s. Years later in an 
interview with Barbara Sawa in 1988 Kantor gave a rare public 
acknowledgement of his debt to Schulz, claiming that:
‘poverty’ is for me a truly human condition, and also a 
condition in which art can exist.
This is why I created for myself this idea of poor reality—
reality of the lowest rank. It is not only my invention, 
though, because there is something very Polish about it. In 
the inter-war period, Bruno Schulz built a world of 
degraded reality in his novels [sic]. I conceived a notion of 
reality which is poor, indistinct and helpless when 
confronted with all the supreme world powers.
(Kantor interviewed in 1988, in Sawa 1990: 65)
The term ‘degraded reality’ was coined by the influential Polish-Jewish critic 
Artur Sandauer, who wrote the introduction ‘Rzeczywistość Zdegradowana 
(Rzecz o Brunonie Schulzu)’ (Degraded Reality—A Study of Bruno Schulz) to 
the first post-war edition of Schulz’s fictions, originally published in 1964. It is 
tempting to think that Kantor’s articulation of his central aesthetic derives from 
Sandauer’s idea of ‘degraded reality’ in Schulz’s fictions. The circumstantial 
evidence is on the surface compelling because Kantor seems not to use the 
term until the 1970s when he started to reflect in writing on his work since 1938. 
It seems entirely characteristic of Kantor to claim that the idea was original to 
him by retrospectively predating it to the time of the occupation. It is, however, 
undboubtably Sandauer who identifies this quality in Schulz’s fictions, and his 
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1964 essay and the republication of Schulz’s work were tremendously influential 
in the Polish culture of the time.
The 1964 republication of Schulz’s stories led to a resurgence of interest 
in his work, which in turn led to the making of Wojciech Jerzy Has’s film of 
Sanitorium pod kledsydrą, released in 197382 at the time when Kantor was 
beginning to work on The Dead Class. As Michael Brooke remarks in his 2008 
review of Has’s film: ‘Most unsettling of all is the recreation of pre-Holocaust 
Jewish Poland, whose total destruction Schulz didn’t live to witness’ (Brookes 
2008: n.p.). Has’s reworking of themes from Schulz’s writings carried a certain 
awareness of the Holocaust that could not have been directly present in 
Schulz’s texts. In consequence the film has a sense of reflecting on Schulz’s life 
from the perspective of his demise at the hands of the Gestapo officer who shot 
him. Also, coming only a few years after the Polish authority’s notorious anti-
Semitic campaign of 1968, this sense of a lost, ghostly Jewish presence within 
Poland was enough to cause censorship problems so that the film had to be 
smuggled out of Poland to appear in the 1973 Cannes Film Festival where it 
won the Jury Prize.83
It is hard not to see in Has’s film elements that prefigure motifs used by 
Kantor in his ‘theatre of death’. The wan-faced train conductor who reappears 
as a Charon-like figure throughout the film seems to prefigure the Charwoman 
of The Dead Class, the Photographer’s Widow in Wielopole, Wielopole, and the 
Innkeeper in I Shall Never Return. Scenes and locations metamorphose fluidly 
in a manner that is true to Schulz’s elastic sense of time and place, but also 
points towards Kantor’s ability to morph his theatrical spaces from Christian 
classroom to Jewish synagogue, and from family-room to battlefield. Moreover, 
in Has’s film, soldiers frequently march with bayonetted rifles in a manner that 
both recalls some of Schulz’s drawings for his second volume of stories (see 
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82 Released in North America as The Sandglass and in the UK as The Hour-Glass Sanitorium. 
83 See: http://www.festival-cannes.com/en/archives/ficheFilm/id/2302/year/1973.html (accessed 
6/9/11), http://www.moviemail-online.co.uk/film/dvd/The-Hourglass-Sanatorium/ (accessed 
6/9/11), http://www.krakowpost.com/article/2265 (accessed 6/9/11), http://stevemobia.com/
WriteSubPages/journey.htm (accessed 27/8/11).
Schulz 1988b: 199, 201 and 259) but also seems to prefigure the many 
manifestations of marching soldiers in Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’.
The metamorphic quality in Has’s film of Schulz’s story exemplifies a 
certain informe of the Polish kind that Kantor derives from Schulz and the other 
two figures of the Polish interwar avant-garde. However, what makes the 
influence of informe in its Schulzian form so poignant for Kantor, as I noted at 
the end of chapter two, is its celebration of provincialism and Jewishness. 
Although Kantor and his generation devoured Schulz before the occupation, the 
idea of ‘degraded reality’, of a vitalist materialism and its creative mutability 
arising out of ‘low’ or ‘degraded’ periferal, provincial reality, for Kantor at least, 
acquired a particular resonance during the experience of occupation and its 
aftermath. In a section that seems to prefigure Alain Resnais’s 1955 film 
documentary about Auschwitz, Nuit et Brouillard (Night and Fog), with its 
documentation of the commodification of human being into soap, lampshades 
and stuffing for sofas, Schulz’s work acquires a certain prescience. In his 
‘Conclusion’ to the ‘Treatise on Tailors’ Dummies’ (a section of the story 
‘Manekiny’), the narrator’s Father comments that:
Ancient, mythical tribes used to embalm their dead. The 
walls of their houses were filled with bodies and heads 
immured in them. A father would stand in a corner of the 
living room—stuffed, the tanned skin of a deceased wife 
would serve as a mat under the table. I knew a certain sea 
captain who had in his cabin a lamp, made by Malayan 
embalmers from the body of his murdered mistress.
[…] my own brother, as a result of a long and incurable 
illness, has been gradually transformed into a bundle of 
rubber tubing. […] Can there be anything sadder than a 
human being changed into the rubber tube of an enema? 
What disappointment for his parents, what confusion for 
their feelings, what frustration of the hopes centred around 
the promising youth!
(Schulz 1988b: 47)
Despite the note of ironic humour that is present, these transformations of 
human being into inanimate commodities seem more casually devastating than, 
say, the transformations in Franz Kafka’s stories, which at least still involve a 
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change into other living forms. In Schulz the transformation is of a more 
humiliating order. It is, however, precisely Schulz’s Jewishness that makes his 
version of informe so profound in its influence on Kantor. In the space of one 
decade following the publication of his first collection of stories in 1934, Schulz’s 
informe had acquired a macabre double perspective.
As already mentioned, a consistent foundation of Kantor’s aesthetic was a 
twofold preoccupation with what he referred to as realności najniższej rangi (the 
reality of the lowest rank) and przedmiot biedny (the poor object). Both of these 
aspects of his aesthetic can be seen to articulate a specifically Polish sense of 
informe, and in its Schulzian form, a specifically poignant Polish-Jewish tenor. 
Kantor’s aesthetic prioritised a poor, lowly, and degraded reality at the margins 
of existence: a form of being that dwells in the liminal zero-zone between 
existence and nonexistence. This aesthetic preoccupation, as I will argue in the 
following discussion, can be seen to relate to aspects of the negative ontology.
Negative ontology: Something for nothing—nothing as something?#
The concept of ‘negative ontology’ has a paradoxical and problematic 
connotation: surely ‘nothing can come of nothing? In the published version of 
his 1935 lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics (2000) Heidegger sees this 
paradox as exemplified in the ancient debate between Parmenides and 
Heraclitus who introduced to Western metaphysics the apparently opposing 
conceptions of reality as either being or becoming:
This division and opposition [Being84 and becoming] 
stands at the inception of the question of Being. Even 
today, it is still the most familiar restriction of Being 
through an Other; for it is immediately obvious, due to a 
representation of Being that has hardened into the self-
evident. What becomes, is not yet. What is, no longer 
needs to become. That which ‘is’ has left all becoming 
behind it, if indeed it ever became or could become. What 
‘is’ in the authentic sense also stands up against every 
onslaught from becoming.
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84 Following Heidegger who tends to make a distinction between Sein, ʻBeingʼ, and seiende, 
ʻbeingsʼ, I use ʻBeingʼ to refer to the totality of existence, the fact that things are at all, and 
ʻbeingʼ or ʻbeingsʼ to refer to individual entities within that totality.
(Heidegger 2000: 100–101)
Out of these Pre-Socratic ideas, first Plato and then Aristotle developed the 
dichotomy of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ into the concepts of ‘substance’ and 
‘appearance’. Ousia (substance) is understood as the essential, substantive 
basis of being, one with a problematic relationship to its appearance: the 
substance can only be known and experienced because of its representation. 
The idea of Nihilism is in a sense a direct challenge to this representational idea 
of reality because it itself appears to challenge the idea of a substantial basis 
for reality: that there is anything behind the appearance. Nietzsche’s plan for his 
proposed final book The Will to Power, opens with a section entitled ‘European 
Nihilism’, which reads: ‘Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this 
uncanniest of all guests?’ (Nietzsche 1968: 7). According to Nietzsche the idea 
of nihilism—the place of ‘the nothing’—is an uncanny presence in the world, 
lurking not only within the essence of human being but in the essence of the 
creative activity of the artist as well as the aesthetic activity of spectatorship. 
The implication is that this negativity, as a lurking presence, is indeed 
something that is paradoxically present—a no-thing that is. Heidegger 
comments on this apparent paradox in his Introduction to Metaphysics:
together with the path of Being, the path of Nothing must 
expressly be considered, that it is consequently a 
misunderstanding of the question about Being if one turns 
one’s back on Nothing with the assurance that Nothing 
obviously is not. (That Nothing is not a being, however, by 
no means prevents it from belonging to Being in its own 
manner).
(Heidegger 2000: 117; emphasis in original)
If, as Heidegger and certain philosophers working in his tradition such as 
Agamben would have it, this negativity is a positive force, then it is necessary to 
develop an understanding of the artist, the work, and the spectator that can 
adequately situate them each in the context of this paradox.
 In 1929, ten years before Kantor was to complete his studies at the 
Kraków Academy of Fine Art, Martin Heidegger delivered his inaugural lecture, 
as Husserl’s successor as professor of philosophy, at the University of Freiburg. 
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Entitled ‘What is Metaphysics?’, the lecture was a convoluted disquisition on the 
place of nothingness as the ground of Being—of existence as such. For 
Heidegger, the place of human being, or dasein (literally ‘being-the-there’) in his 
terminology, was predicated on ‘the Nothing’ such that human being was itself 
‘the lieutenant’ or ‘placeholder [platzhalter] for the Nothing’ (1968: 374, 1998a: 
93 and see also Safranski 1998: 182–183). As he went on to argue in his 1949 
‘Postscript’ to the lecture, Heidegger feared that his foregrounding of the 
paradoxical presence of ‘the Nothing’ (paradoxical because, according to 
conventional logic, ‘nothing’ cannot have a presence by definition) would be 
interpreted in an unremittingly negative manner. Indeed, this has generally been 
the tenor of the ‘place’ of nothingness in twentieth-century discourse. However, 
in the spring of 1929, Heidegger attempted to defend his positive understanding 
of ‘the Nothing’ in his famous public debate with Ernst Cassirer, whose The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (published in three volumes in the 1920s) 
marked him out as the philosopher of culture and proponent of its positive 
values. In the debate, Cassirer championed human culture as ‘transcendence 
turned into form’, a dwelling erected by human being for human being as a 
protection against barbarism and animality. This building of an ‘ideal world’ was 
a protection that was hard won but all too fragile and easily destroyed. 
Heidegger, whilst agreeing that culture was a home for human being, argued 
that it was a home that could become stale and cluttered, a home in need of 
renewal or repair—that culture could become rigid and stultifying. In this way, he 
maintained, human being ‘freezes into’ the culture it has created and loses its 
freedom. In contrast to Cassirer, Heidegger advocated the necessity for human 
being to confront itself with its original nakedness and ‘thrownness’. For him it 
was necessary for human being to be thrown ‘back, so to speak, into the 
hardness of his fate’ (Heidegger 1990: 204), ‘to surrender man […] to 
anxiety’ (ibid.: 200). As Rüdiger Safranski characterises it in his 1998 biography 
of Heidegger, human being should be given a fright that will force it back into 
that homelessness from which the flight into culture can begin anew (Safranski 
1998: 187). In the autumn of 1939, ten years after this debate between Cassirer 
and Heidegger, and shortly before Kantor completed his formal studies as an 
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artist that December, the Germans invaded Poland and set about providing the 
environment that would practically engage him in the environment of occupied 
Kraków in Heidegger’s project of ‘surrendering man to anxiety’.
Occupied Kraków: The reality of biopower
Following the Nazi invasion of 1939, Kantor, along with the other occupants of 
Kraków, was indeed ‘thrown back into the hardness of his fate’. From the 
beginning, the Nazi plan for the Polish people was a severe example of the 
exercise of what has come to be known—following Michel Foucault’s 
characterisation—as biopower: where a power ‘has taken control of both the 
body and life […] that has […] taken control of life in general—with the body as 
one pole and the population as the other’ (Foucault 2004: 253). As Foucault 
argued in his 1976 lecture course at the Collège de France, biopower consists 
in the state’s control over human being, not as a set of individuals valued in 
their own right, but as a part of a collective species. In this way an individual’s 
essence, or essential characteristics, are decided for them by the state. In 
return for its allegiance the state then cares for its subject species. If the state 
does not wish to care for all the people under its dominion then it is but a simple 
logical step to introduce caesuras into the species-population by re-categorising 
(or re-presenting) it as a mosaic of sub-species, or races, which can then be 
coded in favourable or unfavourable ways. By this simple logical and legalised 
manoeuvre, the state can declare war ‘internally’ on its own people by 
formalising and institutionalising racism. Foucault charts the sinister 
manipulation of human being within the play of power exercised by states as 
follows:
The appearance within the biological continuum of the 
human race of races, the distinction among races, the 
hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are 
described as good and that others, in contrast, are 
described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the 
field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of 
separating out the groups that exist within a population. It 
is in short, a way of establishing a biological-type caesura 
within a population that appears to be a biological domain. 
This will allow power to treat the population as a mixture of 
173
races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to 
subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies 
known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of 
racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the 
biological continuum addressed by biopower.
(Foucault 2004: 254–255)
The very genetic material from which the individual human being is generated is  
therefore itself encoded with a specific destiny by the state. The most obvious 
example of the exercise of biopower was, of course, the German Final Solution 
for the ‘Jewish Problem’. 
The ‘logic’ of the 1935 Nuremberg Laws formalised the ‘scientific’ racism 
that singled the Jews out for particularly special treatment as a race 
characterised as inferior—untermensch, or ‘sub-human’—by the Nazi racial 
purity policies. As I will discuss later in more detail, Kantor’s living situation in 
Kraków during the Second World War placed him for a time directly adjacent to 
the Jewish ghetto. Although there was a possible Jewish background on his 
father’s side, according to the official Nuremberg regulations Kantor was not 
Jewish.85 Nevertheless, merely not being classed as Jewish was by itself no 
guarantee of immunity from savage treatment in the occupied territories. There 
is some debate whether such populations as the Poles were formally 
categorised as untermensch or not.86 What seems clear, however, from German 
discourse at the time, is that unless deemed of ‘Germanizable’ stock, Poles 
were to be cultivated as a barely educated race of slave-material. Whilst the 
Jewish people were to be exterminated ‘as lice’ (see Agamben 1998: 114), the 
Polish people were to be narrowly constrained within an inferior form-of-life as 
slaves. In 1939, Dr. Hans Frank, the Governor-General of German-occupied 
Poland made the following pronouncement:
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85 Jewishness is determined by the maternal line and this was scrupulously respected by the 
German legal apparatus following the 1935 Nuremberg Laws. One of the reasons that Kantor 
was able to survive the occupation was that his family history had been Catholic for two 
generations and he therefore, despite his Semitic features, was not classified as ʻJüdischeʼ.
86 For example, see the Wikipedia entry for Untermensch which seems to have sparked off a 
heated exchange on this topic.
From now on the political role of the Polish nation is ended. It 
is our aim that the very concept Polack be erased for 
centuries to come. Neither the Republic nor any other form of 
Polish state will ever be reborn. Poland will be treated as a 
colony and Poles will become slaves of the German empire.
(Dziewanowski 1977: 114)
On 15 March 1940 The Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler echoed this 
sentiment when he closed a speech to concentration camp commandants with 
the statement: ‘Then all the Poles will vanish from the face of the earth’ (Quoted 
in Hillel and Henry 1976: 143). Later that year on 15 August, Himmler issued a 
short memorandum to the Führer. Entitled ‘Some Thoughts on the Treatment of 
Foreign Populations in the East’, the secret document elaborated on the place 
of the Polish people within the overall German racial plan:
I hope to see the very idea of ‘Jew’ completely wiped out by the 
possibility of a great emigration of all Jews to Africa or some 
colony elsewhere. It must also be possible in a somewhat 
longer period of time to make the ethnic notion of Ukrainian, 
Gorale and Lemken disappear from our territory. Everything we 
have said about these splinter races applies on an even larger 
scale to the Poles.
(Himmler cited in Hillel and Henry 1976: 144)
Kantor would have been officially categorised as Nichtdeutsch (non-German): a 
citizen of Poland of non-German descent who could prove themselves free of all 
Jewish connections (Davies 1981: 445). However, as a Slav, Kantor would have 
to survive for almost six years in a reality in which his existence as a human 
being was tested and questioned. As Norman Davies has observed, all ‘the 
occupied territories were designated lawless Artbeitsbereich (Work Areas) 
where martial law was in force and where “death” or “concentration camp” were 
the only two forms of stipulated punishment for any type of offence’ (Ibid.: 441), 
and that to ‘all intents and purposes, Poland had become “Gestapoland”’ (Ibid.: 
443). Himmler stated:
The removal of foreign races from the incorporated 
eastern territories is one of the most essential goals to be 
accomplished in the German East … In dealing with 
members of some Slave nationality, we must not endow 
these people with decent German thoughts and logical 
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conclusions of which they are not capable, but we must 
take them as they really are87 … I think it is our duty to 
take their children with us88 … We either win over the 
good blood we can use for ourselves … or else we destroy 
that blood. For us, the end of this war will mean an open 
road to the East … it means that we shall push the 
borders of our German race 500 kilometres to the east.
(Himmler cited in Davies 1981: 445; ellipses in Davies)
In the words of Governor-General Hans Frank: ‘Once we have won the war, all 
the Poles, Ukrainians and anything else that may still be running around here 
can be turned into mincemeat as far as I am concerned, unless anyone has any 
other ideas for them’ (Quoted in Hillel and Henry 1976: 149). With the German 
occupation of Poland, these racial policies could therefore apply to Kantor. 
Effectively untermensch (in all but name) and slave-material, Kantor was 
assigned to work as a scenery-painter in the properties workshop for the former 
Juliusz Słowacki theatre, which was relocated during the occupation to the 
building of the Synagog Izaaka (Isaac Synagogue) in the original Jewish district 
of Kazimierz (Chrobak, Stangret and Świca 2000: 28; Pleśniarowicz 1997: 42 
and 2004: 35).
The reality of the ʻreality of the lowest rankʼ
The reality of occupied Kraków was one in which the daily walk or tram ride to 
work carried the risk of witnessing or falling victim to random murder.89 The 
threat of this transformation of human being from the status of living to nonliving 
would have been a constant presence. Kantor’s somewhat Semitic features, 
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87 This description ʻ[…] as they really areʼ has obvious sinister connotations which was explored 
in more detail in chapter three in the critique of the ontology of representation in relation to the 
concept of untermensch or ʻsub-humanʼ. Although there is some controversy about whether 
Polish people were categorised as untermensch, the point I wish to make is that they were 
officially targeted within the German system of biopower which sought to advance the Germanic 
race at the expense of other races defined or re-presented as inferior.
88 The official German policy was to ʻGermaniseʼ any children of their subjugated ʻslave-racesʼ 
who appeared Aryan, i.e. blond-haired and blue-eyed. Polish children so identified were taken 
from their families and placed with German families, either in Poland or in Germany itself. See 
Hillel and Henry 1976, chapter 13, ʻFountains of Deathʼ, which deals with this aspect of German 
policy in detail with relation to Poland.
89 See Appendix 1.18 for a brief account of Roman Polanskiʼs film The Pianist (2002), which 
illustrates this reality. 
together with the fact that, with his family, he had been relocated to an 
apartment directly adjacent to the Jewish ghetto, would obviously not help his 
situation in that reality.90 This setting of particular classes of life—Jewish and 
Polish—at or near to zero created a pressure of reality that oriented life to its 
barest essentials. The constant presence of the threat of nonexistence, 
associated with an enhanced perception of the proximity of human being to 
poor, inanimate matter, led to what can be seen as a ‘reverse’, or ‘inverted’ 
ontology, one in which the poor, lowly and inanimate is prioritised, by those so 
categorised, over the higher ranking forms of life occupying the seats of power. 
However, two types of negative connotations can arise from this orientation 
towards zero. On the one hand, the threat is that the individual driven to this 
state will become nihilistic in the commonly understood sense—an 
understanding that human life is meaningless, pointless and might just as well 
be rendered into inanimate matter. On the other hand, such a state of despair is 
not the only response to proximity to the zero zone. A more positive perspective 
is one that recognises that existence as opposed to nonexistence—the very 
being of human being—is illuminated more vividly by the proximity to its 
negation. Viewed in this way the dwelling of humanity near the limits of its 
fragility reveals its value more vividly. This ‘reverse’ or ‘inverted’ ontology, 
according to Leonide Ouspensky in his book Theology of the Icon (1978), is 
familiar from the interpretation of the Gospels, where ‘“The first shall be last,” 
the meek and not the violent shall inherit the earth, and the supreme humiliation 
of the cross is truly the supreme victory’ (Ouspensky 1978: 225).91 As 
Ouspensky and others have argued, this inversion constitutes a new 
perspective that is realised in the aesthetics of the Byzantine icon:
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90 Kantorʼs living situation in Kraków at this time will be dealt with in greater detail later in this 
chapter.
91 For example, see Paulʼs Second Letter to the Corinthians (II Corinthians 12: 9–11).
the Seventh Ecumenical Council emphasized the perfect 
correspondence between the icon and the Holy Scripture 
and that the icon calls us to the life [i.e. of humiliation] 
which the Gospel reveals. But in the Gospel everything is, 
so to speak, in inverse perspective […] Thus the life of the 
Christian is placed in this same perspective: the death of 
the martyr is his victory, his coronation, and the privations 
of the ascetic struggle are transformed into an 
incomparable joy.
(Ibid.)
In his 1987 address at the Cricoteka92 Kantor likened the members of his family 
inhabiting the poor room in Wielopole, Wielopole to figures from the Gospels:
through the greatest humiliation, through approaching the 
bottom, I want to obtain the greatest height. Indeed, […] in 
‘Wielopole’, […] in this small room, the greatness of the 
room is raised via [association with] the Gospel. This 
means that all types are contained within my family, […] in 
my evaluation, a rather abject category is suddenly raised, 
because they begin to enter the space of the Gospel. 
Through humiliation.
(Kantor 1987: 10; my translation)93
The idea of ‘reverse’ or ‘inverse’ perspective is an important one for 
understanding other aspects of Kantor’s aesthetic in terms of a particular 
‘Eastern’ heritage that can be traced by way of Russian Constructivism and its 
avant-garde precursors. This sense of the imbuing of the lowly ordinary family, 
dead and adrift in the mists of memory with a sense of the eternal through 
association to the Gospel, and the particular perspective that this brings is 
something that will be explored in more detail in relation to Kantor’s aesthetic of 
the ‘poor object’ in chapter six. In the remainder of this chapter I want to attend 
more specifically to the logic of the negativity of the abject that can be seen to 
arise in occupied Kraków and the topography of Kantor’s situation there.
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92 The official home of Kantorʼs archive at ulica Kanonicza 5, and his headquarters from 1980 
until his death.
93 See Appendix 1.19a for a transcription of this passage from this event.
Negativity and humiliation: the inverted ontology of ʻthe thing I amʼ
In essence, the ‘humiliation’ that Ouspensky and Kantor respectively refer to 
centres around the extinction of human life. But how is it that the humiliation of 
the expendability of human life is equated with ‘supreme victory’? In the 
Gospels this victory is achieved through recourse to the economy of the 
supernatural afforded by Christ’s resurrection as the Son of God. Although 
Kantor in the passage just cited alludes directly to the Gospels, they are treated 
as yet another found object. Although Kantor was Catholic and was buried with 
full ceremony, his art is not directly religious in that sense. What Kantor is 
instead accessing is a more fundamental metaphysics of humiliation. For there 
to be an idea of humiliation there has to be a prior idea of a ‘something’ that can 
be humiliated, some status or state that is valued, otherwise dignity is 
unthreatened and the act of ‘being made humble’ carries no force. The idea of 
‘life’ as being something valuable or sacred is itself bound up with a particular 
and tacit privileging of the form-of-life particular to human being: the idea that 
life is sacred, but human life is especially sacred. Fundamentally what is at 
issue is not only existence itself, threatened with its negation by death (which is 
one form of humiliation), but also the status of the idea of human life as 
something higher than other forms of existence that is threatened with a 
reduction (a second form of humiliation). This entwining of the concepts of 
existence and status means that both ‘life’, and especially its manifestation as 
human being, has somehow acquired a superior status that can become 
threatened.
Shakespeare’s character Parolles in All’s Well That Ends Well states that it 
is: ‘simply the thing I am / Shall make me live’ (IV.iii: 314–315). This ‘thing I 
am’—mere existence, ‘life’—is the product, in Shakespeare’s play, of humiliation
—a ‘thing’ rendered ‘thingly’ through exposure to the process of humiliation. As 
might be expected from his preoccupation with an aesthetic of poor reality, the 
idea of humiliation as a positive force was central to Kantor’s work as he stated 
in the 1987 address given in the Cricoteka cited above: 
one of the leading values, is that we achieve greatness—
through humiliation […] through the greatest humiliation, 
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through approaching the bottom, I want to obtain the 
greatest height. […] I am concerned that the idea of 
greatness […] cannot be expressed by form. And Casimir 
the Great—the most powerful Polish figure— was 
presented by Wyspiański [in his design for a stained glass 
window] as—a skeleton, a skeleton with the remnants of 
glory— a crown, a sceptre, an orb. This is a wonderful 
idea, a brilliant idea. […] When I started to make ‘The 
Dead Class’, […] this stained glass window project was for 
me a confirmation, that greatness is achieved through 
complete humiliation.
(Kantor 1987: 10–11; my translation)94 
For Kantor then, Wyspiański’s image of the skeletal fourteenth-century Polish 
King encapsulated the fundamental paradox of human being: that the life lived 
in the ‘now’ by any one individual is implicated in a greater whole, one that 
contains both the past and the future enveloping the transient present, the 
former stemming from the nothingness before birth, and the latter indicating the 
annihilation awaiting as death. However, such an ontologico-temporal context 
can also be related to a socio-historical context. In Foucault’s characterisation 
the human being in modernity is ‘an animal whose politics places his existence 
as a living being in question’ (Foucault 1981: 143). As such, biopower brings to 
bear the threat of humiliation on its human subjects, and wields a fundamentally 
sinister and negative connotation: that of frail, abject human being at the mercy 
of power, whether it be the power of the state directly or the power of state-
sanctioned global capitalism. What is at stake therefore is this human life
—‘simply the thing I am’. It is necessary to consider a little more closely the 
manner in which the concepts of ‘life’ (mere existence) and ‘human being’ (living 
existence as status) have become tacitly entwined to illuminate how the 
inverted or negative ontology implied by the foregrounding of the idea of 
humiliation can form a positive strategy of resistance.
Zoē, bios and ʻbare lifeʼ
A central preoccupation that emerged in Agamben’s writing was a development 
of Hannah Arendt’s discussion in her 1958 book The Human Condition (1998: 
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94 See Appendix 1.19b for the original Polish text.
97) concerning the ancient Greek distinction between two concepts of ‘life’. 
Agamben discusses this distinction in several places, notably the essays ‘Form-
of-Life’ (1996 and 2000), ‘The Work of Man’ (2007c), and in his books Homo 
Sacer (1998, originally published in Italian in 1995), Auschwitz: The Witness 
and the Archive (2002, originally published in Italian in 1999) and State of 
Exception (2005b, originally published in Italian in 2003). As Leland de la 
Durantaye points out in his book Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction (2009: 
207–208), Agamben had first read Arendt’s work in the summer of 1968 and 
had written to her in 1970 expressing his admiration for her and how much of a 
decisive influence she had been for him (Ibid.: 41 and 400, note 20). As de la 
Durantaye notes, it appears that it was not until much later that this influence 
began to appear in his work. On page 97 of The Human Condition, Arendt 
states that:
The chief characteristic of this specifically human life, 
whose appearance and disappearance constitute worldly 
events, is that it is itself always full of events which 
ultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography; it 
is of this life, bios as distinguished from mere zōe, that 
Aristotle said that it ‘somehow is a kind of praxis’ [Politics 
1254a7].
(1998: 97)
Instead of one word that becomes easily sacralised in its identification with 
human being, the Greeks employed two words. The word ζωή (zoē) denoted 
‘life as such’: mere natural, nutritive, reproductive and perishable life. As 
Aristotle observed at the beginning of the second book of De anima: ‘Now of 
natural bodies some have life and some do not, life being what we call self-
nourishment, growth and decay’ (Aristotle 1986: 156). As such, zoē referred to 
life in the sense of general being or existence: ‘the simple fact of living common 
to all living beings (animals, men, or gods)’ (Agamben 1998: 1). For the ancient 
Greeks, and with respect to the life of human being, zoē referred principally to 
the domestic environment, the business of daily living, of sustenance and 
reproduction common to the family home or οἶκος (oikos). For what could be 
done with, or made of, the simple fact of living (natural life or zoē) by particular 
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creatures or groups of creatures, the Greeks had another word: βίος (bios), 
denoting form-of-life, ‘the form or way of living proper to an individual or a 
group’ (Ibid.: 1). The bios, or form-of-life specific to human being was that of the 
city or polis, the political and cultural life of human being in community.
For Agamben, the victim of biopower was rendered neither zoē, natural 
life, nor bios, cultural and political life, but a liminal zone of life ‘in between’ for 
which he employed the term la nuda vita, literally ‘naked life’. This liminal zone 
can be seen as the site in which life-as-mere-existence and life-as-status 
overlap and cohere: the zone of humiliation. For Agamben, la nuda vita was a 
development of Walter Benjamin’s use of the term das bloße Leben in his 
essays ‘Fate and Character’ (1919) and ‘Critique of Violence’ (1921), where the 
term, variously translated as ‘mere life’, ‘bare life’ and ‘natural life’, denotes a 
substrate of human being in which notions of fate and guilt can inhere.95 
Agamben makes it clear in his discussion of Benjamin’s 1921 essay at the end 
of the first part of Homo Sacer that das bloße Leben equates to his own concept 
of la nuda vita:
This is why it is not by chance that Benjamin, with a 
seemingly abrupt development, concentrates on the 
bearer of the link between violence and law, which he calls 
‘bare life’ (bloßes Leben), instead of defining divine 
violence. The analysis of this figure—whose decisive 
function in the economy of the essay has until now 
remained unthought—establishes an essential link 
between bare life and juridical violence. Not only does the 
rule of law over the living exist and cease to exist 
alongside bare life, but even the dissolution of juridical 
violence, which is in a certain sense the object of the 
essay [‘Critique of Violence’], ‘stems … from the guilt of 
bare natural life, which consigns the living, innocent and 
unhappy, to the punishment that “expiates” the guilt of 
bare life—and doubtless also purifies [entsühnt] the guilty, 
not of guilt, however, but of law’ [Benjamin 1977: 200].
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95 As de la Durantaye points out, Agamben does not make it clear in his published work that la 
nuda vita was conceived by him as a translation of Benjaminʼs das bloße Leben and that it is, in 
effect, ʻa translation without quotation marksʼ (de la Durantaye 2009: 203). This term also occurs 
in ʻFate and Characterʼ (Benjamin 2004d: 204) and ʻCritique of Violenceʼ (Benjamin 2004b: 
250).
(Agamben 1998: 65)
The apparent slippage in the meaning of the term ‘bare life’ is unhelpfully 
confusing in this passage, perhaps owing to the translation. However, in the 
very next sentence of the essay Agamben is quoting from, Benjamin states that 
‘with mere life, the rule of the law over the living ceases’ (Benjamin 2004b: 250). 
What this means for Agamben is that once certain categories of human being—
groupings based on differences of ethnicity, politics, sexuality or medical status
—are reclassified as different from the population that is under the protection of 
the law, they fall towards the category of zoē through the stripping away of their 
bios. Although, as can be seen from the passage above, it is easy to equate 
Agamben’s reading of Benjamin’s ‘bare life’ with zoē itself, (and sometimes 
Agamben does use the term in this sense), more specifically, he uses the term 
to denote the abjectness of human being stripped of its bios as human being. In 
this sense ‘bare life’ is human being in a state of abandonment, legally enclosed
—in what might be termed a ‘legal bubble’—in such a way that it can be treated 
as if it was ‘mere’ biological life. It is this ‘living, innocent and unhappy’ figure of 
bare life consigned to the humiliating meat-grinder of biopower that is, for 
Agamben, a specific performative relationship between the exercise of state 
force (gewalt or violence) and its formal conceptualisation enshrined in law. In 
her discussion of Agamben’s use of the term, Eva Płonowska Ziarek has 
observed that:
Stripped of political significance and exposed to 
murderous violence bare life is both the counterpart to and 
the target of sovereign violence. To avoid 
misunderstanding, I would like to stress the point that is 
made sometimes only implicitly in Agamben’s work and 
not always sufficiently stressed by his commentators: 
namely, the fact that bare life—wounded, expendable, and 
endangered—is not the same as biological zoē, but rather 
it is the remainder of the destroyed political bios.
(Ziarek, E. P. 2007: 90)
Human being rendered as the remnants of its bios therefore brings it into the 
vicinity of animality, a perceived lower status of being from which it is normally 
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keen to distinguish itself. As Agamben observes, this places human being in a 
liminal zone:
this life is not simply natural reproductive life, the zoē of 
the Greeks, nor bios, a qualified form of life. It is, rather, 
the bare life of homo sacer […] a zone of indistinction and 
continuous transition between man and beast, nature and 
culture.
(Agamben 1998: 109)
For Agamben, the key exemplar of this ‘zone of indistinction and continuous 
transition between man and beast’ was exactly the Nazi treatment of certain 
categories of human being as developed and executed during the Second 
World War.
 Paradoxically human life is something that can be variously protected, 
sacrificed or counted as worthless. It is the last part of this spectrum that is seen 
as crucial by Agamben and is enshrined in the obscure figure from Roman law 
called the homo sacer, or ‘sacred man’. The homo sacer refers to a figure who, 
in being banished from the law, finds itself in the position of being unworthy of 
sacrifice but also of exposure to the jeopardy of being murdered with impunity. 
This unfortunate person is in the situation of being legally ‘outside’ or ‘without’ 
the law by being proscribed by it. The situation of the homo sacer is therefore 
paradoxically wholly determined by the law’s exclusion of it: homo sacer is 
without (i.e. outside) the law, not within it. In this way the figure of the homo 
sacer perfectly exemplifies Agamben’s idea of human being rendered as ‘bare 
life’. However, Agamben also takes this figure to explain far more than an 
ancient Roman legal entity, or the condition of the inmates of the Nazi 
concentration camps. For Agamben, the recognition of the being of human 
being as inhering in the being of bare life—that is in the ‘zone of indistinction 
and continuous transition between man and beast’—is the paradigm of the 
paradoxical nature of human being itself. The zone of bare life is one in which 
human being is both recognised and recognises itself as at its lower limit, a limit 
from which the perspective of the paradoxical circumscription of greatness 
opens up. This was exemplified for Kantor by Wyspiański’s skeletal image of 
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Casimir the Great, an image of a sovereign in whom the very recognition of 
greatness is characterised by the humiliation of its loss. The power of the image 
of the king-as-skeleton derives from the condensing of an implied narrative of 
universal loss into a single image: the work of time renders even the great and 
mighty to nothingness. In the stained-glass design (now realised in a new 
pavilion in the centre of Kraków) Wyspiański’s skeleton-king appears to float as 
if adrift in eternity, his empty eye sockets perpetually filled with the recognition 
of the loss of the power once held. In its self-reflexivity the image contains all 
the King’s life viewed from the perspective of its negation. If the idea of 
‘bareness’ can be seen to share something of this condensed image of the 
situation of human being, then for Agamben it can be seen to resonate with the 
same tenor that the idea of the humiliation of the human being as a ‘poor 
object’ of the ‘reality of the lowest rank’ did for Kantor. For both, the apparently 
negative ontology of human being as a ‘nothing-that-is-yet-something’ was a 
way of making sense of a humanity that finds itself approaching the limits of 
crisis of the zero zone, of finding greatness in the humiliation of ‘bare life’.
The representation of human being
The perception of negativity as a threat to being can be understood, as 
Foucault has observed, as a consequence of the fragmentation of the biological 
continuum by the insertion of caesuras which create separate categories of 
being. This biopolitical creation of fragmentation and difference is usually 
mediated by representation. The construction of caesuras between ‘the 
subspecies known, precisely, as races’ (Foucault 2004: 255) in the hegemonic 
conception of ‘the human’, is achieved through the use of alternative 
representations that can stand in opposition to the official representation of the 
human. For Himmler it was the blond-haired, blue-eyed upright figure of the 
Aryan ideal. In opposition to this ideal other races and classes of people were 
represented as a series of underclasses ranging from the not-quite-human—
often characterised as uneducated, dirty and misshapen, those who could be 
utilised as slave-labour—to the non-human and therefore categorised as 
‘animal’ and who could be utilised and processed in a different way. In this 
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process of categorisation, the undesirable groups were likened to specific 
animals and the particular types invoked were often ones with negative 
connotations such as cattle, swine or vermin. This recategorisation from human 
to animal being was particularly vivid in the case of Nazi treatment of the Jews 
in the 1930s, where, in being categorised as vermin by the Nazi state, they 
could be legally exterminated as such, as Agamben has observed:
The truth—which is difficult for the victims to face, but 
which we must have the courage not to cover with 
sacrificial veils—is that the Jews were exterminated not in 
a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler had 
announced, ‘as lice,’ which is to say, as bare life. The 
dimension in which the extermination took place is neither 
religion nor law, but biopolitics.
(Agamben 1998: 114)
Such an appalling strategy would not be conceivable without the apparently 
innocent ancient distinction between human and animal being.
The famous formulation of Aristotle’s distinction between animals and 
humans arises in his attempts to determine a specific nature for human being 
above that of the animal (a supra-animal nature conceived of as the highest 
‘good’ achievable for human being) in The Politics, The Nicomachean Ethics 
and De Anima. In delineating his tripartite structure of living things—the 
vegetable, animal and intellectual souls—Aristotle implied an ascending ladder 
of being from the nutritive (basic life), the sensitive (animal) to the rational and 
intellectual (human) via the faculties of nutrition, sensation and thought. As 
Agamben has observed, such an attempt to define human being is itself 
inherently grounded in the negative, for the human animal is always only 
defined in terms of something else—as a ‘rational animal’, the ‘political animal’ 
or the ‘animal that has language’—never as something in its own right. In his 
2002 book The Open: Man and Animal (published in English in 2004a), 
Agamben highlights this paradox with reference to Carl Linnaeus’s 
rationalisation of Aristotle’s categories and the particular difficulty he had with 
categorising human being within his new system:
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In truth, Linnaeus’s genius consists not so much in the 
resoluteness with which he places man among the 
primates as in the irony with which he does not record—as 
he does with the other species—any specific identifying 
characteristics next to the generic name Homo, only the 
old philosophical adage: nosce te ipsum (know yourself).
(Agamben 2004a: 25)
The point here, as Agamben goes on to note, is that ‘man has no specific 
identity other than the ability to recognize himself’ (ibid.: 26; emphasis in 
original):96
Yet to define the human not through any nota 
characteristica, but rather through his self-knowledge, 
means that man is the being which recognizes itself as 
such, that man is the animal that must recognize itself as a 
human to be human.
(Ibid.: 26; emphasis in original)
However, this use of representation, to generate difference through the 
formation of categories and the articulation of rifts has been the basis of 
Western ontology since Plato, one side-effect of which has been to conceive of 
‘art’ as degraded, as ‘second-rate’ and the concept of ‘truth’ conceived of as a 
matter of agreement between ‘original’ and ‘copy’. Within this resulting labyrinth 
of representation, the ontological field becomes refracted into competing kinds 
of being, amongst which the very idea of ‘human being’ is cast adrift.
What would a poetics of such being look like? Following his 
experimentations with decor of art informel in the late fifties and early sixties, 
which can be seen as an attempt to liberate the underlying informe of reality, 
Kantor began experimenting with the idea of revealing this ‘truth’ in a different 
way: by covering it up and packaging it. Under the term emballage, described 
by Pleśniarowicz as ‘collage in depth’ (2004: 91), he began playing with the 
paradox of revealing by concealing. The covering becoming a metaphor for the 
skin of appearance but in its messenger-like quality as also envoi of the truth 
from the object beneath. Kantor’s happenings, a form he began experimenting 
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96 This notion of self-reflexivity also relates to the discussion in chapter three concerning the 
with from 1965 (following his visit to New York in that year), can be seen as a 
development of this emballage or ‘playing with wrapping’. Rather than simply 
following the games with chance practiced by the happening artists in Fluxus, 
Kantor’s happenings can instead be seen as an emballage of the reality of 
action through the framing of them with found objects, environments and 
events. Between 1965 and 1971 Kantor arranged happenings based on 
situations and subjects suggested by famous paintings (by Rembrandt, Dürer, 
Géricault), that involved low-rank objects (such as a letter, newspapers, a 
typewriter), and quotidian environments (such as a cafe, a casino, a laundry, the 
sea). In his An Anatomy Lesson According to Rembrandt (1968) Kantor both 
packaged Rembrandt’s famous painting in the guise of a happening, but also, in 
a sense, performed his own ‘anatomy’ on the clothing-skin of the appearance of 
human being itself. (In an interview with Borowski, Kantor called it ‘an example 
of de-emballage’ (in Borowski 1982: 86; my translation).) This chapter closes 
with a discussion of the poetics of being articulated in this work in the light of the 
discussion of negative ontology of human being and the biopolitics of bare life 
elucidated so far.
ʻLetting Tattered Clothing Singʼ: Tadeusz Kantorʼs Anatomy Lesson and 
the ʻreality of the lowest rankʼ
In 1968 Kantor staged for the first time his Anatomy Lesson According to 
Rembrandt in Nuremberg;97 Rembrandt Harmenszoon van Rijn produced his 
painting, The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp, in 1632, at a time when the culture of 
attending the public dissection of corpses in anatomy theatres had become a 
mark of civic respectability.98 Kantor had lived through the Second World War in 
the Polish city of Kraków and his Anatomy Lesson was performed when so-
called realny socjalizm (real socialism)99 was coming to dominate Polish cultural 
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97 For further details and the Polish text of Kantorʼs partytura for this happening together with my 
parallel translation, see Appendix 1.20. 
98 See Jonathan Sawday, The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in 
Renaissance Culture (1995: 150).
99 Realny socjalizm (literally ʻreal socialismʼ) came into widespread use in the 1970s. The term 
designated the predominantly bureaucratic (rather than idealistic) forms of socialism practiced in 
Poland and other Soviet satellite states in particular.
and political institutions during an epoch that Theodor Adorno had recently 
defined as marked by the question of how to live ‘after Auschwitz’ (Adorno 
2003: 435).100 The corpse that is the subject of Doctor Nicolaes Tulp’s 
dissection in Rembrandt’s painting was a thief from Leiden (ironically 
Amsterdam’s rival in the staging of civic anatomies) named Adriaen 
Adriaenszoon, who had been executed on 31 January 1632 for stealing a 
coat;101 in Kantor’s Anatomy it is the clothing that is dissected rather than the 
human being. 
In his 1926 poem ‘Sailing to Byzantium’ W. B. Yeats, railing against the 
approach of old age, wrote that ‘An aged man is but a paltry thing, / A tattered 
coat upon a stick, unless / Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing, / For 
every tatter in its mortal dress’ (Yeats 1967: 217). This notion of the soul 
animating the tatters of mortal clothing invokes the spectre of Plato’s 
formulation of the soul’s separate identity from, and superiority to, the body.102 
However, as Heidegger argued in his 1940 essay ‘The Age of the World 
Picture’: ‘It is in the metaphysics of Descartes that, for the first time, the being is 
defined as the objectness of representation, and truth as the certainty of 
representation’ (Heidegger 2002: 66). Although Descartes’ famous conceptions 
of subjectivity were not available until his publications of 1637 and 1641, the 
philosopher was living in Holland and studying anatomy whilst formulating his 
philosophical position and was in Amsterdam at the time when Rembrandt was 
working on his painting (see, for example, Cottingham 1986: 11, Gaukroger 
1995: 227 and 270, and Sawday 1995: 146–158). During this time (1629–1633) 
Descartes was working on texts that included his Treatise on Man, a vision of 
mechanical beings ‘composed as we are, of a soul and a body’, which he 
planned to describe separately. Unfortunately his plan to include a description of 
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100 See, for example, Adornoʼs ʻThe Meaning of Working through the Pastʼ (1959), ʻEducation 
After Auschwitzʼ (1967), and ʻLecture Fourteen, “The Liquidation of the Self”ʼ (1965), in Adorno 
2003: 3–18, 19–33, and 427–36, respectively.
101 See Sawday 1995: 150.
102 See, for example, Phaedo, 82d-83b, translated by G. M. A. Grube, in Plato: Complete 
Works, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997): 
pp. 49–100 (72–73).
the soul and ‘finally […] show you how these two natures would have to be 
joined and united to constitute men and resemble us’ (Descartes in: Hall 1972: 
1 and Cottingham et al. 1985: 99), was abandoned at this time. This vision of 
the world and the figures described in it was nothing less than a recasting of the 
idea of nature as a mechanistic and rationally knowable system. It was a world 
in which the subject as rational, knowing, soul was absent, and implied the 
separation of mind from body that would inform his position in the Discourse on 
Method (1637) and the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). As Jonathan 
Sawday has observed, the spirit of ‘Cartesian man’ was abroad before 
Descartes explicitly formulated it, exemplified in certain ‘metaphysical’ poetry, 
such as John Donne’s ‘The Ecstasy’, composed before 1614, which was in wide 
circulation before its publication in 1633 (see Sawday 1995: 296 ff. 18, and 
Redpath 1956: 3): ‘It was in the anatomy theatres of Leiden and Amsterdam 
that Cartesian man was born, in the person of a grotesquely twitching criminal 
corpse, at the behest of the medical and juridical authorities of the cityʼ (Sawday 
1995: 158). Following William Schupbach’s influential reading, which sees ‘the 
duality of man’s metaphysical status […] given visible form in the composition of 
Rembrandt’s painting’ (Schupbach 1982: 44), Sawday argues for the ‘Cartesian 
nature of Rembrandt’s image’ as a ‘portrayal of the domination of intellect over 
the aberrant will of the executed felon’, a product of the problem of the 
relationship between the will and the intellect that Descartes had been working 
on in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind written shortly before his move to 
Holland in 1628 or earlier (Sawday 1995: 153). Rembrandt’s Anatomy may 
therefore be seen as contemporaneous with the intellectual milieu that gave 
birth to the Cartesian subject, a conception that installed the recipient of this 
‘certainty of representation’—an incorporeal, sovereign, rational self—within the 
mechanical anatomy of the body: in it but not of it. By re-staging Rembrandt’s 
painting, The Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Tulp, in 1968 and in Nuremberg, the site 
where the world learned the full extent of the irrational certainty of the 
‘rationality’ of Auschwitz, Kantor appears to be articulating a very different and 
more subversive idea of life from the one represented by the sense of 
subjectivity implicit in the original painting. In doing so there appears to be a 
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tacit critique of the idea of Enlightenment rational progress that resonates with 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002). Kantor’s 
Anatomy seems to celebrate life not as the disembodied and sovereign subject 
of the Cartesian cogito—itself an echo of the Platonic dualism of body and soul
—nor as an object of representation, but as life that seems to be distributed and 
immanent within the poor matter of its clothing and possessions.
Instead of a reverential homage to Rembrandt’s solemn anatomy, Kantor’s  
intention might at first appear satirical. The original painting has been 
interpreted as a celebration of the triumph of Dr. Tulp’s rational intellect over the 
dead thief’s mechanical corpse.103 Kantor, however, in his work seems to be 
celebrating the everyday contents of the pockets of the clothing that wraps the 
living body lying on his dissecting table. Rembrandt’s painting would seem to 
have a high purpose, while Kantor’s happening would appear to revel in the low 
and the trivial. As noted in chapter two, such indirection was one of several 
strategies of evasion used by Polish artists during the censorship of the socialist 
period. As I will show, however, this ‘low’ quality can be seen to be part of 
Kantor’s artistic purpose, and arose from his idea of the ‘reality of the lowest 
rank’, or ‘poor reality’.
Kantor’s happening was performed on four occasions between 1968 and 
1971. Each time he made use of found participants with whom he composed his 
tableau according to the formal scheme of Rembrandt’s painting. He snipped 
with scissors at his model’s clothing, opening up the lining and paying particular 
attention to the contents of the ‘wrinkled and crushed / p o c k e t s’, ‘these 
intimate hiding places’, these ‘ridiculous organs of / human instincts / […] for 
preservation and memory’. Thus anatomised, the torn clothing and the 
‘forgotten leftovers’ and ‘shameful litter’ liberated from the pockets were glued 
and stapled to canvas to create something relating to an emballage: an artwork-
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103 See Sawday 1995: 153.
assemblage or many-layered collage of tattered clothing and personal 
belongings that was in effect a ‘still life’ or nature morte.104
In staging his happening according to Rembrandt, Kantor appears to set 
the consequences of the Enlightenment project of positive rational progress 
through scientific enquiry in stark juxtaposition to one of the iconic images of the 
origins of its dream. The corpse in Rembrandt’s painting becomes, in Kantor’s 
performance, an anonymous body whose clothing and belongings are coolly 
and methodically removed and processed, becoming in the end a ‘painting’ 
themselves.105 Kantor’s written partytura or ‘score’ for the happening clearly 
suggests that the seemingly trivial objects harvested from the model’s pockets 
are ‘the genuine, / authentic side of / individuality’. In Kantor’s anatomy the 
objects, in becoming a still life, are seemingly more valued than the forgotten 
model. However, greater value is assigned to these objects precisely because 
of their reference to ‘authentic individuality’, whereas in Rembrandt’s painting 
the bodily parts dissected—the flexor muscles of the forearm—are valued 
because of the general points they can make about the intricacy of anatomical 
192
104 Emballage or ʻwrappingʼ (from the French emballer ʻto wrapʼ) was an element of Kantorʼs 
artistic practice which involved the wrapping of people and everyday objects. As well as 
apparently protecting its contents, the wrapping served to both conceal and at the same time 
reveal their presence. In so doing the emballage also drew attention to itself as a representative 
of poor marginal reality, occupying a liminal place between its contents and the observer. In 
essence, Kantorʼs Anatomy Lesson According to Rembrandt is an anatomy of clothing 
foregrounded as an emballage of the human being; the resulting exhibition of the clothing glued 
to the canvas is, in effect, an exhibition of this dissected ʻwrappingʼ or emballage. See Kantorʼs 
ʻManifest Ambalażyʼ in Kantor 2005: 300–04, and ʻThe Emballage Manifestoʼ in Kobialka, 2009: 
154-58. See also Michal Kobialkaʼs discussion of the specificity of this idea in Kantorʼs work in 
Further on Nothing: Tadeusz Kantorʼs Theater, 2009: 70-74.
105 In this transformation of orientation from the horizontal to the vertical, Kantorʼs work in this 
happening recalls that of Fautrier on his 1928–9 painting Lʼhomme ouverte (The Open Man) or 
Lʼautopsie (The Autopsy), described by Sarah Wilson in her essay ʻFêting the Wound: Georges 
Bataille and Jean Fautrier in the 1940sʼ:
For L’homme ouvert, like a real anatomist himself, Fautrier worked on 
the flat—as though above a veritable corpse, physically engaging, as 
it were, with the entrails of his life-size victim. He then, literally, raised 
the body, as though from the dead to an erect position—to hang it on 
the wall, assuming the power of the life-giving Creator.
(Wilson 1995: 177)
Having left informel painting behind as an explicit genre in the early sixties, the resulting 
ʻpaintingʼ of Kantorʼs happening can be seen as a bricolage version of Fautrierʼs painterly 
ʻanatomyʼ.
mechanisms: the corpse’s individuality is not of interest. It is the demonstration 
of the power of rational knowledge that is of importance.
The subject-object dualism in Rembrandt’s painting intersects with, and 
supports other dualisms, for, the painting has also been viewed as a 
dramatisation of the historical moment of separation of the human soul from its 
bodily machine, and a celebration of the triumph of the rational intellect over the 
substance of nature. This victory, which heralded the coming of Enlightenment 
science, was to liberate Western Philosophy from the post-Aristotelian 
confusions of Scholastic thought. As Sawday has argued, this Cartesian 
rationalisation was of a new, thinking subject, freed of its entanglement with 
troublesome matter, a new ‘us’ able to gaze ‘clearly and distinctly’, to use 
Descartes’ words from his Meditations, on the material of God’s creation, 
understand its workings and in so doing put it to rational use.106 However, the 
new Cartesian system in a sense merely internalised an ancient schism 
between Being as ousia (substance), and the concepts of becoming and 
appearance. In Heidegger’s account in his 1935 lecture course Introduction to 
Metaphysics, for the ancient Greeks the apparent opposition between 
Parmenides’ conception of Being as changelessness and Heraclitus’ conception 
of Being as becoming was understood in a unitary way (2000: 103): just as 
appearance was understood to share in the essence of Being, to be an aspect 
of it (‘appearing belongs to Being […] Being has its essence together with 
appearing’ (Ibid.: 108; emphasis in original)). In contrast to this unity the gaze of 
the new Cartesian rational subject itself tacitly embodies the schism by 
conceiving of the world as one in which the subject can only know the objective 
world through potentially unreliable sensory representations. In this system, 
however, the subject that succeeds in installing itself as sovereign wields the 
power to establish what Michel Foucault has characterised (as noted earlier) a 
‘biological-type caesura within a population’ that allows the population to be 
represented ‘as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, […] to subdivide the 
species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely as races’ (2004: 254). 
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106 See Sawday 1995: 151.
Paradoxically the fragmentation of the world understood in terms of 
representational ontology renders potentially vulnerable all those subject to 
what Foucault has termed ‘biopower’.
As Adorno and Horkheimer argued influentially in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (2002), one of the possible destinations of the hyper-rationalised 
use of science is Auschwitz. There, the sovereign rational intellect turned 
human beings into parts of a machine in which they themselves were 
anatomised and rendered into their inanimate components: skin, hair, and gold 
teeth, to be processed alongside the variety of their personal belongings by the 
Sonderkommando, special groups who sorted through the mounds of bodies 
and clothing outside the gas chambers in order to harvest ‘useful’ commodities 
prior to the bodies’ incineration in the crematoria. It is not only those bodies that 
are decomposed in that image of commodification, but also the ‘humanity’ of 
every survivor and the various category of ‘worker’ in the factory of the camps. 
The Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi has written about the testimony of Miklos 
Nyiszli, a Hungarian physician ‘one of the very few survivors of the last Special 
Squad107 in Auschwitz’ (Levi 1989: 37).108 One episode that Nyiszli recounted 
Levi found particularly significant:
So, Nyiszli tells how during a ‘work’ pause he attended a 
soccer game between the SS and the SK 
(Sonderkommandos), that is to say, between a group 
representing the SS on guard at the crematorium and a 
group representing the Special Squad. Other men of the 
SS and the rest of the squad are present at the game; 
they take sides, bet, applaud, urge the players on as if, 
rather than at the gates of hell, the game were taking 
place on the village green.
(Ibid.: 38)
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107 For Leviʼs account of these ʻSpecial Squadsʼ see Appendix 1.21. 
108 According to Levi, Nyiszli, a renowned pathologist ʻwhose services Mengele […] had 
securedʼ was ʻsupposed to devote himself in particular to the study of twins […] Alongside this 
particular task of his, to which, it should be said in passing, it does not appear he strenuously 
objected, Nyiszli was also the attending physician of the squad, with which he lived in close 
contactʼ (Levi 1989: 37). Nyiszliʼs reminiscences were published in New York in 1960 as 
Auschwitz: A Doctorʼs Eyewitness Account. The soccer match episode occurs in chapter IX 
(Nyiszli 1993: 68).
In his book, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (2002) 
Agamben reflects that:
This match might strike someone as a brief pause of 
humanity in the middle of an infinite horror. I, like the 
witnesses, instead view this match, this moment of 
normalcy, as the true horror of the camp. […] [T]hat match 
is never over.
(Agamben 2002: 26)
The implication is that it is the very unseen negativity at the heart of this 
simulacrum of normalcy that constitutes the hidden idea of humanity: a fragile 
thing of which the failure to acknowledge the awful, bare emptiness of its 
negation is itself a sort of crime. I shall later locate this idea in Kantor’s 
happening.
Kantor received the news in April 1942 that his estranged father, Marian 
Kantor, had been shot in one of the quarries in Auschwitz.109 Although Kantor 
was never there, he was nonetheless a witness to part of the machine of 
extermination. In November of that year Kantor, along with his Mother and his 
sister’s family, was resettled to an apartment building on Węgierska Street in 
the Podgórze district of Kraków (see Pleśniarowicz 2004: 35 and Chrobak et al. 
2004: 38–39). The building stood within the original boundaries of Kraków’s 
Jewish ghetto, which had been established in 1941 by the Germans when they 
evicted the Jews from Kazimierz, the ‘Galician Jerusalem’: the historical centre 
of economic and intellectual life for Polish Jews since the fourteenth century 
(Jodłowiec-Dziedzic 2004: 3). The Galician suburb of Podgórze, situated just 
across the River Vistula from Kazimierz, was a rundown former merchants’ 
residential area. The ghetto was intended to be an incubator of contagious 
diseases, such as Typhoid which the Germans hoped would accomplish the 
extermination of the population of Kraków’s Jews (Ibid.: 8). It was enclosed 
within three-metre high walls, which parodied Jewish tombstones (Ibid.: 8). 
Following reductions in the ghetto’s size, Kantor and his family came to be 
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109 Various dates have been reported for this event; however, Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz gives the 
date as 4 April 1942, according to Marian Kantorʼs nephew, Jozef Zdzisław Kantor. See 
Pleśniarowiczʼs two books (1997: 12 and 2004: 14). See also Zdzisław Kantor 2004: 26.
resettled next to the ghetto boundary in March 1942 (Chrobak et al. ibid. and 
2000: 27; Pleśniarowicz 1997: 41 and 2004: 35). That June, the SS assumed 
authority over the ghetto and in the first few days massacred approximately 600 
Jews in Plac Zgody, the main square, and in the surrounding streets; 7000 more 
were sent to the gas chambers in Auschwitz (Jodłowiec-Dziedzic 2004: 11). 
Further large-scale massacres and deportations to the death camps occurred in 
October of that year. The ghetto was finally ‘liquidated’ in March 1943 and its 
entire Jewish population was either killed there or transported to the death 
camps (Ibid.: 11).
As already briefly noted in chapter one and earlier in this chapter, Kantor’s 
living situation then brought him into close proximity with the doomed Jewish 
population of the ghetto. His officially registered work during 1942–43 was in the 
stage workshops for the Juliusz Słowacki Theatre, which, following the removal 
of Jews to Podgórze, had been relocated to the Isaac Synagogue, in the heart 
of Kazimierz (Chrobak, Stangret and Świca 2000: 28; Pleśniarowicz 1997: 42 
and 2004: 35). To get to and from his place of work, Kantor would have had to 
pass over the only open bridge between Podgórze and Kazimierz, the 
Piłsudskiego bridge. This necessitated his passing along Limanowskiego Street, 
where the reduction of the ghetto had divided that street along its length with a 
barbed wire fence, which formed the new ghetto boundary.110 Anyone walking 
or travelling by tram along this street must have been profoundly aware of the 
figures on the other side of that fence, already marked by degradation and 
death. As Kantor articulated it in his twelfth Milano Lesson: ‘World War II. / 
Genocide, / Concentration Camps, / Crematories, / Human Beasts, / Death, / 
Tortures, / Human kind turned into mud, soap and ashes, / Debasement, / The 
time of contempt…’ (Kantor 2005b: 88 translated in Kobialka 1993: 259).111
196
110 I am grateful to Pani Anna Pióro, the curator of the Apteka pod Orłem museum, for her help 
in understanding the changing topographical reality of the Podgórze ghetto and for granting me 
access to historical maps and photographs of the ghetto. I am also grateful to the late Mike 
Staner, a survivor of the Podgórze ghetto who lived at 12, Węgierska Street whilst it was still 
within the ghetto, and who described to me at length the situation of the reality then.
111 See also the first Milano Lesson Kantor 2005b: 46, translated in Kobialka 1993: 211.
Kantor’s daily confrontation with an erased or virtually erased humanity 
became a source for his artistic theory and practice at this time. It was probably 
during this period, when Kantor was working on what was to be the final 
underground production for his Clandestine Independent Theatre (The Return 
of Odysseus by Wyspiański, 1944) that he first formulated his idea of ‘poor 
reality’ or ‘reality of the lowest rank’. Denied their own cultural practice by the 
occupying forces, many young Polish intellectuals turned to the work of the 
inter-war avant-garde discussed earlier, including that of the Jewish writer and 
graphic artist, Schulz. Kantor was reading Schulz’s fictions avidly at this time 
(see Kantor’s comments in Miklaszewski 2002: 32–33 and 37; Pleśniarowicz 
2004: 27). The connections with what the critic Artur Sandauer was to later term 
the ‘degraded reality’ in Schulz’s fictions (Sandauer 1985: 5–33), and the reality 
both of his own existence as a Pole under German occupation and as a witness 
to the condition of the Jewish population in the ghetto are stark. After the war 
Schulz’s work remained unavailable in Poland until 1964, when Polish cultural 
identity remained suppressed, though this time as a result of the various 
manifestations of ‘real socialism’.
As Czesław Prokopczyk has noted, the notion of ‘degraded’, ‘bankrupt’ or 
‘marginal’ reality in Schulz centres on the Polish word tandeta. The meaning of 
this word, he observes:
may be understood, to put it simply and visually, as the 
lowest layer, or the lowest, though for some intriguing 
reasons favourite, subspecies of the ordinary in the world 
of Schulz’s fiction. It is the layer of shoddy and cheap 
products, of trumpery and lack of taste, of ‘depraved’ 
human characters, or possibly even of crippled and 
deformed beings.
(Prokopczyk 1999: 206)
In Schulz’s fictional universe this degraded reality takes many forms, but it 
seems to derive from the deeply felt paucity of provincial life, the sense that 
what passed for reality in the town of Drohobycz was somehow a second-rate 
imitation of the reality of a Kraków or a Warsaw. Reality in Schulz’s fiction is 
said to be ‘as thin as paper and betrays with all its cracks its imitative 
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character’ (Schulz 1988b: 73). It ‘exists in a state of constant fermentation, 
germination, hidden life’ (Ficowski 1988: 113) and ‘takes on certain shapes 
merely for the sake of appearance, as a joke or form of play’ (Ibid.). It is as if, 
because provincial reality has no substance, it occupies itself with ‘the 
assuming and consuming of numberless masks. This migration of forms is the 
essence of life’ (Ibid.). 
It is not hard to see how this presentation of reality might have spoken to 
Kantor in his situation at this time. The German occupation made explicit and 
all-too-concrete a ranking of humanity that had existed in a less structured way 
before the war. However, under occupation Germans assumed the highest rank, 
Poles became their inferiors, whilst Jews occupied the lowest rank of all: 
according to Hitler and the SS they were beneath even the lowest rank of 
humanity (Davies 1981: 445–446). From this simple tripartite hierarchy 
developed a complex web of resistance, of corruption and collaboration, of 
heroism and cowardice (Davies 1981: 446). Some Jews worked for the Gestapo 
to police Jews under the auspices of the Judenrat (‘Jewish council’). Some 
Poles collaborated to police each other and any Jews attempting to evade 
confinement in the ghetto, or any Poles who helped to hide them. As noted 
earlier, Kantor’s somewhat Semitic features, together with his living next to the 
Jewish ghetto would obviously not have helped his situation in that reality. 
According to the Nuremberg regulations Kantor was officially classed as 
Nichtdeutsch or non-German (therefore not Juden or Jew and not required to 
wear the yellow star). Nevertheless he was frequently stopped and ‘checked’ on 
the way to and from his home next to the Podgórze ghetto: that is, stopped by 
Germans patrols or their Polish collaborators and forced to drop his trousers to 
prove he was not circumcised.112 As already noted, according to Agamben ‘the 
Jews were exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly as Hitler 
had announced, ‘as lice’, which is to say, as bare life’ (Agamben 1998: 114). 
Such a pressure of reality clearly produces ‘degradation’ at many levels. 
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112 I am grateful to the late Mike Staner for describing to me the environment of ʻcheckingʼ 
around this time, both by Germans and by gangs of certain categories of collaborators. I am 
also grateful to Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz who told me that Kantor had made it clear on several 
occasions both publicly and privately that he had been a victim of such checking.
However, it was not merely as a description of the ‘bankruptcy of reality’, of ‘that 
city of cheap human material’ (Schulz 1988b: 76) that Schulz’s metaphysical 
prose would have been attractive to Kantor. More than merely black humour, 
‘degraded reality’ somehow offers a certain hope in Schulz’s depictions in that it 
takes on a celebratory quality and assumes a playful self-sufficiency. Thus, as 
noted earlier, in his ‘Treatise on Tailor’s Dummies, or The Second Book of 
Genesis’, Jakob, the narrator’s father, in the passage cited earlier celebrates 
the ‘infinite fertility’ and ‘inexhaustible vitality,’ of matter, a living fecundity that: 
‘entices us with a thousand sweet, soft, round shapes which it blindly dreams up 
within itself. […] We are simply entranced and enchanted by the cheapness, 
shabbiness and inferiority of material’ (Schulz 1988b: 39 and 41). In his 1968 
commentary on the contents of his model’s pockets, Kantor expressed this 
Schulzian sense of enchantment.
The reality of occupied Kraków was one where the metamorphosis of 
animate to inanimate body was a casual fact of daily life, where mounds of 
clothing or belongings indicated the recently departed presence of a human life 
just as much as its corpse (Davies 1981: 455). In such a ‘degraded reality’—
where the already lowered quality of life could be reduced further still to dead 
matter—it is not surprising that Kantor would be drawn to Schulz’s brand of 
quasi-panpsychism, to this exotic version of the Aristotelian conception of 
hylomorphism: of form and matter (a conception that perhaps also anticipates 
later ideas such as Gilles Deleuze’s vitalist concept of immanence).113 The 
cheapness of life somehow heightens the awareness of the bare emptiness of 
its potential negation but it also, paradoxically, becomes a cause of celebration 
and a form of resistance against the forces of degradation and negation.
In his essay ‘Cinnamon Shops by Schulz: The Apology of Tandeta’, 
Andreas Schönle argues that it is ‘the privileged position of tandeta that […] it 
mediates between form and matter’ (Schönle 1991: 131). In its imitation of form, 
tandeta ‘fakes a definite appearance, without, however, merging completely with 
it’ (Ibid.). The faking ‘a definite appearance’ would appear to be a deliberate 
199
113 See Deleuze 2001 and Agamben ʻAbsolute Immanenceʼ in Agamben 1999g.
paradox designed to call into question the conventional ranking of ‘appearance’ 
as ontologically inferior to ‘authentic’, ‘substantial’ being. Agamben’s use of the 
obscure figure Homo Sacer to articulate a similar paradox of negativity at the 
heart of human being seems to echo the celebration of tandeta. The figure of 
homo sacer (sacred man) is one who through being banished from the law 
occupies a liminal state of being, of ‘bare life’, that is, the life of one ‘who may 
by killed and yet not sacrificed’ (Agamben 1998: 8; emphasis in original). 
Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt in Political Theology (2005) and his 
discussion of the ‘state of exception’, Agamben develops this idea, as noted 
earlier, to cite the bare life of homo sacer as emblematic of the condition of 
human being as a being existing essentially in a liminal zone between biological 
existence and political life: between nature and culture. This is a Heideggerian 
concept of human being as a continually becoming-appearance, of an 
existential performance as opposed to an essentialist substance. As discussed 
earlier, Agamben’s concept of bare life also resonates with Walter Benjamin’s 
concept of der bloße Leben (‘mere life’) in the discussion of sovereignty in his 
1921 essay ‘Critique of Violence’: ‘Mythic violence is bloody power over mere 
life for its own sake; divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the 
living. The first demands sacrifice, the second accepts it’ (Benjamin 2004b: 
250).114 Kantor’s work too invokes an idea of bare life but in a sense of a 
subversive celebration of the immanent, virtual and liminal, rather than merely 
as an object of abjection. If bare life is part of this existentialist ‘essence’ of 
human being then it is in the self-recognition of it as such—the human-as-
abject-being—that affords recognition of the ‘genuine, / authentic side of / 
individuality’. What is discarded or forgotten is therefore salvaged and 
redeemed in a way that also echoes Walter Benjamin’s conception of messianic 
time in his 1940 essay ‘On the Concept of History’ (Benjamin 2006b) as well as 
in Convolute N of The Arcades Project (Benjamin 2002 462–463).
The celebration of tandeta in Schulz’s fictions can therefore be seen as a 
re-appropriation of degradation (or in Kantor’s terms ‘reality of the lowest rank’) 
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114 Benjamin is of course one of the major sources for Agambenʼs ideas, especially his concept 
of la nuda vita—ʻbare lifeʼ. See de la Durantaye 2009: 203.
for creative purposes. This is shown in Kantor’s happening, as the separation of 
layer from layer of clothing leads to the abrupt discovery of ‘new interior worlds’, 
which open up to reveal the almost non-Euclidean space of the ‘antipodes of 
clothing’: ‘pockets! / lots of pockets!’ As Kantor delves into this interior world of 
his model’s clothing, the cotton padding spills out of the lining. Unravelling and 
proliferating seemingly out of proportion to the confined space of its origins this 
padding seems to echo the ‘fluffiness and porosity’ of matter celebrated by the 
father in his ‘Treatise on Tailors’ Dummies’ (Schulz 1988b: 41). Similarly, the 
objects that Kantor harvests from this model’s pockets, whilst initially innocuous, 
seem gradually to change and proliferate in the partytura as the catalogue of 
items progresses. From the innocent and trivial ‘gnawed pencils’ and 
‘toothbrushes’ the list proceeds to more personal objects in the form of 
photographs. However, these consist not only of the normal and expected 
pictures of ‘family’ and ‘children’ but progress to the more illicit pictures of 
‘lover’ and pornography. As Kantor continues to unpack the pockets he 
discovers ‘condoms’, ‘stolen teaspoons’, and finally the increasingly violent 
‘penknives’, ‘knives’, and ‘guns’. There is therefore a sense, as with Schulzian 
matter, that the inanimate objects associated with the anonymous and forgotten 
model have a subversive life and humanity of their own: that, as the father in 
Schulz’s ‘Treatise’ expounds, ‘There is no dead matter […] lifelessness is only a 
disguise behind which hide unknown forms of life’ (Schulz 1988b: 40). There is 
also a sense, noted earlier, in which the objects come to refer to the subject of 
human individuality, not of the anonymous model alone but paradoxically, of the 
individuality of everyone. Kantor’s harvesting of objects may recall the 
harvesting of useful commodities by the Sonderkommandos from the dead 
victims of the gas chambers. However, through his performative manipulation of 
the clothing and objects associated with his model, Kantor can be understood to 
be accessing Schulz’s subversive conception of form and matter so that these 
items take on, as it were, a life of their own. In this dance of becoming and 
seeming, rather than obediently remaining in their category of ‘conventional / or 
insignificant outward appearance’, these items are liberated from the state of 
utter abjection that would otherwise seem to be the fate of Adriaen 
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Adriaenszoon, the subject of Tulp’s anatomy, or the dead victims of Podgórze or 
Auschwitz. Moreover, Kantor staged his performative revision of one of the 
iconic products of scientific rationalism at a time when the domination of ‘real 
socialism’ was in some ways resembling Nazi occupation.
In his ‘Night Notebooks’ Kantor wrote that: ‘The human form is shaped on 
the border area of a live, suffering organism and / a mechanism / functioning 
automatically and absurdly’ (Kantor 2005: 111–112; my translation).115 In this 
conception, Kantor encapsulates the paradoxical fragility of the bare life of 
human being suspended between the mechanism of Cartesian matter and the 
pre-Cartesian animating principle of Aristotelian form, between zoē and bios, 
between nature and culture, between the apparent oppositions of Being and 
becoming—Being and seeming. In doing so, both here and implicitly in what 
might now be seen as his revision of Rembrandt’s Anatomy, Kantor has 
reconfigured the separate, fragmented and incorporeal nature of Cartesian res 
cogitans in a manner that has allowed a sense of human soul to return via the 
illegal, poor side door of tandeta, in a way that prefigures a Deleuzian 
conception of immanence. Where Rembrandt’s Dr Tulp found soulless, 
mechanical material in Adriaenszoon’s dissected forearm and hand, Kantor 
found humanity and soul in the contents of his model’s pockets. In response to 
the unseen negativity at the heart of the football match that Agamben maintains 
is never over, and to the potential threat of the bare emptiness of the negation 
of human life, Kantor’s Anatomy Lesson was a public celebration of humanity 
and soul within the ‘reality of the lowest rank’.
Acknowledging the dangers implicit in the Cartesian cogito this gesture by 
Kantor invokes a more vitalist sense of life, one that is virtual and distributed 
within matter itself: a sense of life that speaks and sings through the clothing 
and possessions that remain after the human body has been discarded. This 
Deleuzian sense of immanence hovers on the borderline between being and 
not-being, suggesting a sense of the self of bare human life being ‘held out into 
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115 ʻPostać ludzka kształtuje się na pograniczu / żywego, cierpiącego organizmu i / mechanizmu 
| funkcjonującego automaticznie i absurdalnieʼ (Kantor 2005: 111–112).
the nothing’, as the Heideggerian conception characterises it (Heidegger 1998e: 
93). Echoing Heidegger’s ‘nothing of being’, Deleuze suggested in the last text 
published before his death that ‘the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life’;116 
the ‘life of the individual fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a 
man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no 
other’ (Deleuze 2001: 28 and 29). In his version of Rembrandt’s Anatomy 
Lesson, Tadeusz Kantor, rather than celebrating the rational, sovereign, 
disembodied subject of the Cartesian cogito celebrates the liminal, immanent, 
bare life of tandeta. Where, in Rembrandt’s painting, the coat stolen by his 
subject is forgotten, Kantor’s response is to let the tattered clothing sing for 
itself.
Although considered a minor piece, Kantor’s Anatomy Lesson 
encapsulates key aspects of his aesthetic: a sense of vertiginous temporality 
through reference to the past (the linking of the 1968 of the happening with the 
1632 of Rembrandt’s painting); the prioritisation of the ‘reality of the lowest 
rank’ and ‘poor objects’; the breaking down of the barriers between spectator 
and performer; the inclusion of himself within the artwork; the détournement of 
existing artworks and situations. Tacitly underlying these aesthetic 
preoccupations was Kantor’s experience of the occupation and, within that, 
even if at this stage only by implication, the fate of Polish Jewry.117 In his two 
larger scale theatrical works that utilised the ‘open’, spectator-inclusive form of 
the happening, The Water Hen (1967) and Dainty Shapes and Hairy Apes 
(1973), Kantor included Jewish figures explicitly. However, his articulation of a 
lost Jewish presence at the heart of Poland, achieves its apotheosis in the 
almost miraculous transformation of the Polish classroom into the Jewish 
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116 See Agamben ʻAbsolute Immanenceʼ in Agamben 1999g: 220.
117 1968 was the year in Poland of the infamous state-sponsored ʻanti-Zionistʼ campaign, which 
became a thinly disguised full-scale anti-Semitic purge that used the Arab-Israeli six-day war of 
the previous year as a pretext to arouse fears of a ʻfifth columnʼ of Israeli sympathisers within 
the Polish establishment (see Davies 1981: 588–589). As a result of this campaign almost 
20,000 Jews left Poland leaving the country a virtually Jewish-free nation (Kersten and Szapiro 
1993: 464–465). Coincidentally, Kantor, who had been appointed a second time as a professor 
at the Academy of Fine Arts in 1967 was also dismissed during the following year in 1969 
(Pleśniarowicz 2004: 102 and 105).
cheder in The Dead Class. This repeated transformation, which sees the 
bickering, face-pulling, and playground-rhyme-reciting ‘children’ gradually 
assume a wailing chanting with ‘hands upraised, rocking rhythmically in the 
ecstasy of Jewish prayer’ (Pleśniarowicz 2004: 203) marks, amongst other 
transformations in his aesthetic, a new turn. This rhythmic wail-like chant, which 
punctuates The Dead Class as if the voice of bare life itself were calling from 
‘the other side’, signals a distinct change to the use of front-orientated, rhythmic, 
repetitive motifs that face directly onto the spectator. The openness, the 
immersion of the audience into the action of the performance that the 
happening form had afforded was exchanged for what Kantor called ‘the closed 
work’. However, this closure afforded a different kind of immersion, a form of 
direct communion with the spectator in ways that hark back to an older source 
of inspiration from the time of the first avant-garde. The exploration of this 
phenomenon is the topic of the next chapter.
The ‘reality of the lowest rank’, according to Kantor’s paradoxical 
valorisation of humiliation, inverts the normal perspective of truth-value, as 
noted by Ouspensky in relation to the Gospels. The surface of representation, 
the poor envoi of the true original, in its low-ranking poor humiliation—in the 
nothingness of its performative representation—becomes the truth. This 
inversion can be seen in Kantor’s Anatomy Lesson in which the authenticity of 
true individuality is found not in the depths ‘in the heart’ but on the surface, not 
even in the skin, but in the skin’s skin, the clothing and trivial objects of 
possession. This reversal was articulated with even more power in Kantor’s 
seminal work The Dead Class. If the hollow heart of Poland is occupied by the 
absence of Jewish presence, then this comes to the surface in those moments 
of The Dead Class where the Polish classroom turns into a Jewish cheder 
(classroom) and the chanting of school lessons metamorphoses into the 
ecstatic keening of Jewish prayer: ‘Aj na nyna / aj na nyna’ (Kantor 2004: 61). 
This reversal of the movement of truth value, from a configuration in which the 
spectator is drawn into the depths of a work towards an illusory truth in its ‘heart 
of hearts’, to one in which the truth advances towards the real world of the 
spectator from out of the depths, is one that can be seen to have its origins in 
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certain aspects of the first-wave avant-garde. However, such a reversal is also 
linked to an older tradition concerned with problems with the articulation of the 
truth, as I will discuss in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6. THE AESTHETIC CONTEXT: THE ‘POOR OBJECT’ AS ICON
Introduction: Intimations of eternity
This chapter relates aspects of Kantor’s early and late career to the key turning 
point in the early 1970s leading to the apparent change in aesthetic presented 
by The Dead Class in 1975. Although Kantor professed such a ‘turn’, he did so 
by appealing to what he described as his discovery of the ‘poor object’ and 
‘poor reality’ some thirty years earlier in his 1944 Underground production of 
Wyspiański’s The Return of Odysseus. However, whilst Kantor, as I have shown 
in the previous chapter, can be seen to draw on the metaphysics of Schulzʼs 
ʻdegraded realityʼ, his apparently peculiar marriage of symbolism and 
abstraction indicates a previously unexplored proximity, by way of the Russian 
avant-garde, with the metaphysical legacy of the aesthetic logic of icons. In 
categorically locating his ʻpoor objectʼ ʻat the threshold between GARBAGE and 
ETERNITYʼ (Kantor 2009c: 346), Kantorʼs aesthetic can be seen to bear an 
unlikely affinity with the ʻhammered gold and gold enamellingʼ—ʻthe artifice of 
eternityʼ118 of Orthodox icons. In exploring the ideas underlying Kantorʼs early 
influences, this chapter makes links between Pavel Florenskyʼs work on space 
and representation, in particular his 1919 essay ʻReverse Perspectiveʼ, and 
Heideggerʼs and Jacques Derridaʼs critiques of representation, drawing on 
recent research to further illuminate Kantorʼs aesthetic of the ʻrealʼ.
If the middle of Kantor’s career was dominated by the idea of informe and 
informel, the beginning could be said to have been more influenced by ideas 
from the first-wave avant-garde, particularly in his tendency towards abstraction, 
enshrined in the ideas from Suprematism, Constructivism and the Bauhaus. 
However, in terms of the underlying concerns that Kantor was engaged with, the 
apparently contradictory tendencies of Constructivism and informel 
nevertheless share an interest in attempts to engage with reality in non-
representational terms. In addition, the notion of informe arising from the Polish 
interwar avant-garde, distinctive in its valorisation of humiliation, is reminiscent 
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118 As the poet W. B. Yeats characterised Byzantine art in his 1926 poem ʻSailing to 
Byzantiumʼ (Yeats 1967: 218).
of the use of poor materials used in Synthetic Cubism and in certain aspects of 
the Russian avant-garde, where artists like Liubov Popova and Vladimir Tatlin 
utilised lowly materials such as sawdust and discarded wood and metal in their 
work as a means of prioritising reality over illusion.
In Chapter three, I sketched out a conception of human being that I 
suggested would have close parallels with Kantor’s work. It will be recalled that 
in Heidegger’s reading of the Heraclitean fragment ēthos anthropōi daimōn: ‘the 
human being dwells […] in the nearness of god’, the concept of ēthos is 
interpreted as a ‘dwelling place’ spanning a temporal whole. In this conception 
time can be understood to loop back on itself in a way that envelops the 
individual human experience and makes a dwelling for it—a ‘present’ that, itself, 
consists of a bundle of present awarenesses of the past together with present 
expectations of potential futures. This conception is opposed to the view of 
human being as a singular substance occupying a point in time separate from 
its past and future. This notion of human being has implications not just for 
individuals, but also for their cultural products as manifested in groups and 
movements. It is worth here reiterating the beginning of the passage cited in 
chapter three from Kantor’s Theatrical Place, from the section entitled ‘The So-
Called Development in Art and Chronology’. In it Kantor writes:
In art, the logic of a phenomenon’s successful development 
does not often coincide with a linear chronology.
Often, I have the impression, which fascinates me, that TIME in 
art, in its course of events, encroaches upon the notion of 
eternity.
As if past and future did not exist in it.
As if the phenomenon of succession or progression did not exist 
in it.
(Kantor 2009c: 360)
This passage has implications not only for how Kantor’s own chronology is read 
but also for how Kantor may himself have read the wider artistic movements 
from which he derived his influence. Its implication is that ‘time in art’ functions 
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as if, or almost as if, it were eternity—timelessness—itself.119 In this way 
developmental elements can come to be viewed as if suspended and freely 
floating in a timelessness no longer constrained by a fixed sequential 
relationship of cause and effect. However, insofar as there is a tendency to 
revert to the idea of a ‘linear chronology’ in the historical development in the arts 
there is a corresponding tendency to see certain artistic movements as 
separate and even antagonistic in a way that disguises underlying issues that 
may be more sympathetic. The problem applies equally to attempts to make 
sense of individual artists’ chronologies and certainly to attempts to interpret the 
facts of Kantor’s development, and especially to his interpretation of his own 
chronology. This chapter will consider aspects of Kantor’s account of his own 
artistic development from 1938 to 1975 where he makes repeated references to 
what he refers to as his key influences: ‘abstractionism’, ‘Constructivism’ and 
the Bauhaus. In response to these early key influences, Kantor set up an 
apparent dichotomy between these apparently abstract tendencies and what he 
refers to as the tendencies of ‘Symbolism’, ‘Dada’, ‘Surrealism’ and, as I have 
already discussed in chapter five, informel. Although tendencies such as 
abstraction and Symbolism, or Constructivism and Surrealism initially may 
appear mutually exclusive and even antagonistic, this is not necessarily the 
case. In the following discussion, I wish to draw out the logic of Kantor’s 
insistence on the ‘notion of eternity’ in relation to art by suggesting hidden 
commonalities uniting apparently antagonistic tendencies. These tendencies 
coalesce around Kantor’s aesthetic of ‘Poor Reality’ and the ‘Poor Object’, 
which, according to his own narrative, marked a break with the tendencies of 
abstraction and Constructivism in his work. A consideration of what happened to 
the influence of Constructivism in Kantor’s work following this turn will facilitate 
a reading of his own chronology in a way that resonates with his own ideas of 
time and memory.
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119 As Antonova discusses in Chapter 4 of Space, Time, and Presence in the Icon: Seeing the 
World with the Eyes of God (2010) ʻeternityʼ can refer to a sense of infinite or unending time, or, 
to timelessness. Kantor seems to use the term in the latter sense. This is the mainstream 
Christian sense based on Augustine and encapsulated by Boethius in his definition in 
Consolations of Philosophy 5.6 (Boethius 1999: 132–133).
The temporal paradox of Kantorʼs artistic development
When Kantor began his career as an artist he was as engaged with the idea of 
theatre as he was with that of painting. His engagement in theatre was in the 
spirit of ‘total art’ in the avant-garde terms of the Futurists and the 
Constructivists: he was interested in directing every element of the theatrical 
event, determining the scenography and costume design as well as the 
conception and direction of the actors’ performance (Kantor in Halczak 1989: 
68). In this Kantor was following (as were his immediate predecessors, the first 
interwar Cricot group) a general trend from the first-wave European avant-garde 
in which groups of artists of the Futurist, Expressionist, Cubo-Futurist and later 
Constructivist and Dadaist tendencies experimented with theatrical performance 
as a form of ‘art theatre’ in opposition to the dominant realistic and naturalistic 
traditions (see Schmalenbach 1970: 188).
Kantor claimed that, by 1938, near the end of his formal education as an 
artist, he was a committed abstractionist, a self-confessed follower of the 
Constructivists and the Bauhaus. He frequently referred to himself at this time 
as being ‘under the influence of abstract art: the whole group of Russian 
Constructivists like Malevich, Popova, Tatlin. I didn’t know what to do with these 
contradictions. Symbolism was dated by the 1930s. You had to be abstract, 
Constructivist’ (Kantor in: Hertz 1985–1986: 14). As noted in chapter one, 
Kantor’s turn away from the mainstream teaching of Post-Impressionist painting 
in the Academy of Fine Arts led him to study stage design under Frycz and this 
would have brought him into more direct contact with the tradition of the first-
wave avant-garde and its developments in Russia and Germany. According to 
Pleśniarowicz (2004: 26), it was Frycz who lent Kantor his copy of the 1928 
volume by René Füllop-Miller and Josef Gregor, The Russian theatre: its 
character and history with especial reference to the revolutionary period (Füllop-
Miller and Gregor 1930), which contained illustrations of Russian Constructivist 
stage design and discussed the influence of Russian icons on the avant-garde 
movement (see Gregor in Ibid.: 91–93 and 129). However, this avowedly self-
conscious dedication to Constructivism and the Bauhaus appears to have 
ceased after only two productions in this style: a puppet production of Maurice 
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Maeterlinck’s The Death of Tintagiles in 1938, and a heavily stylised version of 
Słowacki’s Balladyna in the Independent Clandestine Theatre production of 
1943. Both of these productions were heavily influenced by the abstract 
aesthetics of Constructivism and the Bauhaus; the human figure was reduced to 
the abstract form of lines, triangles, circles and squares. For example, in the 
production of Balladyna, Kantor recalled that he used
geometrical shapes, the circle, the arch, the right angle 
and materials such as tin, black roofing paper and wollen 
cloth. The nymph Goplana, the untouchable sex symbol of 
the new romantic literature, nearly a prototype femme-
fatale, whose part was usually played by extremely 
alluring actresses, became an abstract mechanism-
structure in our staging.
(Kantor in Pleśniarowicz 1994b: 51)
In this way Goplana was presented as an abstract metal shape on a plinth, with 
a notch cut in one edge of the metal for a mouth and a single circle cut for an 
eye. However, following this production, and under the continued pressure of 
the reality of occupied Kraków (explored in chapter five), Kantor appeared to 
radically change his aesthetic strategy, apparently (according to his own later 
narrative written in the early 1970s) abandoning this aesthetics of abstraction 
for an aesthetics of what he called ‘Poor Realism’ or ‘Poor Reality’.
As noted in chapter five, following the Second World War, Kantor 
engaged, in his own idiosyncratic manner, with the mainstream of European 
avant-garde artistic strategies: Surrealism, informel, emballage, assemblages, 
happenings, environmental and conceptual works; the influence of 
Constructivism and the Bauhaus were apparently forgotten. He increasingly 
pursued the prevailing idea of the ‘open’ artwork. In his happenings, such as the 
Sea Happening at Osieki on the Baltic coast in 1967, and in theatre spectacles 
such as The Water Hen (1967), and Dainty Shapes and Hairy Apes (1973), 
based on dramas by Witkacy, he employed an ‘open’ configuration, installing 
the happening or dramatic action in seaside, ‘café’ and ‘cloakroom’ 
environments respectively, settings which actively included the audience within 
the fabric of the performance and, in the case of The Water Hen, and Dainty 
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Shapes and Hairy Apes, incorporated concepts from his Happenings into the 
fabric of the theatrical production. However, in 1975, with the premiere of The 
Dead Class, Kantor apparently broke with this aesthetic of the ‘open artwork’ 
and inaugurated a new period of the ‘closed work’. In this production the 
spectators were clearly separated from the actors and from the performance 
space by a rope barrier. They were therefore not included or ‘involved’ in the 
performance action in the way that they had been previously.
In a text from 1982 ‘Klasa Szkolna’ (The Classroom),120 Kantor explained:
my idea of the CLOSED WORK […] was defined in THE 
DEAD CLASS when I was fed up with the ubiquitously 
overused conceptions of ‘the open work,’ open forms, the 
open theatre, and so on. To that extent the production of 
The Dead Class was a closed work in the mental and 
metaphysical sense.
(Kantor 1995b: n.p.)
This new strategy of apparent separation of performance work from spectators 
lasted in various forms up to his death in 1990 and included his most famous 
major theatrical spectacles following The Dead Class: Wielopole, Wielopole 
(1980), Let the Artists Die (1985), I Shall Never Return (1988) and Today is My 
Birthday (1991), smaller scale performance works (known as cricotages), as 
well as installations and the return to figuration in his late painting. From 1975 
until his death Kantor’s work therefore returned, in one sense, to a more 
prearranged creation that confronted and engaged with the audience, rather 
than a more apparently open arrangement derived from the idea of the 
happening which was, at least theoretically, open to the action of chance and 
the active participation of the spectator.
The advent of the new aesthetic associated with The Dead Class (1975)
could, on the one hand, be seen as a symptom of his nature as a consummate 
showman who aggressively occupied the centre stage of avant-garde art in 
Poland. In this view the avant-garde was an ‘arms race’ in which Kantor would 
experiment in what (for Poland) was a new artistic arena, only to then find other 
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120 See Appendix 1.22 on the problem of dating this text.
artists imitating and debasing the currency of that particular strategy, when he 
would move on to something newer. However, there are other possible reasons 
for the radical change in aesthetic strategy that presaged The Dead Class. One 
was, perhaps, Kantor’s age and the intimation of mortality: he was 60 in 1975. 
But perhaps an even more important reason for his aesthetic turn was a 
‘rediscovery’ of an earlier idea.
In the early 1970s Kantor was taking stock of his artistic ideas and began 
a project of preparing typescripts of all his notes and manifestos dating from the 
beginning of his artistic career before the Second World War. During this period 
of reflection he claimed a ‘rediscovery’ of an artistic idea that he insisted he had 
discovered first in the Clandestine Underground Theatre that he ran during the 
Nazi occupation of Kraków: this idea is the ‘Reality of the Lowest Rank’, 
discussed in chapter five. This was an aesthetic based on the idea of the ‘poor 
object’. To distance himself from Marcel Duchamp’s discovery of l’objet prêt, 
Kantor was keen to claim that this idea was completely original because, he 
said, he had discovered it during the occupation when Poland was cut off from 
the world. He consistently claimed that, at that time, he was unaware of 
Duchamp’s work in this field, stating that he did not see French art until after the 
war (Kantor in Kobialka 1993: 208): 
When I began The Return of Odysseus I knew nothing 
about dada [sic], about Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, 
Schwitters, or those artists who began to use the ready-
made object. So the notion of the ‘ready-made’ or ‘found’ 
object is my personal invention because, truly, I didn’t 
know—you have to believe me.
(Kantor interviewed in the film The Theatre of Tadeusz 
Kantor, Bablet 1991)
Kantor’s ‘Poor Object’ differed from Duchamp’s more cynical readymades (‘that 
other object’ (Kantor 1993: 211)) in that he was more personally involved with 
them. For Kantor, space was charged with the force of memory, and matter, 
following Schulz, was more animate than dead. His ‘revision’ of Duchamp’s 
concept was combined with something like the Surrealist notion of objet trouvé 
(found object or situation). For Kantor it is the object that ‘finds’ the artist and 
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not the other way round. The term Objets trouvé is literally ‘lost property’, and 
as such has the connotation of sadness, melancholy and dejection and 
provides a further clue to Kantor’s personal vision of this concept. For Kantor 
the object is poor because it comes from the lower ranks of reality and, as such, 
is abject, lost, useless, ignored and forgotten. Thus situated, the object is freed 
of its habitual use value in normal terms and consequently free to ‘find’ the artist 
anew. One has only to recall the way that Kantor, in the work from The Dead 
Class on, fusses over his stage properties or corrects the hair on his 
mannequins as if they were his own children to sense his special relationship 
with poor objects. It is both an emotional and a metaphysical connection. 
In a sense, Kantor’s claims concerning the priority of his ideas do not 
matter—he was a showman who needed to defend his artistic marque from his 
rivals to protect what he saw as his originality. What is important is the question 
of the relationship between the ‘poor’ aesthetic of 1944 and the Constructivist 
influence that preceded it, and the relationship of this to the later aesthetic turn 
that led to The Dead Class in 1975 and the subsequent work of the ‘theatre of 
death’ which flowed from that. In ‘The Classroom’ text Kantor states that The 
Dead Class, as a ‘closed work’, proclaimed ‘the era of my own avant-garde. / An 
avant-garde / of reminiscence, / memory, / the invisible, / the abyss and 
death’ (Ibid. n.p.). In his self-mythologisation of his career, Kantor saw himself 
as turning away from the ‘clean’ abstraction of Constructivism and the Bauhaus 
in 1944 with The Return of Odysseus to an aesthetics of ‘poor’ distressed 
objects and reality. However, I wish to argue in this chapter that on another 
level, Kantor can also be seen to be returning to ideas that can be connected to 
Constructivism and indeed seen to derive from it, not as a purely visual 
aesthetic, but rather in the sense of the underpinning philosophical and 
metaphysical ideas that I will discuss later.
Kantor refers to his original debt to Constructivism throughout his career. 
He described the inaugural 1956 production of Cricot 2, Witkacy’s The 
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Cuttlefish,121 as ‘commedia dell ‘arte in abstracto’ (Kantor interviewed in the film 
The Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor 1991), thereby linking it to Oskar Schlemmer’s 
performances in the Bauhaus. Moreover, he explicitly returned to more overt 
discussions of this tendency towards the end of his life. In June 1986 Kantor 
was invited by Renato Palazzi, a favoured critic of his work and then the 
Chancellor of the Civica Scuola d’Arte Drammatica in Milan, to run a series of 
workshops and lectures culminating in a diploma performance for that year’s 
graduating students. Kantor taught a group of eleven students and, out of 
necessity, decided to ‘shake up’ their training by giving them a brief ‘Elementary 
Theatre School’ in which he laid out what he felt to be the most important 
lessons of the twentieth century avant-gardes (see Renato Palazzi in Kantor 
1991b: 5–10; Kobialka 1993: 207; Pleśniarowicz 2004: 133–134). He singled 
out as most important the trends of abstraction, Constructivism and Surrealism, 
and supervised the students in the creation of two short pieces entitled Ślub w 
manierze konstrukywistycznej i surrealistycznej (A Wedding in the constructivist 
and surrealist manner). This teaching was documented as Lekcje mediolańskie 
(The Milano Lessons) and subsequently published in Italian (1988), Polish 
(1991b) and English (1993). In 1987 Kantor staged a short piece, as part of 
Dokumenta 8 in Kassel, called Maszyna miłości i śmierci (The Machine of Love 
and Death). In what must have been for Kantor, a conscious recapitulation of 
the Constructivist-Surrealist pairing in the Milano Lesson pieces, the first half of 
this 1987 performance was ostensibly a reconstruction of his 1938 production of 
Maeterlinck’s The Death of Tintagiles, featuring Kantor’s Constructivist/
Bauhaus-inspired mannequins,122 whilst the second half was a symbolic moving 
tableau employing a Symbolist/Surrealist aesthetic in which a combination of 
live human figures, a skeleton and a more realistic mannequin orbit the central 
iron doors in contrary motion, either walking or carried on a revolving stage.
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121 The choice by Kantor and Jarema to make Witkacyʼs play The Cuttlefish the first production 
of Cricot 2 would seem to be a conscious echo of the first Cricot groupʼs opening production of 
the same work in 1933. Jarema, who was some seven years older than Kantor, had been a 
member of the first Cricot group.
122 See Appendix 1.23 regarding the similarity of these mannequins to figures in Bauhaus, 
Futurist and Constructivist art.
The Machine of Love and Death, as its title evokes, was intended by 
Kantor to state what he saw as one of the central paradoxes of his art: the 
tension between the Constructivist aesthetic of the machine and the symbolism 
associated with the existential emotional landscape of human existence, which 
had preoccupied the Symbolists and Surrealists. Kantor expressed this 
apparent contradiction in the title in a short essay commenting on his 1938 
production of The Death of Tintagiles, written or edited between the 70s and 
80s,123 ‘Between Holy Abstraction and Excommunicated Symbolism’. This text 
was republished as part of the programme notes for The Machine of Love and 
Death. In it the ‘Director of the EPHEMERAL (AND MECHANICAL) PUPPET 
THEATRE’, as Kantor styled himself, describes how he ‘bought a little yellow 
book’, probably one of the Bauhaus publications,124 and set about translating 
the ‘strange captivating texts’ of ‘Walter Gropius, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, Oskar 
Schlemmer, Paul Klee…’ (Kantor in Halczak 1989: 67). Kantor celebrates their 
aesthetic of: 
the metaphysical abstractum, the mechanical eccentricity, 
the triadic ballet, man and the machine, the circus, 
Triangles, CIRCLES, CYLINDERS, CUBES, sounds, 
COLOURS, FORMS SIMULTANEOUS, SYNOPTICAL, 
SYNACOUSTIC, in an ecstasy of joy, CONSTRUCTION, a 
pure OBJECTLESS LIBERATED world, ABSTRACTION...
(Ibid.; ellipsis in original)
In the next paragraph Kantor goes on to articulate what, for him, is the 
incompatibility of the abstract Constructivist tendencies with the Symbolist/
Surrealist tendencies of the other artists and writers to which he was also 
drawn:
The Director of the EPHEMERAL (AND MECHANICAL) 
Puppet Theatre apparently attached too much importance 
to all this [i.e. the ‘metaphysical abstractum’]. But what can 
one do with the GREAT MYSTERY of Maeterlinck’s little 
plays, [from] which one has never parted? What can one 
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123 This essay was probably revised for the occasion of the 1987 performances The Machine of 
Love and Death, although, as Pleśniarowicz (2005a: 575) notes, Kantor may have been revising 
notes made at or nearer the time of the earlier 1938 production.
124 See Appendix 1.24 for a brief account of the Bauhaus ʻlittle yellow booksʼ.
do with the CHARMS cast by Mr. Wyspiański, with the 
Wawel Castle, the HUT in Bronowice, with the growing 
OBSESSION of Kafka’s attics, or finally with Bruno 
Schulz’s RUBBISH HEAP overgrown with burdocks and 
nettles…
(Ibid.; ellipsis in original)
As Kantor was later to note in the 1970s in Theatrical Place:
I was particularly sensitive to the problem of fate and 
death. These were the traces left by the symbolist tradition 
of Maeterlinck and Wyspiański. This was why, despite the 
fact that I admired it greatly, the cold scaffolds of pure 
constructivism were alien to me. M O O D was more 
important—my own, inner, dramatic, tragic mood with all of 
its formalistic consequences, which were not always in 
agreement with the radicalism of an abstract construction
—an abstract construction which was at that time the only 
one that could express that truth I was after. But this was 
not abstraction in its pure sense.
(Kantor 2009c: 330)
As I will argue, Kantor’s distinction between an ‘older’ Symbolism and a 
fashionably ‘new’ abstraction is perhaps something of a smokescreen, and that 
ideas underlying the abstraction of Suprematism and Constructivism also 
underly Kantor’s aesthetic of the ‘poor object’. In any case, Kantor’s 
‘abstraction’, and his development of it, were not, as he argues, ‘abstraction in 
its pure sense’—it was not abstraction and fragmentation for its own sake. His 
aesthetic does not look like that of Cubism, Suprematism or Constructivism 
because it has another motive.
On the surface it seems strange that Kantor should, in effect, imply a 
denial of any continuous presence or influence of the abstraction of 
Constructivism and the Bauhaus in his work; that it should instead appear to 
effectively ‘bookmark’ his career by resurfacing towards its end in this way. It is 
strange because there are other indications that Constructivism haunted 
Kantor’s mature work in his last three major spectacles. In Let the Artists Die 
(1985) the actors are fastened into wooden mechanical contraptions that force 
them into tortured versions of the poses of the medieval Nuremberg artist 
Stoss’s figures at the base of his triptych of the Assumption of the Virgin in St. 
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Mary’s Basilica in Kraków. These ‘torture machines’ are reminiscent of some of 
the merz sculptures of Kurt Schwitters, an artist who came to practice on the 
threshold between Dada and Constructivism in the 1920s. Also in the 1985 
production, the ‘barricade’ assembled at that spectacle’s finale can be seen as 
a ‘poor’ version of typical Soviet Constructivist stage design. In I Shall Never 
Return (1988), the setting is an inn—‘a kind of a b s t r a c t i o n of a 
dive’ (Kantor in Kraszewski 1995: 302 and Kantor 2005b: 111)—presided over 
by a ‘Constructivist-innkeeper’ who sets the square tin-topped tables and stools 
in strict lines and measures them obsessively with a folding ruler (an obsessive 
action that had already appeared in Where are the Snows of Yesteryear (1979) 
and Wielopole, Wielopole (1980)). In Today is My Birthday (1991) the 
Constructivist theatre director Meyerhold is invoked as witness to artistic 
martyrdom, alongside Kantor’s late Polish colleagues in the Kraków avant-
garde, the abstractionists Jarema and Stern.125
These, apparently fragmentary, scattered references to Constructivism 
suggest one of two possibilities concerning what happened to the influence of 
this tendency in Kantor’s notionally ‘Constructivist-free’ work in the years from 
1944 to 1986. On the one hand the Constructive references and elements 
discernable in Kantor’s early (pre-1944) and later (post-1985) work and 
discourse could be understood as merely superficial features of his work, the 
youthfully exuberant responses to early influences in the earlier period or 
something ‘tacked on’ to his aesthetic in his later work. On the other hand they 
could indicate a deeper vein of continuous influence underlying his work 
stemming from a particular understanding of ‘Constructivism’ and associated 
tendencies. One reading of Kantor’s narrative of his career as a linear 
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125 Stern is, strictly speaking, not a ʻpureʼ abstractionist. His paintings featured real materials 
that had an autobiographical and metaphysical resonance, such as earth and ground-up human 
bone, which reflected his experience of surviving a mass exterminations following deportation 
from the Lwów ghetto in 1943 (Di Mambro 1991: 19 and 21, and Kantor 2005b: 301–303). 
However, this could be said to point up a certain non-illusionary aspect of much ʻabstractionʼ 
from the first avant-garde. The Cubists and Futurists frequently made use of real materials in 
the painted surfaces, as did Constructivists such as Tatlin, Rodchenko and Popova. As I will 
discuss later in this chapter, the same can be said of icon painters and of Malevichʼs Black 
Square, which was after all, a real black square. The distinction between Jarema and Stern is 
one between a particular personal articulation of this latter practice and a more ʻpureʼ, ʻcoolʼ, 
geometrical abstraction that later came to characterise the ʻInternationalʼ style.
progression favours the former analysis. However, Kantor constructed and 
reconstructed his own revisionist self-narratives at different stages in his career. 
This self-reflexive tendency, by which Kantor ‘recognises himself’126 in different 
ways, suggests instead a non-linear way of understanding his artistic 
development.
The Suprematist zero—looking to the future or to the past? Suprematism 
Constructivism, and the critique of Euclidean space
Jorge Luis Borges, in his 1942 essay ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’, 
makes the observation that: ‘there is no classification of the universe that is not 
arbitrary and speculative’ (Borges 2001: 231). In the now oft-cited passage 
concerning ‘a certain Chinese encyclopaedia called the Heavenly Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge’,127 a bizarre and seemingly arbitrary division of the 
animal kingdom is alphabetically catalogued, ending with the category ‘n’: 
‘those that at a distance resemble flies’ (Ibid.).
In her book Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in 
East and West (2000), Susan Buck-Morss notes that: ‘It was only in the 1960s 
that Western art historians constructed retroactively an international narrative of 
the artistic “avant-garde,” in which the Russian modernists figured as a critically 
important moment’ (Buck-Morss 2000: 60). As a consequence ‘The term 
“Russian avant-garde” was applied systematically only after the fact […] 
codified by Camilla Gray in her pioneering account, published in 1962, The 
Great Experiment: Russian Art 1863–1922’ (Buck-Morss 2000: 303, note 78).128 
Viewed ‘at a distance’ from the present, ‘Constructivism’ as a category has 
tended to be seen as a tendency in opposition to Suprematism. Indeed, 
Russian Constructivism can seem more distant from Suprematism when seen 
through the veil of ‘International Constructivism’—a tendency that evolved in the 
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126 See Agambenʼs discussion of Linnaeusʼs classification of human being cited in chapter five.
127 This passage was introduced into recent theoretical discourse in Foucault 2002: xvi–xvii.
128 Grayʼs book was republished in 1986 with the title The Russian Experiment in Art: 1863–
1922 (Gray 1986). According to Buck-Morss, Grayʼs book ʻset the logic of the discourse, 
connecting Russian artistic modernism to developments in Western Europe. In the 1960s, 
Soviet artists rediscovered the avant-garde of the twenties, often through Western 
publicationsʼ (Buck-Morss 2000: 303, note 78).
wake of the diaspora of original Russian, German and Eastern European artists 
who were fleeing Nazi and Stalinist repression. ‘International Constructivism’ is 
indeed an aesthetic of hard and clean geometric patterns (for example, see the 
account of ‘Constructivism’ in Rickey 1995). However, the Constructivism of the 
Russian and early Soviet avant-garde, until the early 1920s, was a much more 
confused and fuzzy entity during its period of evolution, only later spawning a 
tendency with a specific, separate and more utilitarian identity. The tendency in 
twentieth-century art history to distinguish between Malevich’s Suprematism, 
and the Constructivism of figures like Tatlin, Popova and Rodchenko, is a 
distinction (in any case one largely based on the personal animosity between 
Malevich and Tatlin) that Kantor seems not to recognise. In this, at least in 
terms of the metaphysics of abstraction that concerned him—an ‘impure 
abstraction’ that could deal with his ‘own, inner, dramatic, tragic mood with all of 
its formalistic consequences’—Kantor can be seen to be entirely justified.
In chapter three I discussed the philosophical context of the problem of 
representation in the context of Heideggerʼs reading of Platoʼs Allegory of the 
Cave. I argued, in employing a more performative notion of human being and 
reality, that the ontology implied by Kantorʼs work escaped conventional notions 
of the artwork as representation-as-copy that had been the basis of Platoʼs 
criticism of art. One interpretation of Heideggerʼs narrative temporalisation of 
the Cave is that the enlightened prisoner, returning to the cave after being 
educated in the ʻGoodʼ of ʻTruthʼ in the sunlit world of the eidē or forms outside, 
is, logically, a messenger from eternity. If the truth of the forms is atemporal 
then the educated ex-prisoner is truly an emissary from that eternal realm: one 
who has crossed the threshold between time and timelessness. In an address 
to the Sociétés de Philosophie de Langue Française given in 1980, Jacques 
Derrida characterised the problematic of representation in just this way, as a 
ʻsendingʼ or ʻdispatchʼ—as envoi of truth (Derrida 2007). For Derrida the 
appearance of the envoi is not separate from that which it represents. Such a 
revision of the relationship between truth and representation derives from 
Heideggerʼs deconstruction of Platoʼs Allegory into a narrative economy. The 
ʻimageʼ of truth enshrined in Platoʼs cave is seen in terms of a necessarily 
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structured process of disclosure or alētheia. The point of invoking Heideggerʼs 
radicalisation of Platoʼs model is to suggest a different way of understanding 
representation, one that rescues artworks from the Platonic stigmatisation of 
being ʻmereʼ copies. For Heidegger, the point of Platoʼs allegory was that, 
although the situation of the prisoners in the cave was the reality of human 
being, it was only one part of its potential scope. The transformation of the one 
prisoner into the messenger or envoi, returning from beyond as the 
representative of truth and eternity, reveals the underlying true nature of the 
cave-prison. It allows the ʻimperfectʼ, ʻcopyʼ of reality—the restricted situation of 
the prisoners and the partial nature of their phenomenal world, their world of 
appearances—to be understood as an integrated part of one economy. In the 
same way that early Christians understood Godʼs Creation as a divine 
ʻeconomyʼ,129 and his plan for its redemption in terms of the Holy Trinity as a 
Trinitarian Oikonomia or ʻeconomy of the Trinityʼ, so Heideggerʼs reading of 
Platoʼs Cave allows reality and human being to be seen as an economic 
ordering. Such an ʻeconomy of truthʼ is also an inherent part of the Orthodox 
iconʼs uncanny power to act as the envoi of truth from ʻthe other worldʼ and 
recent research130 has identified a strong relationship between the metaphysics 
of icons and the early twentieth-century avant-gardes in contemporaneous 
Russian writing.
In his manifesto ‘From Cubism and Futurism to Suprematism: The New 
Painterly Realism’, written for ‘“0,10” (Zero-Ten). The Last Futurist Exhibition of 
Painting’ in 1915, Kazimir Malevich stated that ‘A painted surface is a real, living 
form’ (Malevich 2011: 118), and that the figure in his most (in)famous painting 
Black Square (1915)131 was: ‘The face of the new art […] the living, regal 
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129 In the sense of ʻhousehold managementʼ from the ancient Greek oikonomia from oikos 
ʻhouseʼ and nemein ʻmanageʼ. The theological sense is in the form of a conceit of God 
managing the household of Being or Creation (see Mondzain 2005, Buck-Morss 2007 and 
Agamben 2011c).
130 For example see Florensky 2002a, Spira 2008 and Antonova 2010.
131 According to Drutt 2003, Malevich painted three more versions of his Black Square after the 
1915 exhibition, dated 1923, 1929 and a fourth version thought to have been painted in the 
1930s (see Drutt 2003: 26 and 31, note 33).
infant’ (Ibid.: 122). The sense of vitality that the Parisian informel artists of the 
1940s and 1950s were trying to give to their ‘formless’ abstractions was, in 
Malevich’s characterisation, already present in the painted geometrical forms on 
his canvases in that 1915 exhibition. In the work that he exhibited there, 
Malevich declared: ‘I have transformed myself in the zero of form and through 
zero have reached creation, that is, Suprematism, the new painterly realism—
non-objective creation’ (Ibid.). In a 1916 letter to Alexander Benois, Malevich 
further described his Black Square as the ‘single bare and frameless icon of our 
time’ (Malevich, cited in Douglas 1980: 59). As Christine Lodder notes, the 
placement of Malevich’s Black Square diagonally across the corner of the room 
‘recalled the position of the icon in the Russian Orthodox home, possessing 
metaphysical connotations’ (Lodder 2008: 193).
As Norbert Linton notes in his book Tatlin’s Tower (2009), the ‘Zero-Ten’ 
exhibition ‘contained two major works presented as icons’ (Linton 2009: 50); 
these works were Malevich’s Black Square and Tatlin’s Corner Counter Relief 
(1915). Although Malevich and Tatlin quarrelled during this exhibition (see 
Linton 2009: 51), the genesis of a mutual antipathy that was never resolved, 
both artists seemed to share a preoccupation with icons. Tatlin had trained as 
an icon painter in 1902 (Lodder 1983: 8) and he was acquainted with the 
influential artist Natalia Goncharova, who maintained a keen interest in icons. 
There had also been an exhibition of icons two years earlier in Moscow in 1913 
(Lodder 1983: 11–12, and 269 note 29) that may have maintained a high level 
of interest in this artform amongst this circle of artists. Andrew Spira has noted 
in detail in his book The Avant-Garde Icon: Russian Avant-Garde Art and the 
Icon Painting Tradition (2008) how the interest in icons was shared, for various 
reasons, across the range of artistic trends in the Russian and early Soviet 
avant-gardes.
The connection between Suprematism and Constructivism through their 
shared interest in icons has tended to be overlooked in post-1960s mainstream 
art-historical narratives of that period. Instead, a narrative of the various 
practices of the first avant-garde has come to dominate. This is one that sees 
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the early twentieth-century Russian avant-garde as part of a decisive break with 
a more conventional idea of realism. This was a break that began with Post-
Impressionism, where the illusory painterly space ‘behind’ the picture surface 
began to advance towards, and dissolve into, the texture and geometry of the 
painted surface of the picture plane itself, as seen, for example, in the works of 
Cézanne, Gauguin and Seurat. With the move from Analytical to Synthetic 
Cubism in the work of Braque and Picasso, the reality of the painted surface 
becomes the subject itself as ‘real’ objects such as wallpaper, newspaper or 
rope were incorporated into the ‘picture’, alluding to the object concerned. 
Alongside this move towards abstraction the ensuing experiments of Russian 
Cubo-Futurism continued the exploration of ways of representing the three-
dimensionality of reality in painting, as well as its temporal dimension in the 
form of attempts to represent movement. The key moment in this narrative is 
reached with Malevich’s development of his ideas in his Suprematism, and its 
(literally) iconic apotheosis in the Black Square. In this work the ‘zero’ of 
representation, as Malevich argues, is reached: the painted black square no 
longer represents its subject; it is a painted black square.
In this erasure of representation, the depth of the pictorial space vanishes, 
advancing from the depths of the fictional world of the painting towards the 
reality of the two-dimensional picture surface itself. And, in doing so, the fictional 
pictorial space approaches the three-dimensional reality of the spectator. 
Following the example of some Futurist works, Russian Constructivism, the 
movement commonly seen as following Suprematism and as existing in 
opposition to it, went even further in this regard and, in the form of works such 
as Vladimir Tatlin’s Corner or Counter Relief (1915, also shown in the ‘Zero-
Ten’ exhibition), abandoned the picture frame altogether, advancing beyond it to 
invade the actual space of the spectator.
This tendency in early Modernist paintings of a movement through the 
picture plane towards the spectator can be seen as a movement in precisely the 
opposite direction to that implied by the illusory depth of the picture space 
established in Renaissance linear and optical perspective. In his 1927 essay 
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Perspective as Symbolic Form (1991), Erwin Panofsky notes the Renaissance 
German artist Albrecht Dürer’s (1471–1528) characterisation of this system of 
perspective in which he defines the Latin word perspectiva as ‘seeing through’. 
According to Panofsky this engenders a concept of perspective as one in which 
the picture is:
transformed into a ‘window’ [and] we are meant to believe 
we are looking through this window into a space. The 
material surface upon which the individual figures or 
objects are drawn or painted or carved is thus negated, 
and instead reinterpreted as a mere ‘picture plane.’ Upon 
this picture plane is projected the spatial continuum which 
is seen through it and which is understood to contain all 
the various individual objects.
(Panofsky 1991: 27)
Through this ‘window’132 the mind of the spectator is drawn into the illusion of 
depth amongst the objects represented in the ‘space’ of this rendered world. In 
this system, the surface of visually perceived reality forms the supposed ‘base’ 
of a ‘visual pyramid’, the vertex of which sits on the perceptive surface inside 
one of the eyes of the observer. Lines of sight are characterised as ‘visual rays’, 
which, according to Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472) in his treatise On Painting
(1966), ‘carry the form of the thing seen to the sense’ (see Alberti 1966: 45–46). 
These lines emanate from the visual world and converge on the eye of the 
observer in a single point. The picture plane, as Panofsky notes, intersects this 
visual pyramid such that, if it were to record the rays at the points they passed 
through it, it would reproduce the scene as perceived by the observer exactly. 
For Panofsky, pictures constructed according to this system obey a consistent 
set of laws leading to now familiar features such as a vanishing point (or points), 
a horizon line and the progressive diminution in size of equal dimensions as 
they recede in space (Panofsky 1991: 28).
Paradoxically, because parallel lines appeared to converge, from the 
viewer’s perspective, within the visual field, and coincidentally, because figures 
and objects appear to diminish in size according to distance, a second cone or 
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132 Panofsky notes Albertiʼs account in On painting: ʻI inscribe a quadrangle […] which is 
considered to be an open window through which I see what I want to paintʼ (Alberti 1966: 56).
pyramid is suggestively implied ‘behind’ the picture plane mirroring the one 
emanating from the viewer’s eye; that is, its base sits on the reverse side of the 
picture plane and its vertex lies on the central vanishing point to which parallel 
lines converge and towards which objects diminish in size (see Edgerton 1975: 
136–137).133 As Rudolf Arnheim notes in his 1972 essay ‘Inverted Perspective 
in Art: Display and Expression’, the effect of this linear perspectival system is of 
a sense of movement from the viewer into the illusory depth of the painting: 
‘Any convergent shape creates a sense of movement in the direction of its 
apex. […] the dominant direction of central perspective is that of leading the 
viewer into pictorial space towards the apex of the [second] visual pyramid, the 
vanishing point’ (Arnheim 1972: 133). Viewers of pictures constructed according 
to this system are therefore placed in a powerfully panoptic relationship in which 
the spatial world of the picture is laid out passively before their gaze.
A non-Euclidean alternative: The peculiar aesthetic of Byzantine and 
Russian icons
In contrast to the homogeneous space created by linear and optical 
perspective, the artists of the Russian avant-garde seemed to favour what 
appears at first glance to be a reverse arrangement. This is one in which the 
vanishing point in effect lies before the picture, in the place where the spectator 
is standing. Instead of the sense of space receding into an imaginary ‘picture 
space’ behind the canvas, attention is drawn to the surface of the work itself as 
a reality and a part of the space before it. It is as if the work is entering the room 
to fix the spectator in its gaze, rather than inviting the spectator’s gaze to enter 
an imaginary world behind and within it. As noted above, commentators such as  
Lodder, Linton and Spira have observed that these Russian artists had an 
indigenous national example of just such a reverse arrangement in the form of 
the Russian icon, a tradition dating back to the country’s conversion to 
Christianity by the Byzantine empire in 988 AD. Commonly painted on a doska 
(wooden board), the Russian icon shared with its earlier Byzantine predecessor 
a heavily stylised aesthetic that sought to convey the holy rather than the 
224
133 For a discussion of Brunelleschiʼs experimental set-up with the mirror, see Appendix 1.26.
human reality of the image. In a manner mirrored by the Cubists and Cubo-
Futurists the surface texture and beauty of the painting was highlighted and no 
attempt was made to disguise the reality of the icon as a painted object 
occupying the same space as the spectator. As such, no consistent use was 
made of the geometry of linear and optical perspective and it was not employed 
as a unifying system for creating a ‘world’ in the painting into which the viewer 
was to be drawn. Instead, the icon operated as a ‘window onto eternity’, except 
that this was a window through which the eternal world gazed onto the world of 
the spectators as much as they gazed onto it. Eternity, as represented by the 
face of Christ or the saints, returns each spectator’s gaze with a total and 
chilling implacability.
 This metaphysics of the icon, which posits the manifestation of a ‘real’ 
presence in our reality as an emissary or envoi from a more ‘real’ but concealed 
reality—a ‘reality behind reality’—comes directly from the Byzantine techniques 
developed to answer the iconoclasts’ accusations of idolatry. The icon had to be 
an image that was true, an artefact that instantiated the paradox of the ‘true 
copy’—a material reality in this world that in its formal arrangement and 
construction was an envoi or messenger from the next. From the perspective of 
this ‘real’ reality the painting is not seen as a copy or Platonic simulacrum, but is  
rather understood to create its own reality derived from the eternal world. The 
icon’s role was therefore not to create illusion but to exist as a real object in this 
world and act as a window or interface with eternity. (Adding a further layer of 
metaphorical complexity, icons are also sometimes dizzyingly described as 
mirrors not of this world, but of the next.) Consequently, the elements depicted 
by icons do not invite the viewer to look through them voyeuristically as into an 
illusory ‘real’ world created by the trick of linear and optical perspective. This 
would be too passive a role for something that was thought to be an active 
intermediary from eternity. In icons, the image is flat and often draws as much 
attention to its surface and its frame. Also, icons were often encased in silver 
sculpted coverings with apertures for the hands and faces of the figures to show 
through. Iconographers were unafraid of acknowledging the material presence 
of their work because they did not rely on the illusory tricks of realistic painting. 
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In this they demonstrate a commonality with aspects of Suprematist and 
Constructivist art.
The peculiar presence of the figure depicted in the icon is managed 
through the use of several artistic techniques, analogous to some of those used 
by Suprematist and early Constructivist artists. One of these is the use of a 
concept of ‘rhythm’, a sense of the dynamic relationship or interplay between 
the ‘space’ of the picture-world, the surface of the picture plane, and the space 
of the viewer in front of it. Another technique is the use of a non-perspectival 
sense of light. Further, the concept of simultaneous time is also employed in 
icons to depict non-contiguous biblical narratives in the same work. There are 
also various other ways in which the laws of perspective are apparently 
disregarded through the use of what Antonova has termed ‘supplementary 
planes’ or spaces, that is, surfaces or objects that would not normally be 
observable under the laws of linear and optical perspective. Iconographers 
adhere to strict canonical features and characteristics of biblical figures and 
saints, and install the personage into the icon through a dynamic and abstract 
compositional arrangement of forms that make up the figures and background. 
Key to this is the use of a range of strategies that have become known by the 
blanket terms of ‘reverse’ or ‘inverse perspective’. As I have noted, in what is 
now seen as traditional Renaissance or linear and optical perspective, lines 
converge towards the centre of the picture plane to create an illusion of a cone 
of depth that vanishes into the picture. This technique is based on the illusion 
that objects appear smaller the further away they are from the viewer. In reverse 
perspective, the opposite is the case. The cone of depth is reversed and objects 
in the icon, such as mountains, expand as they move away from the observer. 
Space in the icon unfurls around the spectator, and the only point at which the 
lines of sight intersect are the one where the viewer is standing. The spectator 
therefore is included in the icon. This is one of the reasons for the peculiar 
quality of icons, that they are often said to be alive, and that the eyes, which 
seem so abstract, seem to look directly at the observer in a particularly 
penetrating manner. Echoes of this projection by the artwork of its presence into 
the space of the viewer can be seen in Marjorie Perloff’s description of Tatlin’s 
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Corner Relief in her 1985 book The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant 
Guerre, and the Language of Rupture, which, she writes:
is perceived by the viewer as a forward projection from the 
actual walls upon which it is anchored. The thin and airy 
sheets of metal are assembled so as to extend outward 
into space rather than coalescing around a central core.
(Perloff 2003: 71)
As noted above, Tatlin and artists such as Popova made non-representational 
use of real materials in their artworks. As Lodder (2008) observes:
Tatlin tends to be regarded as a staunch materialist, but 
this may have been overstated because of his rivalry with 
Malevich and later career as a designer. His paintings 
such as the Nude of 1913 had been based on the pictorial 
technique and composition of icon painting, while in his 
reliefs he sometimes used old icon boards and methods 
associated with icon painting. He also used ‘found’ 
materials, which bore the imprint of their experiences over 
time in the form of dents, scratches, etc. Indeed, the 
emerging concept of faktura (texture) in Russian art was 
closely associated with metaphysical notions. Vladimir 
Markov pointed out: ‘Through the resonance of the [icon’s] 
colours, the sound of the materials, the assemblage of 
textures (faktura), we call the people to beauty, to religion, 
to God’. Tatlin even confessed to Berthold Lubetkin that ‘if 
it were not for the icons… I should have remained 
preoccupied with water drips, sponges, rags and 
aquarelles’.
(Lodder 2008: 193–194, italics and ellipsis in original)
In his preoccupation with the ‘poor object’ and ‘poor reality’ Kantor can be seen, 
consciously or not, to be following Tatlin’s preoccupation with the metaphysics 
of faktura. In his own criticism of linear and optical perspective Kantor also 
seems to allude to a metaphysics of space analogous with that of icon painting. 
In his third Milano Lesson, Kantor criticises the homogenised space of linear 
and optical perspective:
The tradition of painting, starting with the Renaissance 
and the application of the laws of optical perspective found 
in the picture only a single space in force in the field of the 
entire image.
TENSION is created through the laws of perspective and 
this uniform, single space.
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ABSTRACTION has discovered and applied the law of 
MULTI-SPACE (This is my interpretation of this new 
space).
(Kantor 1991b: 33; my translation, see Appendix 1.25 for 
original Polish text)
The use of multiple planes and spaces within the same picture was something 
that the Cubists, Futurists and Russian Cubo-Futurists had experimented with. 
It is also, as noted by Antonova, who refers to this phenomenon as the use of 
‘supplementary’ or ‘simultaneous’ planes, predates the first-wave avant-garde 
as one of the characteristics of the use of space in Russian icons (see Antonova 
2010: 105).134
In addition, the presence of a sophisticated philosophical discourse at the 
heart of the early Russian and Soviet avant-gardes, exemplified by the writings 
of Pavel Florensky (to be discussed shortly), justifies a certain blurring of the 
distinction between artistic movements that have subsequently become ossified 
into the firmly divided categories of Suprematism and Constructivism. While it is 
true that these movements, to some extent, identified themselves around 
separate concerns, the distinction has tended to obscure the common 
metaphysical ground that united rather than divided them. The fascination with 
Orthodox icons shared by key practitioners of both movements, already noted, 
can be seen as a shared interest in icons as an antidote to a painterly realism 
that had been increasingly tested by Post-Impressionism, Cubism and Futurism. 
As the illusion of three-dimensional depth in the picture-space, created by the 
mastery of Renaissance linear and optical perspective, was increasingly 
brought forward towards the reality of the flatness of the two-dimensional plane 
of the canvas, the Byzantine tradition of the icon that had been inherited by the 
Russian Orthodox Church was seen as providing a ready-made alternative to 
what seemed to many, then, a spent historical model.
Artists like Malevich wanted to make an art that was real, not a 
representation based on the techniques of illusion, but on an idea of reality 
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134 See Appendix 1.27 for a brief account of Antonovaʼs new definition of ʻreverse perspectiveʼ 
as ʻsimultaneous planesʼ.
derived from the metaphysics of the Orthodox Church that was finding popular 
expression at the time in ideas about the ‘fourth dimension’ through such figures 
as Piotr Ouspensky and G. I. Gurdjieff. Malevich’s Suprematist canvases were 
not representations of geometrical shapes: they were those shapes. On the one 
hand they were representations of those figures floating in space. But, on the 
other hand, because of the nature of the figures and the ‘space’, presented only 
as a white background, they were simultaneously real in the sense that they 
were identical with the geometrical shapes that they manifested. These 
geometrical, two-dimensional figures performed the actual relationship that they 
were in with each other within their white ground. Also, the dynamic 
arrangement of each painting forms a further relationship in the perception of 
the spectator. Kantor discusses Malevich’s Black Square in The Milano 
Lessons:
Malevich’s square lives in its own realness. It is then an 
object. His imitators were nothing more than aesthetes.
This real square exists in the same way as self-generated 
notions function in geometry. To use a religious language
—this square is
G O D.
(Kantor 1993: 215)
As I will show, Kantor appropriated Malevich’s idea of the artwork as 
paradoxical ‘living object’—as something that is both dead and alive. The idea 
was ‘discovered’ with the ‘poor object’ of 1944 in the form of the ‘reality of the 
lowest rank’ of objects such as the chair, the muddy cartwheel and the plank of 
wood. It was ‘rediscovered’ in 1975 with the ideas surrounding the ‘bio-object’ 
and the actor-as-dead-person: the conception behind the ‘theatre of death’ was 
of a performance that, like the ‘poor object’ occurred at the threshold between 
the garbage dump and eternity, between this life and the next.
Pavel Florensky and the aesthetics of eternity: ‘Reverse Perspective’ and 
‘Reverse Time’ 
Panofsky’s 1927 critique of linear and optical perspective in Perspective as 
Symbolic Form was predated by a lecture written in 1919 and delivered in 1920 
(although not published until much later, in 1967) by the Russian theologian, 
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mathematician, and philosopher Pavel Florensky. Entitled ‘Obratnaia 
perspektiva’ (Reverse Perspective), this lecture was delivered to the Byzantine 
Section of MIKhIM,135 and, in it, Florensky developed his ideas on space and 
spatiality in the work of art. These were subsequently the main topic of his 
teaching in the classes he taught at VKhUTEMAS between 1921 and 1924 
(See Misler in Florensky 2002: 199).136 Florensky’s lecture is ostensibly a 
spirited defence of what appear to be the peculiarities of spatiality in Russian 
icon painting, derived from the aesthetic traditions of Byzantine art:
Those who become acquainted with Russian icons of the 
fourteenth, fifteenth and part of the sixteenth centuries for 
the first time are usually astonished by the unexpected 
perspectival relationships, especially in the depiction of 
objects with flat sides and rectilinear edges, as for 
instance buildings, tables and chairs, and especially 
books, specifically the Gospels which the Saviour and the 
saints are usually shown holding. These particular 
relationships stand in glaring contradiction to the rules of 
linear perspective, from whose viewpoint they can only be 
considered examples of crudely illiterate drawing.
(Florensky 2002: 201)
In his defence of these peculiarities of icon art Florensky goes far beyond 
Panofsky’s 1927 critique of linear and optical perspective and in doing so, 
develops a metaphysical aesthetics that, in many ways, parallels that of 
Malevich who was his contemporary. Indeed, although Florensky’s interests 
were predominantly spiritual, mathematical and philosophical, he was familiar 
with the currents of interest in the Russian artistic avant-garde and was 
acquainted with some of its key practitioners.137 In his essay Florensky is keen 
to champion a theory of art that, like Malevich’s, is anti-representational. In 
doing so, he directly equates linear and optical perspective with the traditional 
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135 See Appendix 28.
136 See Appendix 28.
137 Before teaching at the Vkhutemas for example, Florensky was on visiting terms with the 
Constructivist artist Liubov Popova and her circle, which included artists such as Vladimir Tatlin 
(see Pyman 2010: 128–129).
Platonic notion of representational imitation.138 In a passage that identifies the 
root of representationality as lying in the ancient theatre, the task of painting, 
Florensky argues:
is not to duplicate reality, but to give the most profound 
penetration of its architectonics, of its material, of its 
meaning. And the penetration of this meaning, of this stuff 
of reality, its architectonics, is offered to the artist’s 
contemplative eye in living contact with reality, by growing 
accustomed to and empathising with reality, whereas 
theatre decoration wants as much as possible to replace 
reality with its outward appearance. The aesthetics of this 
outward appearance lie in the inner connectedness of its 
elements, but in no way is it the symbolic signifying of the 
prototype via the image, realised by means of artistic 
technique. Stage design is a deception, albeit a seductive 
one; while pure painting is, or at least wants to be, above 
all true to life, not a substitute for life but merely the 
symbolic signifier of its deepest reality. Stage design is a 
screen that thickens the light of existence, while pure 
painting is a window opened wide on reality. […] And so, 
presupposing that the spectator or the stage designer was 
chained fast, like the prisoner of Plato’s cave, to a theatre 
bench and neither could nor should have a direct vital 
relationship to reality, these first theoreticians of 
perspective provided rules for a deception that ensnared 
the theatre spectator as if he were separated from the 
stage by a glass barrier and there were just one immobile 
eye, observing without penetrating the very essence of life 
and, most important, with his will paralysed, for the very 
essence of a theatre that has become mundane demands 
a will-less looking at the stage, as at some ‘untruth’, 
something ‘not really there’, some empty deception. 
Anaxagoras and Democritus replace the living man with a 
spectator, paralysed by curare, and so they thereby make 
clear the rules for deceiving this spectator.
(Florensky 2002: 209–210, italic and underlined emphases  
in original)
A number of key ideas that have been discussed in previous chapters, and that 
occur in some of Kantor’s Theatrical Place essays, are anticipated and 
combined in this passage. Firstly, as with the Polish notion of informe seen in 
Kantor’s postwar work, reality is conceived of as a living phenomenon, and 
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138 Discussed in chapter three of this thesis.
painting as participating in that liveness. Secondly, theatre is demonised as a 
falsifier of reality, in opposition to fine art, a recurrent theme of Kantor’s. Thirdly, 
the art of theatre is likened to a ‘screen’ that obscures the real, while ‘pure 
painting’ is ‘a window opened wide on reality’. This idea stands in opposition to 
Dürer’s notion of the ‘transparent’ nature of perspective mentioned by Panofsky. 
For Florensky, the painting is not a window in the sense of the picture plane as 
conceived by Alberti and Dürer. (In any case, the system of linear and optical 
perspective, as the 1425 demonstration of Filippo Brunelleschi reveals, requires 
the logic of the reflecting mirror to reveal its Euclidean geometry, rather than the 
transparency of a window.) For Florensky, ‘pure painting’ is, rather, a 
metaphorical window, a symbol of direct communion with a reality behind 
appearances, rather than a view onto those appearances themselves. This is 
an idea that comes from the metaphysics of icons. Fourthly, the analogy with 
Plato’s Cave is evoked to describe the relation between the stage and the 
spectator. For Florensky, the spectator is chained in position before the stage 
and separated from it as if by a ‘glass barrier’. And, as in Agamben’s critique of 
the aesthetic relation discussed in chapter four, the living human being is 
replaced with a ‘spectator’—an immobile simulacrum of a real human being, a 
figure ‘paralysed by curare’—a replacement necessary to fit in with the 
particular logic of linear and optical perspective. As I will show later in this 
chapter, these four ideas point directly towards Kantor’s concerns with art and 
representation and resonate strongly with his theoretical discourse.
As Clemena Antonova observes in her book Space, Time, and Presence 
in the Icon: Seeing the World with the Eyes of God (2010), Florensky’s critique 
of linear and optical perspective was based on, and justified by, his 
understanding of nineteenth-century scientific research (Antonova 2010: 32). 
He was attempting to defend icon art in an official culture that, at the time, was 
beginning to seek to devalue it. His discourse around reverse perspective 
demonstrates a sophisticated argument against conventional realism, and 
represents an appeal to older traditions in support of what was otherwise 
perceived as ‘new’ and forward-looking. As Antonova notes, the advocacy of the 
peculiarities of icon painting:
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originated at a particular point in the development of early 
modernism, when traditional ideas about geometrical and 
physical space were breaking down both in science and 
art. The ‘reverse perspective’ of ‘ancient’ Russian art was 
hailed as a prophetic kind of non-Euclidean geometry. It is 
evident that this argument suited the Russian aspirations 
of re-validating ancient Russian art as a counter to the 
Western naturalistic tradition.
(Antonova 2010: 60–61)
Whilst this is undoubtedly true, it is also true that for philosophically minded 
artists such as Malevich, and artistically minded philosophers such as Florensky 
the point about criticising the Western naturalistic tradition was not the question 
of whether a work of art ‘looked like’ reality; it was not a question of knowledge, 
of epistemology. It was rather a metaphysical question of existence, of being, of 
ontology. The tessellated canvases of the Cubists and Futurists, and the 
geometric abstractions of the Suprematists, might not, on the surface have 
looked much like the apparently anti-geometrical formlessness of Kantor’s 
informel canvasses of the late 1950s and early 1960s, but what was at stake 
was very similar: an attempt to articulate the being of reality, its ‘is-ness’ and to 
liberate it from the suffocating constraints of existing systems. That this turn 
from epistemology to ontology should be expressed from ‘within the realm it 
purports to attack’ is often the nature of the avant-garde. There is, perhaps, no 
choice but to détourne the tools to hand: thus ‘perspective’ becomes ‘reversed’ 
to sabotage the rationale of the dominant practice. This détournement of 
representational terminology can unfortunately lead to the sense that what was 
happening in the avant-garde of pre-Revolutionary Russia and the first years of 
the Soviet Union was a change in representational practices. This is to 
misunderstand the break with realism. Malevich was very clear when he 
declared in his 1915 manifesto: ‘I have transformed myself in the zero of form 
and through zero have reached creation’ (Malevich 2011: 122). In this sense art 
was about creation rather than representation.
What the early twentieth-century break with linear and optical perspective 
reveals is an engagement with, and questioning of, the nature of subjectivity 
that the Renaissance development prefigured and prepared the ground for. As 
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Panofsky observes, linear and optical perspective ‘was a translation of 
psychophysiological space into mathematical space; in other words, an 
objectification of the subjective’ (Panofsky 1991: 66). Moreover, ‘Perspective, in 
transforming the ousia (reality) into the phainomenon (appearance), seems to 
reduce the divine to a mere subject matter for human consciousness; but for 
that very reason, conversely, it expands human consciousness into a vessel for 
the divine’ (Ibid.: 72). It was noted in chapter five that Rembrandt’s Anatomy 
Lesson had been interpreted as a portrayal of the Cartesian rational subject’s 
relationship with the objective world, a relationship in which the world is laid out 
like a corpse before the inquiring incorporeal soul. As Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr., 
argues at the end of The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective 
(1975: 164–165), the rapid popularisation of the perspectival system acted as a 
catalyst for the scientific revolution. This was characterised by the new 
perspectives opened up onto both the microcosm and the macrocosm, as 
enshrined in 1543 with the publication of the De humani corporis fabrica of 
Andreaus Vesalius and the De revolutionibus orbium coelestium of Nicolaus 
Copernicus. The impulse to conceptualise the relationship between the viewing 
subject and the objective world that was embodied in the linear perspectival 
model of Brunelleschi and Alberti was part of a shift in thinking that would lead 
to the Enlightenment scientific project. A certain idea of the domination of reality 
became possible because of the techniques and manner in which reality was 
‘rendered’ visualisable. As Robert D. Romanyshyn notes in his 2008 essay ‘The 
Despotic Eye: An Illustration of Metabletic Phenomenology and Its Implications’:
Fifteenth century linear perspective as a psychology of 
infinite distance places us in the world in such a way that 
we become fixed, immobile see-ers, visionaries if you will, 
who gaze upon the world as an object, as something over 
against us and to be viewed with the detachment of infinite 
distance.
(Romanyshyn 2008: 516)
For Panofsky:
the history of perspective may be understood […] as a 
triumph of the distancing and objectifying sense of the 
real, and as a triumph of the distance-denying human 
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struggle for control; it is as much a consolidation and 
systematization of the external world, as an extension of 
the domain of the self.
(Panofsky 1991: 67–68)
This sense of godlike separation from reality is, of course, an illusion. As was 
noted in chapter three, the practice of representation, whilst appearing to 
reproduce and copy, overlays reality with an appearance that can be controlled 
and manipulated. And, as noted in chapter five, in the practice of biopolitics and 
examples such as the Nazi’s treatment of the Jewish race this can have terrible 
consequences.
Seen in this context, the avant-garde idea of setting representation at zero 
to liberate reality acquires a certain metaphysical force. In Florensky’s terms, 
the perspective is reversed. Instead of the monarchical and voyeuristic 
relationship in which the artist-observer, and later the spectator, stand in an 
apparently privileged position as they gaze into the depths of the illusory picture 
plane, the viewer of Malevich’s Black Square is confronted and fixed by the 
work. As with the effect of icon paintings, the movement is in precisely the 
opposite direction to that of linear and optical perspective, hence Florensky’s 
use of the term ‘reverse perspective’. In the conception of art that emerged in 
the Russian and early Soviet avant-garde, the artist is a liberator of a reality that 
communicates with its spectators. Perhaps similarly to the way in which 
‘Tadeusz’s great head’, seen though the large magnifying lens, made such an 
impact on his first wife in the Museum de la Découverte in Paris in 1946, works 
such as Malevich’s Black Square and Tatlin’s Counter-Relief in the ‘Zero-Ten’ 
exhibition leapt out and shocked their audience in 1915. What both exhibitions 
had in common was the opening up of a window, in the symbolic sense that 
Florensky describes, that allows for the metaphysical shock of a direct 
communication between reality and human being. It is a shock because human 
being is itself figured by what is coming from the other side of the ‘window’; it is 
no longer in control, no longer in its illusory, sovereign, disembodied role that it 
had become habituated to through the long familiarity with linear and optical 
perspective. In his collection of writings from the seventies and eighties 
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Theatrical Place, Kantor cites his notes from 1961 concerning the wardrobe in 
which he set the ‘action’ of Witkacy’s 1921 drama The Country House. In this 
account, somewhat reminiscent of Schulz’s language around the descriptions of 
matter discussed in chapter five, the wardrobe does not open as if onto the 
linear and optical perspective of a box stage but instead:
It expands
on that other side.
Its wings,
like backstage, suddenly open up
to the deeper and murkier regions of 
this, one could say domestic, INTERIOR.
Now, in this oppressive and stifling climate,
dreams unfold,
the nightmares of the night are born,
the practices escaping the light of the day corrupt 
behaviours,
shameless and cruel,
are carried out.
Now—
and not in some mystical misty space—
but here, separated from the everyday reality by this thin 
and weak wall,
we feel that we touch upon the condition of non-existence
and Death.
(Kantor 2009c: 363)
The world that the wardrobe opens onto is that of the vitality of matter, as 
revealed by the 1947 exhibition at the Palais de la Découverte. This world is 
one that stares back at the spectator unlike the passive world of Enlightenment 
rational spatiality that the mechanisms of linear and optical perspective unfurled 
before its sovereign gaze. In 1980s Kantor created an installation artwork of the 
wardrobe with a naked male mannequin hanging from a coat hanger inside it 
(see Pleśniarowicz 2004: 82), ill.15). The work does not draw its viewers into its 
depths but confronts them directly from within its depths with the mannequin’s 
glassy gaze and humiliatingly revealed genitalia. As such, it operates in an icon-
like manner, similar to Malevich’s Black Square and Tatlin’s Corner Counter-
Relief.
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As I noted earlier, the fact that Malevich chose to display his Black Square 
diagonally across the corner of its exhibition space, and that Tatlin’s relief also 
occupied a corner from which it projected out into the spectator’s space was no 
accident. The Russian avant-garde’s interest in Russian icons extended to the 
spatial peculiarities in them that Florensky characterises under the term ‘reverse 
perspective’. Suprematism and Russian Constructivism have been understood 
as a utopian, forward-looking artistic movements, characterised, in the words of 
two of the artists from that period, Aleksandr Rodchenko and Olga Stepanova, 
by the slogan ‘The Future is Our Only Goal!’139 However, through their interest 
in icons, Malevich, Natalia Goncharova and Tatlin were just as much looking to 
the past for inspiration, to an Eastern ‘ancient’ tradition of sacred art inherited 
from Byzantium, as to the recent ‘new’ Western avant-gardes of Cubism and 
Futurism. And, as can be seen from the contemporary discourse exemplified by 
Florensky, the sense of mysticism characteristic of Russian Symbolism and its 
writers such as Andrei Bely, was completely woven into the fabric of the 
Russian avant-garde, linking it to a particular Eastern Christian sense of 
spiritual reality inherent in the Russian national psyche.140
It is not surprising therefore, that this ‘new’ Russian and early Soviet art 
had a strongly metaphysical character that sought to question the ontological 
nature of artistic practice. The break with illusory realism that occurred with the 
advent of Modernism is paradoxical in the sense that it is not a break with 
‘reality’ or the ‘truth’ as such. Artists still wished to engage with reality but saw 
that the realism facilitated by linear and optical perspective was simply an 
illusionistic method that created a representational barrier and concealed more 
than it revealed. Although they were almost certainly unknown to each other, in 
their discussions of art, the Russian Florensky and the German Heidegger are 
often remarkably sympathetic. As Antonova points out, in his discussions of art 
‘Heidegger’s highly specific language sounds at times close to’ Florensky’s 
valorisation of the symbolic in his discussions of icons. She goes on to argue 
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139 See Lavrentʼyev in Rodchenko and Stepanova 1991: 9.
140 For example, see Bely 1981 for his Symbolist reading of Anton Chekovʼs The Cherry 
Orchard.
that, whereas ‘Heidegger, as the romantics before him, sees the symbol at work 
in classical Greek art […] for Florensky it is the medieval Russian icon that is 
ultimately symbolic’ (Antonova 2010: 99 and 100). For Heidegger, ‘reality’ was 
‘is-ness’—the fact that there was something rather than nothing, the Being of 
being. Central to this ‘is-ness’ of reality was the being of human being, the ‘is-
ness’ on which the conscious awareness of reality is grounded. However, as 
discussed in chapter four, human being is already always subject to the same 
problem—that of its being already in its own ground, in mediis rebus—‘in the 
middest’—as Kermode puts it in The Sense of an Ending (1967: 7), the fact that 
one is always already in one’s experience of being. In a sense, and to borrow 
Kantor’s term (and to revisit the temporal sense of human being discussed in 
chapter three), human being is already emballaged (wrapped) in the very 
priorness of its own being; it is thrown ‘into the middest’ already enfolded 
between the concerns of its past experience and the anticipation of the future 
that arises from it. In his own way, Kantor expresses a similar point in his 1988 
piece for the monograph of his work Ma Création, Mon Voyage: Commentaires 
Intimes (1991a):
Human flesh is but
a fragile and ‘poetic’
Emballage, of
the skeleton, of death,
and of hope that it will last
until Doomsday.
(Kantor 2009d: 15)
This ‘emballage of being’ is its fundamental appearance for itself—the ‘skin’ 
through which everything is felt and experienced, the barrier between the 
Kantian ding an sich (thing in itself) and conscious awareness. In early 
Modernist painting, the picture plane becomes a metaphor for the barrier 
between the observer and visual reality. As Suchan noted of Kantor’s 
relationship with his informel paintings (discussed in chapter three), the way in 
which the picture plane is conceived is as much about the artist’s being (and 
therefore by implication humanity’s) as about the being of the truth of the reality 
that the artist is attempting to articulate, the being of the artwork itself. The ‘call 
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of being’ is one that comes from the depths of the soul just as much as it comes 
from the depth of things. It is in this sense that eternity, an impossible, ‘abstract’ 
and unreal concept from the human perspective, acquires its practical force. As 
Borges observed in 1936 in his history of eternity (Borges 2001c) ‘When we can 
feel this oneness [i.e. with reality], time is a delusion which the indifference and 
inseparability of a moment from its apparent yesterday and from its apparent 
today suffice to disintegrate’ (Ibid.: 138). This particular aspect of reality as it 
impinges on the awareness is, for Borges, ‘the true moment of ecstasy and the 
possible intimation of eternity’ (Ibid.: 139).
The emballage of the real: Florenskyʼs ʻreverse timeʼ
In his final theological work Iconostasis, composed in 1922, a work that 
explores the metaphysical significance of icons, Florensky attempts to articulate 
this relationship between the visible and the invisible and the nature of the 
barrier that separates them. In his opening discussion of the ‘spiritual structure 
of dreams’ he posits dreams as the threshold between the visible and invisible 
realms of reality. In doing so he engages in a discourse of dreams which does 
not so much follow Freud or suggest Surrealism, but rather seems to prefigure 
some of the concerns articulated by Schulz in his writings just over a decade 
later. Dreams, according to Florensky, are ‘our first and simplest […] entry into 
the invisible world […] This entry is, more often than not, the lowest’ (Florensky 
1996: 34). The chief characteristic that marks the dream world off from the 
visible world of waking reality, Florensky argues, is the behaviour of time. In a 
passage that anticipates the language of Schulz’s discussions of time, 
Florensky suggests that:
Few have sufficiently considered […] the infinite speed of 
the dream-time, the time that turns inside out, the time that 
flows backward. For, indeed, very long sequences of 
visible time can, in the dream, be wholly instantaneous—
and can flow from future to past, from effects to causes. 
This happens precisely when we are moving from the 
visible world to the invisible, between the actual and the 
imaginary.
(Ibid.: 35)
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Following on from the term used in the title of his lecture on ‘Reverse 
Perspective’, Florensky characterises this quality of dream-time as ‘reverse 
time’, where dream ‘flows reversely to what we expect when we think in the 
Kantian sense of time. […] here, in the time of the invisible world, it happens 
inside out’ (Ibid.: 41). So, in the dream, time flows in the reverse direction. 
Except, it also does this in no time, that is, according to Florensky ‘at infinite 
speed’ or, as a time that is ‘wholly instantaneous’ (Ibid.: 35). As Antonova points 
out in her analysis of Florensky’s discussion, ‘there are two interrelated features 
of reverse time—one is its direction, the other its duration’ (Antonova 2010: 21). 
This leads her to interpret Florensky’s ‘reverse time’ as ‘an in-depth reversal of 
kind. The very reversal of time suggests a lack of duration—this is exactly what 
“infinite in speed” and “instant” imply. The lack of duration […] is an aspect of 
the concept of timelessness’ (Ibid.: 22), that is to say, eternity. From his 
discussion and analysis Florensky concludes that:
dreams are the images that separate the visible world 
from the invisible—and at the same time join them. This 
boundary-space of the dream establishes the relationship 
of the dream images to this world as well as to that world. 
From the perspective of the visible world and its ordinary 
images (i.e., what we call ‘actuality’), a dream is ‘merely a 
dream,’ nothing—nihil visibile, yes nihil, but visible nothing, 
visible and perceptible and therefore always approaching 
the images of this ‘actuality.’ But time in the dream—i.e. its 
most general characteristic—runs reversely to time in the 
visible world. And therefore although it is something 
perceived, the dream is wholly teleological, saturated with 
the meanings of the invisible world, meanings that are 
invisible, immaterial, eternal yet nevertheless visibly 
manifest and (as it were) vividly material. A dream is 
therefore pure meaning wrapped in the thinnest 
membrane of materiality; it is almost wholly a 
phenomenon of the other world. The dream is the 
common limit of both the sequence of earthly states and 
the sequence of heavenly states, the boundary where the 
final determination of earth meet the increasing 
densifications of heaven. The dream makes into symbols 
this meeting of the lowest experiences of the highest world 
with the highest experience of the lowest world; thus the 
dream is the last splashes of the higher world into the 
lower—although the perceptible patterns of these 
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heavenly splashes are predetermined by our earthly 
circumstances.
[…]
A dream, then, is a sign of movement between two realms
—and also a symbol: of what? From the heavenly view , 
the dream symbolizes earth, from the earthly perspective, 
it symbolizes heaven. A dream therefore occurs when—
simultaneously but with differing orders of clarity—both 
shores of existence are give to consciousness. We might 
say, then, that a dream happens whenever we cross from 
one shore to the other: but it may be more accurate to say 
that the dream happens whenever our consciousness 
hugs the boundary of the crossing and therefore sustains 
the double perceptiveness that occurs whenever we either 
lightly dream or drowsily keep awake. 
(Florensky 1996: 42–43, emphases in original)
In this passage can be seen the traditional ontological ranking of heaven and 
earth and the explanation why the dreams are ranked as ‘low’ entrances to the 
eternal realm. Nevertheless, it is also possible to perceive in Florensky’s 
account of the liminal nature of dreams a metaphysical conception of the 
artwork that resonates not only with Malevich’s but also with the work of Schulz 
and Kantor. Earlier, in chapter two, I mentioned Sandauer’s citing of Mann’s 
view that: ‘the artist is a kind of Hermes mid-way between the lower and upper 
realm, between the subconscious and consciousness, body and 
spirit’ (Sandauer 1971: 96; my translation). In that instance Sandauer wished to 
characterise Schulz as just such a Hermes-like figure, and subsequently in 
chapter four, I argued that Kantor functioned as an artist in a similar way. This 
conception of an artist was already anticipated in Florensky’s discourse.
There can be a tendency to characterise abstraction, and especially 
Constructivism, as something more mechanical and functional rather than 
mystical and spiritual. However, such a characterisation is unjustified when 
Florensky’s work, little known in the West until relatively recently, is taken into 
account. The presence of this complex and sophisticated discourse around the 
metaphysical aesthetics of icons opens up the possibility that, in looking to the 
Eastern as well as to the Western avant-gardes, Kantor was as much 
influenced by these metaphysical-spiritual ideas as by more overtly artistic 
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considerations. Situated as he was, in Kraków in Poland, between Russia and 
Germany, Kantor was in the perfect geographical position to enjoy such a 
confluence of ideas. Kantor’s work developed in the context of this anti-
illusionistic-realist tenor of Modernism, partly in response to the first avant-garde 
and later, in response to the second wave of the 1950s and 1960s. As a Polish 
artist he was in both a marginal and privileged position. Marginal in the sense 
that he was interacting not at the heart, in Paris or New York, but in the 
sidelines, but privileged in the sense that his encounters could be refracted 
through the peculiarities of his own country’s Modernist traditions. As noted in 
chapter two, the Modernism of Poland’s interwar years, embodied in the 
triumvirate of Witkacy, Schulz and Gombrowicz was a specific processing of 
earlier Polish Romantic and Symbolist strains running deep through that culture. 
In the remainder of this chapter I will return to questions of representation and 
relate them both to the underlying metaphysical-spiritual currents in early 
Eastern-European Modernism and to Kantor’s preoccupations with the ‘poor 
object’ and the idiosyncratic sense in which he might now be understood to 
employ the term ‘Constructivism’.
Kantorʼs aesthetic of ʻPoor Realityʼ
In 1944, when Kantor began to forge ahead with an avant-garde appropriate to 
the conditions of war and German occupation, the ‘poor realism’ that he 
developed looked, on the surface, to be far removed from the ‘shiny’, new and 
colourful avant-garde that had developed in the East in Russian cities such as 
Moscow and St. Petersburg before and after the Bolshevik revolution. Although, 
in subsequent years, Kantor’s version of ‘avant-garde’ would often look much 
like many other contemporary avant-gardes (albeit with his own ‘spin’)—arte 
povera, informal, emballage (packaging), happenings—it did at least continue to 
develop, unlike the Russian avant-garde in the Soviet era which was stifled 
under Stalin and the hegemony of Socialist Realism. However, unlike these 
early Russian avant-gardes, which had a manifestly utopian tenor, united 
loosely under the banner, as noted earlier, of ‘the future is our only goal’, 
Kantor’s art seems to look in the opposite direction towards the past, in the 
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manner of Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’. One of the symbols of the avant-garde 
in the early Soviet era, El Lissitzky’s mechanoid New Man (1923), a figure 
derived from his ‘recasting’ of Malevich’s designs for the 1913 Cubo-Futurist 
opera Victory Over the Sun, appears to be striding confidently from left to right, 
symbolically, one assumes, into the brave new world of the future. Kantor’s art 
in contrast, from its very beginnings, yearns for the loss of the past: in his 1938 
production of The Death of Tintagiles, the sisters, Ygraine and Bellangère, 
mourn for their little brother Tintagiles, whose death, they fear, has occurred at 
the hands of their Queen on the other side the iron doors to her palace by which 
they wait; in his 1943 production of Balladyna, Kantor was looking back to a 
national classic from the era of Polish Romanticism with his revival of 
Słowacki’s 1834 tragedy; in Wyspiański’s The Return of Odysseus, the play that 
formed the basis of his 1944 production, the Sirens inform the eponymous hero 
that ‘No one alive will ever return a second time to the land of his 
youth’ (Wyspiański 1964: 65). Kantor’s postwar engagement with the European 
avant-gardes can be understood as a series of attempts to find new ways of 
making sense of his experience of occupation rather than attempts to look to 
the future. The revival of his interest in theatrical experimentation with the 
formation of Cricot 2 in 1955 was directed not towards new contemporary work 
but to the application of the latest avant-garde strategies to the work of Witkacy, 
an artist from the prewar avant-garde. For Kantor, artistic experimentation in 
postwar Poland was more about revivifying the past to revitalise the sense of 
Polish autonomous artistic identity, than it was about forging any sense of a 
utopian future (Communist or otherwise). In this sense the past for Poles 
became a form of resistance to a putative Soviet future. And, for Kantor, this 
identity-formation based on the past became more insistent as an artistic 
strategy with The Dead Class and the ‘theatre of death’. Towards the end of his 
life, in his 1987 self-portrait I have had enough of sitting in this painting, I’m 
leaving (to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter), Kantor depicts 
himself striding in the opposite direction from that of Lissitzky’s New Man, from 
right to left, and defiantly and contrarily stepping out of the confines of the 
canvas entirely, whilst looking over his shoulder perhaps at what might be 
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coming from the direction of the future. In his ‘continuation’ of the early 
twentieth-century Russian and Soviet avant-gardes, it would seem that what 
Kantor was choosing to continue was not the forward-looking utopianism, but 
rather the sense of ‘reverse time’ in the spirit of Florensky’s exposition of the 
metaphysics of icons. And similarly, whilst in Renaissance linear perspectival 
scheme, the subject’s attention is invited to ‘fall into’ a perception of the illusory 
perspectival space-world, in Kantor’s theatre and paintings this situation is also 
reversed: in one series of late paintings fictional figures emerge out of the frame 
into the spectator’s space and in Today is My Birthday, not only do figures ‘fall 
out of’ their paintings but the ‘dead’ invade the world of the living also.
Viewed in relation to icons, it is possible to understand that Kantor did 
not just regard Constructivism as a formal abstraction but was attuned to the 
kind of underlying metaphysical meaning these works had for artists like 
Malevich and Tatlin, and for commentators like Florensky, as I have 
discussed. Kantor’s shift in 1944 to the use of ‘poor objects’, and his 
renewed exploration of them with his later ‘theatre of death’, might seem a 
radical break with the aesthetic style of Constructivism, but as I will show, 
nevertheless constitutes a continuation of its underlying metaphysical 
concerns. In particular, there are strong parallels between some of 
Florensky’s concepts and Kantor’s explanation of his concerns in his 
writings around his ‘theatre of death’. It is in this sense that Kantor’s ‘poor 
objects’ can be seen to be icons, having the material, non-illusionistic 
presence of icons that use reverse perspective. Moreover, actors, whose 
mode of performing is modelled on the mannequin or the dead articulate the 
kind of reverse time that Florensky theorised. Together they comprise 
elements in Kantor’s ‘theatre of death’ that mediate between the ephemeral 
world and the eternal.
As noted in chapter one, the aesthetic of ‘Poor Reality’, and the ‘Poor 
Object’ were discovered, according to Kantor, during the preparation for his last 
Clandestine Underground production of Wyspiański’s The Return of Odysseus 
in Kraków in 1944, towards the end of the Nazi occupation. The setting of 
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Wyspiański’s drama, Kantor insisted, must be a room to which Odysseus ‘really 
returned’ (Kantor 2009a: 101 and 2009c: 349). It was a real room, part of a first-
floor apartment on ulica Grabowskiego 3 belonging to the Stryjeński family.141 
Kantor transformed this room into the place of performance in the following 
manner: 
In the room where The Return of Odysseus took place I 
did not make any decorations and there was no division 
between the stage and the house, so practically there was 
no borderline which usually marks the area of the stage, 
the space of illusion … . I said to myself that the room had 
to be real. I created a room destroyed by the War; it was 
real, because there were thousands of such rooms in 
Poland at that time. The room in Stryjenska’s flat had to be 
made up so that it looked destroyed. We damaged the 
walls so that bricks and rubble were seen; we broke up 
some of the floor; we brought old cardboard boxes from 
the attic; they were covered with lime and dust, and the 
spectators sat on them.
(Kantor in Pleśniarowicz 1994: 58–9; ellipsis in original)
In this final version of his 1944 Odysseus,142 Kantor used a real room to encircle 
both actors and spectators. Later, writing in Theatrical Place, Kantor recalled 
the process he went through in 1944, of stripping away all symbolic elements of 
the production design to begin to arrive at his conception of the bare room as a 
site of performance:
Finally, I make a decision to accept the empty and 
colorless whitewashed walls of the room as part of [the] 
‘artistic work’.
The walls are bare, naked.
They cordon off the room.
An awfully e m p t y world.
And in this emptiness—USELESS WRECKS.
Under the wall-heaven,
there lies a long and heavy gun barrel.
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141 According to Pleśniarowicz (2004: 40–41), the apartment was opposite the Schutzdienst 
Polizei (Nazi police). My own visits to Kraków have confirmed that it was also close to the 
Gestapo cells located on the corner of ulicy Pomorksa and Królewska opposite Plac Inwalidów, 
where prisoners were tortured.
142 As noted by Pleśniarowicz (1994b), there were two different versions of this production 
planned during the first half of 1944 before the final version performed in June or July of that 
year (Pleśniarowicz 1994b: 57–59).
Odysseus sits on it.
Somewhere on the other end of
this world-room,
there is a piece of poor, simple wooden plank—
remains of a shipwreck. A Wreck.
Maybe at the very end,
‘on the horizon,’
under the wall, the audience will be seated.
But still the reality of this room—
these walls—heaven
produce imaginary illusion.
I would like to paint them myself—using grays and whites—
an empty canvas.
Maybe this can never happen,
that a real, living space of a room, a room in which we live,
becomes part of the domain of imagination;
that this real room
becomes a site of events, situations, objects, and people,
belonging to imagination;
that life is mixed with illusion;
reality with art.
(Kantor 2003c: 331–332)
In this transition from the formal, symbolic abstraction used in his 1943 
production of Balladyna to the ‘poor reality’ of the final version of Odysseus, it is  
possible to see Kantor in this earlier, not yet fully realised, conception of the 
room, searching for a non-representational and anti-illusionistic way of 
articulating reality. It is as if the picture plane surface of the canvas, the illusory 
window of Renaissance linear and optical perspective, is being 
reconceptualised and wrapped around the space of performance, encircling 
both actors and spectators. In this way, the ‘horizon’ or ‘vanishing point’ in 
traditional perspectival construction, now surrounds the performance event, 
enfolding both actors and spectators in the manner of Heidegger’s reading of 
Plato’s cave discussed in chapter three.
As well as working at the spatial reconceptualisation of the performance, 
Kantor was also developing a radical temporal conception about the subject 
matter of place and character. Kantor had originally wanted to stage his 
production on one of the platforms of Kraków’s main railway station (see Kantor 
2009c: 346 and Kaproń 2003). In his conversation with Borowski, Kantor stated 
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that: ‘We wanted Odysseus, returning from the ancient, mournful and 
geometrical reality, to come straight to the railway station; the dirt, the 
grubbiness and the people who did not even care about him’ (cited in 
Pleśniarowicz 1994b: 59–60). Kantor’s idea was that mythical and fictional 
figures, operated from outside of time, in a sense as representatives of eternity. 
As such, these eternal characters manifest themselves throughout time as real 
people in real places, delineated by the character-geometry of their prototype. 
Further, his conception of the mythical characters from Wyspiański’s drama was 
also very particular. Writing about his conception later in Theatrical Place, 
Kantor stated his belief that:
what happens in a play, does really happen in life, today, 
all around me. […] Everything happens at the threshold 
between imagination and life. I started to believe that the 
characters from a play would appear in my (our) life; that 
they would return and, maybe, would remain with us for 
some time.
(Kantor 2009c: 343)
In this way, Kantor figured, that in 1944, the Greek war criminal Odysseus, the 
mastermind behind the Trojan Horse, would take the form of an SS soldier 
disembarking from a train returning from the siege of Stalingrad. However, 
because it was too dangerous to stage an illegal theatre performance in such a 
public space, the room in the private apartment was instead chosen as the 
place of performance. Nevertheless, there was a real element of danger for all 
concerned: other clandestine performances had been raided by the Gestapo 
and their participants arrested. The Gestapo cells were literally five minutes’ 
walk around the corner. The fact, therefore, that the entrance to the room bore a 
notice that read: ‘You do not enter the theatre with impunity’ (cited in 
Pleśniarowicz 1994b: 56), was not an idle joke. Also, in the production, 
Odysseus was indeed dressed with the greatcoat and helmet of a Wehrmacht 
soldier. This, understandably, caused a certain frisson when Odysseus entered 
the room where the spectators were seated.
As Kantor would later theorise in the Theatrical Place essays, this ‘real 
room’ redefined the boundary between fiction and reality. In a sense, the 
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fictional, eternal figure of Odysseus, had been installed into the reality of 1944 
occupied Kraków. As such, the spectators and the performers shared a single 
space containing an invisible boundary between the temporal and the eternal 
realms: a room both of its time and timeless. The walls of the room became the 
horizon-line of the traditional picture stage, which surrounded both actors and 
spectators in a space in which was layered and commingled the fictional-eternal 
and the real-temporal. Different versions of this commingling of the eternal and 
the real in one space formed the basis of The Dead Class, and the ‘theatre of 
death’ productions that followed it. This reconceptualisation of theatrical space 
recalls Søren Kierkegaard’s analysis of the relation between time and eternity in 
his 1844 work, The Concept of Anxiety, in which human being is described as ‘a 
synthesis of the temporal and the eternal’ (Kierkegaard 1980: 85, italics in 
original). For Kierkegaard, the moment was the ‘merely vanishing’ (Ibid.: 88), 
while the eternal ‘on the contrary, is the present’ (Ibid.: 86). In this analysis ‘the 
moment is spatialized’ (Ibid.): ‘for abstract thought, time and space are entirely 
identical, and become so for representation, and are truly so in the definition of 
God as omnipresent’ (Ibid.: 86 fn.). In this way ‘The moment is that ambiguity in 
which time and eternity touch each other’ (Ibid.: 89). In The Return of 
Odysseus, and later in the ‘theatre of death’, Kantor brings his spectators and 
actors together in a relationship in which they perch on the threshold between 
time and eternity. Kantor would later recall in ‘My Work—My Journey’ (1988) 
that he ‘turned Odysseus, a Homeric hero, into / “something,” / that was 
bundled up, wrapped in poor, dirty rags of a military overcoat’ (Kantor in 
Kobialka 2009: 15). Installed in the reality of 1944 as a poor, dishevelled 
Wehrmacht soldier, the figure of Odysseus in Kantor’s production can be 
understood as functioning in an icon-like manner, as an eikon, an image that 
acts as an envoi or messenger from the eternal realm. Just as the icon is 
designed to ‘occupy’ the spectators’ space, and impress on them the reality of 
the other world, so too does Kantor’s Odysseus occupy the space of the 
spectators in the room and brings to them, in tangible terms, an expression of 
the eternal verities of the Odysseus myth through the reality of occupied 
Kraków.
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Into this ‘Poor Room’ Kantor also placed ‘Poor Objects’, torn from their 
normal station in life:
les objet prêt: an authentic German megaphone [stolen 
from the Planty],143 a gun (an imitation as obviously it was 
difficult to get a real one) on trestles and the famous 
cartwheel leaning against the wall, mud-caked, brought 
from the Kleparz (a marketplace in Kraków) by Tadzio 
Brzozowski [the actor playing Odysseus].
(Kantor ibid.)
Reflecting on the ‘poor object’ further in the first Milano Lesson, Kantor 
characterised its ‘poorness’ as follows:
It was a P O O R  object unable to perform any functions in 
life,
an object about to be discarded.
An object that was bereft of a life function that would save 
it.
An object that was stripped, functionless, a r t i s t i c !
An object that would make one feel for it pity and affection.
This was an object that was completely different from that 
other [earlier] object.
(Kantor 1993: 211, the insertion in square brackets is 
Kobialka’s)
The difference can be understood in that Kantor’s ‘poor object’, like the figure of 
Odysseus, functions in an icon-like manner. Shorn of their habitual use-value, 
the wheel, plank and gun-barrel reveal, as objects in their own right, a presence 
that was previously concealed. As such they confront the spectators from their 
own realm, one that lies beyond human experience. In this sense, these ‘poor 
objects’ are also envois or messengers. They reveal a ‘truth’ to human being 
about itself: the truth of object-hood. This is a truth that is akin to death, in that 
death is what reminds human being of its fundamental otherness, the fact that it 
is itself an object, albeit an animated one, that will return to its own, yet alien, 
inanimate state. The being of human being depends not only on ‘what is’, but is 
also defined by a more tacit, hidden, sense of ‘what is not’. To re-characterise 
Heidegger’s preoccupation with Dasein as ‘being-for-death’ (to be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter), ‘what is not’ is not just what all human being 
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143 See Appendix 1.29.
has come from but also, what all human being will become. This hidden 
otherness, which Sartre and Merleau-Ponty also refer to in their philosophy, is 
what is revealed when objects are allowed to manifest their own presence from 
out of the normally hidden ‘corners’ of their existence. It is in this way that they 
may be understood as envois of truth, and as such, to function as icons.
In terms of Kantor’s artistic development, the turn to ‘Poor Reality’ in his 
production of The Return of Odysseus might seem a decisive break with 
Constructivism and the prevailing ideas of abstraction. Malevich’s Suprematist 
canvases appear clear and clean; the constructions of Vladimir Tatlin, 
Aleksander Rodchenko, Laszlo Maholy-Nagy and the stage experiments of 
Oskar Schlemmer seem bright and clear-cut. The sense of abstraction realised 
by these artists is full of vibrant, clean colours, hard lines and edges. While 
Kantor’s stage designs of the late 1930s and early 1940s were essays in this 
Constructivist language, the objects of Kantor’s ‘Poor Reality’ in The Return of 
Odysseus by contrast are shabby, trashy, dirty, worn and worthless. Their 
appearance is rickety and jittery, not hard, clear and geometrically rigorous. 
They indeed seem to be the ‘poor’ distant cousins of International 
Constructivism. On the other hand, they are abstractions of a sort, maybe more 
akin to the found objects in Tatlin’s Corner Counter-Reliefs, as well as to Kurt 
Schwitters’ Merz. Kantor’s room to which Odysseus ‘really returned’ has, after 
all, an abstract quality of its own, as evidenced in the various paintings and 
small and large-scale maquettes and reconstructions that Kantor made of it in 
the 1980s (for example see Kantor 1991a: 22, pl. 10, Porębski 1997: 157, 
Pleśniarowicz 1997: 57 and 60, and Kobialka 2009: 41). The disembodied gun 
barrel and wheel, the horizontal wooden plank hanging overhead, the bare 
walls and rectangular square window with the crosspieces dividing its four blank 
panes delineating the form of a black cross. It is as if the dynamic, geometrical 
forms from one of Malevich’s Suprematist canvases have fallen out of their ideal 
Platonic realm into this world and have been traumatised into reality. The ‘poor’ 
objects, wrenched from their normal context in our world now exist on the 
borderline between this world and the next: half wheel, half abstract shape. 
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In a sense, Kantor’s abstracted ‘Poor Objects’ are assembled as real 
elements in a new, dynamic relation to a constructed reality just as much as 
was the case with the geometric forms in Malevich’s canvases or with the found 
materials in Tatlin’s counterreliefs. As Perloff (2003) points out in The Futurist 
Moment, the assembly and juxtaposition of found materials was a key feature of 
avant-garde art as it moved from Cubo-Futurism towards Constructivism: 
‘Badges’ of the ‘real’ world, such as bits of rope, damaged 
wood, or discarded sheet metal inevitably retain 
connotations of their former use. [Tatlin’s] counterrelief 
thus occupies a middle space between representation on 
the one hand and formal construction on the other, 
depending on whether we choose to stress the nature of 
the materials and the contexts from which they are drawn, 
or the actual arrangement. Its structure, in Martyn Chalk’s 
words, ‘is neither Art nor Engineering, but the result of 
some intuitive grasp of how the world might be put 
together’.
(Perloff 2003: 71–72)
What is seen in Kantor’s ‘Poor Reality’—the constructive arrangement of ‘poor 
objects’ in a ‘poor space’—is a particular modification and development of 
Constructivism rather than a turning away or a refutation of it.
Clearly, key aspects of the aesthetics of icon art are present in 
Suprematism and early Constructivism. Although Kantor does not discuss 
the connection explicitly, it is clear, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
that he was preoccupied with notions of eternity in association with the ‘Poor 
Object’. In his filmed interview with Bablet, he recalls:
Many years later, when I wrote the Emballage or 
Packaging manifesto, I wrote ‘the object lies between 
eternity and the garbage’. It’s a very fine comparison, 
almost a metaphor, but it translates my efforts very exactly, 
since the wheel I found was next to the garbage, and in 
my theatre work it has become eternal. So the object must 
be poor, next to the garbage, and the artist’s genius 
endows it with the value of eternity—it’s very poetic. For 
me, eternity is death.
(Kantor interviewed in the film documentary The Theatre 
of Tadeusz Kantor 1991)
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In his quest to honour the ‘eternal’ qualities of the ‘Poor Object’ Kantor can also 
be seen to employ ideas analogous with those found in icon art.144
In the texts associated with The Dead Class Kantor frequently referred to 
his use of the idea of a dead person as a model for his performers and that the 
dead stand before the living audience as if separated by an invisible barrier. As 
noted above, Florensky saw dreams as forming a boundary between the eternal 
and earthly shores of existence (Florensky 1996: 43). In Theatrical Place, in the 
section entitled ‘The Essential Meaning of the Theatre’, Kantor offers a 
conception of his theatre based on a similar idea: 
T h e a t r e —I still claim—i s  a  p l a c e  t h a t  
r e v e a l s ,  l i k e  s o m e  s e c r e t  r i v e r  f o r d s ,
t h e  t r a c e s  o f  t h e  ‘p a s s a g e ’ f r o m  
‘t h e  o t h e r  s i d e ’ t o  o u r  l i f e .
Before the eyes of the spectators stands an ACTOR, who 
assumes the condition of the DEAD. This spectacle, 
similar in character to ritual and ceremony, operates on 
the spectators as a s h o c k . I name it
m e t a p h y s i c a l .
(Kantor 2004: 387; my translation, see Appendix 1.30 for 
original)
For Kantor a mannequin was a symptom of the ‘reality of the lowest rank’; it was 
an empty object, a carapace, a shell, and as such functioned as an envoi or 
messenger of death. Kantor viewed this emissary of death as a model for the 
actor (see Kantor 2009b: section 8). The conception of the actor’s performance 
was purely formal, modelled on empty, dummy-like gestures, rather than on 
gestures imitative of natural human expressions or based on the idea of 
portraying inner thoughts and emotions. By articulating their nature as objects 
the actors align themselves with the physical-mechanical aspect of their being. 
In appearing true to this aspect of life, they achieve a degree of realness in their 
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144 I am suggesting that Kantor, whether consciously or not, was influenced by the aesthetics of 
icon art as this was indirectly refracted through the aesthetics of Suprematism and early 
Constructivism. However, there may have been more direct connections given that Kantor knew 
the Polish artist and iconographer Jerzy Nowosielski, who had trained as an icon-painter at the 
monastery in Lwów, was involved with the Independent Clandestine Theatre, and was Kantorʼs 
assistant when he was a professor at the Fine Art Academy in the late 1940s (see Pleśniarowicz 
2004: 54).
performance that can be otherwise elusive for actors operating in more realistic 
or naturalistic traditions. Although Kantor, in his Theatre of Death manifesto, 
cites Heinrich von Kleist’s and Edward Gordon Craig’s championing of the 
mannequin over the live performer, he argued that he did not believe:
that a mannequin (or a WAX FIGURE) might be 
substituted for a LIVING ACTOR (like Kleist and Craig 
demanded). It would be too easy and naive. I am trying to 
define the motives and destination of the unusual entity 
which has suddenly come into my thoughts and ideas. Its 
emergence is compatible with my increasingly strong 
belief that life can be expressed in art only by the lack of 
life and a resort to DEATH, by APPEARANCES, by the 
VOID and the lack of any MESSAGE. In my theatre a 
MANNEQUIN should become a MODEL embodying and 
transmitting a powerful feeling of DEATH and of the 
condition of the dead—the MODEL for a Living ACTOR.
(Kantor 1975, Section 8: n.p.)
Craig’s ur-narrative of the genesis of the actor is essentially Platonic in 
character, his account following the tradition from Plato’s critique of all art as 
imitative re-presentation of the prototype (Craig 1958: 94). In section nine of 
The Theatre of Death manifesto, Kantor reverses Craig’s ur-narrative in ‘an 
opposite image, with reversed meaning of events’ (Ibid. Section 9: n.p., my 
italics). In his ‘reversed’ account, Kantor characterises the ur-actor as a 
messenger of the eternal:
OPPOSITE those who remained on this side, there stood 
a HUMAN DECEPTIVELY SIMILAR to them, yet (by some 
secret and ingenious operation’) infinitely DISTANT, 
shockingly FOREIGN, as if DEAD, cut off by an invisible 
BARRIER—no less horrible and inconceivable, whose real 
meaning and THREAT appear to us only in DREAMS. As if 
in the blinding flash of lightening, they suddenly perceived 
a glaring, tragically circus-like IMAGE OF A HUMAN, as if 
they had seen him FOR THE FIRST TIME, as if they had 
seen THEIR VERY SELVES. This must have been a 
SHOCK—a metaphysical shock. The life image of a 
HUMAN emerging out of the shadows, as if constantly 
walking forward—was a moving MESSAGE of its new 
HUMAN CONDITION, only HUMAN, with its 
RESPONSIBILITY, with its tragic CONSCIOUSNESS, 
measuring its FATE on an inexorable and final scale, the 
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scale of DEATH. This revelatory MESSAGE, which was 
transmitted from the realm of DEATH, evoked in the 
SPECTATORS (let us use our term here) a metaphysical 
shock, and the craft of the art of this ACTOR (also 
according to our terminology) revealed that realm of 
DEATH and its tragic and full-of-DREAD beauty.
(Kantor 2009b: 237)145
This conception of the actor, and of the actor-spectator relationship, articulated 
in Kantor’s writings around the time of The Dead Class and Theatrical Space 
would seem to be directly related to reflections on the 1944 production of The 
Return of Odysseus. The equation between the categories of ‘fiction’ and 
‘eternity’ have now been themselves equated with the category of ‘death’. As an 
intimation of eternity: ‘death’—the negation of human being—is its emballage 
(packaging). In seizing on ‘death’ as a model for the actor, Kantor effectively 
transforms the actor into an icon-like performer: one who presents the image of 
human being as an envoi from the eternal world. In conceptualising the 
performance in this way, Kantor can be seen to be mapping the reverse 
perspective, characteristic of icons and the first avant-garde, onto the actors as 
well as the poor objects that he turns into performers, and onto the stage setting 
as a whole.
Kantor’s comments on the barrier between human and eternal reality 
appear more logical when read in the light of the icon’s metaphysical situation 
on the same threshold. If the proscenium arch and its stage space (i.e. the 
picture stage) is seen as a three-dimensional analogy of the picture plane, then 
Kantor can be seen to have approximated the aesthetic of icons in several 
ways.
Firstly, in reflecting on his 1944 production of The Return of Odysseus, 
with its found ‘poor place’ (the room), and its ‘poor objects’, it is significant that 
Kantor foregrounded the idea of marginality, and especially ‘the corner’. It is 
surely not mere coincidence that, just as Malevich and Tatlin placed their key 
works in corners at the Zero Ten exhibition, Kantor explicitly set his Dead Class 
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145 I am intentionally using two translations of Kantorʼs Theatre of Death manifesto, Piotr Graffʼs 
from 1975 and Kobialkaʼs newer version from 2009. This is because all the nuances that I wish 
to bring out from the original Polish (Kantor 2004b) are not present in any one single translation.
in ‘the last forgotten outpost of our memory […] in a crowded corner’ (Kantor 
n.d.(a): 1):
The audience gradually take their seats. On a wooden 
floor in the C O R N E R  there are several rows of school 
D E S K S . These are old-fashioned, poor-looking desks 
from a country school.
This poor classroom is divided on both sides, looking from 
the audience, with a
R O P E .
(Ibid.: 8)
For Kantor, the essence of the piece was based on the idea of the marginality of 
the corner, and this allowed The Dead Class to manifest its ‘corner-ness’ 
wherever it was performed,146 from the cellars of the Krzysztofory mansion to 
the stages of the grandest theatres, Kantor’s school benches confronted each 
audience as if perched on the edge of a forgotten corner of eternity: ‘In this 
performance where the action takes place on the borderline between life and 
death […]’ (Ibid: 155). For Kantor these school desks were: ‘always in a 
CLASSROOM. But it was not a / CLASSROOM—REAL PLACE. / It was a black 
hole, a / void, in front of which / the whole auditorium / s t o p p e d ’ (Kantor 
2009b: 365). In his 1974 texts written in preparation for The Dead Class, Kantor 
wrote of an ‘unusually simple idea which had never been used before’ (Kantor 
n.d.(a): 10–11). Recalling his 1963 production based on Witkacy’s The Madman 
and The Nun, under the banner of the ‘zero theatre’, Kantor recalls ‘considering 
staging a secret performance done “on the side”, …. Yes, exactly: “on the side!” 
In the CORNER! ! ….’ (Ibid.). Kantor goes on to describe the paradoxical power 
of this idea of marginality:
If in a room full of people you make somebody act 
‘abnormally’ i n  t h e  m i d d l e  of the room, all people 
gathered will take it for a p e r f o r m a n c e . If the same 
happens on the side, in the corner of the room, everybody 
will watch it with embarrassment, or even apprehension. 
The same activity when carried ‘in the middle’ of the room, 
before an audience, was regarded as performing, 
pretending, safe, but when it happened in the corner, it 
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146 See Appendix 1.31 for details of the location of this premiere.
became true, real. The line of division and strangeness 
became a fact.
The stage has a l w a y s  been placed ‘in the middle’ ‘on 
the axis’ of the spectator, for the p e r f o r m a n c e  to be 
watched, observed. However, it is enough to move the 
PLACE of the so-called PERFORMANCE to the side, to 
the corner, place it not ‘on the axis’, and a strange thing 
happens. The spectator loses ‘natural’ sight of something 
that used to be ‘performed’, or, to be exact, pretended and 
demonstrated. In the corner it will acquire the features of 
embarrassing exhibitionism, shameful dealing not meant 
for the spectator, completely independent, STRANGE and 
self-sufficient! which [sic] does not require the presence of 
the spectator.
(Kantor n.d.(a): 11)
In this passage can be seen the metaphysics of Schulzian ‘degraded reality’ 
articulated in terms of an anti-representational theory of performance. In the 
same way that the materiality of the icon’s physical presence in the spectator’s 
space allows it to escape the negative connotations of being a ‘copy’, 
conceptually relocating the performance to the ‘side’ and the ‘corner’ allows it to 
acquire an independent, autonomous quality. As things previously hidden 
suddenly reveal themselves and impinge on the spectator with a forceful 
impression, so Kantor’s conceptual marginalisation of the performance action 
acquires a peculiar force.
Secondly, the manner of performance of his actors, in which they are 
used, and use themselves, as found objects, also allows them to function in the 
manner of the figures in icon art. The very ‘emptiness’ of Kantor’s actors in their 
performance endows them with a sense of eternity which confronts the 
audience in the manner of the ‘Poor Object’. In the early sections of The Dead 
Class, the actors confront the spectators from behind their desks, at first by 
simply staring, then by raising their hands as if trying to attract the attention of a 
schoolteacher, later by wailing as if in ecstatic Jewish prayer and later still with 
grimaces, ‘pulling faces at the audience’, as Żurowski has noted. However, this 
is a performance and not a painting, and this confrontational engagement with 
the spectator acquires a choreographic dimension through movement. In a 
pattern that recurs throughout the ‘theatre of death’, the actors periodically 
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recede into and advance from the darkness at the rear of the performance 
space. Following their re-entrance, they engage in a circling movement around 
the stage, a movement that has also has the effect of withdrawing and 
advancing to and from proximity with the spectator. As they pass the front of the 
performance area, on the threshold with the spectator’s space, the actors fix 
their audience with mask-like expressions and beady eyes. The effect of this 
dynamic orientation towards the spectator is, I argue, akin to the way that the 
icon directly confronts the viewer rather than passively offering itself up to the 
spectators’ gaze. However, the layered incongruities with which Kantor has 
endowed his actors contributes a further effect. On the one hand there is the 
incongruity that it is old people who stare back at the spectator from behind the 
schooldesks. But, upon their return to the stage after their first exit, they are 
adorned with mannequins of their childhood selves. It is not just that the actors’ 
performance is modelled on death. Their juxtaposition of their old, corpse-like-
selves with real objects-in-children’s-form doubles the truth-message that 
human being is being-for-death, a being that comes from nothing and returns to 
nothing. In his Partytura writings for The Dead Class, Kantor discusses this 
paradoxical, layered pairing of the actor-mannequin ‘bio-objects’:
The little corpses of children—their own childhoods—
which they bear and which alone could enliven their 
memories … are dead. The pupils are themselves almost 
dead, stricken with a deadly disease. They have a chance 
of becoming O B J E C T S  of art at the cost of 
STRANGENESS and DEATH. This very 
S T R A N G E N E S S  makes them approach the state of 
objects, deprives them of their biological, organic and 
naturalistic l i v e l i n e s s  for which there is hardly any 
room in art.
Through this ‘o f f e r i n g ’, they become elements of a 
work of art. The living one!
(Kantor n.d.(a): 176–177; ellipsis in original)
In this, Kantor seems to echo Malevich’s characterisation of his Black Square 
as a ‘living royal infant’. This playing with the idea of human being around the 
borderland of life and death serves to affirm the very peculiarity of human being.
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Thirdly, in a manner that is directly comparable to the aesthetic of 
timelessness in icons, Kantor frequently represents multiple times in the same 
stage space at the same time. In Let the Artists Die, he shows himself as a six-
year old child, as a dying man, and as the observer of himself dying. In The 
Dead Class and Wielopole,Wielopole, he layers events and characters from 
different times and places within the same place. If the perspective of time is 
considered, then Kantor’s representation of memory can be understood using 
the analogy of reverse perspective that Florensky deploys in his concept of 
‘reverse time’ in the discussion of dreams in Iconostasis. In the ‘theatre of 
death’, the depth of time functions in reverse in that the past is moved up to 
press against the present and stand before the spectators, its reality adjacent to 
theirs behind the invisible barrier separating them from the action. In its 
juxtaposition of the theme of death with that of schoolroom pranks and 
children’s games, The Dead Class again seems to echo Kierkegaard’s 
discourse surrounding the relationship between human being and eternity, and 
his reference to a Danish idiomatic folk phrase, that:
the whole of life was a game that came to an end, and in 
which everyone, the greatest [as] well as the least, made 
their departures like school children, extinguished like 
sparks of burning paper, and last of all the soul itself as 
the schoolmaster. And so there is also a muteness of 
annihilation found in the fact that the whole was merely a 
children’s game, and now the game is over.
(Kierkegaard 1980: 93 fn.)
However, in The Dead Class, Kantor is not the schoolmaster, he is the 
Florenskian window through which the spectator engages with the threshold of 
eternity which the performance brings into presence.
Finally, Kantor’s potential to transform himself into an icon can be seen in 
his ‘Little Manifesto’, discussed in chapter four, in which he recedes into the 
past to stand before his audience, ‘accused I know not what of’, in the corner of 
a forgotten schoolroom. In his final work, during the period 1985–1990, Kantor 
increasingly moved from the periphery to the centre of his work. In this way he 
gradually advanced ‘the thing that he was’ towards the status of an icon, until, in 
258
Today is My Birthday, events conspired to produce a performance work in which 
occurred the peculiar effect of the absent, dead presence of the artist, who, in 
effect, ‘stared’ out at his audience from the very centre of the work. This 
movement further into the artwork, until the artist is wholly iconised within it, will 
be explored in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7. THE METAPHYSICAL CONTEXT: TADEUSZ KANTOR AS 
‘HUNGER ARTIST’ IN THE ‘POOR ROOM OF THE IMAGINATION’
Introduction: Thrown into the stanza of being
So far in my discussion I have focused primarily on Kantor’s work up to The 
Dead Class and Wielopole, Wielopole. In this chapter I wish to focus on the 
major works of his last decade mentioned above: Niech sczesną artiści (Let the 
Artists Die, 1985), Nigdy tu już nie powrócę (I Shall Never Return, 1988) and 
Dziś są moje urodziny (Today is My Birthday, 1991), together with his last cycle 
of paintings, Dalej już nic … (Further on, Nothing … , 1987–89). With his 
development of the idea of ‘the poor little room of the imagination’, from the 
schoolroom of The Dead Class to the family room of Wielopole, Wielopole, 
Kantor opened up the way to include himself more tangibly within his work. In 
doing so it is possible to draw a parallel between Kantor’s late work and that of 
Franz Kafka, especially Kafka’s late story ‘A Fasting Showman’ in the way that 
each used their work to deal with their own impending deaths. At stake in the 
metaphysics of mortality informing each artists’ work are issues concerning truth 
and freedom, which I shall discuss with reference to Heidegger and the early 
twentieth-century Bohemian-Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926). 
These, I shall show, add another dimension to understanding why Kantor called 
the theatre stage his ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’. With The Dead 
Class and Wielopole, Wielopole, and in his writings such as Theatrical Place, 
Kantor began to articulate his engagement with the problem of human being in 
terms of his idea of memory. Increasingly, the site of this engagement with 
memory became more clearly a room: at first a schoolroom in 1975 and then a 
family room in 1980. In later productions the identity of this room would shift its 
form and become a dying room, a prison cell and torture chamber in Let the 
Artists Die (1985), a disreputable inn of memory in I Shall Never Return (1988), 
and the artist’s own studio in Today is My Birthday (1991). Rooms also featured 
in Kantor’s late paintings and in the two cricotages that he created with students 
around the time he was working on his last two large-scale productions. In 
Bardzo krótke lekcja (A Very Short Lesson), performed at the Institut 
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International de la Marionette at Charleville-Mézières in 1988, material 
associated with I Shall Never Return is set in a room inspired by a sketch for 
Kantor’s 1989 painting Mój dom (My House), which depicts a smoking, 
ramshackled chimney stack, rising from bare floorboards in an otherwise empty 
room.147 Kantor never suffered the physical destruction of any of his homes. 
This ‘house’ is an idea of ‘home’ that seems to owe more to Heidegger’s idea of 
the nature of the problematic dwelling of Dasein and its ‘thrownness’ into the 
world than to any physical dwelling. The image of this chimney was fully 
realised in the scenography of Kantor’s last cricotage, Cicha noc (Silent Night) 
performed in Avignon in 1990 which was created during the period of rehearsals 
for Today is My Birthday. For Kantor, the ‘Poor Object’ had gradually come to 
include the idea of memory itself as an ‘object’, and in these last works the 
ideas coalesced into the conceit of the ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’:
—an open interior of our imagination—
which exists in a different dimension.
This is where the threats of our memory are woven;
where our freedom is born….
We are standing at the door giving a long farewell to our 
childhood;
we are standing helpless
at the threshold of eternity and death.
In front of us,
in this poor and dusky room,
behind the doors,
a storm and an inferno rage,
and the waters of the flood rise.
The weak walls of our ROOM;
of our everyday or
linear time
will not save us….
Important events stand behind the doors
it is enough to open them….
(Kantor 2009c: 366; ellipses in original)
This ‘room’ is a space replete with potential in which Kantor can ‘remember’ a 
pre-First-World-War Galician schoolroom that can metamorphose into a Jewish 
cheder; where he can ‘remember’ a wedding between his parents that occurred 
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147 According to Anna Halczak, the painting depicts the only element of the house that had not 
been destroyed (Halczak 2005a).
before his birth, and where Austro-Hungarian recruits colonise the corner of his 
childhood family room; where he can ‘remember’ his own death occurring in the 
same family room where his six-year-old self played with his lead soldiers; 
where characters from his own past productions come back to remonstrate with 
him and where his father who left before he was born is ‘remembered’ as a 
grotesque tableau of his execution in Auschwitz; where an image of Jehovah 
tending to his creation mingles with that of a field hospital for the war-wounded, 
where late friends from his artistic circle in Kraków share his studio with a dead 
hero from the era of Constructivism and where the celebration of his own 
birthday shares the same studio space with that of his father’s birthday 
celebrations depicted in a family photograph taken before he was born. The 
idea that the life of memory in the faculty of imagination, both individually and 
collectively, is the only reality—the truly real—is one that finds resonance in the 
poetry of Wallace Stevens, who, in one of his late poems stages his ‘Final 
Soliloquy of the Interior Paramour’ ‘in a room / In which we rest and, for small 
reason, think / The world imagined is the ultimate good’ (Stevens 1997: 444). 
The imaginative act, central to the act of poiesis, the production into being 
which is what, for Stevens, seems to be the essence of poetry, is related to 
Heidegger’s idea that: ‘Language is the house of being. In its home human 
beings dwell’ (Heidegger 1998c: 239). Agamben develops this relationship in his 
1996 essay ‘“Corn”: From Anatomy to Poetics’ (in Agamben 1999f), where he 
cites Dante Alighieri’s definition of the elements of poetic form in his De vulgari 
eloquentia, II, IX, 2–3:
And here you must know that this word [stanza] was 
coined solely for the purpose of discussing poetic 
technique, so that the object in which the whole art of the 
canzone [song] was enshrined should be called a stanza, 
that is, a capacious storehouse or receptacle for the art in 
its entirety. For just as the canzone is the lap of its subject-
matter, so the stanza enlaps its whole technique […].
(Dante Alighieri 1996: 72–73. Cited in Agamben 1999f: 35; 
his emphasis)
262
Stanza is of course the Italian word for ‘room’. Agamben uses this thirteenth-
century idea of stanza148—‘a capacious storehouse or receptacle’—as a 
metaphor for Being, for Heidegger’s ‘house of being’. For Dante the stanza was 
a container for the poet’s art, a ‘room’ in which the poem’s meanings were 
contained and in which they dwelt. In this sense they were like the Heraclitean 
ideas of ēthos and moira discussed in chapter three: the span of human life 
viewed as the ‘allotted portion’ or container for the individual’s existence. 
Viewed in this way it is possible to see how Kantor’s rooms, and his idea of the 
room, is able to operate for him as a stage for human being. ‘The Poor Little 
Room of the Imagination’ facilitates a space for the free play of memory, 
sometimes personal and sometimes collective (in the sense used by Maurice 
Halbwachs 1980 and 1992). In the final decade of his life Kantor played with 
this idea almost obsessively, as this chapter will show.
Human and animal being and their relation to finitude
In his 1929 lectures on the fundamental concepts of metaphysics Heidegger, 
citing a fragment of Novalis, characterised the human condition as a state of 
homesickness (1995: 5). In chapter five I discussed the problem of the 
representation of human being in relation to non-human animal being in which 
the Aristotelian question concerning the possible nature of a specifically human 
kind of being acquires a biopolitical dimension. For Heidegger, human being, 
‘thrown’ into the world, found itself out of attunement. Heidegger’s solution to 
this state of restlessness was to formulate a conception of human being, or 
Dasein, that was based on an attempt to establish a fundamental difference 
between animal and human nature. To do this he made use of radical 
contemporary scientific theories of the nature of living things to establish a 
particular understanding of the hierarchical ranking of human and animal life.
In his late short story, ‘A Fasting Showman’ (1922)—part of a suite of four 
short stories written and prepared for publication shortly before his death by 
consumption in 1924 and published together under the title ‘A Hunger Artist’—
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148 Agamben had highlighted this definition at the beginning of his second book published in 
1977: Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture (1993b).
Kafka portrays his protagonist as a dying, caged human being, who is placed in 
direct competition with the animal menagerie of the circus in which he is 
exhibited. The hunger artist is compared unfavourably with the other animal 
attractions and is eventually thrown out and replaced by a vibrant young 
panther. Kafka was influenced by Rilke’s poetry, and Heidegger, in a later series 
of lectures delivered at the University of Freiburg in 1942–43 on the pre-
Socratic philosopher Parmenides, also refers to Rilke in his discussion of the 
poet’s eighth Duino Elegy, a poem written in the same year as ‘A Fasting 
Showman’.149 The eighth Duino Elegy deals with the concept of the ‘open’, 
which Rilke uses to make an unfavourable comparison between humans and 
animal nature in general. For Rilke, the ‘natural’ state of the animal lends it a 
more ‘open’ nature, whereas human being is turned back upon itself, closing 
itself up to possibilities. In its eulogisation of animal nature this poem prefigures 
the vital freedom suggested by Kafka’s panther in contrast with the discarded 
hunger artist. Heidegger however, in his discussion of this poem, reverses 
Rilke’s hierarchical ranking by arguing that it is humans that truly see the open 
rather than animals.150
Contrasting visions by Rilke and Heidegger of the relative ranking of 
human and animal nature hinge on a metaphysical preoccupation with death. 
For Rilke, ‘nearing death, one doesn’t see death; but stares beyond, perhaps 
with an animal’s vast gaze’ (1987: 193). For Heidegger, the essential radical 
nature of human being was finitude, or being-for-death—the essential 
transitoriness of human existence. The implication of Heidegger’s perspective is  
that the animal’s ‘vast gaze’ in Rilke’s poem is simply innocent ignorance; only 
the sentience of human being truly has the potential to transcend its situation by 
recognising the imminence of death as an essential defining feature of its being.
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149 The inspiration for Kafkaʼs panther is thought to have been Rilkeʼs 1903 poem ʻThe Panther 
in the Paris Zooʼ (Rilke 1987: 25). However, Rilkeʼs panther is rather a sad animal in 
comparison to Kafkaʼs. Heidegger does not refer to this poem and it is rather the account of the 
vibrancy of animal nature in the eighth Duino Elegy that provides the matter for his discussion.
150 For a stimulating recent discussion of Heidegger, Rilke and the concept of ʻopenʼ see: 
Agamben 2004a.
Franz Kafka was also much preoccupied with death, which often occurs in 
his writing with reference to animal nature (as with, for example, Jozef K., who, 
on the final page of The Trial, dies ‘like a dog’—‘as if the shame of it would 
outlive him’ (Kafka 1977: 254). As Joachim Beug has pointed out in his 1980 
essay ‘The Cunning of a Writer’ Kafka’s writing of death scenes ‘was 
inseparably entangled with the anticipation of his own death’ (1980: 131). In his 
diaries and letters Kafka often referred to the anticipation of his own end: 
‘Sometimes a naïve person will wish, “I would like to die and see how everyone 
mourns me”—this is the scene such a writer is continually staging’ (Kafka 
quoted in: Beug 1980: 132). Indeed, Kafka’s tale about the hunger artist was 
intimately connected with his own death. Kafka had completed his tale, which 
was clearly a reflection of his own worsening tuberculosis, in 1922. It was one of 
the few tales that he permitted his friend Max Brod to have published and he 
died in bed in 1924 whilst correcting the proofs (see Gilman 2005: 116 and 
129). 
Kantor too was an artist much preoccupied with death and, like Kafka, he 
was also involved in his artistic work right up to his end. Kantor was in the 
middle of making the final adjustments and preparations to what was to be his 
last theatre spectacle, Today is My Birthday, when he died on 8 December 
1990. In their artistic attempts to deal with the existential anxiety of the human 
condition, both Kafka and Kantor made a home for themselves in their work. 
Moreover, in both his theatre and, in the paintings made during the last years of 
his life, Kantor was continually staging his own death. However, Kantor went 
even further than Kafka in putting himself on public display in the repeated 
pictorial and theatrical depictions of his soon-to-be-expiring self. The self that 
Kantor is exhibiting is one that is approaching death and with this passage 
towards non-existence and the apparent growing awareness of the poor fragile 
nature of the human individual Kantor might be likened to Rilke’s animal who 
‘stares beyond’ death. However, in his increasing willingness to confront his 
own impending mortality, Kantor can rather be seen as a ‘poor’ version of 
Heidegger’s conception of fully realised human Dasein wrestling with the 
difficult reality of the finitude of human existence. 
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The following discussion uses the problematic juxtaposition between the 
hunger artist and the panther in Kafka’s tale, together with a consideration of 
Heidegger’s analyses of human and animal worlds and of the questions raised, 
as a key to understanding this final turn towards the confrontation of Kantor’s 
own impending mortality in his late work. 
In the preparations for Today is My Birthday (1991), Kantor intended to 
exhibit himself on stage.151 He declared:
I have decided to move in and live on stage—
I have here my bed, my table, my chair, and,
of course, my paintings.
I have often imagined my room in a theatre,
inside of the theatre,
on stage, rather than in a hotel.
So, my—as I call it—Poor Little Room of Imagination
is placed on stage.
(Kantor in Di Mambro 1991: 6; Kantor 2005: 232)
As discussed in chapter five, in 1968 Kantor had previously anatomised an 
anonymous stranger’s clothing and pockets, in his Anatomy Lesson According 
to Rembrandt, to identify ‘the genuine, / authentic side of / individuality, / the 
forgotten leftovers, / the shameful litter, / these wrinkled and crushed / 
p o c k e t s ! / ridiculous organs of / human / instincts / given for preservation / 
and memory!’ (See Appendix 1.20). In his final production, he seemed to want 
to anatomise his own ‘authentic individuality’.
The setting Kantor conceived for himself was in the form of his own artist’s 
studio, with a table and chair, washbasin, stove and a bed. Three large picture 
frames defined the space of the room. The picture frame to the left contained 
the author’s living self-portrait, played by Andrzej Welmiński, seated with 
characteristic hat, scarf and coat. In the frame to the right was a figure in black 
lace depicting one of Kantor’s paintings based on the figure of the Infanta 
Margarita de Austria from Velázquez’ painting of 1656 Las Meninas. In between 
and to the rear and facing the audience stood the large, central frame in which 
would be depicted a re-enactment of a family photograph depicting the birthday 
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151 ʻI am not the author. / No! I am something / more, / I am / in the very centre / of that which is 
going on / on stageʼ (Kantor in Kraszewski 1994: 398).
celebration of Kantor’s father. From a central door in the darkness behind this 
large frame and from the other gloomy corners of this ‘Poor Room’ would enter 
various dead relatives and friends and the ‘massed forces of history’ that 
assaulted the artist in his refuge. Two figures, the author’s ‘shadow’ and a 
cleaning lady, supervised the ‘Poor Room’ and attempted to restore order 
following each incursion from the outside.
Kantor’s on-stage studio was not just a ‘room’ but also, as he said, a ‘Poor 
Room of the Imagination’. As such it was a metaphysical room, a metaphorical 
space situated on the border between two realities: conventional reality 
represented by the audience on one side, and the reality of the eternal world of 
fiction, art and memory on the other, installed by the portals formed by the three 
picture frames that defined the stage area. Kantor described this ‘Poor Room’ 
as ‘a dark hole into which fall various objects from the outside’ (Kantor cited in 
Pleśniarowicz 2004: 277). It is therefore clearly a vision of the imagination or the 
human mind: the world of individual subjective consciousness into which the 
objective world ‘falls’. However, Kantor’s metaphorical room would also seem to 
be a ‘poor’ version of the active, projecting mind championed in nineteenth-
century Romantic metaphors. In Romantic philosophy the mind was a 
Neoplatonic ‘candle of the Lord’, that, unlike the passive mirror or tabula rasa of 
the English Enlightenment philosopher John Locke, was an active partner in 
creating the world as opposed to a passive agent: a lamp rather than a mirror 
(see: Abrams 1979: 57–69). Of course, Kantor’s Romantic heritage was of a 
specifically Polish character. It is therefore not surprising that a sense of cruel 
fatalism informs his model of the mind. In the ‘Poor Little Room of the 
Imagination’ Kantor, his memories and art, shelter from the outer world, 
represented by war and the figures and agents of authority. Kantor envisaged 
this ‘Poor Little Room’ as the ultimate refuge or dwelling of the fragile individual 
human being. Kantor died on December the eighth before the final dress 
rehearsal of Today is My Birthday. The production that premiered in Toulouse 
on January 10, 1991, and that subsequently completed its tour of major 
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European cities and New York, did so without its creator, in the almost-finished 
state that Kantor left it in.152
Kantor had already exhibited theatrical versions of his own death in his 
preceding two major spectacles in response to the growing sense of his own 
impending mortality. In Let the Artists Die identical twin actors repeatedly enact 
an imagined bedridden consumptive death, with one of the twins taking the part 
of the artist’s dying body and the other acting as a witness to the event. In I 
Shall Never Return the setting was a ‘Poor Inn of Memory’ to which Kantor 
returned, carrying a coffin as a blatant symbol of his own death.
On the threshold
It was not only in his theatrical work that Kantor began to place himself on 
public display. Between 1985 and 1988 Kantor produced an extraordinary 
series of paintings which were exhibited in Kraków in 1988 under the title 
Further on, Nothing …. These paintings were a shock to many of Kantor’s critics 
as they marked a turn away from the particular avant-garde strategies of his 
previous paintings which had been preoccupied with the abstraction of informel, 
the aesthetics of emballage and the happening. These new paintings marked a 
return to figuration153 and in many of them the figure depicted (as indeed 
Żurowski had complained about the artist’s onstage presence in his 1985 
essay) was Kantor himself. In the paintings dating mostly from 1987, Kantor 
depicted himself in a number of narrative situations that employed playful 
paradoxes embodied in their titles: Mam dość siedzenia w obrazie. Wychodzę 
(I’ve had enough of sitting in this painting. I’m leaving, 1987); Trzymam obraz, 
na którym jestem namalowany jak trzymam obraz (I am holding a picture in 
which I am shown holding a picture, 1987); and Ścieram obraz, na którym 
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152 In the performance of Today is My Birthday that played after Kantorʼs death, the dead artistʼs 
absence was made present by an oil lamp placed on the on-stage table where he was to have 
been seated during the performance. In the opening sequence this lamp was lit for the duration 
of the performance by Andrzej Welmiński, the actor who played the part of Kantorʼs self-portrait. 
At certain points during the performance Welmiński would protectively pick up the oil lamp to 
shelter it from the hostile forces that periodically invaded the room.
153 These late paintings marked a return to figuration after a period of some forty years. For an 
account of the paintings in this exhibition see Borowski (1989) and Gołubiew (2000).
jestem namalowany jak ścieram obraz (I am wiping off the picture in which I am 
shown wiping off a picture, 1987).154 In these works the paradox is achieved by 
the addition of sculptural objects which extend the figure beyond the confines of 
the canvas into the ‘real world’. Artificial legs and arms continue the painted 
limbs into real space in such a way that the painterly representation of Kantor 
seems to achieve the impossible: of stepping out of the painting, of holding his 
own painting of himself up, or of wiping off the paint from the very canvas that 
portrays him.
Although these paintings are in one sense clearly a return to figuration, the 
representational instability that the playful conceits and additions lend to these 
canvases make them as well a continuation of Kantor’s critique of 
representation as any of Kantor’s work. In a sense these paintings perform their 
own self-criticism. Just as Malevich’s Black Square is not a representation of a 
black square, but a black square in its own right; similarly Kantor’s self-portraits 
clearly signal what they are by going so far in the attempt to create an illusion 
that they render themselves as three-dimensional objects in their own right. 
Whereas in naturalistic paintings and films, the aim is for the viewer to forget the 
medium by being engrossed in the illusory reality of the represented world, in 
Kantor’s late paintings this is not possible. Even the titles draw attention to their 
status as real objects in the real world at the same time as alluding to the 
ridiculous and impossible actions they purport to perform.
The apparent playfulness of the 1987 paintings belies a certain darker 
restlessness, for the paintings from 1988 eschew sculptural extensions and rely 
purely on painterly means to achieve a more sombre affect. In the self-portraits 
in this later sequence, Kantor’s self-portrayal has more the sense of himself as 
a victim, or prisoner. Whereas in the sculptural paintings the figure seemed to 
emanate a vital energy, in these later paintings there is the sense of frailty, 
infirmity and death. In Mam wam coś do powiedzenia (I have something to tell 
you, 1988) an emaciated, naked figure of an aged Kantor stares forlornly out of 
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154 See Kantor 1991a: plates 263, 262 and 268; The Polish titles and dates are taken from 
Gołubiew 2000: 13, 14 and 17. 
a black background directly at the observer. In Pewnego dnia żołdak 
napoleoński z obrazu Goi wtargnął do mego pokoju (One day Napoleon’s 
soldier from Goya’s painting invaded my room, 1988) the figure of Kantor, 
dressed in Bohemian coat, hat and scarf, after the manner of Craig, stands in 
frail defiance as one of the soldiers from Goya’s 1814 painting, The Executions 
of the Defenders of Madrid, takes aim at him. In another series of paintings from 
the same year, titled Cholernie spadam!/I am falling down like hell! 1988) the 
naked and emaciated figure of the artist appears to float over featureless 
landscapes in which the church from his home village of Wielopole sits in the 
distance. Finally, and in stark contrast to the sculptural escape from the earlier 
work I’ve had enough of sitting in this picture …, a painting depicting Kantor on 
his deathbed illuminated by a single candle against a black background, is 
titled: W tym obrazie muszę pozostać [Z tego obrazu już nie wyjdę] (In this 
picture I must stay [From this picture I cannot leave], 1988).155 This prefigures 
Kantor’s decision to ‘move in and live on stage’ in Today is My Birthday. This 
only serves to highlight the sense of continuum between painting and 
performance in Kantor’s work: his theatre spectacles are moving paintings; his 
playful paintings imply performance.
As I have already indicated, this increasing preoccupation with the 
presentation of his soon-to-be-expiring self in his late work suggests parallels 
between Kantor and the protagonist in Kafka’s tale about the hunger artist. The 
fasting showmen of the late nineteenth century, upon which Kafka’s figure is 
apparently based, starved themselves for around forty days and then 
celebrated the end of this successful feat of endurance with a large feast. On 
December 21, 1890, Giovanni Succi broke a forty-five-day fast in New York. As 
the Daily Tribune reported: ‘Succi arose from his couch and then it seemed as if 
the persons looking at him were welcoming him back from the grave a long-lost 
brother’ (cited in Russell 2006: 4). By staging an approach to death by self-
starvation and then turning back from the brink, the performance of the hunger 
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155 See Kantor 1991a: plates 261 (titled here, Autportrait), 265 and 269 (The Cholernie spadam! 
series is not reproduced in this album); The Polish titles and dates are taken from Gołubiew 
2000: 11, 19, 23–26 and 20.
artist could be seen as life-affirming: death has been denied and the appetite for 
life re-embraced. The hunger artist’s self-sacrifice becomes a rebirth and 
therefore a cause for celebration. Kafka’s hunger artist, however, desires to go 
beyond the normal pattern for his fasts and break his previous record. He wants 
to excel at his ‘art’. But, as Kafka’s story finally reveals, the artist was simply a 
fussy eater who couldn’t find anything he liked to eat (Kafka 1978: 173–174). 
For Kafka, the hunger artist, together with the other protagonists in the 
collection he was correcting for the publisher at the time of his death, stands as 
a symbol of the existential nature of the artist’s troubled relation to society. 
Kafka’s artist wants to do a good job, but, because he starves himself out of a 
lack of appetite, he knows that he is, in a sense, a fraud. The very reason for his  
success, the fact that fasting is so easy for him, means that it isn’t really much 
of an achievement and contributes to his sense of failure: the very reason that 
he should not be admired. Because of this, Kafka’s protagonists appear to be 
not so life-affirming, but rather to exemplify Nietzsche’s view of a ‘sick’ and 
problematic humanity: a sick species in existential crisis. As Nietzsche 
comments in On the Genealogy of Morals: ‘man is more sick, more uncertain, 
more mutable, less defined than any other animal, there is no doubt about that
—he is the sick animal …’ (Nietzsche 1996: 100).
One of the most telling aspects of Kafka’s story is that the hunger artist, 
placed in direct competition with the circus’s animal menagerie, loses the 
public’s interest and is eventually thrown out and replaced by ‘a young panther’. 
(In typically Kafkaesque fashion, the hunger artist, ‘in order to spare his own 
feelings … avoided reading the conditions of his contract’ (Kafka 1978: 170).) 
This beast captures the public’s attention completely and seems to be 
presented by the Jewish, consumptive Kafka as the complete antithesis of the 
weak and starving artist: the new animal is like a Blakean Tyger, ‘burning bright’ 
with vital energy and a healthy appetite. As Kafka puts it, the panther’s:
noble body, furnished almost to bursting point with all that it 
needed, seemed to carry freedom around with it […] the joy 
of life streamed with such ardent passion from his throat that 
for the onlookers it was not easy to stand the shock of it. But 
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they braced themselves, crowded round the cage and did not 
want ever to move away.
(Kafka 1978: 174)
The public in Kafka’s story, uninterested in his version of the hunger artist, find 
themselves captivated by the apparent life-affirming spectacle of the panther.
Perhaps panthers are to be preferred? But, if they are more desirable, why 
is the ‘noble body’ of the panther taken as such an attractive and powerful 
antidote to the emaciated and sickly, but still human, form of the hunger artist? 
This apparent inversion in the usual relation in rank between humans and 
animals in the final paragraph of Kafka’s tale relates to the similar reversal in 
Rilke’s eighth Duino Elegy. In Rilke’s poem ‘With all its eyes the natural world 
looks out / into the Open. Only our eyes are turned / backward … like traps 
…’ (1987: 193). For animals, according to Rilke’s poem, ‘everything is 
womb’ (Ibid.: 195) for, like Kafka’s panther, they carry their world around with 
them: they are ‘at home in the world’ in contrast to Heidegger’s conception of 
humanity as existing in a state of ‘homesickness’. As Heidegger discusses in his 
lectures on Parmenides:
According to Rilke the animal sees more than man does, for 
the animal’s gaze is not trammelled by any objects but can 
go on infinitely, in some unknown way, into the objectless. 
The animal has before itself the limitless. It never encounters 
a limit on its path, hence not even death. The animal is ‘free 
from death’ as it goes on into the limitless; its advance is 
never doubled back, as is the case with human representing, 
and it never sees what is behind itself.
(Heidegger 1998f: 157–8)
Heidegger’s account of Rilke’s view of the animals’ ‘openness’ carries 
connotations of Craig’s description of the ‘carved eyes’ in the figures in Ancient 
Egyptian art that carry a strong sense of death that ‘will deny you until the crack 
of doom’ an ‘attitude so silent that it is death-like’ (Craig 1958: 87). This ‘gaze’ 
also seems reminiscent of the implacable gaze of the eyes of icons, which 
famously appear to follow their observers around the room.
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Concerning humanity Rilke asks: ‘Who has twisted us round like this, so 
that / no matter what we do, we are in the posture of someone going 
away?’ (1987: 197). From a Nietzschean perspective Kafka’s figure of the 
panther is perceived by the public as refreshingly free from the ‘sickness’ of the 
hunger artist who stands, instead, as an unwelcome reminder of their own ‘sick’ 
humanity with his unhealthy ‘game with death’. The panther embodies a pure 
‘will to life’ and, as Heidegger points out, knows nothing of death. It is this that 
so captivates the public. The hunger artist, however, is caught in his game 
between desire for public recognition and the desire to justify his ‘art’, which he 
practices, after all, out of habitual compulsion rather than conscious choice. In 
this he is caught in the dilemma of the artist analysed by Agamben in The Man 
Without Content, discussed in chapter four, in conflict between the desire to 
create, and the aesthetic ‘taste’ of the spectator. The hunger artist, therefore, 
embodies the messy reality of human existence characterised by this split, 
caught up in its own self-regard and petty contingent worries and concerns 
which contrasts with the panther’s apparent purity of being.
For Heidegger, Rilke’s version of the hierarchical relationship between 
animal and human being was an illusion: the apparent freedom carried around 
by the animal is rather a consequence of the limited nature of its existence. 
According to Heidegger it is humanity who have the true potential for freedom. 
The essence of human being, for Heidegger, lies exactly in the finitude of its 
existence, and the ‘sickness’ of humanity lies not in any morbid preoccupation 
with death but rather in its failure to accept and dwell within this essential being-
for-death. For Heidegger it is, paradoxically, death that defines us 156 and only 
humanity has the capacity for the recognition that opens the individual up to the 
true nature of being. This recognition of the mortal context of existence is, for 
Heidegger, denied to animal nature. For Rilke, it is only the animal that sees the 
open, whereas, for Heidegger, it is only human being that has this capacity.
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156 ʻFinitude is not some property that is merely attached to us, but is our fundamental way of 
beingʼ (Heidegger 1995: 6).
In his lectures on The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics (1995) 
Heidegger outlined a ranking of the categories of the inanimate, the animal and 
the human, and sets forth the thesis that the stone is worldless, the animal is 
poor in world, and the human being is world-forming (1995: 177). In this 
discussion Heidegger refers extensively to the theories of the Estonian biologist 
Jakob von Uexküll, focussing on his concept of Umwelt or the environment of 
the living creature as subjectively perceived.157 For Uexküll, each animal exists 
in a world which it knows only through a limited number of ‘carriers of 
significance’ which act as ‘disinhibitors’ or triggers for certain aspects of the 
creature’s repertoire of behaviour. Heidegger takes this idea and uses it to 
sketch out a sense of the difference between animal and human being. As 
Heidegger puts it ‘Plant and animal are suspended in something outside of 
themselves without ever being able to ‘see’ either the outside or the 
inside’ (1998: 160). In his famous description of the Umwelt of the tick, Uexküll 
had sought to demonstrate that the animal knows nothing of the world it moves 
and acts in other than the specific ‘carriers of significance’ in its environment. As 
such, according to Heidegger, the animal lives in a circle of captivation, bound 
within the horizon of the specific stimuli with which it is adapted to interface. The 
more complex the animal, the less limiting the ‘circle of captivation’ and the 
more varied the Umwelt. With animals, any sense of awareness beyond this 
horizon is mere anthropomorphism on the part of the human observer; animals 
simply do not have the capacity to transcend their Umwelt. It is this lack of 
ability to question the horizon of their world that Heidegger interprets as poor in 
world: the idea that the animal is trapped or ‘captivated’ in a perfectly 
engineered interlocking set of stimuli and responses. Uexküll uses as an 
illustrative example of the perfect ‘captivation’, and state of blissful sympathy 
with which it is enjoined with its world, the humble tick, which survives with only 
three ‘carriers of significance’: the odour of butyric acid characteristic of 
mammalian sweat, the temperature of 37° characteristic of the temperature of 
mammalian blood, and the typology of mammalian skin (see Agamben 2004a: 
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157 See Appendix 1.32 for a brief account of the significance of new scientific perspectives on 
Phenomenology.
chapter 11). But, insofar as all animals (except, according to Heidegger, 
humans) are defined by their carriers of significance, the number makes little 
difference: Rilke’s animal and Kafka’s panther no more ‘sees’ its environment 
than Uexküll’s tick has a conception of the warm-blooded host that it drops onto. 
Conversely, human beings have the capacity, according to Heidegger, to form 
their own world because they, unlike animals, have the potential to see beyond 
their immediate Umwelt and sense the wider context of their existence. It is in 
this sense of the ‘open’ as the potential to transcend the horizon of their Umwelt 
that characterises Heidegger’s idea of openness in contrast to Rilke’s. As 
Merleau-Ponty noted in the course notes for his lectures delivered at the 
Collège de France from 1957–58 on ‘The Concept of Nature: Animality, the 
Human Body and the Passage to Culture’, the Umwelt of human beings is more 
open than that of animals (2003: 178).
Kafka’s panther only appears, therefore, to express a sense of freedom in 
comparison to the hunger artist. Its strong body threatens to burst from the 
confines of its cage giving a sense of barely restrained danger that threatens to 
transcends the boundaries of its prison: ‘Even the most insensitive felt it 
refreshing to see this wild creature leaping around the cage that had so long 
been dreary’ (Kafka 1978: 174). Like Rilke’s animals in the Duino Elegy the 
panther seems to carry its Umwelt around with it. In contrast, the hunger artist 
does not convey the full potential of human being. By allowing himself to be 
placed next to the other animals, Kafka’s hunger artist emanates a sense of 
defeated, caged humanity. In this sense the hunger artist points towards the 
denial of the potential of human being—and death—whilst the panther points 
vividly towards a sense of its, more limited, life.
ʻIʼve had enough of sitting in this painting. Iʼm leavingʼ
It might seem at first that the Umwelt of Kantor’s self portrayals—the spaces of 
the painting and the ‘Poor Room of the Imagination’ in which he imagines his 
existence—present just as bleak and closed a vision of humanity as that in 
Kafka’s story of the caged hunger artist. However, this is not the effect evoked 
by these works.
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In one of the paintings from 1987, I’ve had enough of sitting in this 
painting. I’m leaving, the figure of Kantor seems reminiscent of both Rilke’s 
image of a humanity ‘twisted around’ and, at the same time, of Kafka’s panther. 
In this painting Kantor depicts himself in the act of stepping out of the fictional, 
two-dimensional world of the picture into the real, three-dimensional, world of 
the observer. In this sense the picture would seem to enact an escape from the 
confines of the Umwelt of the picture frame, showing also, perhaps, an 
unwillingness to simply sit down and accept the given situation of existence. 
However, the figure’s orientation towards the world of the painting and the world 
of external reality contains a number of paradoxes. The figure of Kantor is in 
one sense only partially visible, his torso, right arm and shoulder, and left leg 
are cut off by the left-hand edge of the canvas that he is in the process of 
leaving. Instead of looking out towards the reality he is stepping into, the upper 
part of the figure is turned back, like Rilke’s image of humanity, to look under his 
raised left arm, towards the right of the picture at the chair where he was sitting. 
As with the figure, the chair is only half visible, also cut off, in this case by the 
right-hand edge of the canvas. Only the left leg of the figure has made it to the 
outside world in the form of a three-dimensional artificial leg attached to the 
edge of the canvas. In its posture and attitude, the figure of Kantor in this 
painting might be seen as a ‘poor’ and ‘reversed’ version of Lissitzky’s New Man 
discussed in chapter six. In that picture, the clean cut and confident geometry of 
the mechanical figure is striding dynamically from left to right, not right to left as 
Kantor’s is. Also, Lissitzky’s figure looks confidently forward whereas Kantor’s 
looks backwards into the picture. In comparison to Kantor’s naked figure, 
Lissitzky’s vibrant figure seems to have more of the ‘noble body, furnished 
almost to bursting point with all that it needed’ of Kafka’s panther. Its ‘limbs’ form 
an open star shape whereas one of Kantor’s arms is wrapped awkwardly 
behind his head, the other is invisible beyond the picture frame and the ‘real’ left 
leg that projects into the spectator’s space looks decidedly suspicious, carrying 
a connotation of the collection of artificial limbs in one of the vitrines at the 
Auschwitz museum. The key difference, however, is that Lissitzky’s figure lies 
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wholly within the frame of its picture. It is the attempt of Kantor’s figure to exit 
the frame that lends it its particular power.
Kantor’s painting sets up a paradoxical interplay of references to both the 
visible and the invisible. The fact that only the fictional portions of Kantor and 
the chair are visible whilst the implied versions of them in the real world of the 
viewer are invisible might lead to the interpretation of the painting as indicative 
of the overall title of the series: Further on, Nothing …. Is Kantor stepping into 
the void of non-existence, looking back at the past and away from the death he 
already has one foot in? Is the one protruding leg merely a dead relic? In this 
sense the paradox of this painting can be seen as the tension between, on the 
one hand the longing for the past, and for life, and on the other, the potency and 
courage of being able to choose to step into the void of non-existence.
But, on the other hand, the protruding leg is three-dimensional in 
comparison with the two-dimensionality of the rest of the picture. In that sense it 
is more ‘real’ than the painted leg. However, it is nevertheless artificial and not 
animate: it is not a real leg, merely a real artificial leg. There is more than one 
layer of imitation at play within this work. The artificiality of the three-
dimensional leg in one sense destroys the illusion it is apparently purporting to 
create. If that leg is an indication of the ‘reality’ of the figure—ex-painting—then 
it would be a very un-übermarionette indeed, a very poor-mannequin-of-a-
figure. Paradoxically, when viewed in this way, the painted version of the figure 
would seem more ‘real’. But, in that case, the illusion of the fiction of the painted 
figure would trounce reality. But, as with Malevich’s Black Square and its 
distillation of the presencing of reality performed by icons, there is a sense in 
which Kantor’s painting confounds the binary opposition of ‘real’ and ‘illusory’, 
‘visible’ and ‘invisible’, fiction and reality. For example, viewed from the 
perspective of the painted figure inside the painting, the ‘real’ and ‘visible’ would 
equate with the two-dimensional realm contained within the surface of the 
canvas. The ‘illusory’ and ‘invisible’ world for this figure would equate to the 
four-dimensional spatiotemporal reality of the viewer’s world. Viewed from the 
spectator’s perspective it is the world of the figure in the painting that is 
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‘illusory’. However, what, for the spectator in the real world outside of the 
painting, equates with the ‘invisible’? Surely it is the world of the painting that is 
implicitly extended past the borders of the canvas in the form of the artificial leg. 
However, this ‘world’ seems partially visible, in the form of the artificial leg, and 
partly invisible in the (non)form of the half of the chair that has been cut off by 
the right hand edge of the painting (from the spectator’s perspective). This 
aspect of the painting’s world does not enjoy a visible physical presence outside 
of its canvas in the way that the left leg of the painted figure does. The force of 
this painting is, therefore, partly to do with the impossible act that it is attempting 
to stage. The spectator of the painting knows that the idea of the painted figure 
actually stepping out of the canvas into the real world is an impossibility. Even 
the idea of it is an illusion. The ‘reality’ of this idea is itself invisible; the artificial 
limb is merely a stimulus for the idea. This is signalled all the more by the ‘poor’ 
and somewhat inept nature of the artificial limb. One could imagine, for 
example, artists such as Jeff Koons, or Jake and Dinos Chapman, articulating a 
more polished form for this limb’s entrance to the spectator’s dimension. 
Kantor’s limb is in the spirit of Schulz’s celebration of the tandeta of sham reality 
in the Street of Crocodiles. It is a Schulzian limb, a poor and shoddy imitation, a 
joke. Nevertheless, both the spectator and the painted figure confront one 
another in an uneasy dialogue around this limb, because the work imposes on 
the viewer the idea of its own movement beyond itself, beyond its immediate 
painted reality. However, this ‘beyond itself’, in its very impossibility, suggests 
another reality—a ‘reality beyond reality’, perhaps the ‘reality’ of eternity, 
perhaps the ‘reality’ of death. Like the figures chasing each other around John 
Keats’ ‘Grecian Urn’, ‘For ever warm and still to be enjoyed, / For ever panting, 
and for ever young (Keats 1973: 345, ll. 26–27), Kantor’s painting is forever 
enacting the potentiality of its own impossible, paradoxical transgression. As 
discussed in chapter 3, for the prisoners in Plato’s cave, the reality of the 
machinery of illusion behind them is concealed, as is the sunlit world beyond 
the cave’s entrance. However, in Kantor’s painting, it is not clear who is in the 
situation of the Platonic prisoner: the spectator or the painted figure in the 
picture? Both are arguably in positions of ignorance regarding the potential 
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reality proposed by the painting: the painted figure of the world outside his 
frame; the spectator of that same ‘reality’ in so far as its very invisibility 
presages another reality beyond his or her own.
The ʻLast Supperʼ in the ʻPoor Little Room of the Imaginationʼ: Kantorʼs 
fatal return
Although Kantor’s eyes in this painting are ‘looking back’ in the manner of 
Rilke’s image of humanity, which Heidegger criticises, Kantor’s figure is still 
stepping forward. This paradoxical sense of simultaneous reverse and forward 
movement between past and future is a characteristic found throughout 
Kantor’s work, but is particularly evident in the late works considered here. In 
his penultimate major spectacle, I Shall Never Return, made during the same 
period as the Further on, Nothing … series of paintings, Kantor invokes the 
myth of the return of Odysseus to Ithaca. For Kantor, this myth stood as an 
allegory of the artist’s relationship with reality158 and the meaning was that 
‘return’ is only possible as a ‘return’ to death. The figure of Penelope in this 
respect stands as a symbol for Death as the ultimate reality: she was portrayed 
in the 1988 production as a young woman who longs for the return of her 
betrothed. For Kantor, who, like Kafka, found love anew at the end of his life, 
the paradoxical proximity of Love and Death was a powerful reality.159 This is 
why, in his late work, Kantor portrayed Death as an attractive young woman, 
and why the figure of Penelope, the faithful wife who waits for her husband’s 
eventual return, became the symbol of both Death and Reality, in opposition to 
the Imagination. The ‘life’ of human being, viewed from this perspective is truly 
‘a machine of love and death’: a mechanism that produces the particular being 
of humanity within its finite temporal bubble, hanging in the timelessness of 
eternity.
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158 In I Shall Never Return Kantor is confronted by his own actors in the guise of roles from his 
previous productions, culminating in a re-staging of the banquet scene in which Odysseus 
murders the suitors.
159 In 1923 Kafka, then just turned forty, met the twenty-five year old Dora Diamant, with whom 
he fell in love. Dora helped nurse Kafka until his death in 1924 (Murray 2005: 357–384). Around 
1985 Kantor met and began an affair with Anna Halczak who became his companion and muse 
during his final years. The affair continued until Kantorʼs death (see: Gołubiew 2000: 50–52 for a 
discussion of Kantor's recognition of the proximity of love and death in his last years).
The sense of defeat that is present in the hunger artist’s death, and in so 
many of Kafka’s protagonists, is not present in Kantor’s stagings of his own 
crossing of the barrier between life and death. At the end of Today is My 
Birthday, the ‘Poor Little Room of the Imagination’ is filled with cemetery 
crosses before being overrun by soldiers, police cars, tanks, party-secretaries, 
secret policemen and murderers. To the accompaniment of the rising and falling 
strains of, alternatively, Offenbach’s La Belle Hélène and the funeral march from 
the second movement of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony, caged and screaming 
human figures are wheeled about the stage as if they were circus animals on 
display. In the midst of this carnage, the figures of Kantor’s remembered family 
members stage a slow funeral procession bearing a single wooden plank 
through the chaos to the front of the stage. They arrange the plank into a crude 
table which they sit behind as if for a Last Supper, reminiscent of the final image 
of Wielopole, Wielopole. Despite the apparent defeat of this last refuge of the 
individual:
Against
these ‘powers’
stands the
S m a l l ,
P o o r ,
D e f e n c e l e s s ,
but magnificent
history of
i n d i v i d u a l ,
h u m a n
l i f e .
(Kantor in: Kobialka 1993: 167)
This final tableau, with its intimations of the eternal, advances the silent 
strength of the bare fact of the fragile, individual, poor human life.
Conclusion
As Agamben noted, rooms or stanzas are not just literally rooms but also homes 
in which human being dwells, a space for the free play of memory. In Kantor’s 
late work, rooms become a poetic space, a means for pointing towards the 
unveiling of truth about mortality and finitude. In these last works where he 
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repeatedly attempted to visualise the crossing of the borderline between 
existence and non-existence, even as he approached that frontier himself, 
Kantor, like his self-portrait attempting to leave his own painting, seems to have 
been attempting the impossible. He was attempting to linger at the threshold of 
nothingness as if to see for himself, and to show his spectators, what lies 
beyond the negation of existence. In this way Kantor can be seen to have 
organised the live enactment of the icon’s manner of presencing truth. In a 
sense it is reversed again, for while the icon looks at its spectator, and while 
that is still the case with his late and last work, Kantor looks back at eternity 
and, in doing so, encourages his spectators to join him in the contemplation of 
this impossible but all-enveloping idea. It is, therefore, no surprise that these 
works can be read in the light of Heidegger and Kafka who both, in their own 
ways, attempted to characterise the nature of human existence in its relation to 
finitude—to death. Heidegger envisages an abstract dwelling for human being 
illuminated by the truth of the revealed true nature of the temporal transience 
and finitude of human existence, while Kafka’s protagonists die like dogs, 
sometimes glimpsing a distant radiance. Kantor’s late paintings and theatre 
works present a ‘poor’ but nevertheless positive vision of the human animal: a 
poor individual temporarily lodged for a while in the ‘Poor Little Room of the 
Imagination’.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION: THE ‘BEING’ BEHIND ‘DOING’
Underlying the theme of my thesis has been a desire to engage positively with 
Nietzsche’s observation in On the Genealogy of Morals that: ‘[…] there is no 
“being” behind doing, acting becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction imposed on 
the doing—the doing itself is everything’ (Nietzsche 1998: 29). A contemporary 
trend, as noted briefly in chapter four, is to conclude, on the apparent evidence 
of neuroscience and evolutionary speculation, that ‘the self does not exist’.160 In 
following Kantor’s engagements with reality and human being a different sense 
emerges. As with Heidegger, who engages positively with human being as ‘a 
lieutenant of the nothing’, Kantor would seem to value keenly the tremulous, 
ghostly presence of a ‘something’ within the ‘nothing’. With the title of this thesis 
I intended to declare that I see Kantor as a poetic artist, an artist who speaks 
poetically about human being. By this I understand ‘the poetic’ as the aesthetic 
expression of metaphysics, that ‘the poetic’ is in its essence metaphysical. In 
this sense I see Kantor as an artist who communicates with a poetic, 
metaphysical force through a variety of media. To portray Kantor’s work in the 
way that I have experienced it I have dealt with the range of his work as a 
whole, engaging with the writing, happenings and paintings, as well as with the 
more famous later performance works. I have embraced his peculiarities and 
attempted to understand them through working from and through my own 
context as an English observer of his work, someone who is attempting to 
engage with its underlying contexts, contexts that were, for me, initially alien. To 
work through this problem I have employed Heideggerian and post-
Heideggerian philosophical discourse as a way of informing my hermeneutic 
strategy and as a way of articulating my developing argument concerning how I 
see Kantor as an artist who speaks about human being.
 In chapter one I have given a synopticon of Kantor’s art at one point in his 
career, in the late 1960s, as a way of indicating the apparent confusion and 
difficulty that it presented for the interpretations that I surveyed in chapter two. 
However, if I were to give now, at the end of this thesis, a similar synopticon 
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160 See Tallis 2011: 57–58.
viewed from the perspective of Kantor’s work from The Dead Class until his 
death, it would become a series of images that themselves refer, on the basis of 
informed understanding, to all of his work dating from 1938 and his Bauhaus-
Constructivist production of Maeterlinck’s The Death of Tintagiles. But, more 
than that, these eikons of his mature work would refer, as do the icons of the 
Orthodox tradition, to a sense of timelessness that speaks of the bare, naked 
existence of human being, dwelling on the threshold of eternity itself.
In chapter three I looked at Plato’s cave allegory and used the discourse 
Heidegger and Agamben around the question of human being to read the 
allegory as a narrative of the revealing of the enfolding or, in Kantorian terms, 
the emballage (packaging), of the truth of human being in the world. Through 
my critique of Żurowski’s (mis)reading of Kantor’s Hermes-like role on stage I 
went on in chapter four to read Kantor’s ‘Little Manifesto’ in similar performative 
terms—in which Kantor transforms himself from a recipient of the Rembrandt 
Prize, through a reversed narrative of twentieth-century avant-garde art, into a 
reversed version of adult human being in the form of a small child, who, like 
Plato’s servant boy in the Meno (82b–86c), stands at the threshold of 
remembering and forgetting. In Chapter five I discussed Kantor’s relationship 
with art and reality from a biographical perspective that read his preoccupation 
with materiality—an almost Epicurean sense of the seething aliveness of matter
—as a subversive response to the treatment of human being by the Nazi 
occupation. The image of human being as a poor scarecrow whose soul flaps in 
the wind like tattered clothing was borrowed from Yeats’ late poem ‘Sailing to 
Byzantium’. This poem contains the implicit paradox of setting the poorness of 
tattered human being against the glittering images of eternity in Byzantine art. 
This juxtaposition leads towards the discussion of time and eternity in chapter 
six in relation to the aesthetics of the early twentieth-century Russian avant-
garde. Through a discussion of the metaphysics underlying the aesthetics of 
Malevich’s Suprematist and Tatlin’s Constructivist work I have shown how 
Kantor’s work can be seen to have strong resonance with icon art in terms 
similar to those discussed by Florensky in his work on ‘reverse perspective’ and 
‘reverse time’. Following this discussion, in chapter seven, I read Kantor’s late 
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work in terms of Heidegger’s critique of human being to consider his 
increasingly personal presence in his paintings and theatre works. Kantor can 
be seen to realise the vision of his ‘Little Manifesto’ by installing himself 
permanently, for eternity, in his ‘poor little room of the imagination’. In this he 
gradually moves towards the realisation of a performative revealing of the 
‘truth’ of human being—as a curious ‘nothing’ that is yet ‘something’—a process 
of remembering and forgetting that hovers on the threshold between this world 
and eternity. In this sense, the emballage (packaging) of human being in both 
flesh and time is what reveals the traces of this ‘nothing’.
Although icons have no ‘depth’, as understood in the post-Renaissance 
Western tradition of painting, they nevertheless have a strong presence. As 
Antonova has noted:
this principle of the organization of pictorial space turns 
the icon into a highly specific image—an image invested 
with the power of containing real presence. This could 
question the very distinction between subject and object 
which lies at the heart of aesthetics. In whatever sense we 
understand presence, an animated image cannot be 
regarded as a passive object. In a manner, when ‘the 
object stares back’161 the relationship between viewing 
subject and viewed object is radically transformed.
( Antonova 2010: 154)
What, however, is the basis of this presence if there is no illusion of depth 
‘behind’ the image? What, to borrow Nietzsche’s phrase, is the ‘being’ behind 
doing? If Kantor’s work stands as an eikon, or image of human being, what is 
the basis of its presence?
When spectators gaze at Kantor’s work, whether at one of his paintings, 
objects or performances, they are confronted by a ‘surface’ that stares back at 
them. In this confrontation lies a tacit questioning of the spectators’ being. In the 
last volume of his lectures on Nietzsche, on ‘Nihilism’, Heidegger discusses the 
problem of human being in terms of the ontological difference, the apparent 
differentiation of individual beings from Being itself—the underlying existence of 
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161 Antonova refers to the title of James Elkinsʼ The Object Stares Back: On the Nature of 
Seeing (New York, London, 1994).
reality. This is the ontological version of the hermeneutic circle: a path that: 
‘leads from beings to Being and from Being to beings’ (Heidegger 1991: 188). 
Heidegger goes on to imagine ‘that beings and Being are found to stand on 
opposite banks of a stream we cannot and perhaps never could identify’ (Ibid.). 
There is a striking similarity between this image and Kantor’s formulation of the 
relationship between the spectator and the actor dicussed in chapter six, in 
which the actor, who is modelled on the idea of a dead person, confronts the 
spectator across the line dividing the ‘stage’ from the ‘house’, art from reality. 
There is a sense of a presence speaking from the opposite bank of a stream 
that separates the spectators from their image staring back at them as dead 
people: the reality of the void. In an interview with Bablet, Kantor commented: ‘I 
find means which are exactly like objects, I mean there’s no soul—no soul, no 
interior’.162 It might seem negative to characterise the essence of human being 
as a void, as empty, as nothingness. However, as Raymond Tallis has argued in 
Aping Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and the Misrepresentation of Humanity 
(2011: 250–275), it depends on what conception of human being is being used 
as a basis for framing the discussion. The framework that I developed in 
chapter three is one in which human being was a temporal construct, a being 
that manufactures itself out of the ‘nothing’ of the past and the future, in the 
‘nothing’ of the ‘now’. Whilst the biological machinery that performs this feat is 
physical, the ‘being’ that arises from this ‘doing’ is not: it is literally metaphysical. 
It is in this sense that the ‘nothingness’ that constitutes human being is an 
essential ‘something’ behind the ‘doing’. In this the manner of the existence of 
human being in time is especially important.
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche voices a sense of disgust that 
accompanies the self-contemplation of human being stripped of all meaning:
Where might one escape this veiled look, which leaves 
one with a deep feeling of sorrow as one walks away, that 
introspective look of the man deformed from the outset, a 
look which reveals the way in which such a man speaks to 
himself—that gaze which is a sigh! ‘I wish I were anyone 
else but myself!’ this gaze sighs: ‘but there is no hope of 
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162 Kantor interviewed by Bablet in the film The Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor (1991)
that. I am who I am: how could I escape from myself? And 
yet—I have had enough of myself!’…
(Nietzsche 1998: 101)
The sentiment here recalls the discussion in chapter seven concerning the 
comparison between Kafka’s hunger artist and the vibrant young panther: the 
public were dismayed by the apparition of the hunger artist and turned away to 
crowd around the cage of the new addition to the zoo. I argued there that 
Kantor’s self-display in his ‘poor little room of the imagination’ did not evoke 
such negativity. With Kantor there is no ‘sigh’. He has not ‘had enough of 
himself,’ but rather he has had enough of the painting he is sitting in. As Kantor 
grew nearer to death he would later change his mind about leaving ‘the 
painting’ to instead accept that he would remain within it.
In his 1922 poem The Waste Land, T. S. Eliot wrote: ‘And I will show you 
something different from either / Your shadow at morning striding behind you / 
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; / I will show you fear in a handful 
of dust’ (Eliot 1969: 61). Although Kantor shares and expresses a fear of 
oblivion, fear is not the primary element that his work displays even with the 
strong preoccupation with death evident in his late work. For Eliot, the shadow 
of death is striding in one direction only: death is a certain fate awaiting each 
individual. However, in Kantor’s work the sense is of a more convoluted but 
optimistic sense of time, one in which it is turned back upon itself in the manner 
of the figure in the I have had enough… painting. But, as with the framing of 
human being, the framework within which time is viewed makes all the 
difference. As Agamben observes in his essay on ‘Creation and Salvation’, in 
relation to a totality the normal sense of time is reversed: ‘what seems to follow 
is actually anterior. Salvation is not a remedy for the Fall of created beings but 
rather that which makes creation comprehensible, what give it its 
sense’ (Agamben 2011a: 3). In the economy of Divine Creation it is the ‘making 
sense’ of temporal existence that retrospectively constitutes its being. In a late 
piece of writing titled ‘Ocalić przed zapomnieniem’ (To Save From Oblivion, 
1988),163 Kantor conducts ‘a rigorous “inspection” of my combat unit / called / 
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163 In Kantor 2005b: 125–130 and Kobialka 2009: 389–393.
“individual human life”’, which, he declares, is ‘Too weak!’ (2009: 392). Kantor’s 
strategy for the battle between his individual self, and the world and death, is to 
recognise its frail individuality and ‘bring it now / onto the stage. / Show it to the 
public’ (Ibid.: 393). Kantor does not install himself as a performer but instead, by 
using poor fragments of his own life as ready-made objects for public display, 
he anatomises the reality of human being, which in its nothingness is, each in 
its own individuality, a collection of ready-made memories of experience. In their 
capacity to be remembered these fragments are saved and become, at least 
potentially, eternal. 
The world in which human being exists is indeed a ‘reality beyond reality’. 
The conscious awareness of memory may be an arbitrary manifestation of the 
evolutionary process, but it is nevertheless an immaterial world in which 
specifically human being has its dwelling. This stanza of being, the poetic and 
capacious dwelling place, is what Kantor characterises as memory, a plane of 
reality that is continually being destroyed and saved in individual and collective 
terms. Kantor’s ‘poor little room of the imagination’ is one poignant poetic 
instantiation that reveals the oikonomia of this reality. In his late poem ‘The 
Rock’ (1954), in the section entitled ‘The Poem as Icon’, Wallace Stevens 
writes: ‘Of the poem, the figuration of blessedness, / And the icon is the 
man’ (Stevens 1997: 446). If human being ‘was made in the image of God’ then 
truly its figure is an icon. But, when the transient presence of living human being 
gazes upon its icon, it is only the truth of the mystery that stares back. ‘We say 
God and the imagination are one …’ writes Stevens in his ‘Final Soliloquy’, but 
immediately qualifies this potential solution to Nietzsche’s nihilism of ‘God is 
dead’164 with the words ‘And how high that highest candle lights the dark’ (Ibid.: 
444). In his essay ‘Nudity’, on the idea of the nakedness of truth, Agamben 
observes that: ‘This simple dwelling of appearance in the absence of secrets is 
its special trembling—it is the nudity that, like the choirboy’s “white” voice, 
signifies nothing and, precisely for this reason, manages to penetrate 
us’ (Agamben 2011a: 90). As Agamben (2004a) also commented in an earlier 
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164 In The Gay Science Nietzsche writes: ʻGod is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed 
himʼ (Nietzsche 1974: 181).
work, Linnaeus’s anthropological machine is a mirror in which human being has 
to reflect on itself to create the possibilities for its own potential as human being. 
When humanity stares at its own iconicity it generates that possibility anew, and 
when Kantor ended his Milano Lessons with the words „o wszystkim pamiętać / 
i wszystko zapomnieć…” (Remember everything / and forget everything…)165 
he articulates this paradoxical nothingness of his mere being—the poetics of the 
naked bareness of being ‘even the thing that he is…’.
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APPENDIX
1.1 The 1st Exhibition of Modern Art
As the notes for the 2005 exhibition Tadeusz Kantor: Interior of Imagination at 
the Zachęta National Gallery in Warsaw explain:
The 1st Exhibition of Modern Art, organised with a great 
flourish by Tadeusz Kantor and Mieczysław Porębski at 
the end of 1948 in the Cracow Palace of Art, presented the 
latest works of 37 avant-garde artists from Poland. The 
exhibition was an attempt to rebuild the connection, 
severed by the war, with the international avant-garde, but 
this proved possible only to an extent. The experience of 
the war clearly influenced the dramatic nature of the 
exhibited works, which were intended to demonstrate a 
connection between contemporary art, in its scientific, 
technical, and social aspect, and life. In line with Kantor’s 
suggestion, Zbigniew Dłubak made, for the photomontage 
room, a series of large-size photographs showing the 
extraordinariness of everyday objects, the infinity and 
complexity of nature. Exhibited in the foyer, the 
magnifications of the mechanism of a watch, an x-ray 
photo of the human lungs, the firmament, and the cross 
section of a cabbage head were to prove that 
contemporary art and science had common horizons.
The exhibition was closed by the authorities in January 
1949, and all copies of the catalogue destroyed. In April 
that year, at the 4th General Congress of the Polish Fine 
Artists Association, preceded by the infamous council at 
Nieborów, socialist realism was decreed as the only 
allowed style in art. Kantor withdrew from the official 
artistic life and started working as a set designer. He did 
not direct until 1955.
(Julia Leopold, on the basis of the script for the exhibition 
Tadeusz Kantor: Interior of Imagination by Marek Świca 
and Jarosław Suchan)
Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz, commenting on the scientific tenor of the opening 
gallery to the 1948 exhibition notes that:
A letter to Bohdan Urbanowicz of October 9, 1948 
indicates that Kantor drew on his Paris experience in 
deciding that ‘the first (side) room will show living forms 
discovered by contemporary science (microscopic 
photographs—X-rays—cosmic rays—biology, 
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etc.)’ [Kantor, Letter of October 9, 1948, to Bohdan 
Urbanowicz, in: Chrobak (ed.), W kregu lat czterdziestych, 
vol. II, Cracow 1991, 10]. It was significant that such 
pictures filled the first room in an exhibit of modern art. 
Aside from the main exhibition of paintings, the last room 
also contained ten spatial models built by participants in 
the exhibition. This final element was, as Kantor put it, ‘a 
warehouse of forms outside the frames of the 
pictures’ [Kantor interviewed by Borowski 1982: 38].
(Pleśniarowicz 2004: 56)
1.2 Kantorʼs published statements on the formation of Cricot 2 and the 
idea of ʻautonomous theatreʼ
See Kantor 1955, 1956 and 1963 for contemporaneous published statements 
about the formation of Cricot 2 and the idea of ‘autonomous theatre’. It is not 
always possible to date Kantor’s previously unpublished texts, but see also 
‘Powstanie teatru Cricot 2. 1955’ (‘The Origin of Cricot 2 Theatre. 1955’) (Kantor 
2005a: 125–131), ‘Powstanie teatru Cricot 2. Rok 1955’ (‘The Origin of Cricot 2 
Theatre. The Year 1955’), (Kantor 2005a: 132–133) and ‘Partytura  „Mątwy” S. I. 
Witkiewicza. 1956’ (Kantor 2005a: 136–148, translated as ‘The Scuttle-fish’ [sic] 
by Andrzej and Grażyna Branny, unpublished manuscript, Kraków: Cricoteka 
Archive). See also ‘Teatr Autonomiczny (Manifest teatru zerowego)’ (‘The 
Autonomous Theatre (Zero Theatre Manifesto)’), (Kantor 2005a: 233–243, 
translated as ‘The Autonomous Theatre 1956/63’ in Kobialka 1993: 42–50).
1.3 Cricot 2 productions toured following Kantorʼs death
The Dead Class was toured by Kantor’s Cricot 2 company, along with his final 
production, Today is My Birthday, for two years after his death owing to 
contractual obligations. The final performance was in Brno in 1992 
(Pleśniarowicz 2004: 304). The importance of The Dead Class both for Kantor 
and his audience is shown by the fact that it was the only production other than 
Today is My Birthday that Kantor authorised to be performed after his death. All 
his other productions, in this sense, died with him.
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1.4 Nicholas Serota on Kantorʼs reception in Edinburgh and London
In his short essay ‘Tadeusz Kantor at the Whitechapel’, Nicholas Serota 
recollects that:
In both Edinburgh and London Kantor’s performances 
were received with enormous enthusiasm, presenting a 
European tradition of ‘physical’ theatre which would only 
find expression in England in the work of Simon McBurney 
and the Théâtre de Complicité in the late eighties and 
nineties. For a predominantly young audience Kantor’s 
performances were a powerful, highly charged and novel 
experience. In comparison with English theatre they were 
raucous, intense and psychologically complex in their 
juxtaposition of actors and life-sized mannequins overseen 
by the ever-present figure of the director himself.
(Nicholas Serota in: Suchan 2005: 122)
Serota’s preoccupation here, with Kantor’s performance work in a short essay 
ostensible discussing his presence as a contemporary ‘fine’ artist in the 
Whitechapel gallery serves to demonstrate the ‘theatrical’ bias in the way 
Kantor was perceived in the UK.
1.5 The video archive of Kantorʼs live work
The video record held by the Cricoteka archives, although invaluable is 
necessarily flawed partly because the collection consists of the films made in 
different ways and for different purposes. Some are records of live 
performances and these vary wildly because sometimes the strategy has been 
to shoot the whole performance area in a long shot, which is by far the better 
approach in my view as one has a sense of the performance within the whole 
space. In other recordings, the director and/or camera operator have tried to be 
more ‘creative’ and filmed close-ups that are then edited together. What is 
gained in terms of detail is lost in terms of the composition as a whole. Of 
course, any recording of a live event is of necessity partial.
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1.6 Kantorʼs theatrical objects and their ʻsecond lifeʼ as art objects in 
gallery exhibitions
Since Kantor’s death exhibitions organised by his archive, the Cricoteka, have 
tended to feature his theatrical objects, costumes and set reconstructions 
together with drawings and sketches for productions rather than his paintings or 
other non-theatrical artworks. For example, see the exhibition catalogues: 
Pleśniarowicz, Krzysztof (ed.) (1994b) Tadeusz Kantor „Powrót Odysa.” 
Podziemny Teatr Niezależny/“The Return of Odysseus.” The Clandestine 
Independent Theatre 1944, Kraków: Cricoteka, and Pleśniarowicz, Krzysztof 
(ed.) (1999) Tadeusz Kantor. Klisze pamięci (‘Tadeusz Kantor. Negatives of 
Memory’), Kopenhagen: Rundetaarn. Even the exhibitions in Warsaw (2005), 
Tadeusz Kantor. Interior of Imagination (Suchan 2005: 126–137) and Norwich 
(2009), An Impossible Journey: The Art of Tadeusz Kantor, featured entire 
rooms devoted to Kantor’s ‘Theatre of Memory’ (Murawska-Muthesius and 
Zarzecka 2011:112–116).
1.7 Material concerning Wielopole, Wielopole in Kantor 1984 and Kantor 
1990 compared with that in Kantor 2004.
As Pleśniarowicz (2004: 232, fn. 596) comments in his editorial notes to the 
second volume of Kantor’s writings, fragments of Kantor’s partytura text are 
omitted in Kantor 1990. In addition to the partytura, the English publication 
includes an edited selection of Kantor’s production and rehearsal notes and 
other selected short essays. As Pleśniarowicz observes that this English version 
‘proved to be a more modest selection of texts published earlier in Italy and 
Poland, consisting only of: Sytuacja artysty [The Situation of the Artist], Dzieło i 
proces [Artwork and Process], Spirytualizm i uduchowienie [Spiritualism and 
Spirituality], Cudowność realności [Miraculous Reality]—combined with arbitrary 
essays from Miejsce teatralne [Theatrical Place] in one chapter title bearing little 
relation to Kantor, ‘The Artist and the Theatre’ (in Kantor 2004: 483; italics in 
original; my translation). (In fact this list is not entirely accurate as detailed 
below.) Whereas in the Polish 1984 edition the partytura is sandwiched 
between two complete collections of Kantor’s essays, Teksty autonomiczne 
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(Autonomous Texts) and Miejsce teatralne (Theatrical Place) the texts in Hyde’s 
and Tchorek’s edition are placed at the end of the book following the partytura. 
They are grouped into two sections under the editors’ own (i.e. not Kantor’s) 
titles of ‘Director’s Notes on Rehearsals’ and ‘The Artist and the Theatre’. 
Individual parts from Teksty Autonomiczne are split between these two sections 
and parts of Miejsce teatralne are also inlcluded in the second. Hyde’s and 
Tchorek’s publication of Wielopole, Wielopole is curiously subtitled ‘an exercise 
in theatre’. Given his strong views against theatre, it seems unlikely that Kantor 
would have approved of such a description, which does not occur in the 1984 or 
2004 Polish publications. Hyde gives an entertaining and colourful account of 
working on this translation with Tchorek in Norwich in his contribution to the 
book Kantor Was Here (Murawska-Muthesius and Zarzecka 2011: 101–111, see 
especial p.106).
1.8 Kantor and Grotowski
Kantor was famously rude about Jerzy Grotowski, calling him ‘that thief!’ (see 
Pleśniarowicz 2004: 43). There is no real comparison between Grotowski’s 
‘Poor Theatre’ and Kantor’s aesthetic of ‘poor reality’ although Teemu 
Paavolainen (2011) discusses the difference at length in his recent thesis. 
Eugenio Barba describes how he was once rebuffed by Kantor when the artist 
learned that Barba was working with Grotowski (Barba 1999: 43n). Of course, 
Grotowski’s international fame as a theatre director preceded Kantor’s.
1.9 Information given on the cover and title page of Kobialkaʼs A Journey 
Through Other Spaces (1993) 
The titling of Kobialka’s 1993 book is curious. The front cover and title page 
read: ‘A Journey Through Other Spaces / Essays and Manifestos 1944–1990 
Tadeusz Kantor / Edited and Translated by Michal Kobialka / with a Critical 
Study of Tadeusz Kantor’s Theatre by Michal Kobialka’. The spine is headed by 
both writers names in the form ‘Kantor / Kobialka’ at right-angles to the length of 
the spine, with the title A Journey Through Other Spaces / Essays and 
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Manifestos 1944–1990 running at right angles to this along the length of the 
spine in the normal manner underneath. There is therefore some ambiguity 
whether this is to be seen as a book by Kantor or Kobialka and it has been 
referenced in both ways. Given that almost a third of the book consists of 
Kobialka’s essays and scholarly apparatus, and that Kantor’s writings have 
been translated and ‘invisibly’ abridged and stitched together by the later author, 
I have taken the decision to treat this as a book unequivocally ‘by’ Kobialka. As I 
note above, the 2009 book eschews this ambiguity entirely and I understand 
that the Polish edition to be shortly published by the Cricoteka will be in the 
same format, despite Pleśniarowicz’s definitive edition of Kantor’s writings 
already being separately in print.
1.10 The Partitioning of Poland
The partitioning of the First Polish Republic was effected by its neighbours 
Prussia, Austria and Russia in three stages, in 1773, 1793 and 1795. According 
to the historian Norman Davies this ‘was without precedent in modern European 
History. […] Poland was the victim of political vivisection—by mutilation, 
amputation, and in the end total dismemberment; and the only excuse given 
was that the patient had not been feeling well’ (Davies 2005: 387). The official 
reason for partition was that Poland, ‘The Republic of Anarchy’, was incapable 
of governing itself. As Davies states the ‘developments of the Partition period 
can never properly be understood unless it is realised that Poland’s internal 
troubles were systematically promoted by her more powerful 
neighbours’ (Davies 2005: 388).
1.11 Czesław Miłoszʼs account of Wyspiańskiʼs straw man
As the Polish poet Czesław Miłosz in his history of Polish literature describes 
Wyspiański’s scene:
The personified mulch takes over as a kind of maestro, 
and the play ends as the company begins a somnambulic 
dance under the spell of the straw man and his fiddle. 
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[ … ] there are two groups of characters: ‘living persons’ 
and ‘persons of the drama’ (i.e., the embodied dreams and 
desires of the wedding guests). Viewed as a whole, the 
play offers a pitilessly exposed cross section of Polish 
society that is touched by a strange paralysis of the will ….
(Miłosz 1983: 356)
1.12 Kantor and Tintin: an unexplored relationship
It is surely obvious to many that Wacław and Leszek Janiccy, the identical twins 
that performed in many of Kantor’s productions, are strikingly reminiscent of the 
bungling detectives Thomson and Thompson, characters who first appeared in 
Hergé’s Tintin adventures in Cigars of the Pharaoh (1934). I have been unable 
to find any evidence whether Kantor was familiar with the Tintin books, 
however, there are other intriguing potential links between Kantor’s work and 
the world of Tintin. In The Adventures of Tintin in the Land of the Soviets (1999, 
originally published in French in 1930), an entire frame appears at the bottom of 
page 106 as simply a black square, unmistakably reminiscent of Malevich's 
1915 painting Black Square. In the same adventure, on pages 29–30 Tintin 
discovers a fake factory, exclaiming: 'Great snakes! ... Just stage effects! ... 
They're simply burning bundles of straw to make smoke come out of false 
chimneys!' (p. 30). As Tintin says this he is peering through the 'factory' door 
and sees that it is just stage flats propped up by wooden struts, a revelation that 
seems comparable to Kantor’s critique of the ‘Winter Palace of illusion’ in his 
Theatrical Space writings (Kantor 2009c: 337). In The Blue Lotus (1990, 
originally published in French in 1936) on pages 48–49 a would-be assassin 
masquerading as a photographer attempts to kill Tintin and his friend Chang 
with a machine-gun disguised as a camera (‘Infernal machine! My tommy-gun 
jammed!…’). The camera-machine-gun featured in Wielopole, Wielopole is 
strikingly similar. Finally, Hergé’s last and unfinished story, Tintin and Alph-Art 
(2004, originally published in French in 1986), is left with Tintin about to be 
murdered by being turned into a work of art in the style of the fictional modern 
sculptor César ‘the master of compressionism [and] expansionism […] we’re 
going to pour liquid polyester over you; you’ll become an expansion signed by 
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César and then authenticated by a well-known expert’ (2004: 48). In its playful 
and knowledgeable engagement with the contemporary art world, Hergé’s story 
seems itself reminiscent of Kantor’s Multipart experiment, in which multiple 
canvases had umbrellas crushed onto them, were then plasticised and 
authenticated as works of art before being contracted out to their buyers for 
further alteration. However, it also seems to point the way towards the last 
phase of Kantor’s work, in which he became a part of his own art.
1.13 The Polish text of Raczekʼs 1982 Polityka essay
Ów postulat dotykalności, fizycznego kontaktu z dziełem 
doprowadził Kantora do konieczności wlączenia w 
artystyczne diałanie … samego siebie. W spektaklach 
teatru „Cricot-2” Kantor gra rolę nieco satanicznego 
Dyrygenta-Demiurga, wprawiającego w ruch wykreowany 
świat marionet i nadmarionet. Niczym Craig pragnie on 
posiadiać władzę nad każdym gestem i każdą sekundą 
dziełania swoich aktorów. Przesuwa się wśród nich cicho, 
w napięciu, śledząc uważnie każdy ruch. Władczym 
gestem dłoni, konwulsyjnym zgięciem palców nadaje 
tempo, kierunek, nastrój kolejnym scenom w swym 
teatrze. Kantor nie jest w nim aktorem. Jest dalej i 
konsekwentnie twórcą, a jednak nie mógł uniknąć 
konieczności swej cielesnej obecności. Od czasu do 
czasu przesuwa jakiś rekwizyt, poprawia, składa, 
rozkłada, podaje. Sprawia, że tego teatru nie da się 
„wystawić” gdzie indziej, w innej „inscenizacji”, bez niego.
In his essay, Żurowski renders the translation of this passage entirely in italics, 
seemingly to further emphasise Raczek’s characterisation of Kantor’s on-stage 
presence.
1.14 Polish text of the reason Kantor was awarded the Rembrandt Prize
The Polish description of the reason for the award reads: ‘rzeczywisty wkład w 
kształtowanie obrazu sztuki naszej epoki’, from Chrobak et al. Tadeusz Kantor 
Kalendarium (2005: 148), pdf file published as an integral part of the exhibition 
catalogue Tadeusz Kantor. Interior of imagination (Suchan and Świca 2005).
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1.15 Orson Welles and Anthony Perkins on The Trial
Welles also commented: ‘He [Joseph K.] is a little bureaucrat. I consider him 
guilty . . . He belongs to a guilty society; he collaborates with it.’ (This and the 
Perkins quotation found at: http://victorian.fortunecity.com/vermeer/287/
interpretations.htm, accessed 12/7/11). Welles did not agree with Kafka’s 
rendering of the end of Josef K.’s life in the book version in which the 
protagonist dies ‘like a dog’. He argued in an interview with Hugh Weldon on the 
BBC in 1962:
To me that ending is a ballet written by a Jewish 
intellectual before the advent of Hitler. Kafka wouldn't have 
put that in after the death of six million Jews. It all seems 
very much pre-Auschwitz to me. I don't mean that my 
ending was a particularly good one, but it was the only 
possible solution. I had to step up the pace, if only for a 
few moments.
(http://www.wellesnet.com/trial%20bbc%20interview.htm, 
accessed 12/7/11)
1.16 Kantor and Edward Gordon Craig
During 1980, whilst Kantor and the rest of the company travelled to Florence to 
create Wielopole, Wielopole, Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz remained behind to 
oversee the setting up of the first Cricoteka archive in Kraków (see the section 
titled ‘The Cricotheque’ on last page of the 1980 programme for this production, 
Kantor 1980). He told me, in conversation, that Kantor had been very explicit 
about where he had wanted to work in Florence: he wanted (and was granted 
by the Florentine municipal authorities) working space in a deconsecrated 
convent at via Santa Maria 25, near to where Craig had stayed when he had 
lived in Florence. This link with Craig had, according to Pleśniarowicz, been 
very important for Kantor. (See also Chrobak and Zarzecka (eds) 2007a for 
further material on Kantor in Florence.) 
1.17 Unpublished anonymous translation of a section of Kantorʼs ʻAfter 
the War: A Night Notebook or Metamorphoses (1947–1948)ʼ
An earlier unpublished anonymous translation in the Cricoteka archives follows 
the format given in volume one of Pisma reads:
… space is not a passive c o n t a i n e r ,
in which objects and forms are placed …
SPACE is in itself the SUBJECT of creation.
The main subject!
SPACE loaded with ENERGY.
Space which shrinks and e x p a n d s .
These peculiar movements shape forms and objects.
Space GIVES BIRTH to forms!
[…]
The human figure is shaped on the border area of a live, 
suffering organism and
a mechanism
functioning automatically and absurdly.
Prevalent [in this kind of space] are the laws of 
metamorphosis.
The human figure undergoes
Transformation,
expansion,
transplantation,
and cross-breeding.
1.18 The reality of occupation as portrayed in Polanskiʼs The Pianist
This reality is vividly portrayed in Roman Polanski’s film The Pianist (2002). 
Polanski was himself a survivor of the Jewish ghetto in Podgórze, Kraków. 
Steven Spielberg had invited Polanski to direct the film version of Thomas 
Keneally’s novel Schindler’s Ark (released in 1993 as Schindler’s List), but 
Polanski had declined. He apparently felt more able to tackle The Pianist set, as 
it is, in and around the Warsaw ghetto as this afforded some distance from his 
own experience. Nevertheless, the scenes of brutal and random murder are 
realised with a certain chilling matter-of-factness that strongly suggests that 
they are based on Polanski’s actual experience of such events. Writing in his 
review of the film for New York magazine Peter Rainer comments:
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The Pianist is based on the memoirs of Polish musician 
Wladyslaw Szpilman, who survived the Warsaw ghetto, 
and it’s Roman Polanski’s strongest and most personally 
felt movie. This should not come as a great surprise, since 
as a child Polanski survived the Kraków ghetto and lost 
family members in the Holocaust. The real surprise is that 
the horrors on display in The Pianist are presented matter-
of-factly—which of course makes them seem even more 
horrific. We are not accustomed to such reserve in a 
movie about the Holocaust, and especially not in a 
Polanski movie, where the violence has often been close 
to Grand Guignol. But in this film he is trying to be 
devastatingly true to his emotions, and so there is no need 
for hyperbole. At times, the tension between the 
unwavering directness of his technique and the anguish 
that is behind it is almost unbearable. When we see a Nazi 
soldier casually shoot a Jewish girl in the head for asking 
an innocent question, or when we see soldiers throw an 
old man in a wheelchair over a balcony, we are staring into 
an everyday inferno.
(Rainer 2003: n.p.)
In his perceptive and sensitive review of the film Clive James favourably 
compares Polanski’s film to Spielberg’s more sentimental and ‘uplifting’ 
Schindler’s List:
The story of The Pianist was about just one man being 
saved by a sheer fluke while everyone else was murdered. 
Here was a narrative much more congruent with 
Polanski’s view, and he was able to bring all his 
unsentimental skill to making the most of it on screen.
(James 2005: n.p.)
1.19 Transcription from Kantorʼs address at the Cricoteka, December 
1987:
a) Extract 1
The transcription of this passage from the event (the occasion for which was an 
audience held by Kantor at the Cricoteka in December 1987 on the occasion of 
Wyspiański's jubilee) in the original Polish reads:
przez największe poniżenie, przez dojście do dna, chcę 
uzyskać ten pułap wielki. To zresztą […] w ‘Wielopolu’, […] 
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w tej małej izbie podnosi się pułap tej izby poprzez 
ewangelię. To znaczy że to wszystkie typy z mojej rodziny, 
[…] niezbyt przeze mnie ocenione, raczej niskiej kategorii, 
nagle podnoszą się, ponieważ zaczynają wchodzić na 
teren ewangelii.
(Kantor 1987:10)
b) Extract 2 
The original Polish reads:
jest jedną z czołowych wartości, że uzyskujemy wielkość
—poprzez poniżenie […] przez największe poniżenie, 
przez dojście do dna, chcę uzyskać ten pułap wielki. […] 
Mnie chodzi o to pojęcie wielkości […] nie mieści się w 
formie. I Kazimierz Wielki—największy wzlot potęgi 
polskiej—został przedstawiony przez Wyspiańskiego jako
—kościotrup, szkielet, z resztkami świetności—korona, 
berłe, jabłko. To jest wspaniały pomysł, to jest genialny 
pomysł. […] Kiedy zacząłem robić ‘Umarłą klasę’, […] to 
ten projekt witrażu był dla mnie takim potwierdzeniem, że 
wielkość uzyskuje się przez poniżenie kompletne.
(Kantor 1987: 10–11)
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1.20 My translation of Kantorʼs partytura for An Anatomy Lesson 
According to Rembrandt (1968)
An Anatomy Lesson According to Rembrandt was realised several times as 
stated in the translated passage. As well as the sources cited above, fragments 
of the Polish text have been published in Grammatica 3 (1969). There is an 
English translation by Charles S. Kraszewski in his unpublished manuscript 
‘Collected Theatrical Works and Happenings’ in the Cricoteka archival collection 
(pp. 437–40), and more recently, an English translation was published in the 
book accompanying the 2005 exhibition in Vienna and Warsaw: The Impossible 
Theatre: Performativity in the Works of Pawel Althamer, Tadeusz Kantor, 
Katarzyna Kozyra, Robert Kusmirowski and Artur Zmijewski (Wroblewska et al 
2006, p. 109). The happening was filmed: edited fragments can be seen in the 
film Kantor ist da: Die Künstler und Seine Welt (Kantor is Here: The Artist and 
His World), directed by Dietrich Mahlow (1969), which is available on a DVD 
included with Schorlemmer 2007 and also in the collection of DVDs The 
Theatre of Tadeusz Kantor available from Andrzej Białko (abialko@op.pl). I am 
grateful for the assistance of Elżbieta Kaproń, Tomasz Macios and Professor 
Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz in making the translation of Kantor’s partytura.
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AN ANATOMY LESSON ACCORDING TO REMBRANDT (TRANSLATION OF 
PARTYTURA)
Lekcja anatomii wedle Rembrandta
/partytura Happeningu/
[Happening realizowany kikakrotnie: w Kunsthalle w 
Norymberdze (1968), w Galerii Foksal w Warszawie (1969), w 
Dourdan pod Paryżem (wrzesień 1971), w Henri Onstad 
Kunstsenter w Oslo (październik 1971). Trwał ok. 1 godziny.]
wystarczy zrobić tylko pierwszy krok,
odważyć się coś oddzielić,
aby odkryć nagle nowy wewnętrzny świat:
podszewka!
górna warstwa!
odcinam,
środkową!
a oto dolna!
oddzielam jedną warstwę od drugiej,
teraz natrafiamy na cienki pokład waty,
który w tym miejscu przechodzi w wyraźne zgrubienia,
uwaga!
wewnętrzna kieszeń!
zapięta!
odcinam,
proszę zwrócić uwagę na te interesujące szczegóły:
guziki!
dziurki!
haftki!
zatrzaski!
agrafki!
klamerki!
które w ten cały organizm usiłują wprowadzić porządek,
pozapinać,
usztywnić,
nadać sylwetkę i formę,
stworzyć styl.
I oto jesteśmy już na antypodach ubioru!
kieszienie!
mnóstwo kieszeni!
nie dajmy się zmylić konwencjonalnym
i nic nieznaczącym pozorom,
popatrzmy na nie z boku,
pod innym kątem
albo od środka,
w żałosnym stanie utraconej pozycji,
kiedy zwisają, kiedy nie możemy już w nie wsadzić rąk,
zastanówmy się co właściwie oznaczają
te szczególne schowki,
intymne i dwuznaczne zaułki,
spoufalone i totumfackie,
przewrotne i anonimowe,
nie obawiajmy się śmiałych określeń:
to są po prostu zwyczajne t o r b y !
nie miejmy złudzeń!
wsadza się w nie wszystko, lub prawie wszystko!
obgryzione ołówki
Anatomy Lesson According to Rembrandt
score of the Happening
(The Happening was realised several times: in the Kunsthalle in 
Nuremberg (1968), in the Foksal Gallery in Warsaw (1969), in 
Dourdan near Paris (September 1971), and in Henri Onstad Art 
Centre in Oslo (October 1971). Duration about 1 hour.)
it is enough just to take the first step,
to dare to separate something,
in order to discover abruptly a new interior world:
linings!
the outer layer!
I sever,
the middle!
and here is the bottom one!
I separate layers one from another,
now we meet the thin cotton padding,
which passes here to a distinct swelling,
attention!
internal pocket!
buttoned-up!
I cut,
please take note of these interesting details:
buttons!
button-holes!
hooks and eyes!
press-studs!
safety pins!
clasps!
each of which tries to introduce order in this whole organism,
to fasten up,
to stiffen,
to confer a profile and a form,
to create a style.
And already we are in the antipodes of clothing!
pockets!
lots of pockets!
let us not be tricked by conventional
or insignificant outward appearance,
let us look without prejudice,
from different angles,
or from the inside,
in the piteous state of dislocation
when they hang down, when we are now unable to insert our 
hands,
we puzzle over what these special
compartments actually mean,
these intimate and ambiguous dead ends,
familiar and confiding,
perverse and anonymous,
let us not fear bold expressions:
these are quite simply ordinary b a g s !
let us not be under any illusions!
one inserts into them everything, or else nearly everything!
gnawed pencils
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szczoteczki do zębów
resztki tytoniu
pogniecione papierosy
zapałki
kulki chleba
banknoty
paszporty
zdjęcia rodzinne
zdjęcia kochanek
zdjęcia dzieci
zdjęcia pornograficzne
bilety do kina
bilety tramwajowe
bilety do metra
tabletki aspiryny
prezerwatywy
witaminy
chustki do nosa
papierowy serwetki
papiery urzędowe
rachunki kelnerów
ukradzione łyżeczki
urwane guziki
scyzoryki
noże
I pistolety
oto jest interesująca treść i zawartość
tych intymnych schowków
i ukrytych melin,
oto prawdziwa,
nie sfałszowana strona
indywidualności,
zapomniane resztki,
wstydliwe odpadki,
zmięte i pogniecione
k i e s z e n i e !
śmieszne organy
ludzkiego
instynktu
przechowywania
i pamięci!
koniec z tzw. partycypacją!
Sources: Tadeusz Kantor, Pisma, edited by Krzysztof 
Pleśniarowicz, 3 vols (Wrocław and Kraków: Ossolineum and 
Cricoteka, 2004-2005), I (2004), p. 356 (for details of 
performances); Kantor, Ambalaże (Warsaw: Galeria Foksal, 
1976), p. 26 (for title, main text and layout); Tadeusz Kantor: Z 
Archiwum Galerii Foksal, edited by Małgorzata Jurkiewicz, 
Joanna Mytkowska, and Andrzej Przywara (Warsaw: Fundacja 
Galerii Foksal, 1998), p. 187 (for graffiti in photograph of final 
installation).
toothbrushes
leftover tobacco
crumpled cigarettes
matches
crumbs of bread
banknotes
passports
pictures of family
pictures of a lover
pictures of children
pornographic pictures
cinema tickets
tram tickets
metro tickets
aspirin tablets
condoms
vitamin tablets
handkerchiefs
paper napkins
official papers
waiters’ bills
stolen teaspoons
loose buttons
penknives
knives 
and guns
this is the interesting contents and stuffing of
these intimate hiding places
and secret repositories,
this is the genuine,
authentic side of
individuality,
the forgotten leftovers,
the shameful litter,
these wrinkled and crushed
p o c k e t s !
ridiculous organs of
human
instincts
given for preservation
and memory!
the so-called participation is over!
The final line is a translation of the graffiti scrawled on the gallery 
wall next to the final installation of mounted clothing (see 
photographs in Tadeusz Kantor: Z Archiwum Galerii Foksal, p. 
197).
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1.21 Primo Leviʼs account of the ʻSpecial Squadsʼ at Auschwitz
In his book The Drowned and the Saved (1989) Levi recounts that:
An extreme case of collaboration is represented by the 
Sonderkommandos of Auschwitz and the other 
extermination camps. Here one hesitates to speak of 
privilege: whoever belonged to this group was privileged 
only to the extent that—but at what cost—he had enough 
to eat for a few months, certainly not because he could be 
envied. With this duly vague definition, ‘Special Squad’, 
the SS referred to the group of prisoners who were 
entrusted with the running of the crematoria. It was their 
task to maintain order among the new arrivals (often 
completely unaware of the destiny awaiting them) who 
must be sent into the gas chambers; to extract the corpses 
from the chambers, pull gold teeth from jaws, cut the 
women’s hair, sort and classify clothes, shoes, and the 
contents of the luggage; transport the bodies to the 
crematoria and oversee the operation of the ovens; extract 
and eliminate the ashes.
(Levi 1989: 34)
To ensure that they would not be able to speak of what they had seen, Levi 
reports, these groups were allowed to operate for only a few months before they 
were themselves exterminated. ‘[A]s its initiation the next squad burnt the 
corpses of its predecessors.’ In all, twelve squads operated during the life of 
Auschwitz (ibid.).
1.22 The problem of dating ʻKlasa szkolnaʼ
In Kantor 2004 the title of this piece has the words ‘Rok 1971 lub 72. Nad 
Morzem’ (The year 1971 or 1972. At the seaside) appended to it in square 
brackets. These words are the first words of the essay as given in the collected 
writings, and it could easily be construed that they are conjectures as to its date 
of composition. Kobialka (2009), in the presentation of his translation of this 
essay, could also be interpreted as giving the date of composition as 
‘1971/1972’. However, in Kantor 1995, in which a facsimile of the original 
typescript is given facing William Brand’s translation, there is an additional page 
of text bearing the title ‘Klasa szkolna’ with a date of composition of 1982. This 
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text does not appear in the complete works or Kobialka’s translations. In both 
these pieces of writing, therefore, Kantor seems to refer to his installation Klasa 
Szkolna: Dzieło zamknięte (The Classroom: A Closed Work), first exhibited in 
1982–3, and because of this it would seem that 1982 is the more likely date of 
composition of a piece reflecting on the memory of an event experienced in 
1971 or 1972.
1.23 The similarity of the mannequins in The Machine of Love and Death 
to figures in Bauhaus, Futurist and Constructivist art.
The mannequins featured in the first half of The Machine of Love and Death 
(constructed according to Kantor’s design by Eugeniusz Bakalarz) recall the 
design of some of those used in the Bauhaus stage experiments, but also 
mannequin-like figures that occur in much Futurist and Constructivist art. For 
example, see Rodchenko’s White Non-Objective Sculpture 1918 (reproduced in 
Lodder 1983: 23, plate 1.23), which seems to point towards Kantor’s 
mechanical puppets of the Queen’s three messengers in part 1, the figures in 
Varvara Stepanova’s 1920 paintings Dancing Forms on a White Background 
and The Red Room (reproduced in Tupitsyn 2009: 78, 79); or Agli Sassu’s 
Futurist drawings from 1927–1929 such as Il palancino, Guerrieri, Uomo che 
cammina, L’uomo meccanico, and La fucina (reproduced in Sassu 1999: 39, 55, 
68, 69, 83).
1.24 The 1920s Bauhausbücher
In the 1920s Albert Langen Verlag did indeed publish a series of 
Bauhausbücher in beautiful minimalist hardback yellow covers. Pleśniarowicz 
(2004: 26) suggests that the book Kantor was referring to was Oskar 
Schlemmer’s Die Bühne im Bauhaus (The Theatre of the Bauhaus, 1925), 
which was Bauhausbücher number 4 in the series. However, this volume, 
although it contains writings by Farkas Molnár, Gropius, Moholy-Nagy and 
Schlemmer, does not contain anything by Paul Klee, who was the author of the 
second volume in the series Pädagogisches Skizzenbuch (Pedagogical 
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Notebooks), published in 1925. Perhaps Kantor’s ‘little yellow book’ stands for 
more than one of these volumes. After all, other volumes would also have been 
of interest to Kantor: Piet Mondrian’s Neue Gestaltung. Neoplastizismus (New 
Design: Neoplasticism, 1925), Theo Van Doesburg’s Grundbegriffe der neuen 
gestaltenden Kunst (Basic Concepts of the New Creative Arts, 1924), Wassily 
Kandinsky’s Punkt und Linie zur Fläche. Beitrag zur Analyse der malerischen 
Elemente (Point, Line and Plane: Contribution to the Analysis of Pictorial 
Elements, 1926), Malevich’s Die gegenstandslose Welt (The Nonobjective 
World, 1927) and Albert Gleizes’ Kubismus (Cubism 1928) were all published in 
this influential series.
1.25 Original Polish text for extract from Lesson 3 of The Milano Lessons
Tradycja malarstwa rozpoczynająca się od Renesansu i 
od
zastosowania optycznych praw perspektywy znalazła w 
obrazie
jedną tylko przestrzeń obowiązującą w polu całego 
obrazu.
NAPIĘCIE tworzyło się dzięki właśnie tym prawom 
perspektywy
i jednolitej, jednej przestrzeni.
ABSTRAKCJA odkryła i stosowała prawa WIELO-
PRZESTRZENI
(jest to moja interpretacja nowej przestrzeni). 
(Kantor 1991b: 33)
Note: Kobialka (1993: 218) translates ‘wielo-przestrzeni’ as ‘hyperspace’, for 
which there seems little justification. Indeed it obscures the link with the idea of 
multiple, reverse-hierarchical spaces in discussed by Antonova that 
characterise many icons.
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1.26 Samuel Y. Edgerton Jr.ʻs discussion of Brunelleschiʼs ʻreversedʼ 
visual pyramid
Samuel Y. Edgerton, Jr., in his book The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear 
Perspective, describes Brunelleschi’s experimental set-up with the mirror and 
argues that:
Brunelleschi could have concluded that the visual pyramid 
was actually reversed in the mirror; the apex—his eyes—
of the first pyramid on the viewer’s side of the mirror was 
connected by the visual axis and cathetus to the apex of 
the second pyramid as reflected in reverse. The apex on 
the mirror side also marked the centric vanishing point. 
Brunelleschi would thus have come upon the fundamental 
logic of what came to be known as ‘one-point’ or frontal 
perspective.
(Edgerton 1975: 136–137; emphasis in original)
According to Edgerton’s glossary, the term cathetus is defined as a virtual 
extension of the visual axis into mirror-space as follows: ‘In medieval optics 
(catoptrics), the imaginary line from the point of an object’s reflection in the 
mirror, into the mirror’s virtual space, to the apparent position of the object’s 
reflection itself’ (Ibid.: 195).
1.27 Antonovaʼs proposed new definition of ʻreverse perspectiveʼ
In her book Antonova proposes a new definition of ‘reverse perspective’ as ‘the 
simultaneous representation of different planes of the same image on the 
picture surface, regardless of whether the corresponding planes in the 
represented objects could be seen from a single viewpoint’ (Antonova 2010: 
105; emphasis in original). Her definition derives from Florensky’s discussion of 
‘supplementary planes’ in his 1920 essay ‘Reverse Perspective’, to be 
discussed below. This phenomenon was later also discussed by the artist Lev 
Zhegin and the writer Boris Uspensky in work published in the early 1970s, and 
according to Antonova, the idea ‘constitutes a genuine contribution to the theory 
of “reverse perspective”’ that has so far remained unexploited (Ibid.). Antonova’s 
argument is persuasive in the sense that the idea of ‘simultaneous planes’ 
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constitute a more accurate description of the reality presented in icons than the 
implications of the term ‘reverse perspective’ would tend to suggest, that is, as a 
simple reversal of the laws of linear and optical perspective. However, whilst 
this is true, the new definition is used specifically by Antonova to discuss the 
icon’s articulation of the perspective of God, who, being outside time, enjoys all 
perspectives simultaneously. What her view neglects is the sense of the 
performativity of icons, in which the ‘reversal’ rather concerns the reversal of the 
normative relationship between artwork and spectator inherent in linear and 
optical perspective as opposed to the dynamic sense of dialogue that is 
inherent in icon art.
1.28 MIKhIM and VKhUTEMAS
MIKhIM is the acronym for the Moskovskii institut istoriko-khudozhestvennykh 
izyskanii i muzeevedeniia (Moscow Institute of Historical and Artistic 
Researches and Museology), (Florensky 2002: 10).
VKhUTEMAS is the acronym for Vysshie gosudarstvennye khudozhestvenno-
tekhnicheskie masterskie (Higher State Artistic and Technical Workshops), the 
Russian state art and technical school founded in 1920 in Moscow, and in many 
ways the Russian equivalent of the Bauhaus in Germany. VKhUTEMAS was a 
centre for the avant-garde and was associated with Suprematism and 
Constructivism. Malevich taught there from 1925, but had exhibited there as 
early as 1921. Key figures from the Russian avant-garde were on the teaching 
staff such as: Aleksandra Ekster, Gustav Klutsis, Ivan Klyun, El Lissitzky, Liubov 
Popova and Alexander Rodchenko (Lodder 1983: Chapter 4, 109–140).
1.29 The Planty
The Planty is a strip of parkland that encircles the centre of Kraków, occupying 
the area of the original city walls. It loops around the old town from the area just 
below Wawel Castle. It is a tree-lined network of pathways with benches and 
the German ‘megaphones’, or rather loudspeakers, that Kantor refers to would 
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have been mounted in the trees to broadcast official public announcements 
around the city.
1.30 Polish text from ‘The Essential Meaning of the Theatre’ in Theatrical 
Place 
ISTOTNY SENS TEATRU
Te a t r —twierdzę w dalszym ciągu—j e s t  m i e j s c e m 
o d s ł a n i a j ą c y m ,  j a k  j a k i e ś  t a j n e  
r z e c z n e  b r o d y , ś l a d y  „p r z e j ś c i a ” z  
„t a m t e j  s t r o n y ” d o  n a s z e g o  ż y c i a .
Przed oczyma widzów staje AKTOR, przyjmując kondycję 
UMARŁEGO. Spektakl, zbliżony w swym charakterze do 
obrzędu i ceremonii, staje się operacją w s t r z ą s u . 
Nazywam go chętnie m e t a f i z i c z n y m .
(Kantor 2004: 387)
1.31 The venue of the first performance of The Dead Class
The classroom of The Dead Class was originally installed in a corner of one of 
the cellars of the Krzysztofory mansion on the corner of Kraków’s main square 
and Szczepańska Street. This is the location of the performance filmed by 
Andrzej Wajda in 1976 and is the most widely seen film version.
1.32 New scientific perspectives and twentieth-century Phenomenology
The new scientific conceptions of the nature of living things were not only of 
interest to Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty, in his 1950s lecture course on Nature 
refers to Uexküll along with the theories of other influential biologists such as 
George Ellet Coghill, whose Anatomy and the Problem of Behaviour (1926) had 
been influential in Gestalt psychology. These new conceptions were of interest 
to phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty because of their non-
mechanical, anti-Cartesian and anti-dualistic conceptualisation of nature and 
the living creature. These philosophers found the naturalists’ work useful in their 
argument with the views of the mechanistic school of Behaviourism which was 
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prevailing at the time (See: Merleau-Ponty 2003: 140–5 and 167–178). For a 
further discussion of Heidegger’s use of Uexküll in relation to Rilke and the 
‘open’ see Agamben 2004a.
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